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Dear readers!

In the latest issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" we offer to your attention materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute researches in the fourth quarter of 2014.

Our researches show that the "split" of mass consciousness, including economic consciousness, which emerged under the conditions when the fear of total destabilization, inflicted by the influence of the Ukrainian events, "overshadowed" the reality for millions of Belarusians, gradually disappears. Thus, the ratio of those, whose financial standing improved over the last three months, to those, whose financial standing went downhill, decreased once again, and the share of pessimists, who consider that "socio-economic situation in Belarus will worsen in the next few years", increased. Compared to December 2013 the number of respondents, considering that past year was more difficult for Belarus than the previous one, increased, while the average income per family member decreased over the last month. At the same time analysis of dynamics of economic consciousness demonstrates that pro-market setups of Belarusians gradually grow.

Analysis also demonstrates that economy defines Belarusians' attitude to the state power more and more often. Thus, over the last year increased the number of respondents considering that Belarus should carry out market-friendly reforms. However, between September 2008 and December 2014 the number of those, who consider, that market-oriented reforms are successfully going in Belarus, decreased, while the number of those, who think that "these reforms never really started", increased. The number of respondents considering that "citizens of Belarus don't accomplish their obligations to the state" is by several times smaller than the number of those, who think that "the state doesn't accomplish its obligations to the citizens of Belarus". That is why the gap between the power and the people becomes wider. For the first time over the last year the trend on increase of trust and electoral rating of A. Lukashenko changed to an opposite one: these figures started to sag once again. Almost two thirds of respondents answered negatively the question whether they would personally protect A. Lukashenko in case of some threat; only 20% за respondents gave a positive answer.

Belarusians' readiness for changes, which, it would seem, should have increased amid this trend change, is still "under the carpet" of social and political life. Thus, only one third of respondents consider that fundamental changes in external and internal policies of Belarus are "quite possible" in the next five years, while almost 60% of respondents consider them not likely or even impossible. However, the very understanding of "fundamental changes" in Belarusian society varies quite a lot: only 44% of respondents mean by it a decrease of state's role in social life and as an accordance of greater freedom of actions to its citizens, while 46.4% of respondents perceive them on the contrary as a strengthening of state's role in society, a bigger support to the citizens. Amid Ukrainian events this understanding of changes led to a minimal level of participation in public protests over 15 years of IISEPS monitoring. Even against the background of decrease of trust to the power Belarusians' trust to political opposition is still quite low. Probably, the only oppositional initiative, that enjoys support from the society, is the "People's Referendum".

In foreign policy orientations of Belarusians emerged a more suspicious attitude to Russia and a gradual return of interest to Europe. In comparison with September the share of "Euro-Belarusians" slightly increased. Evaluating the prospect of membership in CSTO, 44.4% of respondents expressed opinion that it will "provide security for Belarus", while 42.7% of respondents think that "it is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia". The number of family members working in Russia decreased over only one quarter, while the number of those working in Germany increased. The key factor that influenced this change is the Ukrainian-Russian crisis: although most Belarusians are still on the side of Russia, their number gradually decreases. Most Belarusians evaluate A. Lukashenko's policy in relation to this crisis positively, but they don't approve the prospect of doing something more serious than organization of peaceful negotiations. At the same time, pro-European and, more generally speaking, pro-Western orientations of Belarusians shouldn't be overestimated. Thus, most Belarusians continue to support integration with the East: the number of those who support membership in Eurasian Economic Union is 2.5-fold as high as the number of those who don't.

As usual, those readers who are more interested in our figures than in our assessments can analyze the research results on their own. The results are presented according to the main socio-demographic characteristics.

In our "Open Forum" rubric we present the most interesting results of work of our colleagues from neighboring countries, publishing the most interesting results of their late surveys. And in the "Bookshelf" rubric well-known Belarusian political expert Sergey Nikoliuk presents an interesting new book "The Future of Belarus. Young Experts' View", recently published by the team of young analysts from "The Liberal Club".

As usual, your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In December of 2014 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.504 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

DECEMBER – 2014

On whose heads were all the "cones" falling in 2014?

While analyzing the results of December survey, one must remember that it was conducted before the government and the National bank made a number of decisions which restricted the conditions of foreign currency purchase. This is an official wording which in fact means a 30% devaluation of Belarusian ruble.

According to a decision of the IV All-Belarusian People's Assembly, average wages in the country should have reached $ 1000. Note: not in 2015, but by 2015. Devaluation brought average wages of an average Belarusian back to the level of mid-2010 ($ 370).

Real wages decreased by 3.5% in November 2014 in comparison with October 2014. Dynamics of macroeconomic indices doesn't inspire optimism, so the probability of further wages decrease is quite high.

Despite the fact that the survey was conducted before the devaluation, answers to the question of Table 1 documented an increase of negative evaluations. According to 45.5% of respondents for Belarus year 2014 was more difficult than year 2013 (+7 points). But this is not a catastrophe, if you compare it to year 2011.

Naturally, evaluations depend on political preferences of respondents. 35.1% of A. Lukashenko's supporters (those who trust him) and 61.2% of his opponents (those who don't trust him) evaluated year 2014 as a difficult one for Belarus. Taking into consideration educational structure of supporters and opponents of the head of state, we can see that with the increase of level education increases level of negative evaluations: primary education – 19.1%, higher education – 50.2%.

As for the personal level, there was no increase of negative evaluations. There is nothing surprising about it. As it follows from Table 2, the range is much narrower when it "becomes personal". Let's compare results of years 2011 and 2012 (see Tables 1-2). In the first case the difference equals to 33.7 points, while in the second case it equals to only 9 points!

By way of commentary let us cite an anecdote, which was popular in the beginning of 90s: "A Chukchi man explains to his wife: "Perestroika is like a

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "Was the past year more difficult or easier for Belarus than the previous one?", %

Variant of answer	12'08	12'09	12'11	12'12	12'13	12'14
More difficult	42.8	52.4	74.7	41.0	38.6	45.6
Same	44.6	38.3	21.6	41.8	50.4	43.1
Easier	7.7	7.6	2.5	14.0	10.1	9.9
DA/NA	4.9	1.7	1.2	3.2	0.9	1.4

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "Was the past year successful or unsuccessful personally for you?", %

Variant of answer	12'08	12'09	12'11	12'12	12'13	12'14
Successful	46.3	48.2	33.0	44.0	48.7	47.6
Unsuccessful	33.1	35.1	45.9	35.8	35.7	32.6
DA/NA	20.6	16.7	21.1	20.2	15.6	19.8

hurricane in taiga: it is noisy above, and below it is dark and all the cones fall on our heads".

In 2014 "cones were falling" twice as often on the heads of A. Lukashenko's opponents as on the heads of his supporters (45.3% vs. 23.8%) and twice as often on the heads of people with higher education as on the heads of people with primary education (35.8% vs. 17.9%).

crash of Russian ruble there was a lot of news about mass homecoming of migrant workers from Central Asia Republics. But this process concerned Belarusians as well, as it follows from Table 4.

Correctness of assumption that Russian factor influences the decrease of labor migration from Belarus is confirmed by Table 5 data. In 2013 56% of Belarusian migrant workers worked in Russia, in 2014

Table 3

Evaluations of year 2014 for Belarus and for Belarusians depending on the average income per family member, %

Income	below 1.45*	1.45-2.1	2.1-4.2	above 4.2
More difficult for Belarus	40.0	47.7	44.3	50.0
Unsuccessful for Belarusians	49.4	34.8	31.8	25.1

** Million rubles*

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "Does any of your family members work overboard at present?", %

Variant of answer	09'13	12'14
Yes	25.6	17.3
No	73.2	81.7
DA/NA	1.2	1.0

Table 5

Dynamics of answering the question: "If "yes", then in which country do they work?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	09'13	12'14
Russia	14.4	8.6
Poland	2.8	2.6
Ukraine	2.0	1.3
Lithuania	1.3	0.6
USA	0.9	1.1
Germany	0.3	2.1

Dependency of "cone fall" on the age is not so simple: 18-29 years old – 30.8%, 30-39 years old – 37.1%, 40-49 years old – 37.4%, 50-59 years old – 35.4%, 60 years old and older – 25.2%. Thus, year 2014 was evaluated as an unsuccessful one mainly by Belarusians of active age.

Dependency of answers to questions of Tables 1-2 on the average income per family member turned out to be quite the opposite (Table 3). Level of negative evaluations of year 2014 for Belarus among respondents with maximum incomes exceeded the same level among respondents with minimal incomes by 10 points. But there is an inverse relation in the evaluations of personal year's results (–24.3 points)!

We've already mentioned connection between evaluations and education level of respondents. Educated people fall for propaganda influence to a lesser extent. Education contributes to critical views on macroeconomic events, and this is reflected in the first row of Table 3.

An unexpected outcome of year 2014 is the decrease of labor migration of Belarusians. After the this share amounted to 49%. With great probability we may assert that Russian labor market shrinkage for Belarusians will continue in 2015 as well.

Summing up year 2013 we had noted that over 5 years Belarusians survived two financial and economic crises and expected the third one all the second half of 2013. But year 2014, despite the zero increase of incomes (excluding December) was perceived as a year of stability by majority of Belarusians. Sociologists were talking about a victory of political factors over economic factors (Anomaly 2014) and saw the main reason for this anomaly in the events in and around Ukraine. It seems that in the end of the year economic factor comes to the fore once again.

Resource of induced mobilization is exhausting

Real after-tax money income of population over January-November 2014 amounted to 101.1% relatively to the same period of 2013. A year before this figure was notably higher – 117.2%. However, such a

considerable decrease of income growth rate influenced the perception of economic crisis quite paradoxically: in December 2013 68.6% of respondents shared the opinion that Belarusian economy is in crisis, while in December 2014 this share amounted only to 52.3% (Table 6). Why did crisis perception by public opinion decrease only by 16.3 point against the background of a catastrophic decrease of income growth rate? What made Belarusians abandon rational perception of macroeconomic events?

growth of positive expectations in 2014 will be evident (Table 8). The foundation for EI growth was laid in March. After "Crimeaisours" EI gained 21 points at once (due to elections of local Councils deputies the survey was conducted in the third decade of March).

Policy correctness index is the most politically charged one of three social indices that IISEPS measures quarterly (Table 9). After March jump by 16.2 points it continued to grow, and in the end of the year it has been fixed in the positive zone. Neither

Table 6

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
Yes	87.6	68.6	54.6	57.7	54.2	52.3
No	8.0	22.2	34.5	30.0	36.5	35.3
DA/NA	4.4	9.2	10.9	12.3	9.3	12.4

Table 7

Dynamics of answering the question: "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
It has improved	1.6	12.6	10.1	9.3	13.5	13.7
It has not changed	23.2	58.1	63.3	57.6	58.8	53.6
It has become worse	73.4	28.4	25.2	32.1	24.6	31.0
FSI*	**–71.8**	–15.8	–15.1	–22.8	–11.1	–17.3

** Financial standing index (the difference between positive and negative answers)*

Table 8

Dynamics of answering the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
It is going to improve	11.9	12.5	24.0	28.6	18.6	23.6
It is not going to change	20.3	46.1	45.0	35.0	49.5	33.4
It is going to become worse	55.5	35.9	26.1	28.7	22.5	33.9
EI*	**–43.6**	–23.1	–2.1	–0.1	–3.9	–10.3

** Expectation index*

This is another example of Anomaly 2014. Man cannot live by bread alone, particularly a man whose rationality was set too high for no good reason.

Dynamics of social indices confirms Belarusians' irrationality. Let us compare financial standing indices for December 2013 and 2014 (Table 7). Difference between them doesn't exceed statistical error, but this cannot be said about the difference in population's income growth rate.

Let us turn now to dynamics of expectation index. In December its value dropped by 6.4 points comparatively to September. Let us remind you, that December survey was conducted before the 30% devaluation of Belarusian ruble. But there was a wide stream of negative information (mainly from Russia) in November as well. It couldn't but influence the confidence in the future.

But if we compare December values of EI in 2013 and 2014 (just as we did with FSI), then the resulting FSI, nor EI achieved positive values.

December decrease of FSI and EI was expected. Similar processes happen in Russia since September. Surveys, conducted monthly and weekly, documented a split of the monolith of public opinion into two parts: the first, symbolical one, is connected to the level of collective ideas of national unity, great power, power authority and so on, and the second one, which takes into consideration real evaluations of state of business in economy and households.

In Belarus such level of social integrity (80-85%) is generally unattainable. It is not without reason that during the year of "induced mobilization" there were no major differences between values of positive and negative evaluations of country's policy. In Russia, according to Levada-Center, PCI amounted to 29 points in December (right direction – 56%, wrong direction – 27%) and to 42% in August!

Table 9

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
In the right direction	17.0	31.9	40.2	42.3	43.0	43.8
In the wrong direction	68.5	54.1	46.2	42.3	43.5	42.9
DA/NA	14.5	14.0	13.6	15.4	13.5	13.3
PCI*	**–51.5**	–22.2	–6.0	0	–0.5	0.9

** Policy correctness index*

Table 10

Dynamics of electoral rating of President A. Lukashenko, %

Date	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
Rating	34.8	39.8	39.8	45.2	40.0

Table 11

Dynamics of trust rating of President A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	12'13	03'14	06'14	07'14	09'14	12'14
Trust	37.7	45.9	49.6	49.9	53.5	49.9
Don't trust	47.5	44.1	39.0	37.3	33.3	35.6
DA	14.8	10.0	11.4	12.8	13.2	14.5

December values of social indices let us make a conclusion that mobilization resource, which emerged in Belarusian society because of Ukrainian events, is going to be exhausted quite soon.

