ISSN 1822-5543

IISEPS NEWS

Analytical Bulletin of Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies

N 1 (75)	www.iiseps.org; iiseps@iiseps.org	MARCH 2015

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Dear readers!

In the latest issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" we offer to your attention materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute researches in the first quarter of 2015.

Our researches demonstrate that the fear of total destabilization, which emerged under the influence of the events in Ukraine and overshadowed the reality for millions of Belarusians, gradually disappears. First of all, it is noticeable in their financial well-being: the number of those, whose financial well-being had improved, significantly dropped, while the number of those, whose financial well-being worsened, increased. Also more people think that Belarusian economy is in crisis. The average per capita income (including salaries, pensions, social benefits and other incomes) continues to decrease. Among the most acute issues, which our country and its citizens face nowadays, are price hike, production decline, unemployment and impoverishment of people. Despite the affirmations of the power, over 80% of Belarusians fear another devaluation of Belarusian ruble in the next few months, and that is why they closely follow changes of their incomes expressed in dollars. President A. Lukashenko has recently stated: "We have everything. Belarusians never lived as well as they do now. If people want to live normally and feed their children, their family – they have everything for it; they just need to get going". There is nothing surprising in the fact that only 36.4% of respondents agreed with this statement, while 53.1% disagreed.

Once again it's economy that defines Belarusians attitude to the state power: positive indices of trust to nearly all of state institutions turned into negative ones over the first quarter. While evaluating government's actions to overcome economic crisis, only a quarter of respondents answered, that it "acts efficiently, but it is unable to resist external reasons of crisis (war in Ukraine, drop in oil prices and so on)", while almost 40% think that "government acts inefficiently, and the references to external reasons is just an attempt to decline responsibility for the crisis". Although as we've noted it earlier, political problems are not among the most important priorities of Belarusians, 51% of them think that "there are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity". March survey results confirmed that economy is the most serious problem for the leadership of the country. Over 38% of respondents consider that an improvement of Belarusians' lives is impossible under the current rule and its policy. A. Lukashenko's rating continues to decrease significantly: in December 40% of respondents were ready to vote for him in presidential elections; today this share amounts to only 34.2%.

Belarusians' readiness for changes is still "under the cover" of social and political life, although some of its signs may already be noticed. Thus, answering in absentia to the recent A. Lukashenko's statement that Belarus is not ready for a drastic change of economy development model ("I'm ready to surprise you with any model. But are you ready to digest this model?"), over a half of respondents answered plain: "Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus", and only one third of them said "No, I'm not ready". Over 40% of respondents consider that "our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)", another 42% say that "our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system". Almost three quarters of voters express their readiness to participate in presidential elections in November 2015. Answering the question "If A. Lukashenko will run as a candidate on presidential elections for the fifth time, and he will have an adversary from democratic opposition, who would you vote for?" 37% of respondents chose the answer "for A. Lukashenko", 23.2% – "for the candidate of democratic opposition", 21% – "for neither of them". According to 40% of respondents, rather high level of support of A. Lukashenko in society is explained by the fact that "there is no one better".

Isolationist sentiments still prevail in foreign-policy orientations of Belarusians. The share of "Euro-Belarusians" is almost unchanged in comparison with December 2014. However, when it comes to some geopolitical problems or conflicts, majority of Belarusians prefer the let-alone principle ("it's neither my headache nor my piece of cake!"). Ukrainian-Russian crisis remains one of the most important factors influencing these changes in foreign-policy orientations of Belarusians. It should be noted that sympathies of the majority of Belarusians are still with Russia. Evaluations of relations between Belarus and Ukraine were subject to significant changes after the dramatic events in Ukraine: over the last years the number of those, who considered these relations to be good, has decreased, while the number of those, who considered them unstable, has increased. Majority of respondents still evaluate positively A. Lukashenko's position towards the crisis in Ukraine, however Belarusians don't approve the prospect of doing something more serious than organization of peaceful negotiations.

As usual, those readers who are more interested in our figures than in our assessments can analyze the research results on their own. The results are presented as a plain count up according to the main socio-demographic characteristics.

In our "Open Forum" rubric we continue to present the most interesting results of the latest surveys of our colleagues from neighboring countries. And in the "Bookshelf" rubric we tell you the story how the recent book of the well-known Belarusians political scientist Yuri Drakokhrust, which we had presented to our readers half a year ago, received Svetlana Naumova award.

As usual, your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In March of 2015 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.515 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

MARCH – 2014

Two views on economic crisis

March survey permits us to draw up an intermediate balance for Anomaly-2014 (growth of positive moods in Belarusian society amid decrease of macro- and microeconomic indices). Main conclusion: the resource of Anomaly-2014 is not exhausted and we cannot exclude that we may witness Anomaly-2015, although it won't be as striking. Dynamics of social indices (Tables 1-3) gives ground for this hypothesis.

Financial standing index (FSI) is least prone to be influenced by any kind of propaganda. It decreased from –17.3 in December down to –37.7 in March (Table 1). Over the last 10 years lower figures of FSI were registered only in 2011 (–71.8 is an absolute record).

These values of FSI (–17.3 in December 2014 and –37.7 in March 2015) are calculated for all respondents in the sample. But for respondents who trust and don't trust A. Lukashenko we have a different dynamics: from 3.1 down to –12.1 for the former and from –44.2 down to –69.5 for the latter. Thus we can see that for supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko perception of their own financial standing is significantly different. They live in different worlds. This is something that oppositional politicians should remember of when trying to get out of "oppositional ghetto".

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
It has improved	1.6	12.6	10.1	9.3	13.5	13.7	8.6
It has not changed	23.2	58.1	63.3	57.6	58.8	53.6	44.0
It has become worse	73.4	28.4	25.2	32.1	24.6	31.0	46.3
FSI*	**–71.8**	–15.8	–15.1	–22.8	–11.1	–17.3	–37.7

** Financial standing index (the difference between positive and negative answers)*

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
It is going to improve	11.9	12.5	24.0	28.6	18.6	23.6	23.1
It is not going to change	20.3	46.1	45.0	35.0	49.5	33.4	36.1
It is going to become worse	55.5	35.9	26.1	28.7	22.5	33.9	33.6
EI*	**–43.6**	–23.1	–2.1	–0.1	–3.9	–10.3	–10.5

** Expectation index*

While analyzing the results of December survey, we constantly emphasized the fact that it was conducted in the beginning of the month, i.e. prior to the 30-percent devaluation of Belarusian ruble. Taking into account the level of dollarization of Belarusian economy and the level of dollarization of Belarusians' thinking, we could have expected a collapse of social indices in the post-devaluation period. However, our expectations were realized only partially.

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
In the right direction	17.0	31.9	40.2	42.3	43.0	43.8	36.9
In the wrong direction	68.5	54.1	46.2	42.3	43.5	42.9	45.8
DA/NA	14.5	14.0	13.6	15.4	13.5	13.3	17.3
PCI*	**–51.5**	–22.2	–6.0	0	–0.5	0.9	–8.9

** Policy correctness index*

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
Yes	87.6	68.6	54.6	57.7	54.2	52.3	67.5
No	8.0	22.2	34.5	30.0	36.5	35.3	20.0
DA/NA	4.4	9.2	10.9	12.3	9.3	12.4	12.5

Table 5

Distribution of answers to the question: "If you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis, then how do you assess government's actions for overcoming it?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Government acts efficiently, but it is unable to resist external reasons of crisis (war in Ukraine, drop in oil prices and so on)	23.7	35.9	7.7
Government acts inefficiently, and the references to external reasons is just an attempt to decline responsibility for the crisis	39.6	13.8	71.9
DA/NA	36.7	50.4	20.4

FSI decrease, however, had no reflection on the dynamics of the expectation index (EI). Its March value is almost the same as in December (Table 2). This "insensibility" amid the landslide of life standards of population should be recognized as unique. The only argument we may come with to explain this, is the residual manifestation of Anomaly-2014. It should be noted, that even a year after "Crimeaisours" EI didn't get back to the value of December 2013.

The policy correctness index (PCI) stays significantly higher than its December 2013 level as well, although it decreased down to a minimum value since March 2014 (Table 3). The record high share of respondents, who didn't know how to answer the question (17.3%), testifies on the presence of problems in evaluation of development of things in the country. This is an unmistakable sign of the fact that economic reality on domestic level and economic reality formed by TV-propaganda set contradictory signals.

However, majority of respondents had no such difficulties while answering the question "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?" (Table 4). The share of positive answers has increased from 52.3% up to 67.5% over a quarter (+15.2 points!).

In that regard we cannot but mention that I. Medvedeva, the chairperson of National Statistical Committee, did not see economic crisis in Belarus. According to her statement during a press-conference in March, "don't say that there is a crisis. There are certain difficulties, we can see them, and we note them. We see it in retail sales, which had been growing very quickly before, and now show only moderate rate. If there is a certain restoration of markets, if the measures for expanding export are taken, then there will be development".

EI would have been much higher if people, working in National Statistical Committee, were part of the survey sample, taking into account their optimism.

Over the last six years Belarusians have survived two economic crises – in 2009 and 2011. The first one was provoked by the world financial crisis and did not influence the trust to the head of state and the government. The second one was unambiguously estimated by the public opinion as man-made, and it led to a record fall of ratings of A. Lukashenko and trust ratings of state institutions in general.

During current crisis propaganda is not as successful as in 2009, but the situation of 2011 seems to be quite far yet. In March 39.6% of Belarusians assessed government's actions as inefficient (Table 5), but you should also note the record high share of respondents who didn't answer the question (36.7%). This is a stock for increasing both positive and negative assessments.

Among A. Lukashenko's supporters each second had difficulties in answering the question. You don't see such things very often.

Table 6

Dynamics of trust rating of A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	12'13	03'14	06'14	07'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
Trust	37.7	45.9	49.6	49.9	53.5	49.9	48.8
Don't trust	47.5	44.1	39.0	37.3	33.3	35.6	39.7
DA	14.8	10.0	11.4	12.8	13.2	14.5	11.5

Table 7

Dynamics of electoral rating of A. Lukashenko, %

Date	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14	13'15
Rating	34.8	39.8	39.8	45.2	40.0	34.2

Table 8

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, what does explain the rather high level of support to A. Lukashenko in Belarusian society?", % *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	03'09	03'11	03'15
There is no one better	44.2	40.4	39.5
Expectations that he will manage to make our lives better in fiture	31.9	29.2	34.9
His real successes and achievements	13.1	17.1	17.8
His personal and business qualities	15.1	7.4	19.6
DA	11.4	16.9	7.7

Social indices (indices of social well-being) are in the first place measurements of subjective feelings of people. They are not objective economical or political indices. Their exaggerated values are a distant reaction to historical moods of spring 2014. "Homo sovieticus" (their share in Belarusian society equals to at least 60%) reacted to "Crimeaisours" in the same way as his Russian "colleagues". He became euphoric, and this euphoria helps him to survive economic and social hardships much easier. As any hysteria, this mood cannot be stable, and this is confirmed by the March decrease of FSI.

Virtual support for a TV-hero

Smooth transformation of Anomaly-2014 into Anomaly-2015 is confirmed by the head of state's ratings. Despite the December devaluation trust rating remained almost the same (Table 6). It is by 11.1 points higher than the last value registered before the beginning of "Crimeaisours" (the first column, December 2013).

Government's trust rating is naturally lower than the head of state's. In March it amounted to 37%, which is by 7.6 points higher than the December 2013 value. But relatively to December 2014 government's trust rating decreased by 4.4 points. Let us note that in the year of presidential elections under the conditions of Anomaly-2015 it turns out that government bears more responsibility for negative trends in economy than the President.

Electoral rating of A. Lukashenko amounted to 34.2%. Relatively to December 2014 it decreased by 5.8 points (Table 7). Under the conditions of a real decrease of salaries (–3.2% in January-February 2015 in comparison with January-February 2014) this decrease should be recognized as an insignificant one.

Electoral rating is the share of votes which a politician received when respondents answered the open question "If presidential elections were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote?" It is calculated based on all respondents in the sample. But during elections percents are calculated based on the turnout (it is another question if somebody really counts votes in Belarus…). In March 73.4% of respondents confirmed their readiness to vote on presidential elections in November 2015 ("yes, of course" – 35.8%, "rather yes" – 37.6%). If we re-count electoral rating of A. Lukashenko based on the share of people who are going to vote, it amounts to 42.9%.

Let us note that the answer "yes, of course" was chosen by 51.6% of respondents trusting A. Lukashenko and by only 19.9% of those who don't trust him.

One of the base factors which support popularity of authoritarian leaders is the lack of alternative. Maintaining the state of lacking alternative is the main task of state propaganda. In Belarus propaganda succeeds in this task very well. It's hard to remember when was the last time when electoral rating of someone from President's inner circle reached a value exceeding the statistical error of 3%. March survey shows that his opponents' results are not an exclusion: V. Neklyaev's rating amounted to 7.6%, N. Statkevich's – 4.5%, A. Lebedko's – 2.9%.

The importance of the principle of lacking alternative is registered in Table 8. The variant of answer "there is no one better" invariably takes the first place. In general, perception of A. Lukashenko's political merits hasn't significantly changed over the last six

years. At least, the results of Table 8 don't give any ground for "voter fatigue" talks.

The data for the crisis year 2011 shouldn't confuse you. That survey was conducted prior to panics on exchange market. In the answers of March 2015 you can see the influence of Anomaly-2015.

Answers to the question "According to you, is a significant improvement of Belarusian people's lives possible under the current rule and its policy?" (Table 9) are well connected with the answers to the previous question. Even after four presidential terms A. Lukashenko is still a president of hope for majority of Belarusians. Naturally, the level of support of 2006 is unachievable today, but it is not needed for another prolongation of power.

not only from current economic problems, but also from home policy events.

Let us note the formal difference in awareness between supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko. It would seem that the higher level of education of the latter should have a positive influence on their awareness. But this time practical results don't confirm this habitual dependency.

Solidity of electoral position of A. Lukashenko is confirmed by the dynamics of answering the question of Table 11. As you can see, over the last six years electoral structure of Belarusian society hasn't really changed. Under conditions of electoral mobilization, which is always present during presidential campaigns in Belarus, the number of those, who are

Table 9

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, is a significant improvement of Belarusian people's lives possible under the current rule and its policy?", %

Variant of answer	06'01	02'06	03'14	13'15
Possible	44.2	57.5	47.1	49.1
Impossible	36.1	30.4	43.8	38.1
DA/NA	19.7	12.1	9.1	12.8

Table 10

Distribution of answers to the question: "In the end of December 2015 President A. Lukashenko changed the leaders of the government and the National Bank. Are you aware of it?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Yes	69.4	69.1	71.8
No	26.7	25.8	26.4
DA/NA	3.9	5.1	1.8

Table 11

Dynamics of answering the question: "If A. Lukashenko runs as a candidate on presidential elections for the fifth time, and he has an adversary from democratic opposition, who will you vote for?", %

Variant of answer	09'09	13'15
For A. Lukashenko	42.9	37.0
For the candidate from democratic opposition	25.2	23.2
For neither of them	17.8	21.0
DA/NA	14.1	18.8

Analyzing the answers to the questions of Table 8-9 one should remember, that, in addition to Anomaly-2015, respondents' past experience influences public opinion as well. During 10 of 15 previous years, growth of population's incomes was expressed in two-digit numbers. It's not easy to refuse such heritage.

