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Dear readers!

In this issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" we offer to your attention materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute researches in the third quarter of 2014.

Our research shows that unstable character of "economic well-being" of Belarusians, registered in June, is still present in the third quarter of the year. Thus, the ratio of those whose financial standing improved over the last three months to those whose financial standing went downhill increased. The number of Belarusians considering that country's economy is in crisis went downhill as well. However, real incomes of population "froze" on the same level. Almost 5% of respondents attributed themselves to a group of population which barely make both ends meet and don't have enough money for buying food; more than a quarter of respondents have enough money for food, but have difficulties buying clothes. It isn't surprising that most of all Belarusians fear poverty and health loss. Belarusians' tendency to work overboard is an eloquent indicator of their financial position: almost in each fourth family one of its members works overboard at present, and each third respondents thinks that "in order to make a successful career it is better to leave for another country".

Belarusians' attitude to state power demonstrates double character as well. On the one hand many of respondents are quite skeptical in their evaluations of state power's activities. Thus, people more often pin their hopes for economical development of Belarus on foreign capital than on the President. 37% of respondents do not feel protected by law. On the other hand people still wait for the power to solve these issues. Level of trust to the head of state and his electoral rating continue to grow. Almost a half of those, who want changes in the country, think that these changes are possible under A. Lukashenko's rule.

In general Belarusians' readiness for changes shouldn't be underestimated, but it is less and less connected to the "titular" opposition. Thus, only 14.1% of respondents trust oppositional parties, while 63.3% don't; only 21.1% suppose that Belarusian opposition understands issues and cares of people like them, while almost 60% share the opposite opinion. Answering the question if a candidate from the democratic forces can win on the presidential elections in 2015, 52% of respondents answered "no".

In foreign policy orientations of Belarusians there is a tendency of distancing from Europe and of a more suspicious relation to Russia. Comparatively to December, the share of "Euro-Belarusians" decreased by 10%, while the number of people opposing to eurointegration of Belarus increased by 15%; second quarter running the share of the latter exceeds 50%, which wasn't observed for the last five years. On the basic cultural and psychological level absolute majority of Belarusians still consider themselves closer to Russians than to Europeans. But the more concrete topics are in the geopolitical process, the more cautious is the attitude of Belarusians. Thus, the number of adherents of Belarus entering NATO decreases significantly. "If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces", more than one fourth of respondents would "resist up in arms". The same number of respondents would "resist up in arms", "if Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces".

Events in Ukraine continue to significantly influence Belarusians, changing their attitude, up to an opposite one, to both internal and external policies. Thus, evaluating the annexation of Crimea by Russia, 27.2% of respondents called it "an imperialistic usurpation and occupation", while almost 60% of respondents think that it is "a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice". More than a half of respondents agree with the definition of Ukrainian powers, installed after V. Yanukovich, as "fascists", and only one third disagrees with this. Almost one fourth of respondents changed their attitude to Russia to a worse one after the events in Ukraine, and almost a half of respondents changed their attitude to the EU to the worse as well. But, as in the case of geopolitical choice, specific topics of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis are evaluated more cautiously. Thus, only 15.2% of Belarusians agreed that Belarus should permit Russia "to bring their troops through the Belarusian territory if Russia takes the decision to bring troops into Ukraine", while three fourths of respondents are unambiguously against it. Almost 77% of respondents have a negative attitude to participation of Belarusian citizens in combat actions on either side. President A. Lukashenko's position in this question enjoys understanding and support of majority of Belarusians, his rating grows. The main reason for this is an aspiration to avoid similar conflicts in Belarus by all means.

As usual, those readers who are more interested in our figures than in our assessments can analyze the research results on their own. The results are presented according to the main socio-demographic characteristics.

In our "Open Forum" rubric we present the most interesting results of work of our colleagues from neighboring countries, publishing the most interesting results of their late surveys. And in the "Bookshelf" rubric well-known Russian publicist Vadim Dubnov presents a new book of our colleague Yuri Drakokhrust "Seven years of famine", which analyzes the most important processes and events of modern history of Belarus.

As usual, your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In September of 2014 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.506 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

SEPTEMBER – 2014

September anomalies

Real gross monthly-average salary of working people in Republic of Belarus grew by 1.3% in January-August 2014 in comparison with the same period in 2013, notably in August 2014 it dropped by 2.2% in comparison with the previous month.

Salaries went down in August; the survey was conducted in the first half of September. It would seem that it shouldn't be complicated to predict the influence of such an unusual event on social indices. However despite the patterns which were formed over the last two decades, reality was different. The current year 2014 stands a good chance to enter the history of independent sociology as the year of social anomalies. The reason for these anomalies is due to the multidirectionality of signals from economy and television (the level of hysteria on Russian TV-channels still didn't go down after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014).

In comparison with June the share of Belarusians who find that their financial standing improved increased by 4.5 points, while the share of those who think that their financial position worsened decreased by 7.5 points at once. As a result the trend on the decrease of financial standing index, which was outlined in June, was "broken" (Table 1).

old) noted an improvement of their financial standing, while in the oldest age group (60 years old and older) this share amounted to 18.9%.

As for the vision of the future, it is quite fuzzy. The share of optimists dropped by 10 points comparatively to June, but at the same time the share of pessimists dropped as well – by 6.2 points. As a result, the expectation index dropped by 3.8 points (Table 2) amid a notable growth of the financial standing index. It's difficult to recollect when FSI and EI were so oppositely directed before.

A certain degree of abnormality could be noted in the behavior of the policy correctness index as well (Table 3). It has almost not changed at all. However, when we were analyzing the results of the June survey, we had noted a close connection between the PCI and the electoral rating of A. Lukashenko. This connection, according to our opinion, is due to the inability of public opinion to draw the line between the personality of the head of state and the course of development of the country. In September the PCI maintained its position amid the growth of A. Lukashenko's electoral rating from 38.9% up to 45.2% (+6.3 points) and the growth of trust rating from 49.6% up to 53.5% (+3.9 points)!

In August the share of Belarusians thinking that there is an economical crisis in the country was rec

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
It has improved	1.6	13.7	11.6	12.6	10.1	9.3	13.5
It has not changed	23.2	63.1	63.9	58.1	63.3	57.6	58.8
It has become worse	73.4	21.6	21.6	28.4	25.2	32.1	24.6
FSI*	-71.8	-7.9	-10.0	-15.8	-15.1	-22.8	-11.1

* Financial standing index (the difference between positive and negative answers)

To rehabilitate partially the rationality of Belarusians it should be noted that pensions in August grew by 7% and it couldn't but influence the social well-being of senior citizens. In September 10.7% of respondents from the youngest age group (18-29 years

old) low after the year 2011, so unfortunate for Belarusians. That means that the June growth was not confirmed in this case as well (Table 4).

It should be noted that perception of economical situation as a crisis one is not really depending on the

level of average income per family member. Moreover, the shares are equal in two extreme groups: up to 1.4 billion rubles – 47%, more than 4.2 billion rubles – 47.3%. It means that one can adapt to the current economical situation not only by increasing their incomes, but also but reducing their needs (negative adaptation).

rary, unstable; they can quickly change from positive to negative.

Consciousness of ordinary citizens is still complaisant as it was in Soviet times. Monopoly of state mass media is relative today, as almost 60% of Belarusians are able to receive alternative information from internet. Still the majority of them don't want to

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
It is going to improve	11.9	17.7	17.5	12.5	24.0	28.6	18.6
It is not going to change	20.3	49.1	46.7	46.1	45.0	35.0	49.5
It is going to become worse	55.5	23.7	28.1	35.9	26.1	28.7	22.5
EI*	-43.6	-6.0	-10.6	-23.1	-2.1	-0.1	-3.9

* Expectation index

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
In the right direction	17.0	39.6	39.1	31.9	40.2	42.3	43.0
In the wrong direction	68.5	45.5	46.7	54.1	46.2	42.3	43.5
DA/NA	14.5	14.9	14.2	14.0	13.6	15.4	13.5
PCI*	-51.5	-5.9	-7.6	-22.2	-6.0	0	-0.5

* Policy correctness index

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
Yes	87.6	59.8	57.4	68.6	54.6	57.7	54.2
No	8.0	29.5	32.4	22.2	34.5	30.0	36.5
DA/NA	4.4	10.7	10.2	9.2	10.9	12.3	9.3

This conclusion is confirmed by the inverse relationship between the perception of economical situation in Belarus as a crisis one and the age: youngest age group (18-29 years old) – 60.9%, oldest age group (60 years old and older) – 47.3%.