From a reformist to a conservative

Approaching exhaustion of mobilization resource is also confirmed by dynamics of A. Lukashenko's ratings (Tables 10-11). Their growth gave way to a reduction. Electoral rating (percentage of votes, which a politician received in answers to an open question "If presidential elections were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote?") dropped by 5.2 points in December compared to September. Despite that, the head of state's "annual balance" turned out to be positive, and he should be thankful for this to Russian TV.

But propaganda efficiency is defined above all not by professional level of propagandists but by population's readiness to accept this propaganda. If propaganda doesn't concern some important layers of consciousness, there won't be any notably influence on public opinion.

Why did Belarusians react so actively to the Russian TV-version of events in Ukraine? Which layers of national (Belarusian) consciousness were affected?

A typical representative of Belarusian majority still can be defined as a "homo sovieticus", as we've mentioned more than once. And imperia complex is one of basic characteristics of this social type. Let us reinforce the above mentioned by the authority of sociologists Y. Levada, who defined main characteristics of soviet people as follows: forced self-isolation, state paternalism, egalitarian hierarchy, imperia complex.

That is why there is nothing surprising in the fact that TV series "Russia gets back its status of the great power" enjoyed popularity in Belarus. For a soviet man it compensated the misery of everyday life with permanent fears of price hike and ruble devaluation.

What was said about electoral rating of A. Lukashenko is also true for his trust rating. However, results documented in Table 11 should be read with a certain part of skepticism. You should remember that there are different types of trust. Thus, on the 18th of December A. Lukashenko brought up a topic of "exchange rate" during an economy conference. He resolutely stated that "we are not going to run after Russia". This resoluteness of the head of state was perceived by Belarusians as a signal for massive currency purchase.

One thing is to trust A. Lukashenko as a symbol of system, as "batka", but quite another thing is to trust him in practical questions. This is another example of two levels of reality perception. "Crimeaisours"-euphoria covers soviet people's vision only partially. This is something that should be remembered of while analyzing survey results.

Topic of trust is continued by the question "Recently President A. Lukashenko has stated "Honesty and justice, that I have promised you, still define my policy". Do you agree with this statement?" The shares of those who agree and disagree are equal – 42.3%, while 15.4% of respondents didn't know how to answer. Thus, trust rating of A. Lukashenko exceeded by 7.6 points the share of respondents who believe in honesty and justice of his policy. This inconsistency once again confirms that social surveys'

results shouldn't be approached mechanically. Public opinion is a mixture of setups, mythologems and current media topics. And this mixture is dynamic.

Women are more inclined to believe in A. Lukashenko's honesty and justice than men (46.8% vs. 36.8%). But the leaders of "believers" are Belarusians with primary education – 76.8% (35.5% among people with higher education).

figure of the state. Thus the double difference in estimations in the first row of Table 12 and six-fold – in the third one.

The image of the permanent head of state gradually changes in Belarusians' minds (Table 13). From a politician, who "slowly, but steadily pursues the aim by way of reforms" (–11.2 points over eight years) he transforms into a politician who "aims at maintaining

Table 12

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you think, over the period after presidential elections 2010 did A. Lukashenko's rating (i.e. the readiness of people to vote for him during the next elections) increase or decrease?", %

Variant of answer	12'11	12'14
Decreased	62.1	29.1
Didn't change	26.4	30.4
Increased	5.0	30.4
DA/NA	6.5	10.1

Table 13

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which image of the present President do you have?", %

Variant of answer	01'07	09'09	06'11	12'12	12'14
He slowly, but steadily pursues the aim by way of reforms	38.9	33.1	23.1	27.9	27.8
He simply aims at maintaining his power	22.8	30.8	35.8	29.1	26.6
He aims at maintaining current governance system	13.0	13.9	18.6	17.3	24.8
He advances slogans without doing anything	8.3	12.7	12.7	15.1	11.9
He transforms reality qualitatively and revolutionarily	11.0	7.8	9.2	10.2	8.9
DA	7.8	9.9	0.6	0.4	–

Answers to the question "Are you ready to personally protect Alexander Lukashenko from some threat?" let us distinguish declarative trust from instrumental trust in a first approximation. Let us remind you, that trust rating of the head of state amounted to 49.9% in December, but only 18.7% of respondents expressed readiness to protect him (32.2% among his supporters and 4.3% among his opponents), 62.2% of respondents refused to protect him and 19.4% of them didn't know how to answer.

Let us remember the collapse of the USSR, when none of 18 million members of the CPSU volunteered to protect the country. The nature of support of authoritarian power and its personification hardly changed since that, so it is possible to affirm that today this support is virtual as well. People do not feel responsibility for their political idol.

Table 12 data let us compare current level of discomfort in the country with the level of December 2011, when positive dynamics of artificial economy crisis recovery has just outlined.

Belarusians' attitude to A. Lukashenko, unlike Russians' attitude to V. Putin, are subject to great variations. Ratings of Russian national leader continue to remain "Teflon-made". The reason for this is different scale of the country and different level of public opinion inertia in perception of social and political reality.

Belarusians are used to living under circumstances of economic instability, and they transfer their emotions (both positive and negative ones) on the top

current governance system" (+11.8 points). For a politician, who hits at the fifth presidential term, this transformation is quite natural. It's no coincidence than in 2014 there was a reincarnation of 1994 rhetoric (strengthening of labor discipline, war on corruption and so on).

High trust rating level of A. Lukashenko traditionally influenced trust ratings of state institutions (Table 14). State mass media and state research institutes turned out to be absolute leaders by trust growth. Under the circumstances of Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, which is based on "event interpretation war" between mass media, this lead shouldn't be surprising.

Still, the absolute leaders by level of trust are those institutions of power, which have a symbolical role, whose main function is to maintain social integrity ("spiritual bonds", as they call them in Russia).

Structure of institutional trust reproduces characteristic split: symbolical importance of authoritarian institutions (President, army, KGB) on one side and distrust to institutions which define possibilities of citizens' political participation (independent professional unions, oppositional parties) on the other side.

Anomalous dynamics of social moods in 2014 is caused by the unexpectedly high flexibility of simple citizens. TV, monopolized by the state, is beyond competition, as in Soviet times. It may seem that internet gives a possibility to find alternative information without difficulties. Almost two thirds of Belarusians

use it. But mass consciousness' ability to have critical views on TV-stories is still on a very low level.

What does mass consciousness mean by reforms?

Growth of trust to the head of state and state institutions happened during the year when the level of evaluations of unfavorable changes in country's economy was three times as high as the level of positive evaluations (Table 15). In September 2008, just before the beginning of the world financial crisis, shares of favorable and unfavorable evaluations was almost equal.

ternal policies of Belarus in the next five years (Table 16). In this case we face again the two levels of reality perception: the symbolic and the real one.

Economic situation is worsening – this is reality. The increasing belief in possibility of changes is the consequence of increasing belief in power's ability to carry out these changes (symbolical level).

Main input in the number of optimists was made by A. Lukashenko's supporters: 42.1% of them believe in possibility of fundamental changes. Only 27.7% of his opponents share this opinion. The distribution of optimists depending on education level is something to pay attention to. It is quite even in all groups (31.4%-34.7%) except for the group with pri-

Table 14

Dynamics of trust rating of state and public institutions, %

Variant of answer	12'13	12'14	Difference
Orthodox Church	63.0	67.2	4.2
Army	44.1	52.1	8.0
Business associations	39.7	35.6	–4.1
Bar association	39.4	51.9	12.5
Non-state media	41.0	41.7	0.7
Catholic Church	36.6	35.3	–1.3
International organizations (UN, EU, OSCE, European Parliament, Council of Europe and others)	36.9	36.9	–
Independent research institutes	36.0	44.9	8.9
President	37.7	49.9	12.2
KGB	33.9	42.0	8.1
Free and independent trade-unions	31.9	33.8	1.9
Human rights groups (Belarusian Helsinki Committee and others)	28.7	37.4	8.7
Courts	34.9	44.4	9.5
Public Prosecutor's Office	34.5	42.3	7.8
Militia	34.9	41.4	6.5
Trade-unions, members of the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus	30.0	36.2	6.2
National Assembly	31.5	37.8	6.3
State research institutes	31.5	46.6	15.1
Central Election Commission	32.0	40.4	8.4
State media	31.6	47.1	15.5
Local Executive Committees	28.6	36.4	7.8
Government	29.4	41.4	12
Local Councils of Deputies	28.9	37.1	8.2
Political parties supporting the present power	19.9	27.5	8.6
Opposition political parties	15.8	16.0	0.2
Protestant Church	10.9	9.9	–1.0

Table 15

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you think that recently there have been changes in the economy of the country, were there more of favorable or unfavorable changes?", %

Variant of answer	09'08	12'14
More of favorable changes	20.7	10.9
Equally	39.3	38.4
More of unfavorable changes	24.4	35.4
No changes at all	9.1	10.7
DA/NA	6.5	4.6

Belarusians evaluated changes in economy of the country as mainly unfavorable, but at the same time there was an increase of level of optimism about possibility of fundamental changes in internal and ex-

mary education – 53.7%.

This type of dependency gives grounds for supposing that it is propaganda that is responsible for the growth of social optimism, as A. Lukashenko's sup-

porters with primary education have a higher level of suggestibility.

In the question on fundamental changes' possibility there is nothing on the character of such changes. They can be positive and negative. But predominance of A. Lukashenko's supporters among those who believe in changes, suggests that most respondents consider that these changes would be positive. In this context reserved optimism of A. Lukashenko's opponents is well understandable.

The question on desirability of such changes (fundamental, but positive or negative?) is bound to the previous question. Over the last six years majority of Belarusians demonstrate a demand for fundamental changes (Table 17). The year of the fourth presidential elections is the only exception.

According to historian A. Akhiezer, ruling elite usually regards reforms as a necessary condition of development – of economy in the first place, while mass consciousness regards reforms as a ground for strengthening of equalization, as a source of welfare.

In April 2013 the most popular answers to the question "According to you, which reforms should A. Lukashenko carry out in the next 12 months?" were as follows: "To increase minimum wage" (61.7%) and "To increase pensions" (41.8%). In other words practice confirmed theory.

That is why there is nothing surprising about such a high demand for reforms among A. Lukashenko's supporters (56.1%). No person of sound mind will refuse reforms when they mean an increase of wages and pensions, isn't it?

Table 16

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you consider fundamental changes in internal and external policies of Belarus possible in the next five years?", %

Variant of answer	09'08	06'10	12'11	09'13	12'14
Quite possible	31.8	30.4	37.1	25.5	34.4
Unlikely	46.6	49.0	43.4	56.1	45.9
Impossible	15.2	13.5	11.3	13.8	13.9
DA/NA	6.4	7.1	8.2	4.6	5.8

Table 17

Dynamics of answering the question: "And would you like those changes to happen?", %

Variant of answer	09'08	06'10	12'11	09'13	12'14
Yes	52.2	46.8	57.7	50.3	51.9
No	15.6	24.0	12.4	20.2	17.7
I don't care	14.7	17.3	16.5	21.1	19.9
DA/NA	17.5	11.9	13.4	8.4	10.5

Table 18

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you consider it important to carry out market-friendly reforms in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	05'11	12'13	12'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
				Trust	Don't trust
Yes	66.6	59.7	63.2	56.1	70.3
No	15.6	27.8	22.0	30.1	14.8
DA/NA	17.8	12.5	14.8	13.8	15.0

But it is one thing to believe in possibility of fundamental changes and totally another – to want these changes to happen. In December 2014 73.5% of A. Lukashenko's opponents and only 39.5% of his supporters chose the "yes"-answer (in September 2013 the ratio was 72.7% and 34.8% accordingly).

Desire for fundamental changes should be regarded as an indicator of social discomfort. Naturally, the level of discomfort is higher among A. Lukashenko's opponents than among his supporters.

Demand for market-friendly reforms in Belarus turns out to be much higher than demand for fundamental, but abstract changes (Table 18). At first sight it may seem improbable. However, let's try to understand what mass consciousness means by reforms.

"Neither I, nor the team of Ministry of Economy are reformists, – stated N. Snopkov, the (now former) Minister of Economy in an exclusive interview to BelaPAN. – We are pragmatists. Pragmatic approach in our work means searching and offering a middle ground between what's right and what's possible under the current circumstances".

Despite this unambiguous statement of main non-reformist of the country, 19.9% of respondents believe in a successful march of market-friendly reforms in Belarus, and 2.4% of respondents are even sure that these reforms are completed successfully (Table 19). Still the predominance of critical viewpoint on market-friendly reforms in Belarus should be noted.

An attempt of economic liberalization was taken in 2007 in Belarus. It ended on the 19th of December

2010 with the violent break-up of the Square. Official results of liberalization were summed up by the head of state in April 2011: "Fed up with democracy. There's no leg to stand on, there is also my fault, but it was your wish to democratize. You got it, you saw it, so now let's act according to life, to people. The same for market economy – fed up".

loss decrease, but however it didn't solve the issue of economy efficiency increase. That is why in order to address the more and more acute external and internal challenges the power turned to ideas from the arsenal of soviet nomenklatura like tightening of discipline.