30.6% of Belarusians didn't "notice" that leaders of the government and the National Bank were changed in December 2015 (Table 10). If we take into account the fact that approximately 85% of adult population of the country watch TV-news ("Yes, regularly" + "Sometimes"). We should recognize that this level of awareness is quite humble. Probably this is related to the popularity of the TV-show "Ukraine" among Belarusian viewers. Watching this show distracts attention

undecided, will reduce significantly, and this will let A. Lukashenko and his political opponents to take the habitual crop of votes.

Longstanding ripples of A. Lukashenko's electoral rating don't reflect changes in the system of values of Belarusians society, but they do reflect the level of satisfaction by the scale of state paternalism. In any case, level of electoral support, registered during surveys, is only virtual. These are TV-viewers who support a TV-hero. But TV-hero doesn't need any other support.

Exhaustion of the inner resource of Belarusian model may form serious threats to the authoritarian regime, not from the electorate (TV-viewers), but because of tension growth inside the power "vertical". Let us remember "the biggest tragedy of XX century"

– the breakup of the USSR. It happened without opposition and mass protests.

But this is not a today's prospect. Up to the end of the year solidarity of the ruling class in Belarus will most probably remain unchanged.

A return to the beginning of nineties is possible

Table 12 data are a visual demonstration of how public opinion' evaluations of problems, which the country and its citizens face, change. Traditionally, the first position is taken by the "price hike". This time it has a record high value – 84.1%. Only in 2006, at the peak of evolution of Belarusian model, this problem was mentioned by 80% respondents.

is by 10.4 points higher than in average). There is nothing surprising about it. Among those, who don't cherish hopes about the near future of Belarusian model, prevail financially active people, i.e. young and educated. In the age group between 18 and 29 this share amounts to 40.9%, while in the age group after 60 years old the share is only 17.7%; among respondents with primary education – 10.8%, with higher education – 40.7%.

"Overcoming of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster" is once and for all pushed out to the periphery of mass consciousness (9.7%). Current economic issues diminished acuteness of "population decline" (8.6%) and "decline of national culture" (9.5%).

Table 12

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which are the most important issues that our country and people face today?", % *(more than one answer is possible)**

Variant of answer	06'99	06'06	12'08	06'14	03'15
Price hike	82.7	60.1	82.5	80.0	84.1
Impoverishment of people	73.2	19.5	37.8	41.9	46.8
Production decline	31.8	18.7	31.7	35.1	50.3
Unemployment	35.7	37.0	35.7	25.2	47.2
Corruption, bribery	29.7	27.6	26.0	23.8	23.1
Fall in population	–	21.9	14.9	16.9	8.6
Human rights infringement	23.3	22.1	20.1	16.0	22.9
Lack of law and order	24.6	22.1	20.6	15.8	15.0
Threat from the West	9.3	18.2	13.0	15.4	19.6
Decline of national culture	13.1	10.8	8.1	13.2	9.5
Overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster	29.5	25.5	10.6	11.8	9.7
Criminality	44.6	23.2	20.8	11.6	17.4
International isolation of Belarus	9.1	14.4	9.8	11.0	11.1
Split of society	5.0	7.3	4.0	10.6	6.7
Threat of Belarus losing its independency	–	8.3	5.2	9.5	5.7

** Table is ranged by the first column*

The exceptionality of the year 2006 in the modern history of Belarus may be seen in majority of "nominations" of Table 12. In particular, in March 2015 the share of respondents who mentioned "impoverishment of people" was 2.4 times as high as in 2006, the difference for "production decline" is 2.7-fold. This "nomination" became the absolute leader in dynamics, and for the first time it has taken the second place in the list. This may be regarded as another dig at I. Medvedeva, the chairperson of National Statistical Committee.

"Unemployment" has also gained noticeably, and made its local maximum – 47.2%. This is somewhat of a greeting to the authors of the law about "social parasites". If under the conditions of a significant aggravation of unemployment problem (probably, this is just a beginning) the state tries to bring their social innovation into practice, the consequences may be quite unexpected.

Unemployment is seen as a problem in the first place by those Belarusians, who negatively evaluate the prospect of changing of the social-economical situation in Belarus in the near future – 57.6% (which

Increase of the share of respondents, who mentioned "threat from the West", was expected amid the anti-West hysteria on Russian TV (19.6%). We cannot say the same thing about "threat of Belarus losing its independency" (5.7%).

According to Belstat, in 2014 the share of households with average accommodate resources per capita below poverty level amounted to 3.4%, in 2013 – to 4%.

In June 1995 26.6% of Belarusians considered themselves poor, in June 2009 – 6%. This may undoubtedly be regarded as a success of Belarusian model on the initial stage of its functioning.

In March 2015 variants of answers to the question "How would you define your financial standing?" were changed, and this doesn't permit us to compare the answers from past years with the current ones. Nevertheless, the share of Belarusians, who estimate their financial standing as "below average/very low", turned out to be 9.5 times as high as the share of those who estimate their financial standing as "above average/very high" (Table 13).

Table 13

Distribution of answers to the question: "How would you define your financial standing?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Very low	9.1	5.4	13.6
Below the average	36.5	26.4	48.0
Average	49.6	62.1	35.9
Above the average	4.6	6.0	2.5
Very high	0.2	0.1	0

Table 14

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, how will your incomes change in comparison with prices in the near future?", %

Variant of answer	11'94	03'14	03'15
Incomes will surpass prices	2.1	6.7	4.5
Incomes will keep up with prices	7.9	27.7	31.9
Incomes will lag behind prices	74.4	62.3	60.8
DA/NA	15.6	3.3	2.8

There is no notable difference in estimations of financial position between men and women. In particular, "very low financial standing" was chosen by 9.8% of men and 8.6% of women. Education of respondents doesn't influence the perception of financial standing as well: primary – 7.4%, higher – 8.4%.

Political preferences of Belarusians (their attitude to A. Lukashenko) on the contrary are an important factor of financial standing perception. Pay attention to the row "Average": it testifies on the wish to feel "like everyone" (to belong to the "majority") among the supporters of the head of state.

Table 14 data permit us to evaluate the prospect of changes in answers to the question of Table 13 from the point of view of public opinion. The share of pessimists, supposing that incomes will lag behind prices, is 13.5 times as high as the share of optimists! And if this mass presentiment comes true, this will mean a growth of poverty level in Belarus.

In the first column of Table 14 you may see the results of a survey conducted 21 years ago. The difference is significant. However, we will venture to affirm that current negative trends in Belarusian economy shouldn't be regarded as temporary. Belarusian model has exhausted its resource, and thus a return to the situation from the beginning of nineties is possible in the medium-term prospect.

Belarusians don't believe in stability of ruble

According to information from the National Bank of Belarus, de-dollarization of economy in the country continues, which is caused by stable exchange rate of the national currency, constant inflation decrease, and current exchange rate policy. It would be prematurely to speak about first successful results of the main financial regulator in de-dollarization for understandable reasons. However, March survey confirms topicality of this policy. 34.1% of Belarusians constantly check how their incomes change expressed in dollars, 43.5% do it from time to time, and only 17.6% – never.

This attention to the "buck" isn't out of the blue. Over the years of independence inflation in Belarus exceeded one and a half trillion percent.

Table 15 data let us to draw a portrait of a Belarusian, constantly preoccupied with the dollar equivalent of his incomes. This portrait is quite recognizable, as it resembles almost any ordinary citizen of Belarus.

Only in the oldest age group (60+) and in groups with primary and incomplete secondary education we may see a significant deviation from the average value over the sample. But this doesn't mean that retired people and people of little education are completely indifferent to dynamics of their incomes expressed in dollars. Near a half of representatives of these groups still check the changes of their incomes expressed in dollars, although they do it only from time to time.

At first glance it may seem that this purely economic question is regarded as a politically charged one by the groups of supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko. In particular, the latter check the changes of their incomes expressed in dollars 2.2 times as often as the former. However, this politicization is only apparent. In reality this is explained by the level of financial activity, which is significantly higher among opponents of the head of state.

Table 16 data may be regarded as somewhat of an indicator of stability (or, more precisely, instability) of Belarusian economy. Let us remind you, that in March 23.1% of respondents expressed confidence in the fact that socio-economic situation in Belarus is getting better, while 33.6% think that it is getting worse. However, only 12.9% don't fear another devaluation of ruble in the next few months.

Table 15

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you check how your incomes expressed in dollars change?" depending on socio-demographic characteristics and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Characteristics	Yes, constantly	Sometimes	Never
Gender:			
Male	39.4	41.1	15.5
Female	29.8	45.5	19.3
Age:			
18-29	40.5	43.0	10.5
30-39	45.8	40.2	10.6
40-49	39.6	45.0	10.0
50-59	37.7	45.7	12.5
60 +	11.9	45.3	39.3
Education:			
Primary	2.2	51.6	43.0
Incomplete secondary	13.1	37.3	40.5
Secondary	33.4	47.3	15.0
Vocational	39.6	45.5	10.4
Higher	48.3	34.6	12.4
Attitude to A. Lukashenko:			
Trust	21.9	47.8	23.4
Don't trust	48.4	39.3	10.0

Table 16

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you fear another devaluation of Belarusian ruble in the next few months?", %

Variant of answer	09'13	13'15
This is a real threat	32.3	32.8
This is possible, but unlikely	39.7	48.4
This won't happen	20.5	12.9
DA/NA	7.5	5.9

It turns out that for a certain part of respondents there could be an improvement of socio-economic situation even under the conditions of a new devaluation. There is nothing unexpected in this contradiction, as public opinion is ambivalent by definition.

Public opinion was divided in relation to the reasons of December devaluation (Table 17). Official version ("because of Russian ruble weakening") is the most popular one. 44.5% of respondents support it. But population's own fault, so often and resolutely pointed by A. Lukashenko, didn't go unnoticed (24.6%). The total is 69.1%. Thus, we may consider that the powers mostly succeeded in shifting the responsibility for devaluation.

It is natural, that A. Lukashenko's opponents are more prone to blame the government and the National Bank for ruble devaluation than his supporters. In their turn, A. Lukashenko's supporters three times as often agree with the population's fault.

In Russia this is the urban middle class that follows the dollar rate change. They are more informed, more educated, more well-to-do, more involved in the market economy and less dependent on the power. But in Belarus, with its longstanding tradition of devaluations, the circle of people, closely following dollar exchange rate, is much wider. It isn't for nothing that during a press-conference in January 2013 A. Lukashenko noted that principal clients of currency exchange offices are retired people.

Between satiety and independence

Analysis of dynamics of social indices convincingly testifies that Belarusians haven't lost belief in tomorrow. Despite a catastrophic fall of financial standing index, expectation index hasn't changed. But for already almost two decades life of ordinary people is moving in a track defined by Belarusian economic model. Thus, belief in future cannot be formed in isolation from belief in the model.

As it follows from Table 18, evaluations of successes of economic model remain stable. December devaluation didn't make a fundamental influence. Moreover, the share of pessimistic evaluations dropped by 7.1 points. At the same time only 8.4% of A. Lukashenko's supporters didn't notice the progress of Belarusian economy, while there were 5.8 times more skeptical people among their political opponents – 48.4%.

During a meeting with representatives of Belarusian and foreign mass media on January 29, 2015, A. Lukashenko had unexpectedly stated that he was ready to surprise his compatriots with "any model",

but he was obliged to restrain his reformatory ardor due to society's inability to "digest" social innovations.

This unexpected turn of the head of state should probably be regarded as a pure improvisation. Over the last years there were no information leaks regarding developmental works on alternative models from either President's Administration or the government. That is why respondents' answers to the question of Table 19 should be regarded as an indicator of dissatisfaction of people with current state of things in economy and not as a need of an alternative (respondents have nothing to compare with). But majority of Belarusians vote for changing the model, and thus they denote the inadequacy of the head of state.

agree are a minority – 36.4%. The share of those who disagree amounted to 53.1%.

Gender input into the distribution of answers turned out to be quite unexpected. Women are much more prone to believe that in modern Belarus "people can live normally and feed their children" than men – 42.5% vs. 29%!

Women's inclination to trust authoritarian politicians is a worldwide phenomenon. In Belarusian society fair sex doesn't fall out of the mainstream. The Father said "We have everything", and female respondents agreed.

One of main conditions of maintaining stability of Belarusian model (in this it is very similar to its Soviet

Table 17

Distribution of answers to the question: "In December-January Belarusian ruble was in fact devaluated in relation to dollar by 30%. According to you, what was the reason for that?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko, % *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
The weakening of Russian ruble	44.5	46.1	41.4
Faulty policy of Belarusian government and the National Bank	37.4	19.4	59.3
People actively buying foreign currency	24.6	33.6	11.3
Other	7.8	9.7	6.3
DA	7.1	10.4	3.7

Table 18

Dynamics of answering the question: "There are different opinions concerning the progress of Belarusian economy model. Which one do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	12'12	12'13	03'15
There is no progress in the Belarusian economy	33.7	34.1	27.0
Without the help of Russia there would be no progress in the Belarusian economy	28.4	28.7	35.4
The progress of the Belarusian economy is explained by internal reasons; Russian aid is an important but not decisive factor	28.1	30.5	32.4
DA/NA	9.8	6.7	5.2

Table 19

Distribution of answers to the question: "During a press-conference in January 2015 President A. Lukashenko had stated that Belarus was not ready for a drastic change of economy development model: "I'm ready to surprise you with any model. But are you ready to digest this model?" What is your answer to this question?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	51.5	32.2	74.7
No, I'm not ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	33.0	47.4	17.6
DA/NA	15.5	20.4	7.7

Almost the same ratio of answers (not in favor of the head of state) was registered in the answers to the following question: "President A. Lukashenko' has recently stated: "We have everything. Belarusians never lived as well as they do now. If people want to live normally and feed their children, their family – they have everything for it; they just need to get going". Do you agree with this statement?" Those who

predecessor) is maintaining the state of emergency. Let us remind you how M. Gorbachev's policy of international relaxation was fatal for the authority of communistic party.

A. Lukashenko constantly touches upon the topic of internal enemies ("the fifth column"). Interpretation of Ukrainian events by Russian TV-channels significantly increased the state of emergency. Unfortunate-

ly, the question on presence of enemies was not asked before March 2014, so we cannot define what the input of "Crimeaisours" into the answers of respondents in Table 20 is.