Summing up the anomalous reality perception of Belarusians let us turn to Table 5. If we omit the year 2009 (the world financial crisis), over 15 years we may see a distinct dependency between the dynamics of electoral rating of A. Lukashenko and the changes of real incomes of people. In this year the dependency doesn't work. While the real incomes' growth rate was at the level of years 2002-2003, the rating of the head of state turned out to jump by 11-12 points!

Social indices document subjective feelings of citizens; they are not objective economical or political indices. Their stability amid the deterioration of economical situation confirms that mass consciousness is still euphoric about Belarusian stability amid the Ukrainian-Russian crisis. These moods are tempo-

be bothered by such activities. Stability is still not questioned, and this above all concerns people of a lower social status, who rest upon the state that provides their livelihood.

Gender-based viewpoint on economical preferences

Public opinion is ambivalent by its nature. Hence blaming it for illogicality and inconsistency is a hopeless occupation. September survey registered a significant growth of adherents of market economy in Belarus. Over a year and a half their share in society grew by 10.5 points (Table 6) and amounted to 74.3%, which is in fact a repetition of September 1998 record! It is important to underline, that the share of supporters of market economy with significant or insignificant state regulations increased as well. At the same time the share of latter exceeded its historical maximum of June 2004 (43.6%).

Still the victory of "marketers" over the adherents of planned economy was accompanied by a signifi-

cant growth of number of people wishing to work at state enterprises: from 40.5% up to 51.6% over a year and a half (Table 7). If truth be told it should be noted that number of those who wish to work at private enterprises increased as well. This multidirectionality of preferences was possible at the expense of the reduction of the share of those who had difficulties to answer down to a record low level (10-fold in comparison to March 2013).

umn DA/NA. It is evident that this redistribution couldn't be stable, especially when you remember that liberalization stage in the modern history of Belarus was ended with a forced crackdown of the "Ploshcha"-demonstration on the 19th of December 2010.

It is understandable that A. Lukashenko's supporters prefer to work at state enterprises (67.1% vs. 30.5%), while their political opponents prefer private

Table 5

Dynamics of real incomes of Belarusians (% of the previous year level) and average annual electoral rating of A. Lukashenko (%)

Index	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Incomes	114	128	104	104	110	118	118	113	113	103	115	99	121	115	104*
Rating	36	41	30	29	39	47	55	46	41	41	45	29	32	38	41**

* January-July

** January-August

Table 6

Dynamics of answering the question: "What would you prefer for Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	11'97	06'06	09'10	03'13	09'14
Market economy including:	69.0	63.6	67.2	63.5	74.3
insignificant state regulations	32.8	34.8	36.4	39.1	45.7
significant state regulations	36.2	28.8	30.8	24.4	28.6
State-planned economy	25.7	13.2	15.7	17.9	13.1

Table 7

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which enterprise would you like to work at?", %

Variant of answer	11'97	06'06	09'10	03'13	09'14
At a state one	53.5	52.0	42.6	40.5	51.6
At a private one	35.7	33.0	32.9	41.0	46.6
DA/NA	10.8	15.0	24.5	18.5	1.8

Nevertheless if we compare respondents' answers in extreme columns of Tables 6 and 7, it is not difficult to see that there were no substantial changes in economical preferences of Belarusians over 16 years. There is nothing surprising about it. Stability of economical preferences is supported by the stability of Belarusian economy's structure. The share of people whose incomes directly depend on the state-employer didn't really change over the period under review.

That is why oscillations of economical preferences, registered over three five-year periods, are formed mainly under the influence of current events, both economical and political. The input of political events increased significantly since spring 2014 for obvious reasons.

Let's compare the data for the years of presidential elections (the second and the third columns). As you can see, in Belarus year 2010 was marked by liberalization and this led to a decrease of share of those who want to work at state enterprises in comparison with 2006. But the number of people wishing to work at private enterprises didn't increase. The share cut off the state enterprises went into the col-

panies (31.1% vs. 67.9%).

Gender-based preferences are not so brightly expressed, nevertheless, women's choice in favor of state enterprises is evident – 57.2% vs. 44.2%. For men the ratio is reverse – 53.9% vs. 40.5%.

Let us give a theoretical ground for these gender-based preferences (they appear in answers to most standard question of IISEPS). Any complicated self-organizing system has two fundamental tasks: the first one consists in supporting integrity and stability of the system; the second one consists in providing adaptivity to both external and internal challenges. These two conflicting tasks are being solved more or less efficiently only if they are morphologically assigned to different "organs" of the system. In our case women are responsible for integrity and stability and men provide adaptivity.

"Atta boy! That's how a president should be!"

Electoral rating of A. Lukashenko hit a new maximum over 4 years (Table 8). The previous time it was higher (53%) in December 2010 right after the presi-

dential elections. i.e. at the moment of maximal electoral mobilization.

Today there is nothing like this; still mobilization effect is evident. It is difficult for the Belarusian society, as well as for the Russian one, to feel the completeness of life under the circumstances of peace. The maxim "let there will be no more war" doesn't have a single meaning, as commonly cited. Of course, we are talking about a war which can be watched on TV, conveniently sitting in an armchair with a bottle of beer.

All aforementioned is right for A. Lukashenko's trust rating as well. It also grew up to a maximal value, narrowly missing the peak recorded in December 2010 (Table 9).

ber does not exceed 1.4 million rubles (60.9%) and among the most financially secured with the income exceeding 4.2 million rubles (54.5%).

The growth of the head of state's ratings promoted his position in the list of main sources of hope for economic development of Belarus (from 33.8% up to 37.9%) (Table 10). That had dragged the position of the government as well (+5.5 points).

Outside capital, permanent leader of the last years, on the contrary, had somewhat lost its position (–8.1 points). It seems that it fell victim to the anti-West propaganda, thriving on Russian TV-channels. Their activity overrode the positive effect of Belarusian powers' steps towards the West, which were outlined recently.

Table 8

Dynamics of electoral rating of President A. Lukashenko, %

Date	12'10	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
Rating	53.0	20.5	33.4	37.3	42.6	34.8	39.8	39.8	45.2

Table 9

Dynamics of trust rating of President A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	12'10	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
I trust him	55.0	24.5	43.4	48.9	46.7	37.7	45.9	49.6	53.5
I don't trust him	34.1	62.0	43.2	40.6	36.7	47.5	44.1	39.0	33.3
DA/NA	10.9	13.5	13.4	10.5	16.7	14.8	10.0	11.4	13.2

Table 10

Dynamics of answering the question: "On whom or on what do you pin your hopes for economic development of Belarus?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	11'94	03'08	06'09	06'13	09'14
On the attraction of outside capital	26.6	37.4	52.7	51.6	43.5
On the President	48.7	44.4	35.7	33.8	37.9
On Belarusian businessmen	23.3	22.0	23.2	30.4	35.5
On the government	17.4	20.4	34.2	26.9	32.4
On managers of government enterprises and farms	20.5	16.1	16.5	22.3	16.7
On political parties and movements	8.0	6.4	7.2	10.7	6.8
On mass media	6.6	2.9	1.8	6.2	4.7
On the National Assembly	8.8	2.3	4.6	5.2	4.6
On army and security bodies	8.0	2.0	2.1	4.1	4.2
On court system	5.6	3.0	3.2	3.9	4.5

As earlier A. Lukashenko enjoys higher trust among women, seniors and not-educated people in the first place. Sex: men – 44.7%, women – 60.8%. Age: 18-29 years old – 32.8%, 60 years old and older – 78.6%. Education: primary – 84%, higher – 43.5%.