Since April A. Lukashenko threatened his inner

Table 19

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, market-friendly reforms in Belarus…", %

Variant of answer	09'08	12'14
…are completed successfully	4.7	2.4
…are advancing successfully	29.8	19.9
…have slowed down	24.7	25.5
…have ended in a fiasco	8.5	9.9
…have never really started	15.7	26.5
DA/NA	16.6	15.8

Table 20

Distribution of answers to the question: "Belarusian powers declared measures against "social parasites" – people, who officially don't work anywhere. Planned measures include labor coercion and special tax. Which measures concerning these people do you approve?"

Variant of answer	%
Labor coercion	29.5
Special tax	15.2
Withdrawal of social payments	25.8
None	27.8
DA/NA	1.7

Table 21

Distribution of answers to the question: "Prime-minister M. Myasnikovich stated that "the main problem of Belarusian economy lies in helpless and passive leaders, who cannot do anything without directions from the top". Do you agree with this?", %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Agree	60.3	65.4	55.3
Disagree	32.4	26.5	40.0
DA/NA	7.3	8.1	4.7

But if we discuss market-friendly reforms in physiological terms ("fed up"), then it should be noted that hunger usually comes back. It happened in history more than once. There is certain logic to it: when economic situation in the country becomes worse and possibilities of getting resources from outside are limited, the state gives more rights to direct manufacturers and citizens, who are obliged to gain independence in economic life. And with every single day we can see more and more problems in economy.

Right way to archaisation

Belarusian power spent the year 2013 in desperate attempts to increase efficiency of economy at the expense of technical modernization of state enterprises. But the only noticeable results of these efforts were multibillion losses (expressed in dollars).

In 2014 it was decided to move from total modernization to pin-point modernization. This guaranteed a

circle with a "severe, tough, but just decree". However, there was a delay in preparation of the decree, so the head of state managed to sign it only on the 12th of December.

There is no need of multibillion investments for tightening of discipline. And this is its indubitable advantage over modernization. War on corruption has the same advantage. During September survey 56.3% of respondents were positive about strengthening of control over the incomes of officials and their relatives.

One more power's initiative also found active support. This time we talk about "social parasites" offensive (Table 20).

We recommend you to pay attention to the last row of the Table 20 (DA/NA): only 1.7% of respondents had difficulties with answering this question. In other words there is a clear vision in society in regards to the set of repressive measures which should be taken against social parasites.

Table 22

Distribution of answers to the question: "Which of the following statements concerning retirement age do you agree with?"

Variant of answer	%
Retirement age should be raised in order to raise pensions	17.0
Retirement age shouldn't be raised, because many people won't live up to it	76.7
DA/NA	6.3

Table 23

Distribution of answers to the question: "Some people by fundamental changes in internal and external policies of Belarus mean a strengthening of state's role in social life, others on the contrary mean a diminution of this role. What do you mean by this?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
The state should strengthen its role in society and give more support to its citizens	46.4	66.6	22.6
The state should diminish its role in society and let people act more freely	44.1	25.2	70.1
DA/NA	9.5	8.3	7.3

Almost all of power's appeals to soviet experience of struggling for the increase of economic efficiency find understanding and support among majority of Belarusians. The following statement of now former Prime Minister M. Myasnikovich is not an exception (Table 21).

Approval from A. Lukashenko's supporters is quite natural. The topic of careless leaders is probably mentioned in every single speech of Belarusian "batka" on economic issues. But even among his opponents absolute majority of respondents agrees that "main problem of Belarusian economy lies in helpless and passive leaders".

The fact, that this problem was promoted to the class of main problems by very nature of authoritarian model of management, constructed by A. Lukashenko, is beyond the limits of reflexive abilities of public opinion.

More than once A. Lukashenko addressed the problem of retirement age rising in his public speeches in 2014. The problem is pending since long ago. The number of people involved in economy constantly decreases, while the number of retired people on the contrary increases. The only real way out of this situation is the rise of retirement age. Especially taking into account the fact that in European countries it was raised up to 65 years.

The head of state explains the European standard lagging by readiness of Belarusians to receive low pensions under the conditions that Soviet norms of retirement age are maintained. Let us restrict ourselves to one quotation, taken on the BELTA-site: "President thinks that retirement age should have been risen long ago. But you don't want it. And I've promised you that before doing that we would listen to your opinion. But remember: the size of pensions will be corresponding" (September 19, 2014).

December survey confirmed validity of A. Lukashenko's references to public opinion (Table 22). Belarusians think that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. A lot of them won't live up to the retirement age. First of all this concerns men: their life expectancy amounted to 66.6 years in 2012.

Political elite's appeal to the heritage of soviet nomenklatura instead of elaboration of new ideas is a classical example of archaisation. But Belarusian power didn't come out of the Ark. In 1994 majority of Belarusians voted for it on a non-democratic elections. The majority had a choice between a European way of development and a return to the past, and they had chosen the latter, i.e. the archaisation. And they constantly confirm their adherence to this choice.

Dissatisfaction of paternalistic state doesn't generate protest

Wikipedia defines paternalism (from the Latin *pater* – father) as behavior by a state, which limits some person or group's liberty or autonomy for that person's or group's own good.

In turn paternalism in regard to a state should be regarded as a form of rational adaptation of a person to almighty and uncontrolled power. When nothing depends on a person, he adopts this natural, normal and perfectly rational setup: there is no point in fussing, let the state take care of all my concerns now and in future.

Let us site historian V. Buldakov: "It is useless to discuss "advantages" or "disadvantages" of paternalistic system, because it is just a product of history like any other system. But one shouldn't forget that it deprives people of the only quality that makes a man a man – the ability to rely on his proper forces and mind."

Formally the share of Belarusians advocating the strengthening of state's role in social life doesn't attain 50% (Table 23). It is natural, that paternalistic

state setups are more popular in peripheral social groups (senior people, people with low education level, people living in small towns and rural areas), which constitute the main part of A. Lukashenko's supporters. Thus the triple predominance of "batka's" supporters over his opponents in the first variant of answer.

bigger profits compared to other economic sectors in Belarus. There should not be such a gap. The banking sector does not produce assets, it just services the real economy".

In December 2014 the share of Belarusians considering that the state mostly or completely doesn't accomplish its obligations to citizens dropped by 6

Table 24

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, to which extent does the state accomplish its obligations to the citizens of Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	03'12	12'14
Accomplishes to the full extent	6.0	5.6
Accomplishes mostly	26.5	30.3
Equally does and doesn't accomplish	31.0	33.6
Doesn't accomplish mostly	26.4	22.4
Doesn't accomplish completely	8.8	6.8
DA/NA	1.3	1.3

Table 25

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, to which extent do the citizens of Belarus accomplish their obligations to the state (observe the laws, pay the taxes and so on)?", %

Variant of answer	03'12	12'14
Accomplish to the full extent	19.0	15.4
Accomplish mostly	49.1	46.0
Equally do and don't accomplish	23.1	30.2
Don't accomplish mostly	6.3	6.0
Don't accomplish completely	1.3	1.0
DA/NA	1.2	1.4

Table 26

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently President A. Lukashenko stated that "In the post-Soviet countries people are fed up with democracy. Now, on the contrary, there is a process going on in which people are more supportive of the concept of a strong state, which will not allow chaos, even more so a civil war, especially after the events in Ukraine". Do you agree with this?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Agree	55.5	83.5	23.1
Disagree	32.1	9.2	64.9
DA/NA	12.4	7.3	12.0

As a rule, a person depending on the state is dissatisfied. That is why paternalistic expectations from the masses are habitually accompanied by massive dissatisfaction by the state, its officials and services.

Level of trust to market institutions is quite low, and demands to the state were and are paternalistic. These demands are grounded on an idea of "nationalization" of all social secondary distribution.

A. Lukashenko perfectly understands these demands from below and constantly tries to satisfy them with corresponding public statements. The last of these statements was made on the 30th of December during the introduction of P. Kallaur as Chairman of the Board of the National Bank: "Banks should stop sheeting fat profits. Of course, our bankers do not live as large as their counterparts in the neighboring states. However, the banking industry posts much

points in comparison with March 2012 (Table 24). The reason for this decrease should be seen in Anomaly 2014, repeatedly mentioned above.

It is natural that a dissatisfied person evaluates the degree of his responsibility to the state differently (Table 25). The sum of negative evaluations of the state's accomplishments amounted to 29.4% in December, while the sum of negative evaluations of citizens' accomplishments amounted only to 7%.

But this dissatisfaction cannot generate social protest, because state paternalism undermines possibilities of citizens' cooperation. It strengthens mutual distrust in society, because various social groups fight with the state and with one another not for the purpose of providing freedom, equality of possibilities and justice, but for the purpose of having more privileges and a bigger piece of state's cake.

Table 27

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, what leads to wealth more often?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	12'93	01'07	03'08	03'09	12'14
Personal relations	72.4	42.9	47.1	45.7	47.0
Dishonesty	56.3	15.5	24.7	22.4	21.8
Labor	36.6	68.2	59.0	63.4	44.3
Talent	32.2	34.9	25.2	24.0	24.5
Luck	29.6	39.1	34.1	39.6	38.2
Education	22.2	37.6	31.8	32.7	26.2

Table 28

Dynamics of answering the question: "Are millionaires (very rich people) necessary for society?", %

Variant of answer	11'94	12'14
Yes, in any case	14.5	24.3
Yes, in case if their wealth was honestly earned	45.7	44.3
No, because you cannot be honest and wealthy	29.4	17.9
No, in any case	8.6	7.3
Other	0.8	1.9
NA	1.0	4.3

Paternalistic system is designed for the servile personality type; all other types are labeled as rioters. Events in Ukraine gave state propaganda a possibility to "paint the images" of democratic chaos and to counterpose them against stability in a strong state.

Taking into account the structure of Belarusian society, it is not difficult to predict the perception of this counterposition. Its result is documented in Table 26. There is nothing surprising in the 4-fold predominance of the share of people who agreed with A. Lukashenko's statement.

In 2015 signs of crisis in Belarusian economy will be more and more apparent, and this will make paternalistic state diminish the volume of social obligations. Under these circumstances it should be expected that citizens would demand the state to provide justice (to overcome crisis not "at the expense of people", but "at the expense of rich banks and businesses" and so on).

Between free deficiency and paid abundance

A range of questions from IISEPS archive was included in December survey, and this gives us an opportunity to track the dynamics of social opinion in Belarus over two decades.

In 1993 under the circumstances of democratic chaos (today A. Lukashenko actively resists its return) personal relations and dishonesty were seen as unarguable leaders in the list of sources of wealth (Table 27). The last place was taken by education. During the years of stability labor took the leadership, still personal relations never went lower than the second place.

During the "Year of Hospitality" (according to a decree of the head of state the year 2014 in Belarus was called the "Year of Hospitality") personal relations once again headed the short-list of means leading to wealth. Their return to the first place became possible due to a catastrophic fall of labor's value (–19.1 points compared to March 2009)! The value of education also notably lessened (–6.5 points).

We regard devaluation of labor and education as a result of state's attempts to modernize economy in 2013. In his seasonal greetings A. Lukashenko thanked in particular those "who contribute to consolidation and prosperity of Belarus with their skilful hands and mastery, their talent and flashes of scientific genius, their firmness and courage". Specialist of personal relations and dishonest people naturally weren't mentioned in the speech. However, from the point of view of public opinion, Belarusian model grants these people with maximum chances for a worthy (financially speaking) life.

It should be noted that belief in labor as a means of achieving wealth enjoys greater popularity among retired people (60 years old and older) than among people of 18-29 years old – 52.4% vs. 39.4%! A similar paradox may be observed in regard to education as well. In positive role of education believe 45.7% of Belarusians with primary education and only 26.3% of respondents with higher education.

Over two decades attitude to necessity of millionaires for society made a positive shift: +9.8 points (Table 28). This shift happened mainly due to the fact that Belarusians less believe in possibility to make a fortune out of honest labor. This change is not so big, but statistically important.

A. Lukashenko's opponents twice as often as his supporters think that Belarusian society need millionaires – 34.3% vs. 16.4%. There is nothing surprising about it, if you take into account socio-demographic structure of these social groups. In particular, the ratio of evaluations was 3.6-fold higher among young people (18-29 years old – 34.4%, 60 years old and older – 9.4%).

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you consider private land ownership admissible in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	12'93	12'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Don't trust
Yes	72.1	73.6	63.9	84.7
No	26.6	19.6	26.9	12.5
NA	1.3	6.8	9.2	2.8

Table 30

Dynamics of answering the question: "Is it admissible that foreigners own land in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	12'93	12'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Don't trust
Yes	20.3	30.6	21.8	43.8
No	78.2	61.1	70.6	50.2
NA	1.5	8.3	7.6	6.0

Table 31

Dynamics of answering the question: "What would you choose?", %

Variant of answer	04'92	11'94	06'97	09'07	12'14
Free of charge social services (education, medicine) with low quality and no choice	26.6	41.1	51.4	47.5	45.6
Possibility and necessity to choose social services suitable by quality and worth of money	70.8	57.1	46.5	52.1	49.9
NA	2.6	1.8	2.1	0.4	4.5

Belarusians' attitude to private land ownership almost hasn't changed over 21 years (Table 29). Almost three quarters of respondents demonstrate their market radicalism in regard to this question. Even the absolute majority of A. Lukashenko's supporters support the idea of private land ownership.

The only group of population where there is no majority of private land ownership supporters is people with incomplete secondary education (36.8%).