Over the nine months that have passed since June 2014 the topic of "enemies" is still important for 60% of Belarusians. The priority is placed on internal enemies.

the cost of temporary drop in production and rise in unemployment.

Belarusians' readiness to change the model, registered in Table 19, is confirmed by the answers to the question "What's more important for you today: maintaining of the current situation in the country or changing it?" (Table 22). This is another indicator of dissatisfaction with the current state of things in economy, which is confirmed by the answers in the "fat" years of presidential elections (the first and the second columns), when the number of advocates of maintaining the current state of things exceeded the number of changes advocates.

Table 20

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do our people and our country have enemies?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	13'15
Our country is surrounded by enemies	12.8	14.0
Our most dangerous enemies are hidden insiders	29.2	26.2
There will always be enemies for our nation on the way of revival	20.8	19.8
Why look for enemies when the root of evil is in our own mistakes	29.2	29.3
DA/NA	8.0	10.7

Table 21

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, what should the state do in the current situation?", %

Variant of answer	11'94	03'14	03'15
Gradually increase salaries and social benefits (pensions, scholarships, allowances) to compensate the price hike	32.5	50.9	48.6
Stop the price hike, even at the cost of temporary drop in production and rise in unemployment	65.8	43.0	44.6
DA	1.7	6.1	6.8

Table 22

Dynamics of answering the question: "What's more important for you today: maintaining of the current situation in the country or changing it?", %

Variant of answer	02'06	12'10	06'14	03'15
Changing of the situation is more important	53.4	49.7	38.3	32.6
Maintaining of the situation is more important	37.8	41.2	52.1	56.5
DA/NA	8.8	9.1	9.6	10.9

Table 23

Dynamics of answering the question: "What's more important: improvement of financial position of Belarus or independence of the country?", %

Variant of answer	08'06	09'07	06'10	03'15
Improvement of financial position of Belarus	48.5	59.4	62.3	58.8
Independence of the country	41.9	32.2	30.4	33.9
DA/NA	9.6	8.4	7.3	7.3

Under the conditions of low level of trust to market institutions, economic and politic concurrence in Belarusian society, the main demand to the state was and is paternalistic in its character. That is why the demand for increasing salaries and social benefits will never lose its topicality (Table 21). A. Lukashenko's supporters are leading here – 56.7%. But the demand for state favors is quite high even among his opponents – 39.9%.

Significant difference with the answers in November 1994 should not surprise you. Beginning of nineties is the period of hyper-inflation in Belarus, thus the increased demand for stopping price hike, even at

In March 2015 only 9% of A. Lukashenko's opponents and 55.5% of his supporters spoke in favor of maintaining the current state of things.

We've already noted several times that the topic of maintaining independence of the country is on the periphery of public opinion in Belarus. That is why the distribution of answers to the question of Table 23 shouldn't surprise you. Except for 2006, the most "bumper-crop" year in the modern history of Belarus,

the share of respondents, preferring economic position over independence is confidently maintaining itself around 60%. The war in Ukraine did not make any notable adjustments in comparison with the peaceful year of 2010.

Table 24

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which of the following statements corresponds to your opinion most?", %

Variant of answer	07'14	03'15
Our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)	38.4	39.9
Our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system	34.2	42.2
Our society needs protection against forces which try to change current order	19.4	14.4
DA/NA	8.0	3.5

Table 25

Dynamics of trust ratings of mass media and oppositional parties, %

Institution	12'12	12'13	12'14	03'15
Oppositional parties	20.0	15.8	16.0	18.8
State mass media	38.1	31.6	47.1	38.7
Non-state mass media	48.1	41.0	41.7	38.2

Table 26

Dynamics of answering the question: "Some people consider themselves as supporters of the current power, others – as opponents. Which group would you ascribe yourself to?", %

Variant of answer	11'06	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	03'15
I am a supporter of the current power	47.8	37.3	36.5	32.8	36.4	37.3
I am an opponent of the current power	18.5	22.0	19.6	21.6	16.2	25.4
I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent	26.2	31.8	36.4	38.7	40.9	36.7
DA/NA	7.5	8.9	7.5	6.9	6.5	0.6

Table 27

Dynamics of answering the question: "If there are protest against the worsening of financial standing in your city (region), are you ready to take part in them?", %

Variant of answer	09'07	12'08	09'11	03'14	03'15
Yes	17.4	18.6	14.7	22.9	15.4
No	72.7	71.8	73.9	68.3	72.6
DA/NA	9.9	9.6	11.4	8.8	12.0

You should pay attention to equality of opinions of supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko. It is not improbable that state patriotism of the former coincided in this case with nationalism of the latter. But whatever the reason of this coincidence is, it should be recognized as unique in the split Belarusian society.

The answers to the question of Table 24 let us evaluate reformatory potential of Belarusian society before and after December devaluation. Changes are not big although statistically significant. At first glance, they demonstrate an increase of reformatory potential. But don't get carried away. Longstanding researches of the IISEPS demonstrate that majority of Belarusians see reforms as a reinforcement of paternalistic care from the state.

The main part of adherents of serious reforms is A. Lukashenko's opponents, and it is not surprising – 67.4% vs. 15.6%. The head of state's supporters declaratively support gradual changes – 56.8% vs. 26.2%. And they prevail among adversaries of changing current order – 24.1% vs. 4.3%!

Society accepts real reforms and is ready to tolerate their negative consequences only under the condition of an existential choice, when the question is formulated as "either… or" ("either life or death"). But today Belarusians don't face such a choice. Hopes on paternalistic abilities of the state are still alive for the "majority"; and power never paid serious attention to demands of the "minority".

Dislike for the power doesn't transform into a wish to protest

Oscillation amplitude of A. Lukashenko's electoral rating may reach dozens percentage points, as longstanding IISEPS researches demonstrate it. Having monopolized the power, he made himself "responsible for everything". That is why mood changes of the authoritarian part of Belarusian society (the so-called majority) directly influence the level of declarative support to the "only politician".

Due to understandable reasons, opposition lacks opportunities to influence economic and social processes in Belarus. They're off side. Oscillations of trust rating of opposition rarely exceed the limits of statistical error (Table 25). Its absolute value is defined by the active part of "minority"; and the share of "minority" in Belarusian society remains constant over already two decades.

At the same time, transition between two groups of the split Belarusian society is quite complicated. That is why a fall of A. Lukashenko's rating doesn't lead to a significant growth of summary rating of his political opponents.

Unlike opposition's trust rating, trust ratings of state and non-state mass media not only change in a wide range, but are even able to exchange their places on the scale of trust. In particular, in December 2012 and 2013 (i.e. after the man-made crisis of 2011) trust rating of non-state mass media exceeded its rival's rating by 10 points.

Under the influence of Anomaly-2014 there was a certain castling. In December 2014 trust rating of non-state mass media remained almost unchanged relatively to December 2013, while trust rating of state mass media jumped by 15.5 points at a time. In March 2015 ratings became almost equal at the cost of trust decrease to state mass media, which could possibly be related to a certain drop of interest of Belarusian TV-viewers to the TV show "Ukraine".

Structural solidity of Belarusian electorate is confirmed by the answers to the question of Table 26 as well. As usually, year 2006 marks out by the level of support to the power, but already by the end of 2007 it had dropped by 10.5 points. During the following eight years the difference between maximal and minimal values amounted to only 4.5 points.

Survey, conducted in March 2015, registered a minimal quantity of respondents, which didn't know how to answer the question. This is a sure sign of society polarization amid the smooth transformation of Anomaly-2014 into Anomaly-2015. Another sign of polarization is the drop of answers "I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent". It is important to emphasize that almost all people, who previously had difficulties with the answer, joined the group of power's opponents.

The level of protest activity dropped by 7.5 points relatively to March 2014 (we're speaking here about declarative protest activity, naturally). Local peak of a year's prescription was probably provoked by mass protests in Kiev, which were not yet discredited by Russian propaganda by the time (Table 27).

Lack of relation between the state of economy and declarative protest activity (for almost 20 years many oppositional analytics spoke about this relation as if it went without saying) is confirmed by September survey of 2011. It fell on the year of historical minimums of social indices.

One of the most important issues, which blocks up normalization of relations between Minsk and the West is existence of political prisoners in Belarus. We are not going to comment on the official viewpoint of Belarusian power. It is well-known, but doesn't enjoy support in society, despite propagandist efforts of state mass media (Table 28).

Table 28

Distribution of answers to the question: "Which of the following statements do you agree with?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
There are no political prisoners in Belarus, only people who were sentenced for crimes against Belarusian laws	32.0	53.9	8.6
There are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity	51.0	25.0	80.7
DA/NA	17.0	21.1	10.6

Even among A. Lukashenko's supporters every fourth respondent agrees that there are people who were sentenced for their political activity in Belarus, while every fifth respondent didn't know how to answer, i.e. expressed doubt in the official point of view.

Let us note a significant difference in men's and women's view on the problem of political prisoners. 24.2% of men share the official point of view. The share of women, agreeing with it, is 1.6 times as high – 38.5%. Such a significant gender difference in estimations isn't registered very often in Belarus.

Apparently, there will be no return to the "fat" years, when incomes' growth was expressed by two-digit numbers, neither in the next 2-3 years, nor in a medium-term prospect. But belief in unlimited possibilities of the paternalist state and its leader, which has formed during the last 15 years, cannot "disappear" after bumping into first failures. Several years should pass in order for society to realize that positive trend changed into a negative one. How it will influence the habitual structure of electorate is anybody's guess today.

Integrate, but remember, who you are

In the first quarter of 2015 there was a record drop of the share of "Euro-Belarusians", i.e. the respondents who spoke in favor of integration of Belarus into the EU. At the same time there was a slight increase of the share of supporters of integration with Russia. However this didn't lead to an identification of interests of Russia and Belarus as equal. Majority of Bela-

rusians don't want Belarus to join Russian counter-sanctions against the EU countries.

March 2015 survey registered a historical minimum of pro-European inclinations in Belarus – the share of supporters of euro-integration dropped below 25% (Table 29).

In September 2014 the share of "Euro-Belarusians" was almost the same, though, while the share of opponents of euro-integration was even higher. However, there was a significant decrease of the share of adherents of Belarus joining the EU.

At the same time the number of supporters of integration with Russia slightly increased (Table 30).

their country with the interests of the ally and partner in integration (Table 33).

The number of respondents, supporting sanctions against Russia, turned out to be 5 times as low as the number of adherents of joining the EU. However, the number of those, who are ready to support Russia, to make sacrifices for the ally, turned out to be significantly lower (by 2.5 times) as the number of those who wish to integrate "the big brother". An imposing majority preferred their country not to join the conflict on either side.

This demonstrates that certain indices of geopolitical preferences of Belarusians shouldn't be interpre-

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question: "If there was a referendum on Belarus joining the EU, how would you vote?", %

Variant of answer	05'07	09'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	12'12	12'13	09'14	12'14	03'15
For	33.5	26.7	34.9	36.2	48.6	38.9	35.9	25.0	28.8	24.6
Against	49.3	51.9	36.3	37.2	30.5	37.6	34.6	50.3	48.8	45.0

Table 30

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the integration of Belarus and Russia was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	09'14	12'14	03'15
For	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.0	28.7	23.9	23.0	23.9	26.3
Against	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	42.9	47.5	51.4	54.3	58.4	48.9

Table 31

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
Integration with the RF	47.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	41.4	37.7	36.6	51.5	47.4	44.9	46.5
Joining the EU	33.3	30.1	42.1	38.0	39.1	43.4	44.6	32.9	32.0	34.2	30.8
DA/NA	19.2	23.9	15.6	23.9	19.5	18.9	18.8	15.6	20.6	20.9	22.7

The answers to the question on a dichotomy political choice confirm these changes (Table 31).

By the look of things, the main reason for the decrease of pro-European inclinations over the past year was the Ukrainian factor, as majority of Belarusian society agrees with the Russian version of events in Crimea and conflict in Donbass, while the West and the EU in particular support Kiev's position.

However these oscillations (pro-European moods dropped in March 2015 even in relation to the low December level) could have had some other reasons.

Surely, the formulation "Je suis Charlie" doesn't describe the reaction on the murder of Parisian cartoonists in all Europe. However, it has even lesser relation to the attitude of Belarusians to this crime (Table 32). Religious fanatism is not proper to Belarusians, but the majority of them cannot say "Je suis Charlie", as you can see it. It is quite probable that this apparent gap in systems of values led to a certain decline of pro-European moods.

However, neither this circumstance, nor the growth of pro-Russian moods means that Belarusians started to identify their interests and interests of

ted unambiguously as readiness to identify their interests with the interests of one or another geopolitical "pole". This choice is often nothing more than readiness to enjoy all advantages of certain integration vector avoiding losses related to it.

The answers to the question on who's to blame in "the food war", which broke out between Belarus and Russia in the end of the past year, are also quite typical (Table 34).

The odds in favor of those who blame Moscow over those who blame Minsk for the conflict are more than 3-fold, but it is quite revealing that the variant of mutual fault was the most popular one. It seems that this is not due to a lack of patriotism, but to life philosophy of Belarusians: they perceive a conflict as an abnormality and a threat, they are convinced, that both sides are always to blame in a conflict and that a compromise is better than a confrontation. At least, in regard to Russia this reaction is quite frequent.

At the same time the relative majority of Belarusians negatively evaluate sanctions against their own country, and the evaluations became more negative

Table 32

Distribution of answers to the question: "12 employees of a French satirical journal "Charlie Hebdo" were killed in January in Paris. This was a revenge for publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. What do you think about this?"

Variant of answer	%
It is an attempt upon the freedom of speech	38.8
I pity the killed ones, but it was their fault, they shouldn't have insulted religious feelings	38.2
It was a fair punishment for insulting religious feelings	7.9
DA/NA	15.1

Table 33

Distribution of answers to the question: "In the end of the past year Russia introduced a ban on importing foods from the EU countries, which earlier introduced sanctions against Russia as an answer to its policy in Ukraine. According to you, how should Belarus act in this conflict?"

Variant of answer	%
We should also introduce a ban, because Russia is our ally and Belarus should support it	17.0
Belarus should not associate itself with the ban; this is a conflict between the EU and Russia, it doesn't concern Belarus	64.8
Belarus should join the EU sanctions against Russia	5.8
DA/NA	12.4

Table 34

Distribution of answers to the question: "In the end of the past year Russia introduced a ban on importing foods from Belarus and accused Belarus of low quality of products and re-export of foods from the EU countries. How do you evaluate positions of the sides in this conflict?"