This socio-demographic support is based on the politics with a significant paternalistic inclination. So there should be no surprise that all attempts to improve efficiency of national economy are reduced to purely technical actions, and bureaucracy is responsible for carrying them out.

Let us note, however, that despite the widely-spread opinion A. Lukashenko is not the president of poor people. He enjoys roughly same trust among the Belarusians whose average income per family mem-

It is natural that hopes for the foreign capital are more typical of the opponents of A. Lukashenko (those who don't trust him) than of his adherents – 55.7% vs. 34.6%. Naturally, for the government the ratio is inverse – 16.0% vs. 43.3%.

Managers of enterprises and farms notably lost their position (–5.6 points). 18.6% of A. Lukashenko's adherents and only 10% of his opponents pin their hopes on them. Public roasts of enterprise managers, which the head of state perpetuated almost weekly, couldn't but influence public opinion.

Finishing the analysis of Table 10, we would like to note a slow but steady growth of Belarusian businessmen' position (+5.1 points). This is an undeniably positive aspect, as this position in the upper part of

the list is not due to caprices of propaganda, but due to the successes of their professional activities.

Majority of Belarusians evaluate positively the head of state's constant visits to enterprises (Table 11). At the same time this positive evaluation may be regarded as a verdict to current economic model of Belarus. What else could it be, if 41.6% of adult population of the country agrees that local managers cannot act without control from the top? Among adherents of A. Lukashenko this point of view is shared by 55.2% of respondents, among his opponents – by 25.1%.

Table 11

Distribution of answers to the question: "President A. Lukashenko regularly makes trips over the country visiting industrial and agricultural enterprises. Which statement from the following do you agree with?"

Variant of answer	%
If he didn't personally control the work of enterprises, many local level managers would stop working	41.6
Sometimes he is obliged to delve into unfamiliar fields of work to better understand what happens there	28.6
President should settle strategic issues and not substitute local level managers	28.3
DA/NA	1.5

Table 12

Dynamics of answering the question: "Some people think that after A. Lukashenko's resignation from presidency life in Belarus will become better, others think that it will become worse. And what do you think?", %

Variant of answer	10'10	09'11	12'11	03'12	12'12	09'14
Life will become worse	28.7	23.8	21.5	26.7	25.9	33.3
Life will not change	28.6	26.9	29.9	36.5	36.5	40.3
Life will become better	25.3	35.2	31.7	26.0	24.5	17.7
DA/NA	17.4	14.1	16.9	10.8	13.1	8.7

Let us cite a typical comment to a collection of "inspectional" photos of the head of state, found on tut.by: "A responsible man always and everywhere knows what happens in the country! Atta boy! That's how a PRESIDENT should be! Thrifts about everything, delves into everything! They cannot foul him! If all the government was like that, we would live in clover!"

Such comments, as well as the answers to the question of Table 11, characterize not so much the attitude of society towards the head of state, but the authoritarian nature of society (or at least of its majority).

20 years after the triumphant victory of A. Lukashenko on the first presidential elections majority of Belarusians (55.7%) still think that in 1994 they had made a right choice. Only 29.9% of respondents share the opposite point of view, which is, however, quite a few. This ratio with some slight variations was observed during all presidential elections, which testifies of a stable electoral structure of Belarusian society.

Today in the threshold of the fifth presidential elections there are no reasons to claim that by autumn 2015 the ratio of electoral supporters and op-

ponents of the longstanding head of Belarusian state could change substantially.

Table 12 confirms this. Even two months prior to the voting in 2010, i.e. under the circumstances of strengthening electoral mobilization the share of respondents, agreeing that A. Lukashenko's resignation from presidency will lead to worsening of their lives, was lower than in September 2014!

Over two decades A. Lukashenko didn't lose his ability to inspire hope to people. It doesn't matter that today not everything is as good as it was desired, but changes to the better are possible. 48.9% of re-

spondents pin their hopes for such changes, desirable for themselves, on the head of state. 38.4% of respondents think that these changes are impossible.

Amid the sacred war between local Russian Good and worldwide Evil, staged by Russian TV-channels, emerged the "crimea-is-ours-ism" as a mass mood consolidating atomized society. It is natural the influence of "crimea-is-ours-ism" on Russians is significantly stronger than on Belarusians. Nevertheless, it may be observed in Belarus for three consecutive surveys.

**All people are equal in the face of repressions.
But some people are more equal than others**

According to John Galbraith, an American economist, there are three main ways of forcing people to do something: ideal and material rewards and punishment. There are no societies where one of these ways would be absent. But their ratio in different societies may vary in wide ranges. In particular, societies, which pay greater attention to punishment, are called repressive. In the modern world they are opposed to merit-based societies.

In Belarus a public debate on the anti-corruption draft bill is being carried out in compliance with the

head of state's commission. The readers of "Soviet Belorussia" actively joined the discussion. Let us limit ourselves to one suggestion expressed by Rodion from Brest: "They should make a treaty with Russia and transport corrupted official to the North. And they should serve Stalinist terms there".

The true subject of repressions is the socio-cultural integrity, indissoluble unity of society and culture. Table 13 illustrates the correctness of this statement.

Table 13

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently in Belarus a draft bill "On battling corruption" was discussed. According to this bill there would be a greater control over the incomes of officials and their relatives. Some people are positive about it, some are negative and some are indifferent. What's your attitude to it?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Positive	56.3	71.7	32.9
Indifferent	32.6	21.7	50.8
Negative	9.6	5.6	14.5
DA/NA	1.5	1.0	1.8

Table 14

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently former head of Belneftekhim Concern I. Zhilin was exonerated from criminal liability because he had made triple amends to the state. Some people regard this approach as positive, some as negative, others are indifferent. What is your attitude to this?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Positive	34.5	43.6	22.0
Indifferent	34.6	29.2	40.1
Negative	27.1	23.6	34.5
DA/NA	3.8	3.6	3.4

Table 15

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you feel yourself protected by law?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	09'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Don't trust
Yes	38.5	54.7	79.4	20.2
No	53.4	37.0	15.3	71.5
DA/NA	8.1	8.3	6.3	8.3

The share of respondents who evaluated positively the initiative on strengthening control exceeded the share of those who evaluated this juridical innovation negatively six-fold. Among A. Lukashenko's supporters the "index of preponderance" (IP) of the former over the latter amounted to 13, among his opponents it amounted to 2.3.

Such a significant divergence of IP is not accidental. Authoritarian head of state is supported by authoritarian voters. These voters regard power capable of unlimited repressions as a single source of order. The more a person needs state support, the higher is his individual IP.

Among respondents with primary education IP amounted to 39 (!), among respondents with higher education IP=5; in the age group of 18-29 years old

IP=2, in the age group of 60 years old and older IP=12. Women, *ipso facto*, depend on the state more than men, and this is reflected in the gender-based IPs: 6 and 5 accordingly.

Society without repressions never existed, doesn't exist now and probably will never exist in future. But the essence of repressive society is not in the high level of repressions (it is a consequence), but in out-of-law character of imposing, execution and cancellation of punishments.

In modernized (Western) societies repressions are impersonal. In society of incomplete modernization (Belarus) repressions have a personal character. This is an important characteristic of their specific nature.

All people are equal in face of repressions, but some are more equal than others. And by this "some" we mean representatives of power in the first place. Belonging to this sacred substance results in favor and privileges. These privileges are numerous and expansive, it isn't important to name them all. Let us note only one: immunity from jurisdiction. Most likely, a person from power will get himself and his intimates off any history, which would result in a catastrophe for mere mortals.

Let us cite Victor from Brest: "Someone takes 10 dollars and serves 10 years in prison; but those who steal millions, are not reachable for the law".