A. Lukashenko's supporters didn't know what to answer three times as often as his opponents. Probably, this should be explained by the fact, that there is a high share of rural citizens and pensioners among his supporters. The former as a rule own farmlands, the latter own dachas. That is why the answers recorded in Table 29 should be regarded as a compromise between ideological setups which are important for seniors and natural need to own "a patch of land". But market radicalism of the absolute majority of Belarusians disappears as soon as there is a question on foreigners' right to own land in Belarus (Table 30). Nevertheless, over 21 years public opinion made a step of 10.3 points towards the market. But even among people who don't trust A. Lukashenko the share of people supporting foreigners' right to own land in Belarus didn't reach a half of respondents.

Dynamics of answering the question of Table 31, recorded in the first three columns, is a reflection of dynamics or perestroika-period illusions of Belarusian society. In April 1992 amid positive expectations of material benefits of future transition to the market, absolute majority of Belarusians declaratively preferred possibility and necessity to choose suitable by quality social services.

It didn't take long to sober up (see second and third columns of Table 31). After 1997 the ratio of answers became stable. Maybe it is optimal under the current state of Belarusian model.

Over the last 20 years there were significant changes in branches, were state monopoly becomes weaker (business, mass culture and so on). However the supporting institution of soviet and pre-soviet times is the same – uncontrollable power. Namely the power institutions (court, power structures and educational system) block the modernization of Belarusian society, i.e. they don't let it become modern.

National unity by way of dividing into insiders and outsiders

The topic of social unity is one of the main topics of the head of state's speeches. Naturally, he didn't avoid it in his seasonal greetings, but this time he approached it differently, from the split viewpoint: "We saw for ourselves what internal feuding, hatred and intolerance lead to. The line between bright and loud slogans and society split is very thin. The line between this split and a war is even thinner. And if people forget about the value of peace and consent, they cross all these lines in a blink of an eye".

Global practice shows that democracy is the most efficient tool to overcome splits. However, there is no such tool in the arsenal of present power. On the contrary, A. Lukashenko sees democracy as a source of chaos. He solves the problem of unity by the breeding

method, borrowed from soviet nomenklatura. To a great extent he reproduces their system of values.

Breeding is a mechanism of integration of cultural unity by means of differentiation (alienation of aspects that cannot be integrated and prevent from integration in principle). Let us remind you one of favorite phrases of V. Lenin, which defined his position in regard to factional struggles in parties: "Before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation." This legendary phrase vividly demonstrates political meaning of breeding mechanism.

In modern Belarus breeding is being carried out by way of dividing society into people who are loyal or disloyal to the power. The former enjoy certain preferences, while the latter are being marginalized (during Stalin rule disloyal people were killed or sent to labor camps).

Breeding methods constantly improve. Let us just make mention of the Decree No. 5 "On Strengthening the Requirements for Managers and Employees of Organizations".

Not a single state institution (from educational ones to military ones) is freed of preliminary work of "human material" breeding. Their joint efforts permanently maintain a technologically necessary level of fear in society, which makes individual people self-determinate in the system "power – opposition". Efficiency of these efforts is documented in Table 32.

A record high total of answers "a lot of people are afraid"/"all people are afraid" was documented in June 2011. It amounted to 68.4%. If we take into account the fact that "The State for the People" is the slogan of President's official website, then we should recognize that the state truly actively participates in people's lives.

In December 2014 level of fear in society dropped by 14.2 points in comparison with the record high level (54.2%). But we wouldn't advance a conclusion that the power changed their views on breeding policy to softer ones. Probably, this is another manifestation of Anomaly-2014.

Table 32

Dynamics of answering the question: "What do you think about the readiness of people in Belarus to express their political views?", %

Variant of answer	02'01	06'06	10'10	06'11	03'13	12'14
No one is afraid	20.0	18.6	18.3	10.6	14.0	16.9
Very few people are afraid	33.8	28.5	16.3	16.9	18.7	24.2
A lot of people are afraid	29.5	40.2	40.5	46.1	41.4	42.7
All people are afraid	6.3	7.9	18.8	22.3	19.3	11.5
DA	10.4	4.8	6.1	4.1	6.6	4.7
Positive answers total	**55.8**	**47.1**	**32.6**	**27.5**	**32.7**	**41.1**
Negative answers total	**35.8**	**48.1**	**59.3**	**68.4**	**60.7**	**54.2**

Table 33

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, are human rights respected in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	03'04	06'06	03'13	12'14
Yes	10.5	11.2	24.9	16.2	17.4
Rather yes	21.7	31.7	36.1	34.9	40.2
Rather no	38.7	31.5	20.0	29.1	25.5
No	23.7	19.1	14.3	14.7	12.2
Na	5.4	6.5	4.7	5.1	4.7
Positive answers total	**32.2**	**42.9**	**61.0**	**51.1**	**57.6**
Negative answers total	**62.4**	**50.6**	**34.3**	**41.8**	**37.7**

Table 34

Dynamics of participation in public protests, %

Variant of answer	08'01	04'06	12'10	06'11	12'11	12'14
Rallies, pickets	16.7	15.1	11.8	16.0	14.8	9.3
Strikes	12.9	12.5	8.6	13.6	11.4	1.6
Armed struggles	2.8	5.1	3.8	5.0	3.8	1.0
Hunger strikes	4.0	5.7	4.2	6.6	4.9	0.8

The logic of answers to the question of Table 32 can easily be seen in the dynamics of answering the question "According to you, are human rights respected in Belarus?" (Table 33). Anomaly-2014 manifested itself in this case as well (in December 2014 the total of positive answers jumped by 6.5 points in comparison with March 2013, while the total of negative answers dropped by 4.5 points over the same period). The total of positive answers was record high in the year of the third presidential elections.

The input of Anomaly-2014 can easily be seen in the dynamics of readiness to participate in public pro-

tests as well, if we compare the results of the last two columns (Table 34). The almost 10-fold decrease of readiness to go on strike is the most impressive one. Today we register minimal level of Belarusians' participation in protests over almost 15 years of IISEPS monitoring.

ers of Kremlin brought Russian economy to crisis. It is natural, that Belarusian model also caught it like flu.

Belarusians already start to think about the consequences of negative changes in economy. But what makes them look at current events critically is

Table 35

Distribution of answers to the question: "According to you, is there a national unity in Belarus today?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	12'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Rather yes	48.4	66.6	24.1
Rather no	42.9	25.6	69.4
DA/NA	8.7	7.9	6.5

Table 36

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	09'14	12'14
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	26.9	27.2	31.6
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.2	59.9	56.8
DA/NA	10.9	12.9	11.6

Table 37

Dynamics of answering the question: "Did your attitude to Russia change after this year's events in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14
Yes, it became worse	24.3	31.8
Yes, it became better	21.9	20.4
No, it didn't change	51.5	44.8
DA/NA	2.3	3.0

Table 38

Dynamics of answering the question: "Did your attitude to the EU change after this year's events in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14
Yes, it became worse	47.0	44.6
Yes, it became better	5.6	10.1
No, it didn't change	42.4	41.6
DA/NA	5.0	3.7

Result of power's attempts to build a national unity is reflected in Table 35. Public opinion was divided roughly into two halves in their estimations. Besides, less than a half of Belarusians agreed with the official version of unity.

Society, which relies on a basic consensus, cannot be created by means of breeding. This conclusion was perfectly illustrated by the unsuccessful attempt of Lenin's and Stalin's successors to create a new historical entity "soviet people" during years of perestroika. What was perceived as a socio-cultural entity by internal and external observes, almost momentarily ran away to national "homes"; and national party elites actively participated in this process or even directed it in certain republics.

Anomaly-2014 is a temporal phenomenon. Going forward from one victory to another, effective manag-

not connected to understanding official policy's invalidity. A typical example from the majority cares only about how economic problem will influence him and his family. In other words he evaluates what's going on the basis of self-preservation and survival. One more time he tries to adapt to the authoritarian regime without thinking about changing this regime.

A little further from Russia

December survey results demonstrate that pro-Russian aspirations and desires of integration with Russia in Belarusian society became somewhat more reserved. At the same time pro-European moods slightly increased. Change of attitude to Russia is probably explained by a certain re-thinking of Russian policy in Ukraine.

Table 39

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the integration of Belarus and Russia was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
For	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.0	28.7	23.9	29.3	24.8	23.0	23.9
Against	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	42.9	47.5	51.4	47.7	54.8	54.3	58.4

Table 40

Dynamics of answering the question: "If there was a referendum on Belarus joining the EU, how would you vote?", %

Variant of answer	05'07	09'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
For	33.5	26.7	34.9	36.2	48.6	38.9	35.9	30.2	27.4	25.0	28.8
Against	49.3	51.9	36.3	37.2	30.5	37.6	34.6	44.3	50.8	50.3	48.8

Table 41

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14	12'14
Integration with the RF	47.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	41.4	37.7	36.6	51.5	46.9	47.4	44.9
Joining the EU	33.3	30.1	42.1	38.0	39.1	43.4	44.6	32.9	33.1	32.0	34.2
DA/NA	19.2	23.9	15.6	23.9	19.5	18.9	18.8	15.6	20.0	20.6	20.9

Table 42

Dynamics of answering the question on attitude to Eurasian Economic Union creation, %

Variant of answer	Attitude to Eurasian Economic Union creation			
	06'12	09'13	06'14	12'14
Positive	48.7	37.6	49.8	44.4
Indifferent	31.4	37.4	29.6	31.5
Negative	10.7	13.8	15.1	18.1
DA/NA	9.2	11.2	5.5	6.0

During half a year evaluations of "Crimeaisours" were changing slowly, but steadily: the number of adherents of Russian version was slightly decreasing, while advocates of the opposite version were becoming slightly more numerous (Table 36).

General attitude to Russia in relation to events in Ukraine also changed in this direction over the last quarter (Table 37).

Changes in attitude to Europe were directed oppositely: the number of those, whose attitude to Europe became better, increased, while the number of those, who changed their attitude to a worse one, decreased (Table 38).

All things considered it was the Ukrainian factor that somewhat shifted the balance of geopolitical preferences (Table 39-41).

There even was an insignificant increase of the share of supporters of integration with Russia in answers to the question of Table 39. But there was a much more significant jump of the share of opponents of integration with the RF, and it had reached a maximum value over many years of IISEPS monitoring.

Pro-European moods grew somewhat more notably, at the same time there was a slight decrease of Eurointegration opponents.

Summary result is reflected in the answers to the dichotomous “either/or” question: a relative majority is for integration with Russia as in previous surveys, but the gap between geopolitical opponents became smaller.

Another indicator of change in attitude to Russia is the dynamics of attitude to the creation of Eurasian Economic Union. Over two years this number was subject to undulations, but during the last half of a year we could observe a down-wave: the number of supporters of the union slightly decreased, while the number of their opponents increased (Table 42).

In our opinion, there are several reasons for the change of attitude to Russian policy in Ukraine. The first one is the attitude to the policy as is. There is no prosperity in the Crimea since the annexation, and table 1 data reflects it. As for the events in Donbass, blood, violence and a stream of refugees (including those who seek refuge in Belarus) make a not so attractive picture.

IISEPS surveys in March, June and September demonstrated that Belarusians’ were less sympathetic to Kiev than to pro-Russian separatists in the conflict in the East of Ukraine. However, December sur-

Table 43

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you support independence of Novorossiya?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	49.5
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	22.1
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	18.4
DA/NA	10.0

Table 44

Distribution of answers to the question: "In relation to the conflict in Ukraine president A. Lukashenko stated "If there is a distrust of Russia to the West, of the West to Russia, of America to Russia and of Russia to America, and a distrust among warring sides, I am ready to use our armed forces to separate the conflicting sides". Some people were positive about this statement, others were negative. What is your attitude to it?"

Variant of answer	%
Positive	18.7
Negative	64.1
DA/NA	17.2

Table 45

Distribution of answers to the question: "Belarus and Russia are members of a military union – The Collective Security Treaty Organization. How do you evaluate Belarus' membership in CSTO?"

Variant of answer	%
CSTO membership provides security for Belarus	44.4
CSTO membership is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia	42.7
DA/NA	12.9

Table 46

Dynamics of answering the question: "If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14
I'd resist up in arms	25.9	23.4
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	39.7	48.0
I'd greet these changes	13.3	9.7
DA/NA	21.1	18.9

vey showed that the gap between supporters and opponents of Novorossiya's independence amounted to less than 10 percentage points (Table 43).

The second factor which influenced re-evaluation of Russian policy in Ukraine is the danger of escalation of the conflict to Belarus. Our previous materials demonstrated that Belarusians are dead set against a military entanglement of their country in this conflict. Evaluations of President's initiative to send Belarusian peacemakers to Ukraine confirmed this in December survey (Table 44).

Many Belarusians fear that their country will be entangled in conflicts not only as a peacemaker. While the number of supporters of Belarus' membership in Eurasian Economic Union is more than twice as high as the number of its opponents (44.4% vs. 18.1%, see table 7), respondents were divided roughly into two halves evaluating Belarusian participation in the military union CSTO (Table 45).

It is clear, that 43% of respondents who consider that a military union with Russia is fraught with Belarus' participation in military schemes of the ally are quite a lot. And this alertness, as may be supposed, is defined in no small measure by Russian actions in Ukraine.

And finally the third factor influencing the evaluation is the psychological projection of Russian policy in Ukraine on Belarus. It may be seen in the dynamics of answering the question on reaction to a hypothetical armed Russian invasion in Belarus (Table 46).