Variant of answer	%
Russian side is to blame in this conflict	35.1
Belarusian side is to blame in this conflict	10.2
Both sides are to blame equally	42.9
DA/NA	11.8

Table 35

Dynamics of attitude to Western sanctions in relation to Belarus, %

Variant of answer	06'11*	09'11**	03'15***
Positive	25.6	19.5	16.9
Negative	33.3	40.6	36.8
Indifferent	32.8	39.6	37.8
DA/NA	8.3	0.3	8.5

** "The EU and the USA broaden the sanctions against the leadership of Belarus: they forbade their countries to almost 200 of Belarusian officials, judges and journalists headed by A. Lukashenko, because they are considered to be guilty of falsification of results of presidential elections and repressions against participants of peaceful protests. Some people think this is good, others think this is bad. What is your opinion?"*

*** "Recently the EU and the USA have introduced new economic sanctions against several Belarusian enterprises, because their incomes are considered to strengthen political regime which suppresses democracy and human rights. How do you evaluate introduction of these sanctions?"*

**** "Several years ago the EU and the USA have introduced sanctions against the leadership of Belarus. They have forbidden their countries to 250 of Belarusian officials, judges and journalists headed by A. Lukashenko, because they are considered to be guilty of falsification of results of presidential elections and repressions against participants of peaceful protests. Later they have introduced economic sanctions against several Belarusian enterprises, because their incomes are considered to strengthen political regime which suppresses democracy and human rights. How do you evaluate introduction of these sanctions?"*

in comparison with the period when those sanctions were introduced (Table 35).

In February a summit of Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France was held in Minsk. On this summit the leaders of these countries had signed treaties on settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. The role of Belarusian side didn't seem to the respondents to be defining, but this role brought to the President some dividends of popular sympathies (Table 36).

Table 36

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's role in the negotiations between the leaders of Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France on February 11-12 in Minsk?"

Variant of answer	%
A. Lukashenko had no role at all, Belarus simply provided place for the negotiations	28.0
A. Lukashenko's role was small, but useful for achieving peace	47.7
A. Lukashenko played an important role as a peacemaker	20.4
DA/NA	3.9

Table 37

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14	03'15
Unambiguously positively	14.8	13.6	17.5
Rather positively	44.7	45.1	47.8
Rather negatively	17.2	16.8	19.6
Negatively	9.6	12.9	4.7
DA/NA	13.7	11.6	10.4

Table 38

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?", %

Institution	06'14	09'14	12'14	03'15
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	26.9	27.2	31.6	22.0
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.2	59.9	56.8	58.5
DA/NA	10.9	12.9	11.6	19.5

Both organization of aforementioned negotiations and other aspects of official Minsk' policy led to another growth of positive evaluations of this policy (Table 37).

Electoral rating of the current president significantly decreased over the quarter – from 40% down to 34.2%. There is no doubt that main reason for this lies in the economic crisis which broke out in Belarus in the end of 2014. However, rating drop was not that significant as we could have imagined. Unlike in 2011 there was no collapse. Besides, trust rating of A. Lukashenko remained almost the same: in December 2014 it amounted to 49.9%, in March 2015 – to 48.8%.

From our point of view, Ukrainian policy of official Minsk was a certain counter-balance to the crisis: success on the diplomatic field had partially compensated failures on the economic field.

Fraternal cold spell

As survey demonstrates, Belarusians' evaluations of events in Ukraine didn't change significantly. As before, majority shares Russian point of view on the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Donbass. At the same time attitude to Ukraine and Ukrainians notably worsened compared to previous years.

In December 2014 survey materials we've noted that Belarusians attitude to "Crimeaisours" has slightly changed over half a year: the number of adherents of the Russian version of events became slightly lower, while the number of those who had an alternative point of view increased a bit. However, in March 2015 the trend is broken: the share of those who defined the annexation of Crimea as usurpation and occupation turned out to be minimal over the whole time of observation (Table 38). However, the share of those who didn't know how to answer was twice as big as last year.

The same peculiarity (increase of the share of those who didn't want to answer) was observed in the evaluations of the conflict in Donbass as well. However, in the answers to this question we may observe a certain decline of the share of adherents of independence of the rebellious region. Nevertheless, the share of opponents of Novorossiya remains unchanged (Table 39).

As you can see, we must be careful when talking about trends of respondents' attitude towards the events in Ukraine; each next survey may break the trend. It would be more correct to speak of a stable ratio of opinions and oscillations around it.

The numbers on respondents' attitude towards the neighboring country and its people is another confirmation of the fact, that a significant part of Belarusians doesn't share Ukrainian estimations of the crisis, going on in this country (Tables 40-41). It should be noted that Belarusians' attitude to Ukrainians has always been very good: on the scale of social distance in IISEPS surveys Ukrainians were always the second closest nation after Russians.

Table 39

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you support independence of Novorossiya?", %

Variant of answer	12'14	03'15
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	49.5	42.0
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	22.1	25.5
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	18.4	15.9
DA/NA	10.0	16.6

Table 40

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which attitude to Ukrainians prevails in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	12'09	03'15
Positive	53.8	33.5
Neutral	38.3	51.1
Negative	3.7	10.8
DA/NA	4.2	4.6

Table 41

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate current relations between Belarus and Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	12'09	03'15
Good	53.0	31.3
Unstable	34.8	50.2
Bad	5.6	7.4
DA/NA	6.6	11.1

Table 42

Dynamics of attitude to the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko*, %

Variant of answer	06'14	03'15
Positive	12.0	7.3
Indifferent	36.0	36.6
Negative	21.2	47.4
I don't consider him a legitimate President of Ukraine	15.1	–**
I don't know who was elected	10.6	–
I don't know who is this	–	3.8
DA/NA	5.2	4.9

** In June 2014 survey we asked the question "What is your attitude to the new President of Ukraine, elected on the 25th of May 2014?"*
*** A dash means that corresponding variants of answer were not present*

In comparison with the five-year-old survey positive evaluations of Ukrainians as an ethnos and of relations between Belarus and Ukraine declined by approximately 20 (!) percentage points. At the same time negative evaluations changed insignificantly. For the most part these changes were due to the growth of neutral estimations of Ukrainians and unstable mutual relationships.

Tables 40 and 41 data correlate with Tables 38 and 39 data: opinion, that Ukraine is wrong about Crimea and Donbass, is extrapolated on the attitude to the country and its people in general. It doesn't become really worse, but it becomes much colder.

Dynamics of attitude to the current Ukrainian leader also indirectly testifies on a cold snap in relations (Table 42).

At the same time respondents demonstrated a very moderate optimism in relation to a possible improvement of mutual relationships (Table 43).

It is interesting to note that, despite this cold snap in relation to Ukraine and Ukrainians, the share of adherents of the ideologeme about the triune nation remains unchanged (Table 44).

According to some people this ideologeme is a synonym of "the Russian world", ideological basis for annexation of Belarus and Ukraine by Russia. Meanwhile in reality it correlates with geopolitical setups of respondents in a rather complicated way (Table 45).

As it was expected, adherence to the ideologeme of the triune nation is related to adherence to integration with Russia, but not as tight, as it could be: almost one quarter of "triuners" support Belarus' entry into the EU. On the other hand, almost the same

Table 43

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you think, will the relations between Belarus and Ukraine become better or worse in the next few years?"

Variant of answer	%
They will become better	22.0
They will not change	46.8
They will become worse	15.3
DA/NA	15.9

Table 44

Dynamics of answering the question: "Are Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians three different nations or three branches of the same nation?", %

Variant of answer	08'06	12'09	03'15
Three branches of the same nation	65.7	66.5	66.6
Three different nations	28.3	30.6	27.1
DA/NA	6.0	2.9	6.3

Table 45

Connection between the attitude to the idea of a triune nation and the geopolitical choice and the attitude to Ukrainians, %

Variant of answer	"Are Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians three different nations or three branches of the same nation?"	
	Three branches of the same nation	Three different nations
If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?		
Integration with the RF	55.2	28.2
Joining the EU	23.2	48.8
How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?		
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	12.6	45.1
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	66.6	41.7
Which attitude to Ukrainians prevails in Belarus?		
Positive	36.4	24.3
Neutral	52.2	50.1
Negative	7.7	19.2

share of people considering Slavic people as three different nations supports integration with Russia.

In a way Americans and Englishmen or Germans and Austrians could also be considered as "twin nations": there is as much of ethnic and cultural foundations for this as for the Easter Slavic "triplets". However, this real proximity doesn't results into a need of state unity.

Connection between the "triune" ideologeme and evaluations of attitude to Ukrainians turns out to be much more unexpected. If it was a synonym for "the Russian world", then it would be logical if its adherents would give worse evaluations to Ukrainians who left this immanent and primordial unity.

However, the result is opposite. In other words, conception of the "triune nation" integrates people with a reverse logic: you cannot choose your kinsfolk, but they still are your kinsfolk.

However, you should pay attention to the fact that the question was asked not on respondents' attitude to Ukrainians, but on evaluation of prevailing attitude in Belarusian society. Those, who think that Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians are three different nations, may reason out of majority's evaluation of the current crisis in the neighboring country. And these evaluations may be seen in Tables 38 and 39.

In fine it should be said, that Belarusians' attitude to Ukrainians is in the doldrums now. Estimations of what are the reasons and who is guilty for the crisis in Ukraine have been partially projected onto the attitude to the country and its people. This doesn't mean that situation will never improve, but for the moment that's it.

If we talk about political conclusions to draw out of this, politicians naturally should not follow every ripple of public opinion. At the same time they should at least take into account real moods in society.

These moods are contradictory, if one has enough will and resources, it is possible to break them, but it is important to know them.

Language and national identity

The Belarusian language loses its importance as a sign of national identity of Belarusians. The share of those who advocate Belarusian to be the only official language in Belarus is almost equal to the share of those who want to see Russian as the only official language. At the same time national identity itself has somewhat consolidated.

The last time that IISEPS asked the question on differences between Belarusians and Russians was in 2006. Dynamics of answers since 2002 was essentially insignificant. This question was asked again during the current survey, and answers given to it testify of some important changes (Table 46).

Table 46

Dynamics of answering the question: "How Belarusians differ from Russians?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	09'02	03'03	08'06	03'15
By language	39.1	38.1	33.8	24.6
By culture and traditions	27.3	33.6	33.4	36.3
By history	22.3	26.3	27.0	32.8
By psychology	20.5	20.1	20.3	19.2
By appearance	2.6	2.5	4.7	4.8
They don't differ	44.0	37.5	41.5	32.5

Table 47

Native language and language spoken at home in Belarus according to national census of 1999 and 2009, %

Indicator	1999	2009
Consider Belarusian as native language	73.6	53.2
Consider Russian as native language	24.1	41.5
Speak Belarusian at home	36.7	23.4
Speak Russian at home	62.8	70.2

Table 48

Dynamics of answering the question: "If there was a referendum on which language should be official in Belarus, which variant would you choose?", %

Variant of answer	11'04	09'05	03'15
Belarusian should be the official language	16.8	20.1	14.5
Russian should be the official language	7.1	11.2	13.1
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	71.8	56.0	48.3
I don't care	–*	10.1	20.9
DA/NA	4.3	2.6	3.2

** This variant of answer was missing*

National identity even in the most liberal interpretation includes realization of own singularity, distinguishability from others, even those, who are very close and nice, a realization of own collective "us", which doesn't include others, even if the attitude towards them is very good.

Table 46 demonstrates that there is in fact an intensification of realization of singularity of Belarusians from Russians: in three surveys, conducted in the XXI century, the share of respondents, who considered that there were no differences between the nations, oscillated around 40%; in the last survey this share amounted only to one third of respondents. However, the way the differences have changed is no less revealing.

In the surveys conducted between 2002 and 2006 the most popular variant was the Belarusian language. However, you may notice, how from one survey to another it was losing its ground as a quality which differentiates Belarusians and Russians. In the last survey it yielded the palm to differences in culture, traditions and history.

Many researchers noted the role of the Belarusian language as a means of "symbolic communication", as a sign of national identity. This is confirmed by a significant gap between those Belarusians, who named Belarusian as their native language, and those, who said that they speak mostly Belarusian at home in the results of the last national census (Table 47). However, according to the same census, both these shares decrease.

By the look of things this process led to the fact that for Belarusians language is not the main identifier of their difference from Eastern neighbors anymore. However, this process did not lead to a weakening of realization of differences in general. This

happened at the cost of strengthening of other identifiers such as culture, traditions and history. Over 13 years the shares of respondents choosing these variants were constantly growing, having increased by 10 percentage points. As a result, Belarusians began to realize that they are different from their Eastern neighbors to even a greater extent.

The changing of the situation with the Belarusian language and its role in Belarusian society found its way into the answers to the question on preferred status of languages (Table 48).

Table 48 results demonstrate a decrease of the share of supporters of Belarusian being the only official language in the country and an increase of adherents of Russian monolingualism. In March 2015 these shares became almost equal. It should be noted that position, mentioning Russian as the only official language in Belarus, is not present in Belarusian public discourse at all. There is an idea that factual ratio of languages is described by this formula, however, it seems that no one has ever advocated deprivation Belarusian of official language status. This doesn't mean, however, that this opinion is not present in society: as you can see, it is, and it gathers more and more supporters.

We may suppose that the influence of "the Russian world" is more important in this aspect. The problem of language status became much more politically charged against the background of Ukrainian events, and this confused part of respondents. Their "I don't care" is probably a synonym of "I don't want this problem to create an occasion for troubles".

This is not the notorious "fear factor" which is so beloved by certain publicists: even in their peculiar ideas of Belarusian society no one will arrest a man who speaks in favor of the officially existing bilingualism. But this is a fear of the possibility that a definite formula of language status will cause some undesirable consequences.

In March survey we've also asked questions on respondents' reaction to a hypothetic armed invasion from Russia and NATO (Tables 49 and 50).

There were no big changes in these moods over the quarter, however, the decrease of the share of those who are ready to resist Russian armed invasion is worth mentioning. Now this share is almost equal to the share of those who would greet this course of events.

Table 51 data demonstrate how correlate the answers to the questions on differences between Belarusians and Russians, preferred status of official languages and reaction to a hypothetic armed invasion from Russia.

Table 49

Dynamics of answering the question: "If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14	03'15
I'd resist up in arms	25.9	23.4	18.7
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	39.7	48.0	47.1
I'd greet these changes	13.3	9.7	15.0
DA/NA	21.1	18.9	19.2

Table 50

Dynamics of answering the question: "If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14	03'15
I'd resist up in arms	26.0	25.8	23.3
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	40.0	39.6	45.3
I'd greet these changes	9.7	10.7	9.7
DA/NA	24.3	23.9	21.7

We may suppose, that partially this is due to both the influence of the events in Ukraine (Crimea, Donbass) and the concept of "the Russian world". However, this is not the only reason: in comparison with the 10-year-old results the share of supporters of official Russian monolingualism increased only by 2 points. If this opinion is the result of the influence of "the Russian world", then it is not the only influence.

Another revealing result is the decrease of the share of supporters of the current juridical equality of two languages. In 2004 their advantage was overwhelming; in March 2015 they are only a relative majority. By the look of things, this happened at the cost of the share of respondents choosing the variant of answer "I don't care", as the share of people choosing this category has doubled over the decade.