A typical example of personal approach of imposing and cancellation of punishment is the release from the prison of I. Zhilin, former head of Belneftekhim Concern. This approach didn't arouse much indignation in Belarusian society, as it follows from Table 14. Moreover, one third of respondents evaluated positively this selective approach of Belarusian Themis (43.6% among A. Luakshenko's supporters).

ture of answers, shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 15 is incompatible with the aims of modernization. This incompatibility can be seen in Belstat's monthly reports more and more clearly.

Fearing civil war

"Everything's not so bad, it's possible to live". This viewpoint on the current situation in the country is shared by a little bit more than one third of Belarusians (Table 16). This is by 6.9 points more than in September 2013 and in 2.2 times more in compare

Table 16

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which one of the following statements do you consider the most appropriate to the current situation?", %

Variant of answer	08'01	04'02	12'11	09'13	09'14
Everything's not so bad, it's possible to live	25.3	17.2	15.6	27.3	34.2
It's difficult to live, but still possible to put up with it	54.2	57.0	52.2	51.3	47.4
It's impossible to put up with our misery anymore	18.5	24.0	29.7	18.5	15.1
DA/NA	2.0	1.8	2.5	2.9	3.3

Table 17

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which group of population can you assign yourself to?", %

Variant of answer	03'11	06'13	09'14
We hardly make both ends meet and have not enough money even to buy food	10.3	8.5	4.8
We have enough money for food, but buying clothes is a real problem	33.7	37.2	25.5
We have enough money for food and clothes, but buying durable goods is a problem	44.1	45.3	52.8
We can easily buy durable goods, but it is difficult to buy really expensive things	10.9	8.3	15.0
We can afford some quite expensive buys – a flat, a summer residence and so on	0.7	0.6	1.6
NA	0.3	0.1	0.3

One of the least expected results of September survey is represented in Table 15. If respondents' answers had to be perceived literally, then we would suggest that over the last three years there were revolutionary changes in the judicial system of Belarus. Majority which felt unprotected from law now transformed to minority.

Who or what should be thanked for such an unexpected change to better? The first reason is evident. We encounter it in analysis of almost every trend. A. Lukashenko's ratings and feeling of juridical protection grew because of the same reason. Let us call it "the Ukrainian syndrome". But there is another reason. September 2011 survey coincided with the peak of economic crisis. And a large-scale crisis, no matter what are the reasons for it, increases the general feeling of insecurity.

So as a result there was a "low base effect". And now we are comparing the results of current survey to the low base of 2011.

The share of respondents feeling protected by law is four times as big among the supporters of A. Lukashenko as among his opponents. There is nothing surprising about it. But the head of state's opponents are mostly well-educated young people, whose input into economical development is incomparable with the input of seniors with primary and incomplete secondary education. Certainly, the struc-

son with December 2011.

Level of incomes of respondents almost doesn't influence evaluations of their lives in categories of Table 16. Thus, in extreme groups depending on the level of income per family member (up to 1.4 million rubles and more than 4.2 million rubles) first category was chosen by accordingly 41.4% and 43.3% of respondents.

But if we separate out traditional groups of A. Lukashenko's supporters and opponents, then we will see that the difference in answers is five-fold – 50.5% vs 10.2%.

Thus in Belarus *homo economicus* and *homo politicus* are two substantially different human types with their own "worldviews". The first type's worldview is depicted in soft pastel shades, while the second type's worldview – in black and white colors. Hence the inclination of a *homo politicus* to go from one extreme to another while evaluating both political and economical situations.

Positive trends of the last survey are continued in the answers to the question "Which group of population can you assign yourself to?" (Table 17). Let us remind you that March 2011 survey was conducted in the first half of the month, i.e. before the crisis which was started with the refusal of the state to freely sell foreign currency to citizens (the 22nd of March). Therefore the answers of respondents in the first col-

umns are still influenced by mobilization effect of the presidential election campaign. Nevertheless, the share of answers in the first row ("We hardly make both ends meet and have not enough money even to buy food") decreased more than two-fold, and 1.3-fold in the second row ("We have enough money for food, but buying clothes is a real problem").

civil war and foreign aggression. The share of Belarusians fearing job loss is record high.

The share of those who fear arbitrary rule dropped by 8 points amid the increase A. Lukashenko's ratings. It's not so easy to explain the significant increase (+12.8 points) of fears of poverty amid the growth of positive moods recorded in Tables 16 and

Table 18

Dynamics of answering the question: "What do you fear most of all today?", %

Variant of answer	04'00	03'08	03'09	06'10	03'13	09'14
Health loss	74.0	60.3	62.7	65.6	59.1	62.4
Poverty	56.3	46.2	56.1	45.8	30.2	43.0
Job loss	21.7	25.9	34.5	32.1	27.2	27.9
Arbitrary rule	32.3	13.9	26.1	17.3	24.7	16.7
Criminality	33.0	12.3	15.6	16.2	18.2	16.1
Civil war	27.2	8.5	16.6	9.8	14.3	27.0
Foreign aggression	7.2	8.2	16.1	6.4	11.5	19.9
Belarus' loss of independence	8.7	3.8	7.4	5.2	5.9	13.0
Something else	0.6	1.4	2.3	3.3	2.3	1.5

Table 19

Distribution of answers to the question: "In an interview to the Russian TV-channel "Dozhd" President A. Lukashenko made a supposition that state ideology in Belarus should be created on the basis of patriotism. Some people are positive about it, some people are negative, and others are indifferent. What is your attitude to this?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Positive	45.9	60.5	21.1
Indifferent	39.6	30.5	56.2
Negative	10.5	4.7	19.9
DA/NA	4.0	4.3	2.8

The question of Table 17 is much more materially-minded than the question of Table 16. That is why the answers of respondents, if we try to analyze them from the viewpoint of abovementioned ideal *homo economicus* and *homo politicus* types, make quite a strange mix.

In extreme groups by per capita income (up to 1.4 million rubles and more than 4.2 million rubles) 21.1% and 5.6% of respondents accordingly have not enough money to buy food. The difference is four-fold. Nevertheless, the share of 5.6% of "starving" people with an income higher than 4.2 million rubles per family member looks quite unexpectedly, to be honest.

Among the supporters of A. Lukashenko the share of "starving people" amounted to 2.6%, among his opponents it amounted to 9.4% (3.6-fold higher). It would seem that everything is perfectly logical, except that the dependency between the trust to the head of state and the level of incomes is insignificant: up to 1.4 million rubles – 60.9%, more than 4.2 million rubles – 54.5%.

Over the last year and a half the structure of people's fears (Table 18) has significantly changed under the influence of stormy political events. First of all you should note the almost two-fold increase of fears of a

17. Everything is not so bad, it is possible to live, absolute majority has enough money for buying food and clothes (which wasn't observed earlier), and still 43% of adult population of the country fear poverty. There is something to reflect upon.

In a society of uncompleted modernization the order of values is organized in mythical and religious forms. Critical reflection of public opinion is not presumed, and any non-dogmatic interpretations of current events are defined as heresy, destined to be excluded and destroyed. Under these conditions surveys register not so much the dynamics of moods and ideas of the society devoid of independent sources of information, but the efficiency of state propaganda.

A true patriot must support authority

There was a hitch with Belarusian state ideology. And what an amazing start there was in March 2003. Let us cite the Report, made at the seminar on ideological work: "Ideology for a state is the same thing as immune system for a living organism. If immunity weakens, any infection, even the most insignificant, will become mortal. This is also valid for a state: when ideological basis of a society is destroyed, its downfall becomes only a question of time, no matter

how strong and threatening may the state appear from the outside".

What do Belarusians have today? On the 20th of May 2004 in an interview to the Russian TV-channel "Dozhd" A. Lukashenko could only certify that after a massive brainstorm leaded personally by the head of state the mountain of national intellect brought forth a mouse: "They have suggested me patriotism. Patriotism isn't new. National idea should be different from the ideas of other countries. Isn't patriotism important for Russia? It is trite, it is banal. And we need something that could captivate people, something that can be pleasant for souls".