There is a notable decrease of the share of those who are ready to greet a Russian invasion. This factor testifies a certain cold snap in relation to Russia. Still, the share of those, who are ready to accept this situation without any objections, increased much more notably. However, acceptance isn't approval.

At the same time there were almost no changes in the figures concerning a hypothetical NATO intervention in Belarus (Table 47).

Change of attitude to Russia and its actions in Ukraine didn't really influence evaluations of official

Table 47

Dynamics of answering the question: "If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14
I'd resist up in arms	26.0	25.8
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	40.0	39.6
I'd greet these changes	9.7	10.7
DA/NA	24.3	23.9

Table 48

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	09'14	12'14
Unambiguously positively	14.8	13.6
Rather positively	44.7	45.1
Rather negatively	17.2	16.8
Negatively	9.6	12.9
DA/NA	13.7	11.6

Minsk policy towards Ukraine. There was a slight increase of those, who strongly blame this policy: approximately 3 percentage points (Table 48).

It is difficult to assert if a certain cold snap in relation to Russia is a start of a new trend or just another fluctuation. This cold snap, documented in the survey, was mainly motivated by security considerations. However, it is quite probable, that there will be a bigger influence of the financial crisis, which broke out in Russia to the full measure right in December, during the survey conduction. Russian crisis itself and its "echo" in Belarus will probably contribute to a further decline of pro-Russian moods.

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in December, 2014 (%)

1. "Was the past year successful or unsuccessful personally for you?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Successful	47.6	64.0	53.9	44.5	42.8	42.0	44.9	54.2
Unsuccessful	32.6	28.0	30.9	31.5	37.1	37.4	35.4	25.2
DA/NA	19.8	8.0	15.2	24.0	20.1	20.6	19.7	20.6

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Successful	70.5	48.4	45.9	45.7	45.4
Unsuccessful	17.9	26.1	34.5	33.8	35.8
DA/NA	11.6	25.5	19.6	20.5	18.8

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Successful	42.7	45.0	62.1	54.4	37.5
Unsuccessful	35.6	34.2	28.2	25.9	51.8
DA/NA	21.7	20.8	9.7	19.7	10.7

Table 1.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Successful	40.1	57.6	38.5	50.6	30.5	50.9	66.5
Unsuccessful	38.0	32.6	39.9	38.8	25.0	29.7	22.9
DA/NA	21.9	9.8	21.6	10.6	44.5	19.4	10.6

Table 1.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Successful	40.1	51.0	40.9	51.6	53.1
Unsuccessful	38.0	29.1	34.4	18.8	13.3
DA/NA	21.9	19.9	24.7	19.6	14.6

2. "Do you consider it important to carry out market-friendly reforms in Belarus?"

Table 2.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	63.2	64.0	70.9	74.0	69.7	60.9	65.5	50.4
No	22.0	16.0	13.9	12.3	17.8	21.4	17.8	37.5
DA	14.8	20.0	15.2	13.7	12.5	17.7	16.7	12.1

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	52.1	49.7	64.3	65.6	68.0
No	39.4	33.3	21.7	18.8	16.0
DA	8.5	17.0	14.0	15.6	16.0

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	69.0	64.0	72.1	52.8	64.3
No	16.2	20.1	10.6	35.4	14.3
DA	14.8	15.9	17.3	11.8	21.4

Table 2.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	63.4	66.4	62.7	42.6	76.9	58.9	67.0
No	18.2	23.5	18.9	40.2	11.1	23.4	22.9
DA	18.4	10.1	18.4	17.2	12.0	17.7	10.1

Table 2.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	63.4	66.3	55.7	65.2	64.7
No	18.2	16.8	25.0	22.7	26.2
DA	18.4	16.9	19.3	12.1	9.1

3. "According to you, market-friendly reforms in Belarus…"

Table 3.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
…are completed successfully	2.4	0	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.5	6.0
…are advancing successfully	19.9	14.0	13.3	11.6	14.8	14.6	22.0	33.5
…have slowed down	25.5	22.0	30.7	29.9	29.3	27.5	23.1	19.5
…have ended in a fiasco	9.9	10.0	13.3	11.6	9.1	11.1	8.0	8.9
…have never really started	26.5	32.0	28.0	26.5	30.4	31.1	29.5	16.3
DA/NA	15.8	22.0	13.4	19.0	15.3	14.3	15.9	15.8

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (includ-ing incomplete)
…are completed successfully	7.4	4.6	2.0	1.7	1.4
…are advancing successfully	43.6	26.8	15.8	17.7	19.7
…have slowed down	10.6	20.9	29.2	27.9	22.4
…have ended in a fiasco	9.6	11.1	11.8	7.9	8.5
…have never really started	11.7	20.3	26.7	27.7	32.7
DA/NA	1.1	16.3	14.5	17.1	15.3

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
…are completed successfully	1.9	1.1	1.0	5.5	0
…are advancing successfully	12.4	18.9	13.6	33.4	5.5
…have slowed down	24.9	27.8	28.2	20.3	36.4
…have ended in a fiasco	13.9	7.3	11.7	8.7	9.1
…have never really started	29.4	30.4	27.2	16.3	40.0
DA/NA	17.5	14.5	18.3	15.8	9.0

Table 3.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
…are completed successfully	0	4.0	0.9	3.0	5.6	2.3	2.2
…are advancing successfully	14.0	18.2	24.4	13.7	27.4	16.6	25.6
…have slowed down	14.7	20.0	33.2	22.6	25.4	31.4	35.7
…have ended in a fiasco	12.6	12.1	10.6	18.5	7.6	6.3	1.8
…have never really started	29.4	36.9	20.7	28.0	21.8	18.3	27.7
DA/NA	29.3	8.8	10.2	14.2	12.2	25.1	7.0

Table 3.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
…are completed successfully	0	1.0	4.7	3.5	2.9
…are advancing successfully	14.0	22.0	15.1	23.8	24.0
…have slowed down	14.7	32.2	29.4	25.0	26.0
…have ended in a fiasco	12.6	5.5	15.4	8.6	8.1
…have never really started	29.4	23.7	22.9	25.8	29.4
DA/NA	29.6	15.6	12.5	13.3	9.6

4. "If you think that recently there have been changes in the economy of the country, were there more of favorable or unfavorable changes?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
More of favorable changes	10.9	8.0	7.8	6.8	6.8	6.1	11.7	20.7
Equally	38.4	34.0	38.6	33.6	34.8	35.0	36.4	48.0
More of unfavorable changes	35.4	32.0	35.9	44.5	44.3	42.5	33.7	20.7
No changes at all	10.7	14.0	14.4	11.0	11.7	11.8	11.4	6.3
DA/NA	4.6	12.0	3.3	4.1	2.4	4.6	6.8	4.3

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
More of favorable changes	20.2	18.3	9.6	9.0	9.2
Equally	45.7	46.4	38.3	34.4	38.1
More of unfavorable changes	19.1	20.9	36.0	42.3	37.1
No changes at all	4.3	10.5	12.2	11.2	9.2
DA/NA	10.7	3.9	3.9	3.1	6.4

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
More of favorable changes	8.4	7.5	10.5	20.3	1.8
Equally	25.6	41.9	41.0	48.0	28.6
More of unfavorable changes	51.4	33.5	30.5	21.4	39.3
No changes at all	10.8	11.7	14.3	6.1	26.8
DA/NA	3.8	5.4	3.7	4.2	3.5

Table 4.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
More of favorable changes	4.1	11.5	6.5	12.4	8.5	17.2	19.4
Equally	22.7	31.4	50.0	24.9	45.0	48.3	51.1
More of unfavorable changes	54.3	39.4	33.3	36.7	33.5	23.0	19.4
No changes at all	14.8	13.7	8.8	14.8	9.0	5.7	7.0
DA/NA	4.1	4.0	1.4	11.2	4.0	5.8	3.1

Table 4.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
More of favorable changes	4.1	12.3	11.8	14.0	12.5
Equally	22.7	43.2	39.4	42.4	43.4
More of unfavorable changes	54.3	32.2	31.5	33.1	27.8
No changes at all	14.8	7.5	12.2	8.6	10.4
DA/NA	4.1	4.8	5.1	1.9	6.0

5. "According to you, is there a national unity in Belarus today?"

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Rather yes	48.4	56.0	43.0	43.5	42.0	40.7	41.7	67.6
Rather no	42.9	34.0	47.0	47.6	49.6	49.6	48.1	26.1
DA/NA	8.7	10.0	10.0	8.9	8.4	9.7	10.2	6.3

Table 5. 2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Rather yes	76.6	64.1	49.2	40.6	40.8
Rather no	20.2	21.6	43.1	50.6	50.0
DA/NA	3.2	14.3	7.7	8.8	9.2

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Rather yes	38.4	45.6	51.5	65.4	28.6
Rather no	52.7	45.1	38.8	27.4	60.7
DA/NA	8.9	9.3	9.7	7.2	10.7

Table 5.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Rather yes	34.9	46.0	55.6	32.0	56.8	57.7	59.5
Rather no	51.7	47.3	36.1	59.8	38.2	31.4	33.5
DA/NA	13.4	6.7	8.3	8.2	5.0	10.9	7.0

Table 5.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Rather yes	34.9	47.4	56.8	52.3	50.5
Rather no	51.7	41.2	37.9	39.8	43.0
DA/NA	13.4	11.4	5.3	7.9	6.5

6. "Do you consider fundamental changes in internal and external policies of Belarus possible in the next five years?"

Table 6.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Quite possible	34.4	38.8	36.8	31.3	27.3	31.4	31.8	43.6
Unlikely	45.9	40.8	47.4	53.1	52.3	50.7	46.2	33.8
Impossible	13.9	10.2	14.5	14.3	15.9	13.6	13.6	12.9
DA	5.8	10.2	1.3	1.3	4.5	4.3	8.4	9.7

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Quite possible	53.7	33.3	33.5	31.4	34.7
Unlikely	23.2	42.5	46.6	50.1	47.6
Impossible	13.7	13.1	14.2	14.5	12.9
DA	9.4	11.1	5.7	4.0	4.8

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Quite possible	29.6	33.8	32.7	42.6	23.6
Unlikely	54.9	45.5	48.1	34.7	54.5
Impossible	11.5	16.5	13.5	12.6	14.5
DA	4.0	4.2	5.7	10.1	7.4

Table 6.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Quite possible	27.7	31.9	34.1	32.5	37.2	27.4	50.2
Unlikely	56.2	40.3	46.1	42.0	43.2	51.4	39.2
Impossible	13.4	24.8	12.0	21.9	9.5	13.7	3.5
DA	2.7	3.0	7.8	3.6	10.1	7.5	7.1

Table 6.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Quite possible	27.7	30.0	33.6	35.5	42.6
Unlikely	56.2	50.5	44.3	43.8	37.1
Impossible	13.4	11.6	15.0	14.5	14.8
DA	2.7	7.9	7.1	6.2	5.5

7. "Some people by fundamental changes in internal and external policies of Belarus mean a strengthening of state's role in social life, others on the contrary mean a diminution of this role. What do you mean by this?"

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
The state should strengthen its role in society and give more support to its citizens	46.4	50.0	35.5	36.7	33.3	39.1	45.3	71.1
The state should diminish its role in society and let people act more freely	44.1	40.0	55.3	47.6	55.7	50.5	43.0	24.6
DA/NA	9.5	10.0	9.2	15.7	11.3	10.4	11.7	4.3

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
The state should strengthen its role in society and give more support to its citizens	77.9	66.7	44.2	38.6	40.8
The state should diminish its role in society and let people act more freely	20.0	24.8	45.7	50.7	49.0
DA/NA	2.1	8.5	10.1	10.7	10.7

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
The state should strengthen its role in society and give more support to its citizens	30.8	46.3	30.8	69.1	40.0
The state should diminish its role in society and let people act more freely	57.8	43.6	58.7	25.1	47.3
DA/NA	11.4	10.1	10.5	5.8	12.7

Table 7.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
The state should strengthen its role in society and give more support to its citizens	31.8	31.9	62.5	48.2	46.2	48.0	61.8
The state should diminish its role in society and let people act more freely	60.3	62.8	31.5	44.1	41.7	32.0	27.6
DA/NA	7.9	5.3	6.0	7.7	12.1	20.0	10.6

Table 7.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
The state should strengthen its role in society and give more support to its citizens	31.8	57.9	42.3	46.1	51.9
The state should diminish its role in society and let people act more freely	60.3	27.4	50.5	43.4	40.0
DA/NA	7.9	14.7	7.2	10.5	8.1

8. "And would you like those changes to happen?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	51.9	54.0	60.5	57.5	62.9	60.0	47.0	34.7
No	17.7	16.0	16.4	13.0	8.7	16.8	20.4	25.5
I don't care	19.9	18.0	15.8	15.8	20.4	16.4	17.8	27.8
DA	10.5	12.0	7.3	13.7	8.0	6.8	14.8	12.0

Table 8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	23.4	34.0	55.4	54.3	60.4
No	26.6	22.2	17.5	16.7	14.0
I don't care	45.7	30.1	17.9	18.8	11.3
DA	4.3	13.7	9.2	10.2	14.3

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	64.0	51.4	68.0	35.5	50.9
No	10.0	19.4	11.7	25.0	18.2
I don't care	19.6	15.4	10.7	28.7	23.6
DA	6.4	13.9	9.7	10.8	7.3

Table 8.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	56.3	51.6	52.1	48.8	45.2	39.1	64.8
No	14.3	16.0	18.9	22.0	16.6	24.7	15.0
I don't care	19.1	28.0	20.3	22.0	21.6	17.8	10.6
DA	10.3	4.4	8.7	7.2	16.6	18.4	9.8