Those, who think that Belarusians differ from Russians by psychology and appearance, are ready to resist an armed invasion to the greatest extent. Among those, who suppose, that the difference is in the language, the share of those, who are ready to fight, is the same as among those, who see the difference in culture and traditions. However, among those, who emphasize linguistic difference, the share of those who would greet an invasion is the lowest. It is quite natural, that respondents, who see no difference between Belarusians and Russians, are the least prone to resist an intervention from Russia.

Table 51

Differences between Belarusians and Russians, preferred official languages and reaction to a hypothetical annexation of Belarus by Russia with the help of armed forces*, %

Variant of answer	"If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?"		
	I'd resist up in arms	I'd try to adapt to a new situation	I'd greet these changes
How Belarusians differ from Russians?			
By language	23.6	53.6	4.8
By culture and traditions	23.5	50.3	8.0
By history	18.5	53.7	5.2
By psychology	29.2	42.3	11.7
By appearance	30.6	48.6	15.3
They don't differ	9.7	49.7	24.7
If there was a referendum on which language should be official in Belarus, which variant would you choose?			
Belarusian should be the official language	36.5	40.6	4.1
Russian should be the official language	21.0	33.5	24.0
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	16.4	51.4	10.5
I don't care	9.1	51.4	28.4

** The table is read across*

Correlation between the characteristic under study and preferred status of official languages is quite enigmatic. As it was possible to suppose, adherents of Belarusian language officiality are most prone to the rejection of Russian intervention. However, the typical characteristic of the adepts of Russian monolingualism, despite the expectations, is not the readiness to greet "polite people" with flowers, but a contrast attitude – among them the number of those who are ready to adapt to the situation is the smallest, while the number of adherents and opponents of resisting is nearly equal.

Indifferent people are the most inclined to greeting such course of events.

In comparison with the previous surveys, the Belarusian language's role as a national identifier has slightly declined, however it was substituted by other factors, and so the self-realization as a part of a national community became somewhat stronger.

Although adherence to the Belarusian language is a factor which determines rejection of a hypothetic Russian armed invasion, other identifiers determine this attitude to the same extent. And even the wish for the Russian language to be the only official one doesn't cause maximal readiness to greet this course of events.

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in March, 2015 (%)

1. "Do you check how your incomes expressed in dollars change?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, constantly	34.1	35.3	35.3	47.3	45.8	39.6	37.7	11.9
Sometimes	43.5	45.1	45.8	39.2	40.2	45.0	45.7	43.8
Never	17.6	13.7	9.8	10.8	10.6	10.0	12.5	39.3
DA/NA	4.8	5.9	6.1	2.7	3.4	5.4	4.1	5.0

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, constantly	2.2	13.1	33.4	39.6	48.3
Sometimes	51.6	37.1	47.3	45.5	34.6
Never	43.0	40.5	15.0	10.4	12.4
DA/NA	3.2	9.3	4.3	4.5	4.7

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, constantly	48.0	38.5	25.6	13.9	37.1
Sometimes	39.8	47.3	50.0	42.5	32.9
Never	8.2	9.1	15.9	38.7	25.7
DA/NA	4.0	5.1	8.5	4.9	4.3

Table 1.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, constantly	34.2	37.3	28.0	36.5	34.3	30.7	36.8
Sometimes	51.9	50.4	43.6	40.6	45.3	34.7	32.9
Never	12.5	9.2	18.3	19.4	14.4	30.1	23.7
DA/NA	1.4	3.1	10.1	3.5	6.0	4.5	6.6

Table 1.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, constantly	34.2	42.7	37.0	31.8	27.0
Sometimes	51.9	35.2	39.1	45.0	45.5
Never	12.5	16.0	19.2	15.9	22.4
DA/NA	1.4	6.1	4.7	7.3	5.1

2. "Do you fear another devaluation of Belarusian ruble in the next few months?"

Table 2.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
This is a real threat	32.8	30.0	36.6	44.9	37.9	35.5	32.0	20.5
This is possible, but unlikely	48.4	44.0	45.1	43.5	48.1	50.5	51.5	48.5
This won’t happen	12.9	14.0	11.1	6.8	8.7	10.0	9.0	24.8
DA/NA	5.9	12.0	7.2	4.8	5.3	4.0	7.5	6.2

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
This is a real threat	12.8	20.9	31.5	36.9	41.3
This is possible, but unlikely	44.7	49.0	51.5	48.0	44.3
This won't happen	42.5	20.9	10.8	8.9	8.7
DA/NA	0	9.2	6.2	6.2	5.7

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
This is a real threat	36.9	37.1	32.5	20.1	44.3
This is possible, but unlikely	49.4	49.5	41.0	49.0	38.6
This won't happen	8.8	7.8	12.0	24.7	12.9
DA/NA	4.9	5.6	14.5	6.2	4.2

Table 2.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
This is a real threat	34.1	37.3	24.9	30.4	35.5	33.0	33.3
This is possible, but unlikely	54.6	43.9	46.9	50.3	49.5	50.6	42.1
This won't happen	9.9	18.0	12.0	15.2	8.5	9.7	17.5
DA/NA	1.4	0.8	16.2	4.1	6.5	6.7	7.1

Table 2.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
This is a real threat	34.1	36.9	31.3	31.8	30.1
This is possible, but unlikely	54.6	42.7	50.9	44.6	48.6
This won't happen	9.9	12.2	12.1	16.3	14.1
DA/NA	1.4	8.2	5.7	7.3	7.2

3. "There are different opinions concerning the progress of Belarusian economy model. Which one do you agree with?"

Table 3.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
The progress of the Belarusian economy is explained by internal reasons; Russian aid is an important but not decisive factor	32.4	30.6	28.1	22.4	22.8	27.0	33.7	49.2
Without the help of Russia there would be no progress in the Belarusian economy	35.4	22.4	26.8	25.9	40.7	40.8	39.0	33.6
There is no progress in the Belarusian economy	27.0	36.7	37.3	44.2	31.9	29.1	24.0	11.3
DA/NA	5.2	10.3	7.8	7.5	4.6	3.1	3.3	5.9

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
The progress of the Belarusian economy is explained by internal reasons; Russian aid is an important but not decisive factor	54.8	52.3	26.6	28.5	31.3
Without the help of Russia there would be no progress in the Belarusian economy	34.4	27.7	40.0	33.5	34.0
There is no progress in the Belarusian economy	5.4	15.5	27.7	31.8	31.6
DA/NA	5.4	4.5	5.7	6.2	3.1

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
The progress of the Belarusian economy is explained by internal reasons; Russian aid is an important but not decisive factor	22.8	30.7	29.3	46.9	27.5
Without the help of Russia there would be no progress in the Belarusian economy	37.4	35.9	23.2	34.8	34.8
There is no progress in the Belarusian economy	36.0	28.1	39.0	12.1	33.3
DA/NA	3.8	5.3	8.5	6.2	4.4

Table 3.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
The progress of the Belarusian economy is explained by internal reasons; Russian aid is an important but not decisive factor	22.1	26.8	44.3	23.1	34.8	37.5	40.6
Without the help of Russia there would be no progress in the Belarusian economy	38.4	33.3	20.5	53.3	44.3	25.0	34.5
There is no progress in the Belarusian economy	37.5	38.6	25.6	18.3	19.9	31.3	13.1
DA/NA	2.0	1.3	9.6	5.3	1.0	6.2	11.8

Table 3.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
The progress of the Belarusian economy is explained by internal reasons; Russian aid is an important but not decisive factor	22.1	34.0	31.6	36.0	37.4
Without the help of Russia there would be no progress in the Belarusian economy	38.4	35.0	39.4	32.6	32.2
There is no progress in the Belarusian economy	37.4	25.9	24.5	24.4	23.4
DA/NA	2.1	5.1	4.5	7.0	7.0

4. "During a press-conference in January 2015 President A. Lukashenko had stated that Belarus was not ready for a drastic change of economy development model: "I'm ready to surprise you with any model. But are you ready to digest this model?" What is your answer to this question?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	51.5	64.0	69.3	66.0	59.3	56.6	51.7	26.2
No, I'm not ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	33.0	16.0	16.3	17.7	27.4	25.6	34.7	57.7
DA/NA	15.5	20.0	14.4	16.3	13.3	17.8	13.6	16.1

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	21.1	30.7	53.7	57.9	58.4
No, I'm not ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	65.3	45.8	32.1	25.2	29.2
DA/NA	13.6	23.5	14.2	16.9	12.4

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	66.8	53.4	62.2	26.6	68.6
No, I'm not ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	22.6	28.9	17.1	55.3	24.3
DA/NA	10.6	17.7	20.7	18.1	7.1

Table 4.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	61.6	57.3	49.5	41.2	50.0	45.8	48.0
No, I'm not ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	33.3	35.7	25.7	44.7	19.5	36.7	37.1
DA/NA	5.1	7.0	24.8	14.1	30.5	17.5	14.9

Table 4.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, I'm ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	61.6	44.9	53.5	48.8	49.0
No, I'm not ready for a change of economy development model of Belarus	33.3	33.3	27.3	32.6	36.9
DA/NA	5.1	21.8	19.2	18.6	14.1

5. "Which of the following statements corresponds to your opinion most?"

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)	39.9	54.0	48.7	57.8	46.6	43.8	38.5	20.0
Our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system	42.2	30.0	39.6	31.3	43.9	44.5	44.5	44.5
Our society needs protection against forces which try to change current order	14.4	6.0	8.4	6.1	6.8	9.3	13.2	32.1
DA/NA	3.5	10.0	3.3	4.8	2.7	2.4	3.8	3.4

Table 5.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)	21.3	20.9	41.5	44.8	45.6
Our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system	46.8	41.8	42.2	42.0	41.6
Our society needs protection against forces which try to change current order	29.8	32.0	12.3	10.4	10.1
DA/NA	2.1	5.3	4.0	2.8	2.7

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)	52.1	40.0	51.2	22.1	51.4
Our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system	37.3	45.6	31.7	45.5	38.6
Our society needs protection against forces which try to change current order	8.5	10.4	12.2	28.3	8.6
DA/NA	2.1	4.0	4.9	4.1	1.4

Table 5.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)	49.0	46.5	35.3	32.9	44.0	36.9	30.6
Our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system	37.4	34.6	47.7	46.5	42.0	43.2	46.7
Our society needs protection against forces which try to change current order	12.9	14.0	12.4	17.1	12.5	17.0	16.6
DA/NA	0.7	4.9	4.6	3.5	1.5	2.9	6.1

Table 5.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Our society needs serious reforms (structural and system changes)	49.0	40.8	37.2	39.5	34.6
Our society needs gradual reforms which would preserve current system	37.4	40.8	41.1	46.5	44.7
Our society needs protection against forces which try to change current order	12.9	15.6	17.0	10.5	15.5
DA/NA	0.7	2.8	4.7	3.5	5.2

6. "President A. Lukashenko has recently stated : "We have everything. Belarusians never lived as well as they do now. If people want to live normally and feed their children, their family – they have everything for it; they just need to get going". Do you agree with this statement?"

Table 6.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	36.4	30.0	22.2	27.9	29.3	27.4	33.8	61.4
No	53.1	56.0	67.3	64.6	61.2	61.6	54.1	28.7
DA	10.5	14.0	10.5	7.5	9.5	11.0	12.1	9.9

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	88.3	52.3	31.1	29.0	31.9
No	9.6	34.6	57.1	59.7	59.7
DA	2.1	13.1	11.8	11.3	8.4

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	25.5	31.9	25.3	59.4	24.3
No	65.3	57.5	60.2	29.7	64.3
DA	9.2	10.6	14.5	10.9	11.4

Table 6.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	27.9	34.1	48.9	40.8	18.0	41.8	46.3
No	71.1	60.3	39.7	53.8	50.0	47.5	42.2
DA	1.0	5.6	11.4	5.4	32.0	10.7	11.5

Table 6.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	27.9	34.7	33.5	33.7	48.2
No	71.1	50.0	51.2	51.2	44.6
DA	1.0	15.3	15.3	15.1	7.2

7. "If there was a referendum on which language should be official in Belarus, which variant would you choose?"

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Belarusian should be the official language	14.5	12.2	17.0	16.2	13.0	11.0	14.7	17.2
Russian should be the official language	13.1	20.4	20.3	14.2	13.0	14.5	12.0	8.2
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	48.3	49.0	49.0	52.7	53.8	49.3	49.6	40.3
I don’t care	20.9	16.3	11.7	14.2	17.2	21.6	19.9	31.3
DA/NA	3.2	2.1	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.6	3.8	3.0

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Belarusian should be the official language	16.0	11.8	14.3	10.6	21.2
Russian should be the official language	5.3	14.4	14.1	14.4	11.4
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	13.8	46.4	46.8	55.9	52.2
I don’t care	60.6	20.9	22.8	15.3	12.8
DA/NA	4.3	6.5	2.0	3.8	3.4

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Belarusian should be the official language	15.3	12.5	13.4	17.3	10.1
Russian should be the official language	12.5	14.4	24.4	9.0	17.4
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	46.7	53.8	50.0	41.5	52.2
I don't care	23.1	15.3	12.2	29.1	17.4
DA/NA	2.4	4.0	0	3.1	2.9

Table 7.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Belarusian should be the official language	18.0	6.1	9.2	5.3	8.9	30.5	22.3
Russian should be the official language	6.1	9.6	15.6	28.4	6.4	7.9	22.3
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	40.5	49.6	53.2	56.2	69.8	39.5	34.1
I don't care	33.7	32.0	17.4	9.5	12.4	20.9	12.2
DA/NA	1.7	2.6	4.6	0.6	2.5	1.1	9.3

Table 7.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Belarusian should be the official language	18.0	13.3	10.0	16.6	14.7
Russian should be the official language	6.1	15.4	19.2	9.7	14.7
Both Belarusian and Russian should be official languages	40.5	48.8	49.1	55.2	48.6
I don't care	33.7	19.1	18.9	14.3	18.3
DA/NA	1.7	3.4	2.8	4.2	3.7

8. "According to you, is a significant improvement of Belarusian people's lives possible under the current rule and its policy?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Possible	49.1	44.0	39.2	34.7	34.5	41.8	51.1	75.2
Impossible	38.1	42.0	43.8	55.8	50.4	41.8	35.3	17.7
DA/NA	12.8	14.0	17.0	9.5	15.1	16.4	13.6	7.1

Table 8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Possible	78.7	75.2	47.2	44.3	36.6
Impossible	13.8	15.0	39.8	42.7	48.0
DA/NA	7.5	9.8	13.0	13.0	15.4

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Possible	39.4	42.6	36.1	73.3	40.0
Impossible	49.1	40.3	50.6	19.5	42.9
DA/NA	11.5	17.1	13.3	7.2	17.1