Nevertheless, patriotism, evaluated as trite and banal by A. Lukashenko, enjoys positive attitude from most Belarusians (Table 19). Among adherents of the head of state the share of positive evaluations amounted to 60.5%.

able to draw a line between love to Motherland and love to authority and state. A. Lukashenko should be attributed to this one third. Our certitude in this opinion is based on the following citation, taken from the Report made at an ideological conference: "Before we were battling against the church; today the church has patriotic moods, they support us". He couldn't be more frank: he is a patriot who supports us (the authority).

This viewpoint on patriotism is shared by 45.1% of supporters of their political idol. Among his opponents this point of view finds popularity only among 11.2% 3a respondents (Table 20). The difference is fourfold!

But *tempus fugit*. A true patriot must support authority, but that doesn't deprive him of a right to criticize this power. 75.1% of Belarusians agree with this free interpretation (64.9% of A. Lukashenko's supporters and 89.4% of his opponents). The idea that

Table 20

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you agree that "a patriot should support authority whatever it may be"?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
I agree	10.5	17.5	3.2
I rather agree	20.0	27.6	8.0
I rather disagree	40.9	35.3	46.9
I disagree	25.4	15.7	40.9
DA/NA	3.2	3.9	1.0

Table 21

Distribution of answers to the question: "If an initiative of separation from Belarus appeared in some region of Belarus, which actions should Belarusian power take?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
To carry out a referendum on separation in this region	10.0	11.9	7.2
To carry out a national referendum on separation of this region	18.4	15.4	20.8
To negotiate with people desiring this separation	36.3	34.1	40.7
To put under arrest the instigators of the initiative	16.9	18.9	15.8
To suppress this initiative by all means	14.0	16.0	11.2
DA/NA	4.4	3.7	4.3

We would not recommend caring about the serious divergence of evaluations of patriotism's potential as a pivot of state ideology between A. Lukashenko and his adherents. Question doesn't mention triteness and banality. As it is known, respondents formulate their answers on questions of a questionnaire in the process of answering; hence respondents defined their attitude to patriotism through the prism of their attitude to the head of state.

Let us note that the first variant of answer was supported by 30.5% of respondents in the age group of 18-29 years old and by 67.4% of respondents in the age group of 60 years old and older.

According to a tradition formed during Soviet and pre-Soviet era about one third of Belarusians are un-

patriotism is incompatible with criticism of power is shared by 19.9% of respondents (31.3% and 4.8% accordingly).

American's patriotism, as you know, manifests itself in their readiness to exhibit American flags on their houses on any occasion. There is no such tradition in Belarus yet. Flying flags is a responsibility of the state. But in case of such an order, only 4% of respondents have a big national flag at home. It is quite unexpected, but the shares of people having a big national flag at home among adherent and opponents of A. Lukashenko are equal – 4.3% and 4.4% accordingly.

As for small flags, the share of people possessing them didn't even amount to one third – 29.2% (34.6% and 19.2% accordingly).

The question of Table 21 is inspired by the events in Ukraine. We can say that Belarusian respondents were caught off guard by this question, as its topicality for Belarus was never discussed publicly. Hence the insignificant divergence in answers of adherents and opponents of A. Lukashenko. And this is despite the fact that the question is very politically-charged! There isn't even a significant difference in regards to military methods of combating separatism.

Patriotism in Belarus is based on the memories of a "glorious past" because there are no important examples in the present. As for the "vision of the future", there isn't even a sketch of it.

Let us back the last statement by A. Lukashenko's answer to the question of Y. Zisser, owner of TUT.BY portal on Belarus in 30 years: "...a sovereign and independent state. This is my main task, which I must accomplish. [...] so that Belarus was a state and our people were never under someone's whip". And that is all.

But while political elite is busy carving up the administrative rent "here and now", in almost every fourth Belarusian family one of its members is obliged to pack their bags and work abroad (Table 22).

son, conscientious work in every area (be it a machine-operator, a driver, a teacher, a programmer, a builder or a scientist) – this is what patriotism is. At the same time this is the basis for a strong economy. And strong economy is a pledge for independence, freedom and prospect of Belarus".

It's hard to suggest a more strict definition of patriotism within the framework of authoritarian political model. Employers give orders, employees execute orders. They do it honestly, conscientiously and don't reach into politics.

Who understands people like you?

Trust rating of oppositional parties froze on a minimal level amid the increase of A. Lukashenko's ratings (Table 24). It has lost 5.9 points since December 2013. And it seems logic. Amid stormy political events in and around Ukraine the inability of oppositional parties and their leaders to make news, interesting for public opinion, became especially evident.

And there is a high need of news in Belarusian society today. This may be seen from the growth of trust ratings of both state and non-state mass media, which is registered second quarter running.

Among Belarusians that don't trust the head of state (in September their share amounted to exactly

Table 22

Dynamics of answering the question: "Does any of the members of your family work overboard at present?", %

Variant of answer	09'13	09'14
Yes	25.8	23.5
No	72.3	75.8
DA/NA	1.9	0.7

Table 23

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that nowadays young people can make a successful career in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	03'02	04'06	03'11	06'12	09'14
Yes, they can	43.2	61.6	45.9	46.2	57.6
No, they cannot	39.4	30.7	44.9	44.4	33.9
DA/NA	17.4	7.7	9.3	9.4	8.5

Table 24

Dynamics of trust ratings of mass media and oppositional parties, %

Institution	12'10	09'11	03'12	06'12	12'12	03'13	06'13	09'14
Oppositional parties	16.3	12.1	17.0	17.3	20.0	13.1	15.4	14.1
State mass media	52.9	25.7	33.9	32.4	38.1	28.1	33.6	39.3
Non-state mass media	46.3	32.2	34.3	35.5	48.1	28.8	31.1	36.0

Despite this sad statistics the share of Belarusians believing that young people could make career in the homeland grew by 11.4 points over the last two years (from 46.2% up to 57.6%). Probably, this is an effect provoked by Russian TV-channels (Table 23).

We started the patriotic subject with a citation of A. Lukashenko. It would be logic to cite him again, closing this subject: "Personal honesty of every per-

one third) only 22.1% trust oppositional parties, 51% don't trust and 26.9% didn't make a decision in this question. According to our opinion, only the last group may be considered as an electoral base of opposition which they may try to conquer with the help of their own resources.

Under conditions of electoral mobilizations, which happen in Belarus each 5 years during presidential

elections, a candidate (or candidates) of oppositional parties enjoy support from an absolute majority of people who don't trust A. Lukashenko. Although it should be noted that a significant part of voters doesn't vote "for" the oppositional candidate (or candidates): they vote "against" A. Lukashenko.

State mass media enjoy trust from 65.5% of adherents of A. Lukashenko and of only 4.4% of his opponents! Attitude to non-state mass media is not so politically-charged: 30.4% and 46.9% accordingly.

The ratios, quoted above, may be regarded as an answer to the question: "Who is splitting the society up?" Belarusian state because of its authoritarian nature is unable to be active in politics, i.e. to coordinate interests of various professional, political and other groups of population. That is why there is nothing accidental in the fact that there are no fractions in the National Assembly; and owing to this reason "it isn't a place for discussions".

education will help us: primary education – 4.3%, higher education – 24.6%. As you can see, with much wisdom comes not only much sorrow, but also much doubt. Belarusians with primary education constitute a significant part of A. Lukashenko's supporters, and hence they don't need understanding from opposition. They are convinced that HE understands their problems and cares. What else do "specialists" with primary education need to feel confident about today and the future?

Of course, understanding of social problems requires from politicians not only deep theoretical knowledge, but also managerial experience, because without working in the halls of power it is impossible to know numerous nuances, which constitute social life. But opposition is not permitted to work in the halls of power. This is the fate of any dictatorship. All dictatorships end up with another rebellion and return to a new dictatorship because of dictatorship mature

Table 25

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that Belarusian opposition understands issues and cares of people like you?", %

Variant of answer	09'13	09'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Don't trust
Yes	24.4	21.1	12.4	34.3
No	56.6	59.2	72.6	47.3
DA/NA	19.0	19.7	15.0	18.4

Table 26

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	09'14
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	26.9	27.2
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.2	59.9
DA/NA	10.9	12.9

The absence of a political subject, playing the role of a mediator, doesn't mean that there are no conflicts either inside the society or between its parts and the power. In the present context the only way of solving the internal issues is a revolution or a rebellion, which happened in history more than once.