Table 8.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	56.3	47.9	48.4	58.4	49.7
No	14.3	20.5	17.6	14.9	19.9
I don't care	19.1	17.5	20.4	16.1	24.4
DA	10.3	14.1	13.6	10.6	6.0

9. "Are you ready to personally protect Alexander Lukashenko from some threat?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	18.7	14.0	10.5	12.9	10.2	12.9	19.3	35.8
No	62.2	66.0	69.1	69.4	73.5	67.9	59.1	45.0
DA/NA	19.1	20.0	20.4	17.7	16.3	19.2	21.6	19.2

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	41.1	31.4	15.9	12.4	19.4
No	45.3	43.8	65.7	66.4	65.0
DA/NA	13.4	24.8	18.4	21.2	15.6

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	11.2	15.7	9.6	34.3	14.3
No	74.6	62.5	68.3	45.1	71.4
DA/NA	14.2	21.8	22.1	20.6	14.3

Table 9.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	13.1	14.2	28.1	17.1	17.2	13.7	27.8
No	77.3	69.3	48.4	65.3	57.1	53.7	57.7
DA/NA	9.6	16.5	23.5	17.6	25.7	32.6	14.5

Table 9.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	13.1	22.7	16.2	16.0	23.6
No	77.3	55.7	56.1	66.8	57.3
DA/NA	9.6	21.6	27.7	17.2	19.1

10. "Next presidential elections in Belarus will be held in 2015. According to you, if the elections are rigged, should opposition urge people to come out to a square and organize public protests?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, they should	23.9	32.0	32.2	31.5	33.0	25.4	19.7	10.9
No, they shouldn't	61.7	54.0	52.0	52.1	50.4	55.4	66.7	80.9
DA	14.4	14.0	15.8	16.4	16.6	19.2	13.6	8.2

Table 10. 2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, they should	9.5	7.2	25.8	26.2	30.4
No, they shouldn't	85.3	79.1	60.6	55.2	56.3
DA	5.2	13.7	13.6	18.6	13.3

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, they should	34.4	21.6	33.7	11.1	35.7
No, they shouldn't	46.9	63.6	51.9	80.5	44.6
DA	18.7	14.8	14.4	8.4	19.7

Table 10.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, they should	33.7	45.3	21.1	16.6	11.0	8.0	21.6
No, they shouldn't	49.5	44.9	56.4	72.2	75.5	72.6	70.9
DA	16.8	9.8	22.5	11.2	13.5	19.4	7.5

Table 10.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, they should	33.7	16.8	21.4	27.0	21.6
No, they shouldn't	49.5	68.8	62.9	59.8	66.0
DA	16.8	14.4	15.7	13.2	12.4

11. "Are you ready to participate in public protests after the elections 2015, if their results are rigged?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	13.4	22.0	24.3	21.1	15.2	15.3	9.1	4.6
No	79.2	70.0	65.8	69.4	75.4	76.5	85.6	90.8
DA/NA	7.4	8.0	9.9	9.5	9.4	8.2	5.3	4.6

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	3.2	7.2	16.2	13.6	15.0
No	93.6	89.5	76.0	78.1	76.9
DA/NA	3.2	3.3	7.8	8.3	8.1

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	21.3	11.2	20.2	5.5	19.6
No	68.2	82.8	67.3	89.7	76.8
DA/NA	10.5	6.0	12.5	4.6	3.6

Table 11.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	15.4	20.3	14.2	10.7	11.1	6.9	12.3
No	78.8	75.7	77.0	74.6	85.4	82.9	81.1
DA/NA	5.8	4.0	8.8	14.7	3.5	10.2	6.6

Table 11.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	15.4	13.4	11.8	12.1	14.0
No	78.8	79.1	78.1	78.1	81.3
DA/NA	5.8	7.5	10.1	9.8	4.7

12. "Part of opposition thinks that it is necessary not to organize mass protests after the elections 2015, but to make the power introduce changes in Belarus via the "People's Referendum". Do you agree with this?"

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, I agree	48.0	40.8	48.7	57.1	47.3	43.6	45.1	51.3
No, I disagree	29.3	28.6	28.3	20.4	29.4	34.4	29.5	29.5
DA/NA	22.7	30.6	23.0	22.5	23.3	22.0	25.4	19.2

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, I agree	58.5	48.4	45.3	49.3	47.8
No, I disagree	22.3	32.0	29.8	27.9	31.1
DA/NA	19.2	19.6	24.9	22.8	21.1

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, I agree	49.0	46.4	45.2	50.9	41.8
No, I disagree	30.6	29.7	23.1	28.8	29.1
DA/NA	20.4	23.9	31.7	20.3	29.1

Table 12.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, I agree	45.9	57.3	40.6	33.7	59.3	37.7	57.3
No, I disagree	30.5	25.8	38.7	32.5	12.6	37.1	28.6
DA/NA	23.6	16.9	20.7	33.8	28.1	25.2	14.1

Table 12.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, I agree	45.9	45.2	45.2	55.1	49.2
No, I disagree	30.5	30.5	29.7	23.4	31.3
DA/NA	23.6	24.3	25.1	21.5	19.5

13. "Recently President A. Lukashenko stated that "In the post-Soviet countries people are fed up with democracy. Now, on the contrary, there is a process going on in which people are more supportive of the concept of a strong state, which will not allow chaos, even more so a civil war, especially after the events in Ukraine." Do you agree with this?"

Table 13.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I agree	55.5	44.0	44.7	43.5	41.7	47.3	59.6	80.7
I disagree	32.1	36.0	39.5	38.8	42.4	40.6	29.8	12.9
DA/NA	12.4	20.0	15.8	17.7	15.9	12.1	10.6	6.4

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I agree	83.0	79.9	54.0	46.4	49.7
I disagree	11.7	12.3	34.6	37.1	37.1
DA/NA	5.3	7.8	11.4	16.5	13.2

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I agree	36.3	57.8	37.9	80.5	38.2
I disagree	49.4	28.3	41.7	13.4	49.1
DA/NA	14.3	13.9	20.4	6.1	12.7

Table 13.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I agree	36.6	40.3	64.5	52.1	56.8	63.4	81.4
I disagree	55.8	52.2	21.7	29.0	19.1	25.1	10.6
DA/NA	7.6	7.5	13.8	18.9	24.1	11.5	8.0

Table 13.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I agree	36.6	66.7	54.7	55.9	61.8
I disagree	55.8	18.6	27.3	29.7	29.4
DA/NA	7.6	14.7	18.0	15.4	8.8

14. "Do you support independence of Novorossiya?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	49.5	44.0	51.0	39.5	39.0	49.6	47.9	63.0
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	22.1	18.0	21.9	25.2	25.0	21.4	26.2	16.9
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	18.4	22.0	16.6	22.4	24.6	19.3	16.0	12.9
DA/NA	10.0	16.0	10.5	12.9	11.4	9.7	9.9	7.2

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	67.0	61.7	50.8	44.3	42.5
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	11.7	15.6	22.3	27.1	21.4
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	14.9	14.9	17.7	17.4	24.1
DA/NA	6.5	7.8	9.2	11.2	12.0

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	38.2	51.9	45.2	61.5	37.5
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	25.3	22.3	21.2	16.6	33.9
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	27.9	13.5	23.1	13.2	21.4
DA/NA	8.6	12.3	10.5	8.7	7.2

Table 14.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	31.5	45.6	58.7	40.8	50.8	52.3	70.5
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	27.7	23.9	24.8	20.1	26.6	13.2	15.0
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	39.4	27.4	12.4	24.3	4.5	6.9	4.8
DA/NA	1.4	3.1	4.1	14.8	18.1	27.6	9.7

Table 14.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, people of Novorossiya have a right for self-determination	31.5	60.5	50.5	53.3	51.7
No, I support territorial integrity of Ukraine	27.7	16.2	19.0	23.7	23.6
There is no Novorossiya, there is only Russian aggression against Ukraine	39.4	6.5	20.1	13.6	13.0
DA/NA	1.4	16.8	10.4	9.4	11.7

15. "Did your attitude to Russia change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, it became worse	31.8	34.7	32.2	39.5	38.4	32.9	32.2	21.8
Yes, it became better	20.4	18.4	15.8	12.2	15.2	20.7	19.7	30.2
No, it didn't change	44.8	40.8	48.1	46.3	43.0	43.9	44.3	45.7
DA/NA	3.0	6.1	3.9	2.0	3.4	2.5	3.8	2.3

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, it became worse	9.6	24.8	32.6	32.8	39.8
Yes, it became better	47.9	20.3	18.4	20.0	16.0
No, it didn't change	37.2	52.3	47.0	44.7	39.1
DA/NA	5.3	2.6	2.0	2.5	5.1

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, it became worse	41.8	29.8	35.8	21.6	37.5
Yes, it became better	17.2	18.3	14.6	29.8	12.5
No, it didn't change	38.2	48.4	45.7	45.9	48.2
DA/NA	2.8	3.5	3.9	2.7	1.8

Table 15.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, it became worse	55.3	35.4	42.6	30.8	19.2	10.3	15.5
Yes, it became better	8.9	23.5	22.2	20.1	22.7	27.4	23.5
No, it didn't change	35.8	39.8	32.4	43.8	53.5	58.9	55.8
DA/NA	0	1.3	2.8	5.3	4.6	3.4	5.2

Table 15.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, it became worse	55.3	21.6	31.2	27.2	25.2
Yes, it became better	8.9	26.5	25.8	24.1	18.2
No, it didn't change	35.8	47.4	38.4	45.5	53.5
DA/NA	0	4.5	4.6	3.2	3.1

16. "Did your attitude to EU change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, it became worse	44.6	30.0	36.8	37.4	39.0	46.2	43.8	56.7
Yes, it became better	10.1	14.0	12.5	13.6	10.6	10.8	9.0	7.2
No, it didn't change	41.6	48.0	46.8	45.6	47.7	40.1	43.0	32.1
DA/NA	3.7	8.0	3.9	3.4	2.7	2.9	4.2	4.0

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, it became worse	58.3	54.5	38.7	45.1	45.1
Yes, it became better	4.3	7.2	12.7	9.3	9.9
No, it didn't change	33.0	34.4	45.4	42.0	40.6
DA/NA	4.4	3.9	3.2	3.6	4.4

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, it became worse	33.4	46.4	35.9	57.6	40.0
Yes, it became better	13.1	8.9	16.5	7.1	9.1
No, it didn't change	51.1	40.5	44.7	31.1	45.5
DA/NA	2.4	4.2	2.9	4.1	5.4

Table 16.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, it became worse	24.6	33.8	63.3	45.6	45.2	51.7	56.4
Yes, it became better	12.6	11.6	8.3	8.9	15.1	6.3	7.0
No, it didn't change	62.8	52.9	24.8	37.9	31.7	38.0	33.5
DA/NA	0	1.7	3.6	7.6	8.0	4.0	3.1

Table 16.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, it became worse	24.6	55.7	43.9	48.0	49.6
Yes, it became better	12.6	10.7	12.1	5.9	9.4
No, it didn't change	62.8	29.6	37.5	42.6	36.9
DA/NA	0	4.0	6.5	3.5	4.1

17. "Eurasian Economic Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia comes into force on the 1st January, 2015. How do you evaluate Belarus' membership in this union?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positively	44.4	32.0	41.4	38.0	34.2	36.3	47.2	61.9
Negatively	18.1	20.0	22.4	21.8	22.8	21.7	15.8	9.7
Indifferently	31.5	44.0	30.3	35.4	38.8	36.3	27.9	22.1
DA	6.0	4.0	5.9	4.8	4.2	5.7	9.1	6.3

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positively	66.0	63.4	41.5	37.1	43.3
Negatively	3.2	9.2	18.3	21.2	22.9
Indifferently	28.7	21.6	35.2	34.5	26.3
DA	2.1	5.8	5.0	7.2	7.5

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Positively	28.7	46.9	34.6	62.0	36.4
Negatively	25.6	18.1	23.1	8.4	20.0
Indifferently	40.4	28.6	39.4	22.7	38.2
DA	5.3	6.4	2.9	6.9	5.4

Table 17.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Positively	25.7	37.2	39.6	45.6	43.5	66.7	62.3
Negatively	21.6	30.5	30.4	8.9	18.5	3.4	8.3
Indifferently	45.9	28.3	23.5	41.4	27.5	25.3	24.1
DA	6.8	4.0	6.5	4.1	10.5	4.6	5.3

Table 17.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positively	25.7	59.8	43.2	47.3	45.7
Negatively	21.6	11.7	15.7	21.1	20.3
Indifferently	45.9	22.7	35.7	27.0	27.3
DA	6.8	5.8	5.4	4.6	6.7

18. "In regards to the conflict in Ukraine President A. Lukashenko has recently stated: "Uncle Sam from over the ocean constantly pushes us to a battle". Do you agree with this statement?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I agree	60.9	54.0	52.6	51.0	51.0	58.2	62.0	78.3
I disagree	28.7	32.0	36.8	32.7	39.5	33.2	25.9	13.7
DA/NA	10.4	14.0	10.6	16.3	9.5	8.6	12.2	8.0

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I agree	78.7	77.8	60.8	55.5	54.3
I disagree	9.6	16.3	30.2	31.2	35.2
DA/NA	11.7	5.9	9.0	13.3	10.5

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I agree	46.7	63.6	53.4	77.3	42.9
I disagree	41.6	25.8	38.8	14.0	44.6
DA/NA	11.7	10.6	7.8	8.7	12.5

Table 18.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I agree	37.3	54.0	64.8	57.4	67.2	75.3	80.5
I disagree	55.8	39.4	22.7	31.4	10.6	15.5	13.3
DA/NA	6.9	6.6	12.5	11.2	22.2	9.2	6.2

Table 18.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I agree	37.3	75.0	67.7	64.1	61.0
I disagree	55.8	12.3	25.1	22.7	27.3
DA/NA	6.8	12.7	7.2	13.2	11.7

19. "Belarus and Russia are members of a military union – The Collective Security Treaty Organization. How do you evaluate Belarus' membership in CSTO?"