Table 8.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Possible	46.9	48.2	57.8	49.1	30.3	50.6	59.8
Impossible	49.0	43.0	24.3	45.6	50.2	25.6	25.8
DA/NA	4.1	8.8	17.9	5.3	19.5	23.8	14.4

Table 8.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Possible	46.9	42.0	50.5	46.1	57.1
Impossible	49.0	37.2	35.6	38.0	32.4
DA/NA	4.1	20.8	13.9	15.9	10.5

9. "Are you going to vote in presidential elections in November 2015?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, of course	35.8	20.0	28.3	29.7	28.4	33.1	40.2	48.2
Rather yes	37.6	46.0	36.8	33.1	33.0	41.3	39.8	37.2
Rather, no	16.3	16.0	17.1	25.7	26.1	16.7	9.8	9.6
Of course, no	6.0	6.0	7.2	6.8	8.7	7.8	4.9	2.8
DA/NA	4.3	12.0	10.6	4.7	3.8	1.1	5.3	2.2

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, of course	60.6	42.2	31.4	32.5	37.2
Rather yes	31.9	42.2	38.4	35.6	38.3
Rather, no	7.4	8.4	17.6	20.5	15.1
Of course, no	0.1	3.9	7.5	6.6	5.4
DA/NA	0	3.3	5.1	5.8	4.0

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, of course	26.9	35.7	25.3	50.4	23.2
Rather yes	34.7	39.6	47.0	35.7	40.6
Rather, no	25.4	14.9	9.6	8.5	23.2
Of course, no	10.4	4.9	2.4	3.1	5.8
DA/NA	2.6	4.9	15.7	2.3	7.2

Table 9.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, of course	16.3	33.6	51.4	34.1	30.0	34.7	55.5
Rather yes	35.0	38.9	37.2	36.5	50.5	38.1	29.3
Rather, no	33.0	15.7	8.3	18.2	6.5	14.8	11.8
Of course, no	12.2	8.7	1.4	9.4	3.5	4.0	0.4
DA/NA	3.5	3.1	1.7	1.8	9.5	8.4	3.0

Table 9.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, of course	16.3	43.7	33.5	43.8	41.1
Rather yes	35.0	37.5	40.9	33.7	40.1
Rather, no	33.0	11.9	15.3	12.4	10.3
Of course, no	12.2	1.0	7.1	5.4	4.1
DA/NA	3.5	5.9	3.2	4.7	4.4

10. "If A. Lukashenko runs as a candidate on presidential elections for the fifth time, and he has an adversary from democratic opposition, who will you vote for?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
For A. Lukashenko	37.0	24.5	24.3	18.9	23.1	30.7	37.6	66.5
For the candidate from democratic opposition	23.2	30.6	27.0	37.2	31.8	21.1	22.9	9.9
For neither of them	21.0	28.6	26.3	24.3	26.9	24.3	18.8	11.0
DA/NA	18.8	16.3	22.4	19.6	18.2	23.9	20.7	12.6

Table 10.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
For A. Lukashenko	76.6	69.3	31.0	29.2	30.2
For the candidate from democratic opposition	2.1	7.2	23.3	25.0	35.2
For neither of them	8.5	13.1	26.2	24.8	13.8
DA/NA	12.8	10.4	19.5	21.0	20.8

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
For A. Lukashenko	23.3	31.8	26.5	64.4	20.3
For the candidate from democratic opposition	31.4	22.3	38.6	10.1	34.8
For neither of them	29.7	21.1	18.1	11.6	23.2
DA/NA	15.6	24.2	16.8	13.9	21.7

Table 10.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
For A. Lukashenko	26.2	35.1	46.8	42.9	24.5	42.6	46.3
For the candidate from democratic opposition	31.6	28.5	19.7	20.6	27.0	10.2	18.3
For neither of them	37.8	28.1	9.2	20.6	7.0	21.6	15.3
DA/NA	4.4	8.3	24.3	15.9	41.5	25.6	20.1

Table 10.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
For A. Lukashenko	26.2	37.5	37.6	34.1	46.4
For the candidate from democratic opposition	31.6	19.5	19.9	26.4	19.8
For neither of them	37.8	12.3	20.9	16.7	17.5
DA/NA	4.4	30.7	21.6	22.8	16.3

11. "Which of the following statements do you agree with?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
There are no political prisoners in Belarus, only people who were sentenced for crimes against Belarusian laws	32.0	22.0	22.9	15.6	21.6	31.3	32.0	52.1
There are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity	51.0	60.0	56.2	70.7	64.0	53.4	48.5	29.6
DA	17.0	18.0	20.9	13.7	14.4	15.3	19.5	18.3

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
There are no political prisoners in Belarus, only people who were sentenced for crimes against Belarusian laws	67.4	45.8	29.5	24.8	28.5
There are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity	14.7	34.0	53.1	58.0	57.0
DA	17.9	20.2	17.4	17.2	14.5

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
There are no political prisoners in Belarus, only people who were sentenced for crimes against Belarusian laws	22.4	30.5	20.7	48.8	20.0
There are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity	63.2	52.5	58.5	31.3	65.7
DA	14.4	17.1	20.7	19.9	14.3

Table 11.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
There are no political prisoners in Belarus, only people who were sentenced for crimes against Belarusian laws	23.8	38.2	45.7	30.0	22.0	35.6	31.1
There are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity	71.4	50.8	29.2	57.1	59.0	50.3	33.8
DA	4.8	11.0	25.1	12.9	19.0	14.1	35.1

Table 11.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
There are no political prisoners in Belarus, only people who were sentenced for crimes against Belarusian laws	23.8	28.9	32.4	31.9	39.9
There are people who were sentenced to prison for their political activity	71.4	47.3	53.0	48.6	38.4
DA	4.8	23.8	14.6	19.5	21.7

12. "Some people consider themselves as supporters of the current power, others – as opponents. Which group would you ascribe yourself to?"

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I am a supporter of the current power	37.3	30.0	24.2	19.7	22.0	34.6	37.6	64.5
I am an opponent of the current power	25.4	28.0	35.3	40.8	30.8	23.6	24.1	12.4
I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent	36.7	42.0	39.9	39.5	46.4	41.4	37.2	22.3
DA/NA	0.6	0	0.5	0	0.8	0.4	1.1	0.8

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I am a supporter of the current power	73.4	67.3	32.5	28.8	31.3
I am an opponent of the current power	5.3	6.5	26.7	29.0	33.7
I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent	19.1	24.8	40.4	41.7	34.0
DA/NA	2.2	1.4	0.4	0.5	1.0

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I am a supporter of the current power	24.7	32.7	28.4	62.1	21.4
I am an opponent of the current power	33.4	25.0	38.3	13.7	30.0
I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent	41.4	41.6	32.1	23.5	48.6
DA/NA	0.5	0.7	1.2	0.8	0

Table 12.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I am a supporter of the current power	21.1	31.0	46.4	41.2	27.0	50.8	50.7
I am an opponent of the current power	29.9	29.7	14.2	28.8	34.5	9.6	27.9
I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent	49.0	38.4	37.6	30.0	38.5	37.9	20.5
DA/NA	0	0.9	1.8	0	0	1.7	0.9

Table 12.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I am a supporter of the current power	21.1	45.9	36.7	37.4	43.2
I am an opponent of the current power	29.9	16.7	27.3	30.4	23.9
I've never thought about it and I'm indifferent	49.0	36.7	35.6	31.0	31.9
DA/NA	0	0.7	0.4	1.2	1.0

13. "In the end of the past year Russia introduced a ban on importing foods from Belarus and accused Belarus of low quality of products and re-export of foods from the EU countries. How do you evaluate positions of the sides in this conflict?"

Table 13.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Russian side is to blame in this conflict	35.1	42.9	40.9	32.9	34.5	35.9	33.8	33.2
Belarusian side is to blame in this conflict	10.2	12.2	4.5	11.6	14.4	9.3	13.2	7.3
Both sides are to blame equally	42.9	28.6	41.6	44.5	41.3	43.4	43.6	44.8
DA/NA	11.8	16.3	13.0	11.0	9.8	11.4	9.4	14.7

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Russian side is to blame in this conflict	28.7	38.6	36.0	33.7	35.7
Belarusian side is to blame in this conflict	5.3	5.2	9.9	11.6	12.8
Both sides are to blame equally	60.6	37.9	43.9	42.0	39.7
DA/NA	5.4	18.3	10.2	12.7	11.8

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Russian side is to blame in this conflict	34.5	35.0	45.1	31.7	47.1
Belarusian side is to blame in this conflict	15.4	8.7	8.5	7.2	10.0
Both sides are to blame equally	41.1	44.3	35.4	46.6	30.0
DA/NA	9.0	12.0	11.0	14.5	12.9

Table 13.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Russian side is to blame in this conflict	36.7	34.1	25.1	31.8	53.0	25.5	38.3
Belarusian side is to blame in this conflict	16.0	12.2	5.5	14.1	31.0	54.5	30.7
Both sides are to blame equally	45.6	48.5	48.9	41.2	31.0	54.5	30.7
DA/NA	1.7	5.2	20.6	12.9	14.0	12.5	19.3

Table 13.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Russian side is to blame in this conflict	36.7	37.2	35.4	34.9	32.4
Belarusian side is to blame in this conflict	16.0	7.5	8.2	14.0	6.7
Both sides are to blame equally	45.6	43.4	37.9	38.8	47.0
DA/NA	1.7	11.9	18.5	12.3	13.9

14. "Did your attitude to Russia change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, it became worse	21.5	17.6	26.8	28.6	25.8	19.9	23.7	13.2
Yes, it became better	22.0	15.7	11.1	13.6	18.9	21.0	22.9	33.5
No, it didn't change	52.2	60.8	54.9	54.4	50.4	55.5	50.4	48.7
DA/NA	4.3	5.9	7.2	3.4	4.9	3.6	3.0	4.6

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, it became worse	7.4	13.7	18.3	26.0	29.5
Yes, it became better	57.4	21.6	20.5	18.7	18.8
No, it didn't change	35.1	56.9	56.6	53.0	46.0
DA/NA	0.1	7.8	4.6	2.3	5.7

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, it became worse	27.4	20.4	23.2	15.5	26.8
Yes, it became better	18.9	20.0	15.9	32.2	8.5
No, it didn't change	50.0	54.9	56.1	47.9	62.0
DA/NA	3.7	4.7	4.8	4.4	2.7

Table 14.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, it became worse	24.8	18.4	12.8	30.0	19.5	10.8	32.0
Yes, it became better	21.1	25.4	21.6	12.4	18.0	29.0	26.4
No, it didn't change	53.7	53.1	61.9	52.9	57.0	58.5	29.8
DA/NA	0.4	3.1	3.7	4.7	5.5	1.7	11.8

Table 14.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, it became worse	24.8	23.1	12.8	20.6	24.7
Yes, it became better	21.2	24.8	15.6	28.4	21.1
No, it didn't change	53.7	46.3	66.0	45.1	50.0
DA/NA	0.3	5.8	5.6	5.9	4.2

15. "Did your attitude to the EU change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, it became worse	35.6	27.5	23.5	27.2	31.9	34.4	39.8	46.2
Yes, it became better	7.9	3.9	7.2	5.4	7.2	9.6	10.9	6.8
No, it didn't change	49.7	60.8	58.8	58.8	50.6	51.4	45.1	41.7
DA/NA	6.8	7.8	10.5	8.6	10.3	4.6	4.2	5.3

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, it became worse	47.9	39.6	31.8	34.6	38.3
Yes, it became better	9.6	5.8	8.6	7.0	8.4
No, it didn't change	42.5	46.8	52.5	50.6	47.0
DA/NA	0	7.8	7.1	7.8	6.3

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, it became worse	28.1	37.1	28.9	45.5	21.4
Yes, it became better	10.8	6.0	2.5	8.7	7.1
No, it didn't change	53.8	50.2	57.8	40.4	64.3
DA/NA	7.3	6.7	10.8	5.4	7.2

Table 15.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, it became worse	29.2	32.9	51.4	27.1	29.6	53.4	29.8
Yes, it became better	4.8	5.3	4.6	9.4	2.0	5.7	23.2
No, it didn't change	64.6	59.2	34.4	57.6	60.8	36.4	30.3
DA/NA	1.4	2.6	9.6	5.9	7.6	4.5	16.7

Table 15.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, it became worse	29.2	38.2	27.8	41.2	40.5
Yes, it became better	4.8	9.2	7.8	7.8	9.3
No, it didn't change	64.6	44.0	58.0	43.2	41.2
DA/NA	1.4	8.6	6.4	7.8	9.0

16. "Which attitude to Ukrainians prevails in Belarus?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positive	33.5	26.0	39.0	32.0	25.5	30.0	34.6	41.0
Neutral	51.1	68.0	50.0	53.1	54.4	56.8	48.9	43.2
Negative	10.8	6.0	6.5	8.8	13.3	10.0	13.2	11.0
DA/NA	4.6	0	4.5	6.1	6.8	3.2	3.3	4.8

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	47.9	40.3	34.0	30.7	29.0
Neutral	44.7	45.5	51.4	53.5	51.9
Negative	7.4	9.1	9.7	10.1	15.5
DA/NA	0	5.1	4.9	5.7	3.6

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Positive	28.3	32.7	31.7	41.1	32.9
Neutral	57.3	50.6	58.5	42.6	55.7
Negative	9.7	11.3	9.8	11.6	10.0
DA/NA	4.7	5.4	0	4.7	1.4

Table 16.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Positive	26.8	34.6	29.0	19.9	53.8	54.0	22.3
Neutral	67.1	53.5	51.2	50.9	31.7	38.1	55.5
Negative	4.4	9.3	13.8	26.9	8.5	4.5	12.7
DA/NA	1.7	2.6	6.0	2.3	6.0	3.4	9.5

Table 16.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	26.8	31.0	37.0	35.0	37.2
Neutral	67.1	46.5	48.4	48.6	46.0
Negative	4.4	15.0	11.0	12.8	10.9
DA/NA	1.7	7.5	3.6	3.6	5.9

17. "How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's role in the negotiations between the leaders of Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France, which were held on February 11-12 in Minsk and lead to signing of a treaty on settlement of the conflict in Ukraine?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
A. Lukashenko had no role at all, Belarus simply provided place for the negotiations	28.0	36.0	34.0	41.1	34.2	27.1	27.8	14.9
A. Lukashenko's role was small, but useful for achieving peace	47.7	50.0	41.2	44.5	46.4	48.4	51.9	48.7
A. Lukashenko played an important role as a peacemaker	20.4	12.0	15.7	9.6	16.3	19.9	18.8	33.0
DA/NA	3.9	2.0	9.1	4.8	3.1	4.6	1.5	3.4

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
A. Lukashenko had no role at all, Belarus simply provided place for the negotiations	12.8	15.0	27.8	29.0	38.1
A. Lukashenko's role was small, but useful for achieving peace	28.7	54.2	49.5	51.9	40.8
A. Lukashenko played an important role as a peacemaker	52.1	28.8	18.3	15.8	16.7
DA/NA	6.4	2.0	4.4	3.3	4.4