The answers to the question "Do you think that Belarusian opposition understands people like you?" (Table 25) are indicative of possibilities for extension of electoral support to opposition and at the same time of an objective limit to such extension.

Number of positive answers among all respondents amounted to only 21.1% and to 34.3% among the opponents of A. Lukashenko. The high share (almost each fifth) of respondents, that didn't know how to answer this apparently simple question, is worth mentioning too. What's more interesting is that among the opponents of the head of state the number of those who didn't know how to answer is by 3.4 points higher than among his supporters.

Let's try to find an explanation to the preponderance of A. Lukashenko's opponents in the row "DA/NA". The connection between the number of respondents that didn't know how to answer and their

professionals in opposition don't appear under the conditions.

Ukrainian compass for geopolitical poles of Belarus

As it was repeatedly noted in IISEPS works, Belarusian society in its majority supported Russian position both on the annexation of Crimea and on the armed protests in Donbass. September survey showed that answers of Belarusians on according questions almost haven't changed over the quarter. Nevertheless, that doesn't testify that Belarusians are ready to personally support the cause in Ukraine they consider right. At the same time events in Ukraine significantly influenced geopolitical priorities of Belarusians. Although – all in due time.

Let's begin with the evaluations of events in Ukraine in March-September 2014 (Tables 26-30).

Up until now the reaction seems similar to the reaction of Russian society: "Crimeaisours", "junta" in Kiev, anti-terrorist operation regarded a "counterinsurgency operation", and, accordingly, the West is wrong in its confrontation with Russia. However, if we

Table 27

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	09'14
It's a crime, a war against their own people	57.7	60.6
It's a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion	14.0	12.0
It's a severe, but a forced measure	19.5	19.0
DA/NA	8.8	8.4

Table 28

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you agree with the definition of participants of armed riots in the east of Ukraine as "terrorists"?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	09'14
Yes	30.1	32.3
No	54.1	54.1
DA/NA	15.8	13.6

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you agree with the definition of the Ukrainian power, which was installed after Yanukovich's overthrow, as "fascists"?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	09'14
Yes	50.9	52.2
No	28.8	32.2
DA/NA	20.3	15.6

Table 30

Distribution of answers to the question: "Western countries have introduced strict sanction against Russia for its policy in Ukraine. How do you evaluate these measures?"

Variant of answer	%
Positively	20.0
Negatively	67.4
DA/NA	12.6

Table 31

Distribution of answers to the question: "In July in the sky above Ukraine a passenger plane of Malaysia Airlines was struck. Almost 300 people died. How do you think, who is to blame for it?"

Variant of answer	%
Participants of the armed protests in the East of Ukraine	16.5
Russian power	10.0
Ukrainian power	25.0
I don't know, it's necessary to wait for the results of the investigation	48.5

have a look at other questions, the picture appears to be much more complex (Table 31).

As a comparison, in a July survey of Levada-center 82% of Russian respondents were blaming Ukrainian power ministries for the crash of the airliner, 6% of respondents were blaming Russian militaries and 3% – Donbass home guards. In Belarus shares of adherents of Russian and Ukrainian versions of the catastrophe turned out to be almost equal, in Russia the share of former exceeded the share of latter tenfold! Feel the difference...

Belarusian respondents are quite restrained in the relation to advisability of conflict escalation as well. Let us remind you: for 52% of respondents Ukrainian

powers are "fascists" and for 60% of respondents Ukraine's use of armed forces for the restoration of control over Donbass is "a crime against their own people". Shouldn't the majority consider natural that Russia must stop this "fascist crime" by force? It should. But it isn't (Table 32).

Once again as a comparison: in a March survey of Levada-center 74% of Russian respondents expressed themselves in favor of bringing Russian troops to Ukraine. In August 41% of respondents were for it and 43% – against it. In comparison with March warlike character in Russia dropped significantly, although the difference with Belarusian society is still quite notable: in August in Russia the numbers

of adherents and opponents of a full-scale war (although Russians were going to die in this war also) was almost equal, in Belarus the number of former is almost four-fold lower than the number of the latter.

And when there is a question about a direct or indirect participation of Belarus and Belarusians in the war in Ukraine, the overwhelming majority does not want this participation under any pretext (Table 33).

Lugansk People's Republic right, then why are they so reluctant to believe in villains with Ukrainian epauletts, which made the airplane crash? Why don't they dream about Russian army coming and saving the citizens of Donbass from "chasteners"? Why do they turn out the idea of Belarus participating in this right cause?

The case is in the mismatch between the ideolo-

Table 32

Distribution of answers to the question: "Some people in Russia think that Russia must send their troops to help the participants of armed protests in the East of Ukraine. What's your attitude to it?"

Variant of answer	%
Negative	53.6
Positive	14.0
Indifferent	21.0
DA	11.4

Table 33

Distribution of answers to the question: "If Russia decides to bring their troops into Ukraine, do you think Belarus should permit Russia to do it through Belarusian territory?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	15.2
No	74.8
DA/NA	10.0

Table 34

Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to the participation of Belarusian citizens in combat actions in the East of Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	6.0
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	8.3
Negative	76.9
DA/NA	8.8

Table 35

Distribution of answers to the question: "The negotiations between representatives of Ukrainian powers and participants of armed protests in the East of Ukraine were held in Minsk in the end of July. How do you evaluate the fact that Belarus provided ground for these negotiations?"

Variant of answer	%
Negatively, there should be no negotiations with terrorists	12.4
Negatively, there should be no negotiations with the fascist junta	11.6
Positively	59.3
DA/NA	16.7

Here the number of permission advocates is almost the same as the number of supporters of the direct participation of Russian troops in the Ukrainian conflict. However the number of opponents is considerably higher: almost each third of four respondents. Belarusians are even more unanimous in their negative attitude towards the participation of their fellow countrymen in the armed conflict in Donbass – on any of the sides (Table 34).

Data of Tables 27-29 and Tables 31-34 seem to be contradictory and arouse some suspicions about respondents' honesty. If majority of Belarusians consider the causes of Donetsk People's Republic and

gical and practical levels of thinking. And in this case when we speak of the ideological level we don't necessarily mean "false consciousness". If such mismatch is good or bad depends on the ideological position. For the supporters of Ukraine's integrity it is good. For the supporters of Novorossia's independence from Ukraine it is bad. We only register the fact of the mismatch, the fact, that ideological setup doesn't crowd out pragmatic and existential motives.

Belarusians' evaluations of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass are determined by their sympathy to Russia. But this sympathy doesn't mean that Belarusians think that Russia is always right

about everything, including all the aspects of the conflict in the East of Ukraine. The setup doesn't invade pragmatics. So comes the thought that the plane crashed on the territory controlled by separatists, that before it were them who crashed planes and so on. In other words, the mechanism of certitude that Russia didn't do it because it couldn't do it, is not working.

Attitude to Russian policy in Ukraine significantly influenced Belarusians' attitude to the European Union and Russia itself and their geopolitical choice. This choice can hardly be called completely ideological, as a lot of Euro-Belarusians are attracted to Europe not so much because of its values, but because of material abundance, which often determines the

Table 36

Distribution of answers to the question: "Did your attitude to Russia change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes, it became worse	24.3
Yes, it became better	21.9
No, it didn't change	51.5
DA	2.3

Table 37

Distribution of answers to the question: "Did your attitude to the EU change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes, it became worse	47.0
Yes, it became better	5.6
No, it didn't change	42.4
DA	5.0

Table 38

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the integration of Belarus and Russia was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
For	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.0	28.7	23.9	29.3	24.8	23.0
Against	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	42.9	47.5	51.4	47.7	54.8	54.3

Table 39

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	05'07	09'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
For	33.5	26.7	34.9	36.2	48.6	38.9	35.9	30.2	27.4	25.0
Against	49.3	51.9	36.3	37.2	30.5	37.6	34.6	44.3	50.8	50.3

Answers to the questions of Tables 32-34 show that ideological setup doesn't invade the level of existential values as well. Respondents, even if they support Donbass insurgents, may reason like this: "So Russia brings their troops there, it's gonna be a big war. What if America gets in? A world war? And we're so close. Do we need that? And what if they drag us into it? God forbid! No way. Our people should stay away from there. We better care about our land".