Table 19.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
CSTO membership provides security for Belarus	44.4	36.0	45.0	33.3	33.0	41.9	43.9	60.9
CSTO membership is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia	42.7	46.0	42.4	53.1	52.3	45.9	42.0	28.7
DA/NA	12.9	18.0	12.6	13.6	14.7	12.2	14.1	10.4

Table 19.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
CSTO membership provides security for Belarus	68.1	60.8	42.2	39.8	39.1
CSTO membership is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia	24.5	28.1	44.2	47.9	45.6
DA/NA	7.4	11.1	13.6	12.3	15.3

Table 19.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
CSTO membership provides security for Belarus	28.0	47.8	42.7	59.4	35.7
CSTO membership is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia	56.0	39.8	43.7	29.6	51.7
DA/NA	16.0	12.4	13.6	11.0	12.6

Table 19.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
CSTO membership provides security for Belarus	22.9	36.7	40.6	41.4	51.3	66.7	62.3
CSTO membership is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia	63.4	54.0	49.8	43.2	28.6	20.1	27.2
DA/NA	13.7	9.3	9.6	15.4	20.1	13.2	10.5

Table 19.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
CSTO membership provides security for Belarus	22.9	55.8	48.4	45.7	48.1
CSTO membership is fraught with involvement into military schemes of Russia	63.4	28.4	37.6	43.0	41.3
DA/NA	13.7	15.8	14.0	11.3	10.6

20. "Recently President A. Lukashenko has stated "Honesty and justice, that I have promised you, still define my policy". Do you agree with this statement?"

Table 20.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I agree	42.3	40.0	34.2	24.7	27.4	35.2	40.9	71.3
I disagree	42.3	40.0	46.7	57.5	57.4	47.3	43.9	17.8
DA	15.4	20.0	19.1	17.8	15.2	17.4	15.2	10.9

Table 20.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I agree	76.8	69.9	41.0	30.7	35.5
I disagree	11.6	17.6	44.3	51.9	48.1
DA	11.6	12.4	14.8	17.4	16.4

Table 20.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I agree	20.5	42.5	33.0	70.0	30.9
I disagree	64.0	41.2	43.7	17.9	54.5
DA	15.5	16.2	23.3	12.1	14.5

Table 20.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I agree	25.3	40.9	47.0	39.6	37.2	51.4	60.2
I disagree	69.9	51.6	36.9	43.2	38.2	24.0	19.9
DA	4.8	7.6	16.1	17.2	24.6	24.6	19.9

Table 20.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I agree	25.3	47.8	45.7	42.6	48.2
I disagree	69.9	30.6	38.6	39.8	34.6
DA	4.8	21.6	15.7	17.6	17.2

OPEN FORUM

In this issue of the IISEPS analytical bulletin under the heading "Open Forum" we continue to publish a selection of data from sociological surveys conducted by our colleagues in foreign countries with our brief comments.

Despite purposeful efforts of the Belarusian leadership to design their own model of development, its uniqueness is relative. This conclusion applies to economic, political, social and other components of the Belarusian model. We believe that the comparative analysis of social processes in other countries will allow readers to better understand the results of researches on the Belarusian society.

TWO ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN REALITY PERCEPTION

Despite expectations of most experts, Russian society didn't pull out of the state of excitation over the fourth quarter of the year. Trust to the power and evaluations of its activities are still very high. However, all the indicators connected to practical interests and evaluations of situation and family conditions start to sag.

We deal with moving apart of two aspects of perception and evaluation of current events. The first aspect is symbolical. It is associated with the level of collective notions, with the symbols of national unity, with the notion of great power and with power authority. The second aspect consists of real evaluations of the state of affairs. These evaluations started to sag after sanctions and inflation rate hike.

Let us remind you: when V. Putin rose to power, mass expectations in regard to the new head of state were limited to two hopes: the first hope, expressed by 70% of respondents, implied that V. Putin must lead the country out of the economic crisis, and the second one, supported by approximately 55% of respondents, so equally notable, implied that he must return to Russia the status of "a great power" (Levada-Center data).

These two demands were the most exact description of the nature of expectations and public setups in regard to the power (and therefore basic notions of the due social and political system in the country). This means that public consciousness is ready to accept authoritarian and uncontrollable power only against the background of a great power (empire).

The TV-version of "Crimeaisours" and military actions in the South-East of Ukraine created the necessary background, and the grateful reaction of mass consciousness was not long in coming: the share of respondents perceiving Russia as a great power jumped by 20 points in November 2014 in comparison with September 2012 (Table 1).

Electoral rating of President V. Putting, after having put up the same 20 points, continues to maintain at the level of historical maximum even in the first half of November (69-72%, according to weekly observations of Public Opinion Foundation). Declining oil prices and consequent diving of the Russian ruble had no impact on the attitude to the head of state for the time being. Trust rating of Prime Minister D. Medvedev is stable as well.

Levada-Center never recorded such breath-taking values of V. Putin's electoral rating (October – 56%, November – 53%). In part this difference with POF may be explained by the fact that Levada-Center posed an open question, while POF's questionnaire includes a list of politicians. Nevertheless, if we count V. Putin's electoral rating taking into account only those respondents who plan to vote in the elections and had already made up their minds, we shall see that the lack of alternative is even more striking: October – 88%, November – 82%. As a comparison, V. Zyuganov's (who is the second leader in the list) corresponding values amount to 4% and 7%.

But let us move from the symbolical aspect to the aspect of real evaluations of the state of affairs in the country and social well-being (Table 2). WCIOM data will help us in it.

All three indices, which describe respondents' evaluation of the state of affairs in the country, decreased throughout September-November. Index of economic situation in Russia decreased more than others (–23 points). However, neither of these indices didn't reach the January level.

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, is Russia a great power as for today?"*, %

Variant of answer	03'94	07'08	09'12	11'14
Yes	14	49	48	68
No	72	31	37	19
DA	13	20	15	12

** Levada-Center data*

Table 2

Dynamics of indices of social moods, %

Indices*	01'14	08'14	09'14	10'14	11'14
Indices of the assessment of situation in the Country					
Economic situation in the country	36	72	63	59	49
Political situation	45	79	75	71	62
General vector of development of the country	51	78	78	76	65
Indices of social wellbeing					
Satisfaction with life	58	77	71	69	71
Social optimism	66	77	64	63	49
Financial state	65	76	71	71	70

** The indices for each of the indicators are calculated as a variance between the sum of positive and average evaluation and the sum of negative evaluations*

Index of social optimism is the champion of decrease among indices of social well-being (–28 points). And this is despite the fact that index of financial state (calculated from answers to the question "How would you evaluate financial state of your family at present?") almost hasn't changed during the last three months!

This inconsistent dynamics of indices of social well-being testifies that negative expectations start to accumulate in the society. They are not yet reflected in respondents' evaluations of their current financial state, but "the night is young". Crisis in Russian economy kicks into gear, and very soon it will move from macro level to micro level.

More than 40% of Russians make plans only for one or two months ahead (WCIOM). 18% of Russians make plans for several years ahead. And the number of those, who stopped making plans at all due to the unstable situation in the country, increased from 17% up to 19% over the fourth quarter.

According to Federal State Statistics Service data on socio-economic situation in Russia over 10 months of 2014, in October households spent a record high share of their monetary incomes on currency purchase – 8.6% ($ 8.8 million). Taking into account dynamics of currency deposits, we may conclude that population provided approximately one third of capital outflow in one moths.

Besides cash currency purchase, bank savings in rubles reduced by 0.3% ($ 1.2 billion) over October, at the same time bank savings in foreign currencies increased by $ 10.7 billion. People try to shift from ruble to something else, and by something else they mean not only foreign currency: decrease of income growth rate makes them invest more actively into stock market and real estate.

According to research holding Romir data, based on Romir Household Panel, everyday consumers expenditure grew by 3.2% in November compared to October and by 13% compared to September. Over the previous three years there were no increases of expenditures in November compared to October. At the same time, in November food spending decreased by 5% compared to October, while non-food spending increased by 15%.

According to WCIOM's December survey the number of those, who don't consider present times as good times for major purchases, is increasing. It should be noted, that survey was conducted before the aggravation of currency crisis, when Central Bank raised key interest rate up to 17% and therefore provoked panic on exchange market. Against this background there was a pick-up in buying activity in some regions: people were buying brown and white goods on a massive scale. However, most analysts predict that this panic buying will diminish in the first quarter of 2015.

At the same time, according to WCIOM data, the share of respondents, considering present times suitable for credit activities, continues to decrease as well. Present credit trust rating decreased down to the level of crisis year 2009, when 70% of respondents considered that it wasn't the best time to take credits.

Russian political scientist V. Pastukhov calls the hypertrophic ability of symbolic aspect to influence social well-being "a syndrome of shut off consciousness". This syndrome bans the formation of non-conformist movements and makes reasonably smooth evolution impossible. As a result, negative trends hit the bottom, thereafter comes "massive enlightenment", sometimes even more disgusting than massive delusion.

It seems that today Russia once more achieved peak values of conformism and starts another cyclical movement to "massive enlightenment". Russian history, as V. Pastukhov puts it, is used to move pushing off the bottom.

There are no prospects of economic recovery as for today. This economic crisis paves the way for a "mass enlightenment", especially taking into account the fact that for most Russians personal financial well-being and economic potential of the country are main characteristics of the idea of "great power" (Table 3). Military and nuclear strengths are only on the third place.

Let us note that rating of characteristics is exceptionally stable. During the crisis year 1999 and on the peak of economic growth of 2008 structure of answers of Russians never changed in essence.

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, is it a good or a bad time for major purchases?", %

Variant of answer	The IV quarter of 2012	The IV quarter of 2013	The II quarter of 2014	The III quarter of 2014	The IV quarter of 2014
Rather good	35	37	47	36	26
Rather bad	52	49	43	50	61
DA	12	14	11	13	13

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, what does the idea of "great power" include?"*, %

Variant of answer	03'99	07'08	09'12	11'14
High well-being of citizens	63	66	61	60
Economic and industrial potential of the country	64	57	55	60
Military strength, nuclear missile arsenal	30	37	44	44
Great culture, science, art	31	31	27	23
Abundant nature resources	14	19	21	20
Respect from other countries, world authority	35	24	19	19
Scale of the country, great expanses	4	8	10	16
Freedoms and civil rights	15	16	17	13
Heroic past	7	10	10	13
Population size	2	5	5	6
DA	4	2	2	2

** Levada-Center data*

Table 5

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which country would you prefer to live in: a huge country respected and feared by other countries, or in a small comfortable and harmless country?"*, %

Variant of answer	02'08	06'09	12'14
Definitely/rather first variant	75	35	75
Rather/definitely second variant	19	58	27
DA	6	7	9

** Levada-Center data*

Table 4 helps to understand the reason why the first president of the USSR M. Gorbachev and the first president of Russia B. Yeltsin lost Russians' support. They didn't satisfy mass expectations of people's well-being growth. Will V. Putin suffer the same fate? It is impossible to answer this question unambiguously as for today, but the processes are already under way, and this way coincides with the track of the unlucky predecessors of the current head of state.

Another evidence of predominance of economic factors over symbolic factors is the dynamics of answers to the question "Which country would you prefer to live in: a huge country respected and feared by other countries, or in a small comfortable and harmless country?" (Table 5).

The second column is quite notable. June 2009 is the peak of world financial crisis. Russia's GDP dropped by 7.8% compared to rich 2008, and real monetary income of population increased by modest 1.8%. According to priorities, reflected in Table 4, ideas of "great power" changed.

It is nice to declare desire to live in a big country, feared by its neighbors, when you have a double-digit growth of incomes. Thus there are no doubts that the ratio of answers, recorded in November 2014, will start to change very soon.

Let us reinforce this supposition by a statement of L. Gudkov, the director of Levada-Center: "Critical anti-West dissatisfaction is at its peak right now due to propaganda, but gradually it will spread on our power, government, bureaucracy and the President himself. Exasperation by Vladimir Putin, ideas of mafia power, which were threshed out by the proclamation of Russians' protection in Ukraine, will return, because the complaints against the leader of our country haven't disappeared. But I don't expect a social explosion. <…> We'll rather witness local outbursts, like strikes against the healthcare reforms, i.e. some kind of splashes in response to inadequate actions of

Table 6

Distribution of answers to the question: "In general do you trust or distrust Ukrainian TV?" depending on age of respondents, %

Variant of answer	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Trust completely	16.5	19.8	19.9	25.7	23.6	30.1
Trust partially	61.4	62.2	61.7	57.5	58.3	53.5
Distrust completely	18.1	12.8	13.6	15.4	14.0	9.8
DA	4.1	5.2	4.7	1.4	4.1	6.6

Table 7

Distribution of answers to the question: "In general do you trust or distrust Russian TV?" depending on age of respondents, %

Variant of answer	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
Trust completely	4.3	4.1	5.6	5.9	5.4	4.9
Trust partially	27.5	26.8	26.8	22.4	29.5	24.2
Distrust completely	55.1	50.5	48.7	52.9	40.2	36.1
DA	13.1	18.3	18.9	18.8	24.9	34.7

local powers. Such protests will happen more often. The power will probably react in one, the most stupid, way – they will reinforce repressions".