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
A. Lukashenko had no role at all, Belarus simply provided place for the negotiations	38.8	26.5	38.3	15.9	28.2
A. Lukashenko's role was small, but useful for achieving peace	45.6	50.2	39.5	48.6	45.1
A. Lukashenko played an important role as a peacemaker	10.9	20.7	16.0	31.9	18.3
DA/NA	4.7	2.6	6.2	3.6	8.4

Table 17.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
A. Lukashenko had no role at all, Belarus simply provided place for the negotiations	37.8	29.8	18.3	34.3	27.9	19.3	25.0
A. Lukashenko's role was small, but useful for achieving peace	49.3	47.8	49.1	37.3	61.1	43.8	43.0
A. Lukashenko played an important role as a peacemaker	12.2	20.2	28.4	21.3	10.0	34.7	21.0
DA/NA	0.7	2.2	4.2	7.1	1.0	2.2	11.0

Table 17.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
A. Lukashenko had no role at all, Belarus simply provided place for the negotiations	37.8	27.2	27.8	23.3	24.3
A. Lukashenko's role was small, but useful for achieving peace	49.3	50.0	47.3	44.4	47.1
A. Lukashenko played an important role as a peacemaker	12.2	18.7	19.6	29.2	22.7
DA/NA	0.7	4.1	5.3	3.1	5.9

18. "How do you evaluate the possibility of bringing Belarusian peacekeeping forces under the flag of the UN in order to observe the truce in Donbass?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positively	18.2	18.0	18.2	16.3	17.4	16.4	23.7	17.2
Indifferently	26.7	28.0	28.6	26.5	26.9	26.1	21.8	29.7
Negatively	44.8	42.0	44.2	46.9	46.2	47.9	43.2	42.1
DA	10.3	12.0	9.0	10.3	9.5	9.6	11.3	11.0

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positively	7.4	24.8	17.4	15.6	23.5
Indifferently	51.6	22.9	30.6	23.8	17.4
Negatively	31.6	38.6	42.3	50.7	48.3
DA	9.4	13.7	9.7	9.9	10.8

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Positively	18.7	18.9	10.8	17.5	22.9
Indifferently	31.9	20.5	30.1	30.2	20.0
Negatively	40.4	50.6	47.0	41.0	44.3
DA	9.0	10.0	12.1	11.3	12.8

Table 18.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Positively	19.3	7.9	29.4	10.1	14.0	17.6	26.2
Indifferently	36.6	28.9	18.3	29.0	14.5	23.9	30.5
Negatively	40.3	55.7	38.1	55.0	66.5	41.5	22.3
DA	3.8	7.5	14.2	5.9	5.0	17.0	21.0

Table 18.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positively	19.3	20.1	18.1	16.2	17.3
Indifferently	36.6	24.8	28.1	19.8	24.2
Negatively	40.3	44.2	44.9	50.0	44.8
DA	3.8	10.9	8.9	14.0	13.7

19. "12 employees of a French satirical journal "Charlie Hebdo" were killed in January in Paris. This was a revenge for publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. What do you think about this?"

Table 19.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It is an attempt upon the freedom of speech	38.8	39.2	41.2	43.8	43.3	45.6	37.2	28.4
I pity the killed ones, but it was their fault, they shouldn't have insulted religious feelings	38.2	39.3	31.4	34.2	33.5	34.5	43.6	44.9
It was a fair punishment for insulting religious feelings	7.9	3.9	5.9	6.2	8.7	6.4	7.5	11.0
DA/NA	15.1	17.6	21.5	15.8	14.5	13.5	11.7	15.7

Table 19.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It is an attempt upon the freedom of speech	11.7	39.0	37.8	39.6	47.8
I pity the killed ones, but it was their fault, they shouldn't have insulted religious feelings	73.4	31.2	39.1	36.3	31.6
It was a fair punishment for insulting religious feelings	7.4	9.7	9.3	7.3	5.7
DA/NA	7.5	20.1	13.8	16.8	14.9

Table 19.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
It is an attempt upon the freedom of speech	48.7	39.2	41.5	27.1	37.1
I pity the killed ones, but it was their fault, they shouldn't have insulted religious feelings	32.0	38.5	34.1	45.9	35.7
It was a fair punishment for insulting religious feelings	5.9	7.8	4.9	10.8	10.0
DA/NA	13.4	14.5	19.5	16.2	17.2

Table 19.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
It is an attempt upon the freedom of speech	48.3	33.9	33.6	25.9	55.0	31.6	37.3
I pity the killed ones, but it was their fault, they shouldn't have insulted religious feelings	40.5	48.5	38.7	43.5	28.5	49.7	20.6
It was a fair punishment for insulting religious feelings	4.4	12.3	4.6	18.8	4.5	5.6	7.9
DA/NA	6.8	5.3	23.1	11.8	12.0	13.1	34.2

Table 19.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It is an attempt upon the freedom of speech	48.3	43.7	40.8	30.6	32.0
I pity the killed ones, but it was their fault, they shouldn't have insulted religious feelings	40.5	31.7	37.6	40.7	39.9
It was a fair punishment for insulting religious feelings	4.4	6.1	9.6	10.5	9.0
DA/NA	6.8	18.5	12.0	18.2	19.1

20. "Several years ago the EU and the USA have introduced sanctions against the leadership of Belarus. They have forbidden their countries to 250 of Belarusian officials, judges and journalists headed by A. Lukashenko, because they are considered to be guilty of falsification of results of presidential elections and repressions against participants of peaceful protests. Later they have introduced economic sanctions against several Belarusian enterprises, because their incomes are considered to strengthen political regime which suppresses democracy and human rights. How do you evaluate introduction of these sanctions?"

Table 20.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positive	16.9	10.0	24.0	23.8	19.8	16.7	18.4	9.0
Negative	36.8	20.0	21.1	24.5	31.9	34.0	40.8	53.0
Indifferent	37.8	50.0	44.8	45.6	38.8	40.1	34.1	30.2
DA/NA	8.5	20.0	9.1	6.1	9.5	9.2	6.7	7.8

Table 20.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	4.3	8.5	16.3	17.5	25.8
Negative	67.0	43.8	35.2	33.7	30.5
Indifferent	23.4	34.6	41.9	38.9	34.9
DA/NA	5.3	13.1	6.6	9.9	8.8

Table 20.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Positive	27.1	14.3	19.8	9.6	12.7
Negative	22.9	39.6	19.8	53.0	28.1
Indifferent	41.0	38.7	45.7	29.4	47.9
DA/NA	9.0	7.4	14.7	8.0	11.3

Table 20.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Positive	32.5	19.7	6.9	10.1	14.0	4.5	20.5
Negative	24.4	39.0	47.7	38.7	25.5	52.3	36.3
Indifferent	42.0	38.2	33.0	42.3	53.0	36.9	21.4
DA/NA	1.1	3.1	12.4	8.9	7.5	6.3	21.8

Table 20.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	32.5	13.7	14.6	13.2	11.6
Negative	24.4	38.2	29.2	38.9	49.2
Indifferent	42.0	35.8	48.8	35.8	29.4
DA/NA	1.1	12.3	7.4	12.1	9.8

OPEN FORUM

In this issue of the IISEPS analytical bulletin under the heading "Open Forum" we continue to publish a selection of data from sociological surveys conducted by our colleagues in foreign countries with our brief comments.

Despite purposeful efforts of the Belarusian leadership to design their own model of development, its uniqueness is relative. This conclusion applies to economic, political, social and other components of the Belarusian model. We believe that the comparative analysis of social processes in other countries will allow readers to better understand the results of researches on the Belarusian society.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VIGILANCE IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCHES

In the first quarter of 2015 two chiefs of state sociological services publicly expressed their opinion on the IISEPS. On the 14th of January the chief of Information-Analytical Center under Administration of the President of the republic of Belarus (IAC) A. Derbin stated his thoughts in an interview to BELTA reporter. On the 28th of January Professor I. Kotlyarov, chief of Institute of Sociology of NAS of Belarus, gave an interview to The Soviet Belorussia.

This co-ordination in time cannot be accidental. Both interviews were held under the motto "Why people should not trust to all sociological surveys and is it possible to conduct remote surveys from abroad?" We cannot exclude the possibility that all those questions were written in the same cabinet.

Both maestros of state sociology were categorical in their conclusions. I. Kotlyarov said: "Personally I think that they don't conduct any surveys in Belarus at all, but plainly use some random data which have no connection to the topic of research". A. Derbin was even more categorical: "I want to notice that each interviewer has a certification where the topic of the survey, its time constraints and the name of the organization are marked. Still there are cases when vigilant citizens called militia to inform that our interviewers conduct door-to-door interviews. However, we don't know any case when militia arrived and met interviewers from the IISEPS. If they had been conducting surveys, this would certainly have happened. So there is a big question on how they conduct their surveys".

I. Kotlyarov's interview was accompanied by several tables with questions on mass media without any information on when those questions were asked. To our big surprise, Institute of Sociology's data is sensibly the same as "random data" of the IISEPS (Table 1).

Unfortunately, the Institute of Sociology does not publish answers to politically charged questions. In this regard they are in full agreement with the IAC. This is why we don't have the chance to compare A. Lukashenko's rating calculated "by strict scientific procedure" with the same rating which the IISEPS "paints fulfilling someone's order".

Table 1

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you use internet?"*, %

Variant of answer	IISEPS	Institute of Sociology
Yes, daily	40.4	46.2
Yes, several times a week	17.3	12.2
Yes, several times a month	6.5	4.4
Yes, several times a year	0.6	3.5
No / Don't know what it is	35.2	29.5

** Some formulations were different, for example, "Yes, several times a year" for the IISEPS and "Less than once a month" for the Institute of Sociology*

FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE LEAD OF RUSSIA

On the 8th of February the Public Opinion Foundation (POF) registered the historical maximum of electoral rating of the President of Russia V. Putin (74%). Five consecutive weekly surveys gave the same result. The line of rating on the graph confidently goes in parallel with the base line. What does that mean? A triumph of a politician or a definitive death of society, which didn't manage to blend into modern times?

It's easy to remember the popular cinema shots of ECG recorders which start to show a straight line. In these cases doctors usually try to jumpstart patient's heart with the help of an electric discharge. However, current situation is different from cinematic likes in the aspect that the straight line on the graph is in many respects the result of powerful discharges of propaganda. As a consequence, in order to get the society back to life there is no need in intensive care, but on the contrary, this intensive care should be stopped.

WCIOM does not publish electoral ratings of politicians since May 2014. V. Putin's rating in May amounted to 68%, which is by 25 points higher than in February. Unlike POF, Levada-center measures open electoral ratings of politicians (no list attached). In February V. Putin's rating amounted to 55% (in

August it was 57%). But this is the share of all respondents. If we take only those who declared their readiness to participate in presidential elections, the level of electoral support of V. Putin is fundamentally different – 86%! March rating of V. Putin's actions approval amounted to 85%, which is only 1 point lower that in February.

Russian civilization: they have turned people's attention from the inner problems to outer ones.

The success surpassed the wildest expectations, and this is reflected in the third column of Table 2. The only exception is the level of well-being of people, because its perception depends on propagandistic efforts of the state to the least extent.

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "Name positive changes in the life of the country over the past year, which you relate to Vladimir Putin?", % *(open question, more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	2008	2013	2014	2015
Stabilization in the country	14	5	16	15
Annexation of Crimea, settlement of the Ukrainian question, sanctions	–	–	–	14
Russia's position in the world became stronger, foreign policy became better	12	3	10	11
Economical well-being of people became better; salaries, pensions and social benefits increased; the life improved overall	25	11	11	11
Economy, industry and agriculture are being restored; economic growth	9	3	5	9

"The Black Tuesday", when the Russian ruble collapsed on the 16th of December, had no influence on the electoral rating of the national leader. Subsequent anxious reports from the economical front didn't shake the rating as well. After several years of "electoral vacancy" V. Putin's rating has the Teflon quality, i.e. it doesn't depend on the state of economy.

On the 13th of March WCIOM published their press-release № 2792 entitled "Vladimir Putin: three years after the Elections-2012, fifteen years in the lead of Russia". Here are some excerpts from the press-release.

"Over the years of presidency Vladimir Putin became the universally recognized leader of the country. Despite economical hardships Russian citizens highly value his work and treat him with respect, hope and trust". "Rating of approval of President's work amounted to 88% in March. Russian citizens mostly feel respect (44%), hope (33%) and trust (30%) towards Vladimir Putin.

More than one third of our fellow citizens (37%) are convinced that Putin's main concern is the position of the country on the world arena. Two thirds of respondents (68%) stated that over the years of being in power President justified their hopes".

We reduced the number of answers to the question of Table 2 to five most popular variants. Low activity of respondents shouldn't surprise you. It is normal for open questions. Nevertheless, it is easy to notice a hole for the unhappy year 2013, when V. Putin wasn't perceived as a guarantor of stability in the country (–9 points in comparison with 2008). However, he lost same 9 points as the sole person responsible for the foreign policy. Two last rows of Table 2 demonstrate the inability of the head of state to manage economical problems, both on household (–14 points!) and national economy (–6 points) levels.

Kremlin didn't need non-standard innovations to solve inner issues. They have used the algorithm, which reliability is confirmed by the many centuries of

New economic reality changed the structure of people's complaints against the government; however the level of complaints didn't change. According to Levada-center, only 10% of Russians have no complaints against the government over the last 15 years.

The most important complaint is related to the fact that Russian government cannot cope with the price hike and with the decrease of incomes. 55% of respondents mentioned this in March. Only a year ago only 41% of respondents mentioned these complaints, while in 2000 the figure amounted to 39%.

In 2000 price hike reached 20%. However this caused less discontent than now, when annual inflation equals to nearly 17%. This paradox can be explained by the fact that in the beginning of aughties economic hardships were perceived as temporary problems. People expected that under the new President life in Russia will soon get better, and it won't get worse than during the 1998 default. These expectations weren't groundless, because in the first half of aughties real after-tax incomes of citizens were increasing by 10% every year, and sometimes even more.

It seems that today positive expectations tend to decrease. Nowadays many Russians think that future will bring only more problems. A lot of people don't see government effectively solving emerging issues.

The second place in the list of complaints is occupied by the lack of well-thought economic plan in the ministry. 29% of respondents mentioned that.

Citizens also blame government for the following: powers cannot cope with the economic crisis; they don't think about social security of people and cannot provide work for Russians; powers are corrupted and act in their sole interest – each of these variants was mentioned by approximately 20% of respondents.