Thus formally illogical answers turn out to be emotionally, value-consciously logical. Existential values of own and national survival turn out to be stronger than ideological setups.

Another bright example of a similar mismatch may be seen in evaluations of the negotiations between the conflicting sides in Minsk, organized as an OSCE contact group meeting (Table 35).

choice in favor of the EU. In turn, a considerable part of Belarusians prefer integration with Russia not because of spiritual closeness, but counting on a flow of cheap energy carriers and a stable market. Still the ideological component is present in the choice between the EU and the RF, and it fulfils probably even a bigger role than pragmatics.

The attraction of European well-being didn't become weaker over the time of Ukrainian crisis, the flow of cheap Russian gas in Belarus didn't become shallow. And still... See Tables 36-37.

The number of those whose attitude to Russia worsened turned out to be almost equal (a little bigger) to the number of those whose attitude to Russia became even better after the dramatic events in Ukraine. But the number of respondents whose attitude to the EU became worse turned out to be more

than 8 times (!) bigger than the number of those whose attitude became better.

However, as it was mentioned above, this change only partially influenced Belarusians' attitude to the prospect of integration with the East and the West. However, this effect cannot be unnoticed (Tables 38-40).

In comparison with the beginning of the year the share of "Euro-Belarusians" dropped by 10 percentage points, at the same time the share of opponents of Belarus integrating the EU jumped by 15 points. Second quarter running the latter share exceeds 50%, which wasn't observed over the last 5 years.

The changes over the last 9 months in the answers to the "either...or"-question are quite revealing as well: ratio of evaluations changes to the opposite one – in December 2013 relative majority was for the EU, in September 2014 – for the RF. However, it should be noted, that the inclination to integration with Russia slightly decreased comparatively to March.

changes in geopolitical preferences by implication: in comparison with the end of the previous year the number of supporters of integration with the EU dropped, the number of supporters of integration with the RF jumped.

Donbass and the bones of a Belarusian soldier

The fact that all of the sides of Ukrainian conflict chose Belarus for hosting the negotiations is, on top of everything else, an acknowledgement of political talents of the Belarusian President. In this complicated and dangerous situation he has managed (at least, as for today) to rest on good terms with almost all of the direct and indirect participants of the conflict.

And how do Belarusians perceive his policy towards Ukraine? His gestures in favor of Moscow and Kiev during the whole conflict can be listed endlessly. But what is the resultant force of all these maneuvers in the mass consciousness?

Table 40

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	03'14	06'14	09'14
Integration with the RF	47.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	41.4	37.7	36.6	51.5	46.9	47.4
Joining the EU	33.3	30.1	42.1	38.0	39.1	43.4	44.6	32.9	33.1	32.0
DA/NA	19.2	23.9	15.6	23.9	19.5	18.9	18.8	15.6	20.0	20.6

Table 41

Distribution of answers to the question: "According to you, what is President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
He completely supports the policy of Russian power	18.2
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	2.7
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties	35.5
He maintains neutrality	36.3
DA	7.3

Table 42

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
Unambiguously positively	14.8
Rather positively	44.7
Rather negatively	17.2
Negatively	9.6
DA/NA	13.7

If we should talk about foreign policy consequences of Belarusians' reaction to the policy of Russia in Ukraine, it should be noted, that these consequences were mostly ideological. Belarusians don't really express a desire for Russians to begin a full-scale war in Ukraine. Even more so they don't want their country and its citizens to participate in bloodshed in Donbass. Nevertheless, the fact that majority of Belarusians support Russian policy in Ukraine influenced

Only few respondents think that he supports Kiev in this conflict (Table 41). The number of those, who think, that he acts completely in the course of Moscow policy, is 6-fold higher. Still the former and the latter constitute only an insignificant minority in comparison with those who think that he doesn't equate his policy with neither of opposing parties.

As September survey shows an imposing majority of Belarusians share Russia's position on Ukraine.

Table 43

Dependency of evaluations of President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine on socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences, %

Characteristics	According to you, what is President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?			How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?	
	He completely supports the policy of Russian power	He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	He maneuvers between the conflicting parties/Maintains neutrality	Unambiguously positively	Negatively/Rather negatively
<i>Age:</i>					
18-29	22.1	3.2	64.9	48.3	34.5
30-59	18.0	2.5	72.7	58.5	28.3
60 +	14.6	2.6	76.8	73.1	15.7
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>					
Completely objective/Mostly objective	17.8	2.9	73.8	77.8	12.0
Completely biased/Mostly biased	20.2	3.0	71.2	36.3	49.3
<i>How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?</i>					
It's a crime, a war against their own people	16.2	2.2	76.1	68.5	20.7
It's a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion	28.3	6.1	55.6	30.0	55.6
It's a severe, but a forced measure	21.3	2.4	68.9	48.4	32.4
<i>Do you agree with the definition of participants of armed riots in the east of Ukraine as "terrorists"?</i>					
Yes	24.6	2.7	67.0	43.4	40.9
No	15.6	2.8	74.8	68.0	21.1
<i>Do you agree with the definition of the Ukrainian power, which was installed after Yanukovich's overthrow, as "fascists"?</i>					
Yes	16.0	2.2	76.1	66.8	23.0
No	23.3	3.1	64.0	46.2	37.9
<i>The negotiations between representatives of Ukrainian powers and participants of armed protests in the East of Ukraine were held in Minsk in the end of July. How do you evaluate the fact that Belarus provided ground for these negotiations?</i>					
Negatively, there should be no negotiations with terrorists	25.8	5.9	64.5	29.9	61.0
Negatively, there should be no negotiations with the fascist junta	20.1	5.7	67.8	45.4	46.0
Positively	18.0	2.0	75.4	73.3	17.0
<i>If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?</i>					
Integration with the RF	16.7	2.9	74.1	69.7	18.8
Joining the EU	25.7	2.9	63.7	39.8	46.1

Table 41 testifies that majority thinks that the head of Belarusian state doesn't share this position. So how does the majority evaluate this Lukashenko's policy?

An imposing preponderance of positive evaluations is evident (Table 42). It should be noted that the total share of positive evaluations (14.8%+44.7%=59.5%) exceeds both A. Lukashenko's electoral rating (45.2%) and his trust rating (53.5%).

Table 43 demonstrates this paradox even more brightly.

A clear connection in the answers to all questions of Table 43 can be observed: the bigger the share of those who think that A. Lukashenko's policy towards Ukraine coincides with Russian position, the lower evaluations of this policy are. This is true for every group.

This is natural for the groups whose political preferences define them as opposition. For opposition proximity of official Minsk's position to the position of Kremlin is an evident drawback, even a betrayal of interest of Belarusian people. For many of these people

talking about pro-Russianism of A. Lukashenko is another way to express their negative attitude to him.

What's more interesting is the character of this connection in groups with opposite political preferences. Sharing Russian position in their evaluations of events in Ukraine, they think that A. Lukashenko's position is the same not more often, but even more rare than respondents in an average selection. Nevertheless, they approve this policy, although it doesn't coincide with their preferences.

As it was noted earlier (see Ukrainian Compass for Geopolitical Poles of Belarus) there is a mismatch between ideological, practical and existential levels in Belarusians' evaluations of events in Ukraine. Supporters of Russian position approve it on the ideological level. However on both practical and existential levels they are not so reckless in their support of separatists and Russia. "We are for it, but without us" – this is a brief characteristic of their position.

grenadier". Paraphrasing him we may describe these people's setup as follows: "All Donbass (and probably all Ukraine) is not worth healthy bones of a single Belarusian soldier".