UKRAINIAN IMMUNITY TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

Public opinion in Belarus is formed under strong influence of Russian TV. In September 36.3% of Belarusians watched Russian TV-news on a regular basis, sometimes this figure even reached 48.5%. 49.2% of respondents evaluated these programs as completely or mostly objective, and 39.4% of respondents – as completely or mostly biased.

Russian TV input into Ukrainian media scene is fundamentally different. Let us address the results of a survey called "Mass media and trust to Ukrainian and Russian mass media" which was conducted by Kiev International Institute of Sociology in October.

Answering the question "Which are your sources of information about situation in Ukraine?", 83.5% of respondents mentioned Ukrainian TV, 21% – Russian TV (31% – internet sites, 29% – friends and relatives, 29% – Ukrainian newspapers and magazines, 16% – Ukrainian radio, 11% – social networks, blogs, 2% – Russian newspapers and magazines, 1% – Russian radio).

Among Ukrainian population in its entirety 9% of respondents watch Russian TV on a regular basis, 29% do it from time to time and 61% – never (1% of respondents didn't know how to answer the question).

22% of Ukrainians completely trust Ukrainian TV, 59.5% trust partially, 14% don't trust at all (4.5% are not sure). Level of trust substantially depends on the region. In Western region 26% of population completely trust Ukrainian TV, 68.5% trust partially and 3% don't trust at all. In Central region these figures amount to 28%, 63% and 4% accordingly. In Southern regions the figures are 22%, 56% and 18% accordingly. In return in Eastern region (including Donbass) only 10% of respondents completely trust Ukrainian TV, 49% trust partially and 35% don't trust at all (6% didn't know how to answer). If we take Donbass separately, then only 7% of its population trust Ukrainian TV, 50% trust partially and 34.5% don't trust at all.

Only 5% of Ukrainians completely trust Russian TV, 26% trust only partially and 48.5% don't trust at all (20.5% were not sure).

Let us note that in Western and Central regions almost no one trusts Russian TV completely. Partial trust was expressed by 8% of respondents in Western Ukraine and by 14% of respondents in Central Ukraine. 81% and 58% accordingly don't trust Russian TV at all. In Southern region 4% of respondents trust Russian TV completely, 25% trust partially and 38.5% don't trust at all. The share of those who didn't know how to answer is the highest in this region – 32.5%. In return in Eastern region (including Donbass) 17% of respondents completely trust Russian TV, 63% trust it partially and 12 don't trust it at all. If we take Donbass separately, 20.5% of its population trust Russian TV completely, 67% trust partially and only 7% don't trust at all.

Table 6-7 let us evaluate level of trust to Ukrainian and Russian TV depending on age of respondents.

It is natural that the older the respondents are the more they trust national TV. In the age of internet these are mostly senior citizens who watch hours upon hours of television, and those who watch it like this trust it most of all.

However, this pattern doesn't work in regard to trust to Russian TV in Ukraine. Neither complete, nor partial trust doesn't depend on age of respondents. As for complete distrust, respondents of 18-29 years old express it half as much as respondents older than 70 years old (due to the share of those who had difficulties with the answer).

Ukrainian citizens' age doesn't contribute to regular watching of Russian TV as well. Among respondents of 18-29 years old 8.6% watch it on a regular

basis, 33% watch it from time to time and 1.4% don't watch it at all. Among people older than 70 years old these figures amount to 5.9%, 21% and 72% accordingly.

These sociologic data clearly demonstrates that Ukrainian society has a significant immunity to Russian propaganda.

POSITIVE NEWS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

While future citizens of the Eurasian Economic Union hit currency exchange offices in vain attempts to protect their savings in national currencies, citizens of former Baltic republics raise the level of positive evaluations of EU economy and common European currency. This is the conclusion we make on the basis of the freshest survey of Eurobarometer, conducted in EU countries between 8 and 17 November 2014.

Average positive evaluation over 28 EU countries amounted to 56%. In comparison with May it increased by 1 point. Let us note a substantial difference between countries within the euro zone and outside it: 67% and 35% accordingly.

Latvia turned out to be the leader of positive evaluations' increase – +13 points (63%). You should remember that Latvia entered euro zone since January 1, 2014. This leadership is a vivid proof that, when national economies switch to euro, for citizens positive moments predominate over negative moments.

The second place of positive evaluations' increase is taken by Lithuania – +6 points (74%). Lithuanians switch to euro since January 1, 2015. That is why their optimism should be regarded as a kind of advance. We hope that this optimism is based on the experience of their northern neighbors in EU – Latvia and Estonia.

Optimism rise of Estonians over the second half of 2014 turned out to be quite moderate against the background of neighbors. They added 3 points, but they added it to a record-high level of positive evaluations, and thus Estonians kept their leadership in this index in Europe – 83%.

Estonian citizens closed the top three while answering the question "Do you feel you are a citizen of the EU?" – 78%. The first place is still occupied by Luxembourgers – 89%, the second one is occupied by Malta citizens – 85%. Let us note a high level of European identification among Lithuanians – 71% and Latvians – 68%.

Citizens of Belgium (48%), Italy (47%) and Greece (45%) round out the top.

In fine of a short round-up of the results of November Eurobarometer, let us note a decrease of topicality of unemployment (from 48% down to 45%) and economic situation (from 29% down to 24%). These are good news.

Economy of the EU manifestly makes progress, and this increases positive image of the EU (39%, +4 points compared to spring 2014). There was also a notable increase of trust to the EU (37%, +6 points), national governments (29%, +2 points) and national parliaments (30%, +2 points).

"OSTALGIE" STILL IN VOGUE

On the 9th of November Germany and "all progressive mankind" (a set expression of soviet propaganda) celebrated the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall.

The wall fell in 1989. Remaining sections were turned into art-objects, two parts of Germany reunited. Nowadays this day is a national holiday, a day of brotherhood and unity. However, even 25 years later some problems are still there. Germans have even invented a special word for it – "ostalgie" (from "Ost" – East and "nostalgie"). This word means "longing for Soviet past". Today almost every sixth German advocates restoration of the Berlin wall. This was demonstrated by the results of a survey conducted by the institute for new social answers Insa-Consulere on commission from the newspaper Thüringer Landes Zeitung.

According to the results of the survey, 16% of respondents spoke in favor of return of the Berlin Wall. From the point of view of party membership 16% of supporters of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and 15% of supporters of the Left Party advocated restoration of the construction between the East and the West of Germany. Among the voters of the Christian-Democratic Union of Angela Merkel and of the Green Party this share amounted to 11%. Supporters of the euro-skeptical party "Alternative for Germany" advocate the restoration of the wall more often than others – 20%.

According to the survey, 40% of young Germans, whose parents grew up in East Germany, don't consider GDR as a dictatorship, and 50% of them think that democracy in West Germany wasn't real.

The raucous 1990s happened not only on post-Soviet space. With the quick re-orientation of the economy of East Germany on market a lot of enterprises were closed, and employment bans were introduced, so a lot of people lost sense of their lives. Besides, standard of living in eastern regions is still lower than in the West (GDP per capita in the East equals to 66% GDP in the West).

That is why "ostalgie"-fashion is quite stable. During the celebrations goods labeled "Made in GDR" enjoyed high demand in Berlin. An expensive tour (89 euro per hour) around the city in a Trabant had to be booked in advance, and Soviet style rooms in Ostel Hostel (guests there usually grow numb in front of a portrait of Eric Hoenikker) were fully booked.

According to Public Opinion Foundation (fom.ru), "Levada-Center" (levada.ru), WCIOM (wciom.ru), ROMIR (romir.ru), Insa-consulere (insa-consulere.de), Kiev International Institute of Sociology (kiis.com.ua), Eurpbarometer (ec.europa.eu)

BOOKSHELF

"The future of Belarus. Young experts' view". – *Edited by Evgeny Preigerman, Minsk, 2014, 316 pp.*

Republic of Belarus is a country, where political elite is unable to form an image of the future. This is the lot of modern authoritarian regimes, which were formed on the post-Soviet space.

Totalitarian Soviet state was a state aiming at future. It was based on the idea of building paradise on earth (communism). Which is the society that Belarusians try to build for thirty years already headed by A. Lukashenko? The power doesn't even try to formulate its image.

And if there is no image of the future, then the attempts to formulate the national idea also turn out to be vain. Thus the constant appeal to the past with its cult of the Great Patriotic War. Consequently, the past is a kind of an ersatz of the future.

The right for official interpretation of the past in Belarus was appropriated by the political elite, and it permits them to base their entitlement to power not only on the ground of elections' results and entitlement to representation acquired in competitive struggle, but also on the ground of right of inheritance ("We are the heirs of the generation of victors!", "This is our victory!", "We won't cede it to anyone!").

But as specialist in institutional economy put it, civil society exists in order to overcome state's fiasco. In particular, they are to form the image of the future, and not only of some abstract future, but of a desired future, which cannot be built without participation of the civil society.

I regard "The Future of Belarus. Young Experts' View" edited by Evgeny Preigerman as an attempt to overcome state's fiasco. There was another book that served as a trigger which made nine young authors combine their forces in order to create a collective effort. This book is "The Future of Belarus. Independent Experts' View" edited by Prof. Oleg Manaev. It was written in 2012 by a group of Belarusian and foreign scientists and analysts, who are specialized on Belarusian studies.

Therefore "The Future of Belarus. Young Experts' Vies" is some kind of a response from the young generation of researchers, formed in post-Soviet times, to the generation which studies Belarus for several decades already.

There was only one restriction, which young authors imposed on themselves: each analytical essay should have contained a mid-range (up to 2020) and a long-range (after 2030) forecast.

Despite a relatively small size of the book it addresses a wide range of topics and questions:

- system reforms and transformations;
- economic and political model of Belarus;
- relation between society and state;
- foreign policy of Belarus;
- Belarusian identity;
- cultural policy of Belarus;
- state and prospects of secondary and higher education, and quality of Belarusian science.

The book starts with an essay of Evgeny Preiferman called "Which hybrid will the clay of history mold of Belarus?" Author considers Belarus as a hybrid entity whose future is defined by three fundamental factors: Russia, regional dynamics of Eastern Europe, and quality of elite and leadership. According to the author, we shouldn't expect substantial changes in the mid-run (2020): "There will be further exhaustion of life resources of long-established socio-economic and political models, and an accumulation of system problems".

The book was written before "Crimeaisours". It is natural, that author could not foresee the acceleration gained by economic, political and social processes in the Slavic triangle. That is why "variability of possible scripts of further development", related to 2030, starts to come into life right now.

The central notion of Artem Schreibman's essay "The Future of Political System of Belarus" is evolution. According to author, transformation of political system in Belarus will happen by way of evolution, and the power will be the subject of changes. Obviously, not on its own will, but under the influence of economy "in the widest sense".

Initial thesis of Nikita Belyaev's "Interest of Belarusian society as an insurance of changes" is the sufficiently effective functioning of political system over 20 years. The insurance for this efficiency is to a large extent A. Lukashenko's policy, aimed at realization of consumers' requests and demands of the majority of Belarusian society, as well as their gradual transformation and formation of new cults/stimuli in order to decrease the wish to participate in political life.

The future in the mid-run (2020) will be formed at the expense of degradation of Belarusian political system, which will be expressed in the efficiency drop of work and manageability of the machine of government, in the rise of crisis phenomena in economy, in the degradation of quality of social policy and state services. This will be a major factor contributing to gradual transformation of social moods.

Demand for reforms may be strengthened "in the case of decrease/absence of financial support from Kremlin". The author doesn't exclude a possibility of economy collapse in Belarus under these conditions. This collapse will contribute to the transition from words (about reforms) to actions (actual reforms).

As it follows from the name of Andrei Scriba's essay ("Belarus balancing between the EU and Russia"), the author marks out the aspiration of Belarusian powers to maintain "a regional balance between the European Union and Russia" in the foreign policy of Belarus. He shares the opinion of those experts, who assert that after turbulent political events in December 2010 and under the conditions of Eurasian integration it is not possible anymore to maintain this balance. The probability to return to it through to 2020 is also quite low. As for the mid-range prospect (2030) renewal of balancing practice seems to be much more probable. That is why the issue of regional self-determination of the country will probably become very acute in 15-20 years.

It would seem that after turbulent events of 2014 the authors of the book would refuse many of their forecasts. There is nothing surprising about it. It is hard to escape the example of a broken clock that doesn't move and thus tells the time correctly twice a day.

But despite the deviations between forecasts and reality, the book, according to its authors, has two added values. First: it urges to think and talk about the future, which is less typical for the analytical and polemical space of Belarus than thinking and talking about the past and the present. Second: this book (together with the book edited by Prof. Oleg Manaev) provides a possibility to compare analytical ideas of the future of younger and older generations. This comparison by itself may be quite an interesting direction of research, because within its frame it is possible to understand to which extent are the expectations for the future of Belarus are formed under the influence of past experience and to which extent they formed under the influence of creative ideas devoid of time reference.

And these "added values" are certainly worth consent.

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expert

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