The lack of correlation between V. Putin's rating and Russians' evaluations of their well-being over a year should be considered as something extraordinary. The chief of Levada-center L. Gudkov

says: "All the indices of social moods go downwards. But it doesn't influence the attitude towards the power. The level of support is still very high. There is identification with the great power, an attempt to gain self-esteem – yeah, we're that cool! And there is a different level of reality – impoverishment, devaluation of savings, purchasing power and salaries decrease. But these levels are somewhat parallel now, they don't intersect. We could call it schizophrenia or something else, but this is the reality of the moment".

How long will this paradoxical situation remain unchanged? Those who wish to make at least an approximate forecast become more and more rare today. Probably, there won't be any changes in the next few months.

CRIMEA IS OURS: A YEAR LATER

According to February survey of WCIOM the overwhelming majority of Russians (85%) consider that the decision on re-integration of Crimea and Russia is final. Only 4% suppose that territorial allegiance of the peninsula may be discussed again under certain circumstances (under the pressure from the West, under the threat of a war and so on).

opinion. Let us note that with the growth of education level of respondents their positive evaluations increase as well, which is quite unexpected against the background of long-standing IISEPS surveys (in Belarus there is an inverse relationship between the level of education and the level of support of politically-charged decisions of the power).

Most respondents (65%) didn't know if there were any signs of decline for people living on the peninsula after the re-integration with Russia. Those who suppose that there were some hardships speak mostly of domestic problems: electricity, gas, water (11%), blockade attempts from the side of Ukraine (7%), bureaucratic obstacles (5%).

Majority of Russians are convinced that world community will recognize Crimea as a Russian territory sooner or later: 27% of respondents suppose that it will happen quite soon, 43% – in the next few years, 15% – in 10 years or later. Only 8% suppose that it will never happen.

Amid the high support of Kremlin's policy the share of those who are ready to "feed Crimea" beyond the general budget norm reduced noticeably over less than a year: from 23% down to 15% (Table 4). It is one thing to demonstrate virtual patriotic feelings in response to virtual (TV) appeals.

Table 3

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you think, was Crimea's comprisal into Russia profitable or harmful for people living there?" depending on education, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Primary, incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher
Rather profitable	80	71	78	81	83
Rather harmful	9	10	11	9	6
DA	11	19	11	11	11

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which opinion do you agree with most a all?", %

Variant of answer	04'14	02'15
Crimea and Sebastopol should receive a bigger financial support from the federal budget than other regions of Russia	23	15
Crimea and Sebastopol should receive the same financial support from the federal budget as other regions of Russia with similar social and economic conditions	63	74
Crimea and Sebastopol should not receive any support from the federal budget	8	6
Don't know	7	5

Two thirds of respondents (69%) agree that Russia benefited from the annexation of Crimea. People still consider that most important benefits are: an outlet to the sea and possibility of free deployment of the Black Sea Fleet bases (36%), additional resort lands (21%), and restoration of historical justice (23%). The share of those who see negative consequences amounts to 14%. Supporters of this viewpoint are mostly worried about sanctions, economic crisis in the country and big expenditures of budget on supporting the new constituent entity of Russia.

80% of respondents are sure that re-integration with Russia was profitable for the inhabitants of Crimea (Table 3). Only 9% share the opposite

And it is a completely different thing to agree to support great-power ambitions out of your own pocket.

Levada-center data confirm that major part of population still evaluates positively the annexation of Crimea. But the explanations used to legitimize this act have changed. A year ago in March the actions of Russian leadership were perceived as a pursuit to protect Russian population in Crimea and to stabilize the situation in Ukraine; today people tend to emphasize the restoration of historical justice (40%) – a restitution of Russian territory. This idea was widely promoted in mass media and official discourse.

The share of people who evaluate positively the consequences of the annexation decreases: from

79% in May 2014 down to 69% in March 2015. "Expansionist" expectations of population are confined to Crimea: 57% of respondents think that in future Russia should stay in its current borders. The number of Russians, considering that Russia has the right to annex former USSR territories in case the rights of Russians living there are infringed, decreased from 58% in March 2014 down to 34% in March 2015.

Even a year after the annexation of Crimea state propaganda manages to attract Russians' attention to the events in Ukraine. 48% of respondents followed these events very/rather attentively in February 2015. The peak of attention happened in June 2014 – 65%.

In February 34% of respondents agreed with the statement that "there is a war between Russia and Ukraine". However, this is a strange war, because it is impossible to understand who's battling on the Russian side: only 26% of Russians dare say that there are Russian troops on the Ukrainian territory. 45% of respondents stated that they would be positive if they learnt that "regular Russian military units are in the ranks of pro-Russian fighters". So the war goes on, Russia takes part in it one way or another, but it is not clear, who's battling: Ukrainians with Ukrainians or Russia with Ukraine.

Mass consciousness gradually gets used to this hybrid character of ongoing events. A. Levinson, sociologist of Levada-center, states: "In the more intimate situation of focus-groups people more and more often mention the opinion that this isn't a war against Ukraine and Ukrainians – we don't need them. This is a world war, a war against our most important opponent. Sometimes it is the West, the NATO, the USA – people think that these are synonyms. A lot of people directly qualify these events as an ongoing third world war".

That is why the attitude to Ukraine (which is an opponent in a war, as more than one third of Russians agrees) is as follows: only 27% of respondents have a negative attitude, other 27% are indifferent and 40% of respondents even have a "good" attitude.

Thus there is a war against the West. But even this war is perceived as a hybrid one by the majority of population. As a result, 66% of Russians think that it is important to "mend relations" with the opponent, called "the USA and other Western countries".

"WE HAVE LOST DONBASS"

Foreign-policy orientations of people living in Donbass are drastically different from those of people living in other regions of Ukraine. This is proved by results of a survey conducted in February by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Donbass is the only region where the number of supporters of entry into the Customs Union is bigger than the number of those who prefer euro-integration. This could mean that after the complete cessation of hostilities Donbass will be ready to re-integrate Ukraine only on their own terms.

The survey was conducted on the whole territory of Ukraine, including Donetsk and Lugansk regions (both zones which are under and not under Ukrainian control). In addition to these regions, Kharkov region was also attributed to the Eastern part. It turned out that the East still prefers the idea of entering the Customs Union (30% of support) than euro-integration (20%).

K. Bondarenko, the head of the Institute of Ukrainian Policy, said: "We have lost Donbass, in the sense that Ukraine has lost the struggle for its people. We may continue the war, we may even raze the region to the ground, but that will only escalate problems. Donbass cannot be subordinated by force alone. The only possibility is a compromise with credible assurances. But this compromise can be achieved only by negotiations. And Ukrainian powers should negotiate not with the ones they would like to, but with the ones who have emerged as real leaders of Donbass amid the recent events".

In neighboring regions of the Southern part of Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Kherson) only 12% of respondents would vote for entry into the Customs Union, while 33% would prefer rapprochement with the EU. In the West and in the Center of Ukraine majority of citizens (from 57% up to 75%) prefer the EU as earlier.

All in all today in Ukraine the number of supporters of joining the EU constitutes 47.2%, while the number of supporters of entering the Customs Union amounts to 12.3%. Before the Euromaidan euro-integration was supported by 41% of Ukrainians and the Custom Union membership – by 35% (Tables 5-6).

Public opinion was influenced not so much by the events of the Euromaidan, which started as actions in support of euro-integration, as by the further events in Crimea and Donbass. "Part of society changed their views in favor of pro-European course of integration; another part condemns actions of Russia, but don't support integration with the EU, and thus incline to an independent course for Ukraine", – explained the analytics of the KIIS.

According to the results of the survey, the number of people, who prefer neither variant of integration, grew from 9% on the eve of the Euromaidan up to 27% in January 2015. Experts in Kiev note that this index is the most important one, because it testifies that Ukrainians fear actions of Russia and don't trust the EU at the same time.

RUSSIA BECAME ONE OF WORLD LEADERS

The number of Americans considering Russia "the United States' greatest enemy" has recently doubled. This is the result of a survey conducted by the American Gallup Institute in February 2015. According to this poll, 18% of Americans share this opinion. Two years ago, only 2% of Americans mentioned Russia, but that increased to 9% in 2014.

It should be noted that in 2012 during pre-election debates between M. Romney and B. Obama the

latter made fun of his adversary when Romney named Russia (and not Al-Qaeda) as the greatest enemy of the US.

It's not a secret that ordinary people in America are quite conservative (the same may be said about ordinary people of any country though). Usually this is confirmed by sociological data, especially when it comes to foreign-policy preferences of US citizens. The list of countries, which have or don't have Americans' sympathies, sometimes remains the same over decades, according to the Gallup Institute.

to blame for the military actions and peaceful population bombardments.

According to Levada-center, attitude towards America in Russia is quite similar. Today 82% of Russians are negative towards the USA. This is the highest level of distrust to America since 1988.

However, there are certain nuances in the attitude of Russians towards the USA, which are absent in the attitude of Americans to Russia. Firstly, judging by sociologic surveys, growth of anti-American moods in Russia had been constantly observed

Table 5

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which way of integration should Ukraine choose?", %

Variant of answer	02'13	09'13	02'15
Entry into the European Union	36.6	41.3	47.2
Entry into the Customs Union	37.5	35.3	12.3
Neither	10.7	9.2	27.3
DA	15.2	14.1	13.1

Table 6

Distribution of answers to the question: "Which way of integration should Ukraine choose?" depending on region*, %

Variant of answer	West	Center	South	East
Entry into the European Union	75.3	56.9	33.2	20.1
Entry into the Customs Union	1.3	3.2	17.8	29.8
Neither	17.1	24.3	36.8	32.4
DA	6.4	15.6	12.2	17.6

** February 2015*

Thus, for many years running, Israel is the country which has the most sympathies of Americans, while anti-leaders are Iran or North Korea. Russia was absent from the number of countries considered as hostile by Americans for a long time.

The second place is taken by North Korea (15%), while China and Iran, who were the leaders of the list for three consecutive years, dropped their positions. Almost a half of Americans see Russian military power as a critical threat to the US. 41% of the US citizens see Russia as an important, but not critical, threat. Seven percent do not consider Russia a threat, down from 17% in 2014.

In the list of threats which respondents see as critical to life interests of the USA in the next ten years, Russian military power takes the fifth place.

Among the more serious threats respondents have chosen the terroristic organization "Islamic state" and international terrorism (84%), development of nuclear weapon in Iran (77%) and military power of North Korea (64%).

The Gallup Institute conducted this poll on February 8-11, 2015, right after the meeting of the Normand four, where a set of special measures was elaborated. This set of measures included, in particular, ceasefire in Donbass since February 15, heavy armament disengagement, and creation of a security zone. It should be noted, that the tone of American mass media was unambiguous: Russia is

during the aughties and the second half of nineties. Secondly, attitude of Russians towards America is more complicated than the attitude of Americans to Russia. For the citizens of the US Russia is just another faraway hostile country, presenting a potential or a real threat, and nothing more than that. But people in Russia have contradictory views on America. On the one hand, the USA and the West in general represent the totality of Russians' conceptions of an ideal social system. One might say that their system is something that Russians would also like to have at home. On the other hand, there is a notion that the USA is a potential military adversary, an enemy, a threat. To the eyes of Russians there is no contradiction between these two notions. These are just two sides of the same coin. Russians are afraid and envious at the same time.

When Russian society projects its own aggressiveness on the outer world, this turns into an idea that over the last 10 years respect to Russia in the world significantly increased. In 2012 25% of respondents thought so, in August 2014 this figure reached 44%. The share of answers "respect to Russia diminished" on the contrary fell from 32% down to 22% (Levada-center).

Public Opinion Foundation (fom.ru), "Levada-Center" (levada.ru), WCIOM (wciom.ru), Kiev International Institute of Sociology (kiis.com.ua), Gallup Institute (gallup.com)

BOOKSHELF

Yuri Drakokhrust, the Svetlana Naumova Award's laureate

In the end of March it became known that Yuri Drakokhrust became the laureate of the Svetlana Naumova Award, which aims at "stimulating political journalists and analysts and drawing attention to the most prospective young politicians and public figures in Belarus". He won the prize in the category "Analytics".

"Together we're working on a matter of great concern. We're trying to get the country, where we live and which we love, out of the trap, where it is caught today" – said the leader of the campaign "Tell the Truth" Vladimir Neklyaev, summing up the results of the awards.

In 2012 the prize in category "Analytics" was awarded to Valeria Kastsyuhova, coordinator of the project "The Belarusian Yearbook"; in 2013 – to Alexander Klaskouski, head of analytical projects of BelaPAN news agency; in 2014 – to Inna Ramasheuskaya, BIPART (Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation) research coordinator.

Only recently the latest book of Yuri Drakokhrust "Seven years of famine. Polemics" (Library of Freedom. XXI century – Radio Free Europe/Radio Svoboda, 2014, 406 p.) has been presented to our readers in the Bookshelf rubric.

We heartily congratulate our colleague on this memorable event and present to the readers his acceptance speech during the ceremony:

"Dear friends!

For me it's a great honor and satisfaction to win this honorable award.

I want to thank the founder of the award – the civil campaign "Tell the Truth!" – for this high estimation of my humble work.

I want to thank all those, who had voted for me in the internet poll.

I want to thank Radio Svoboda and Tut.By portal for giving me the opportunity to publish my blogs and reach my readers.

I want to thank my respected competitors, Sergey Nikolyuk and Andrey Parotnikov: to compete for the award in the company of such people is an honor itself.

Accepting this award, I want to say some words about the person, who gave her name to the award – about Svetlana Naumova. She was a dazzling scientist, one of the best political scientists in Belarus. I remember our talks; I remember her deep and precise discourses in my radio broadcasts "The Prague Accent". But I'd also like to mention her intellectual conscience and genre purity which she maintained. Mixing genres is very popular nowadays, like when intellectuals, descending from the "tower" of pure analysis, become advice-givers, often uninvited. They begin to preach to politicians, they tell them what to do and how. After that they run away to their "towers" and blame "ignoramuses", who were unable to realize their great ideas. Svetlana Naumova never did that. She was an intellectual, a researcher, then she became a politician and she took all responsibility for the matter she became engaged with. She became a real citizen of our country, in the sense which is not often realized. The political defeat of the force, which she was part of, was her defeat as well. But for a human it was a victory, an existential victory of a soldier, killed in action. Clarity and purity of Svetlana Naumova's position is something that I always admired and admire to this day.

With respect to this role of Svetlana Naumova the politician I declare that I transfer the money part of the award to the human rights center "Viasna" for aiding Belarusian political prisoners and their families.

Once again, thanks for the award and thanks for the attention."

The IISEPS team

Analytic Bulletin of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies

IISEPS Executive Director:

Dr. **Algirdas Degutis**

IISEPS News
Jogailos g. 4, LT-01116 Vilnius
Editor Algirdas Degutis (+370-6) 887-50-00
E-mail: *iiseps@iiseps.org; iiseps.iiseps@gmail.com*
www.iiseps.org
ISSN 1822-5535
ISSN 1822-5543 (on line)
250 copies

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