Probably for someone's liking that sounds awfully cynical. Nevertheless this pragmatic reticence of the great chancellor greatly contributed to the peace in Europe. By the way, he never said that Germany didn't have interests in the Balkans or that Russia's activity in the region pleased him a great deal. He recognized the interests and he was troubled by Saint-Petersburg's actions and plans for Constantinople. However he had a clear understanding of the price. Bismarck's successors preferred an ideological, "moral" approach. It resulted in the First World War.

When Maira Mora, the EU ambassador to Belarus, urged Belarusians to support their president in his peaceful policy, she was probably aware of real

Table 44

Distribution of answers to the question: "If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?"

Variant of answer	%
I'd resist up in arms	25.9
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	39.7
I'd greet these changes	13.3
DA/NA	21.1

Table 45

Distribution of answers to the question: "If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?"

Variant of answer	%
I'd resist up in arms	26.0
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	40.0
I'd greet these changes	9.7
DA/NA	24.3

For oppositional respondents both Kremlin and Minsk power "cats" are "grey": the fact that Kremlin calls Ukrainian power "junta", and A. Lukashenko politely communicates with P. Poroshenko and his revolutionary predecessors doesn't mean a thing for these respondents. Their benchmark is the position of Kiev. They compare the position of Minsk to it and draw the conclusion that there is no unambiguous support as in case with Western countries. So if Minsk does not Kiev, it supports Moscow. This logic, as you can see, is valid not for all respondents from this group, but for the majority it is.

A completely different logic, an opposite one to a certain extent, is proper for another part of respondents – those, for whom the benchmark is the Moscow position. They see that A. Lukashenko's position doesn't coincide with the Kremlin one. For them it is slightly upsetting, but not very much, because ideological setup doesn't invade practical and existential levels.

Otto von Bismarck once said: "The Balkans are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian

alternatives. Belarus conducting policy in the Ukrainian question resembling policy of the EU-countries, may only be in dreams. A real alternative, based in particular on social moods, comprises Minsk copying all the actions, gestures and ideologemes of Moscow.

A jab to the West, a jab to the East

One of the most cited results of the previous survey conducted in June became the answers to the question "If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?" 14.2% of respondents answered that they would resist up in arms, 47.7% of respondents would try to adapt to new situation and 16.5% of respondents would even greet such changes.

In light of events in the East of Ukraine these figures are not very inspiring. These events weren't over in September, when this question was asked in a slightly different form (Table 44).

September survey openly asked about an armed seizure, while in June respondents could suppose that we asked him about a reaction on a possible ref-

erendum about annexation of Belarus or its part by Russia. Moreover, three month ago the question was asked about a complete action ("annexed"), while in September the question was about an attempt ("tried to annex"). That is why formulation could have influenced the answers.

What else could influence the answers? Respondents' perception of events in Ukraine and projection of their results on the destiny of own country certainly could do it. It is evident, that the share of those who are ready to protect Motherland from an invasion from the East increased significantly. Now it is almost twice as high as the share of those for whom Russian soldiers would be "friends".

Table 46

Distribution of answers to the question on possible military invasions from Russia and NATO*, %

If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?	If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?			
	I'd resist up in arms	I'd try to adapt to a new situation	I'd greet these changes	DA/NA
I'd resist up in arms	14.2	3.1	6.0	2.6
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	5.3	26.7	2.0	5.8
I'd greet these changes	3.0	7.6	0.9	1.9
DA/NA	3.5	2.8	0.9	14.1

** Data in the table are absolute percents from the whole sample*

Possibly, the cruelty of war in Donbass and repeated statements of politicians (beginning with the President) about readiness to fight for homeland somewhat aroused Belarusians' patriotism and intensified their readiness to protect their country.

It is interesting to note that answers on a similar question about an armed invasion from the West turned out to be very similar (Table 45).

Here the shares of people ready to resist up in arms and people ready to adapt are almost equal to the according shares from Table 44. The share of those who are ready to greet an armed invasion from the West is almost the same as the share of those who would happily greet the "guests" from the East.

Taking into account the deep ideological split in Belarusian society, which is in no small part due to geopolitical choice, one could suppose that people ready to resist up in arms with an invasion from one side wouldn't at least object to "liberators" from another side. And vice versa. However this supposition can be confirmed only partly (Table 46).

It's easy to see that a significant part of respondents (14.2%) – which is almost each seventh – is ready for an armed resistance to an invasion of both Russian and NATO troops. This setup coincides with the statements of President A. Lukashenko on protection from attack wherever they would come from. This patriotic spirit of the head of state is shared by quite a part of Belarusians. But a much bigger part of them (26.7%) is similarly consistent in their readiness to adapt to any trouble of a kind.

It is interesting to note the asymmetry of Table 46: more than a half (7.6%) of those who would greet armed annexation of Belarus to Russia (13.3%)

would also try to adapt to the results of a Western intervention; at the same time almost two thirds (6%) of those who would greet results of a NATO operation (9.7%) would resist Russian aggression up in arms.

Table 47 demonstrates how certain reactions to a hypothetical foreign intervention are connected to political preferences.

Young people would to a greater extent resist an attack from the East and to a lesser extent – from the West. Nevertheless, different age groups would fight Western "guests" with almost the same involvement, while readiness to fight with the East depends on age to a much greater extent.

Attitude to the President quite significantly influ-

ences respondents' readiness to rebuff the invaders: those who trust him are inclined to fight with Western aggressors; those who don't trust him would better fight against the East. Cultural self-identification and geopolitical preferences turn out to be even more differentiating factors. Readiness to resist up in arms to an invasion from "strangers" is twice as high as readiness to fight with "friends". But it is also notable that quite a big part of respondents' in corresponding groups are ready to resist "friends" as well.

It is typical that in group of those who refuse to make a geopolitical choice between the RF and the EU the number of those who are ready to greet the consequences of both Russian and NATO intervention is minimal.

Respondents' evaluations of objectivity of Russian TV influence their intentions to almost the same extent. This influence, however, mostly applies to the hypothetical answer to a Russian invasion; as for a hypothetical NATO intervention, both those who trust Russian TV and those who don't are equally ready to resist a Western invasion.

At first sight it may seem that consent with the opinion that Russia must send their troops to Ukraine should significantly influence unwillingness to resist these troops if they come to Belarus. However, there is no direct connection. People who think that Russia should battle in Ukraine don't think that Russian army forces are good for everyone.

As you may see from Tables 46 and 47 militarily Belarusians are not very inclined to equate their interests with one or another military force. Probably that is the reason for little popularity of ideas of military collaboration with the RF or NATO (Table 48).

Table 47

Connection between the answers on behavior under the condition of a foreign military intervention, socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences*, %

Characteristics	If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?			If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?		
	I'd resist up in arms	I'd try to adapt to a new situation	I'd greet these changes	I'd resist up in arms	I'd try to adapt to a new situation	I'd greet these changes
<i>Age:</i>						
18-29	33.2	39.0	9.2	25.6	39.1	16.7
30-59	27.6	41.5	9.3	27.6	37.0	9.9
60+	14.3	36.3	27.1	22.6	47.9	2.3
<i>Do you trust the President?</i>						
Trust	21.3	37.3	17.4	30.2	38.9	2.5
Don't trust	34.7	39.1	10.0	19.0	40.7	22.8
<i>Do you consider yourself closer to Russians or Europeans?</i>						
Russians	20.2	42.3	16.4	30.1	42.4	2.9
Europeans	42.4	33.0	4.5	14.6	33.9	29.2
<i>If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?</i>						
Integration with the RF	17.8	41.2	23.4	33.6	42.9	2.0
Joining the EU	41.5	35.9	5.2	16.0	37.6	26.1
DA/NA	20.2	42.3	2.9	23.8	37.3	1.9
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>						
Completely objective/ Mostly objective	17.1	43.6	18.5	28.1	44.7	2.1
Completely biased/Mostly biased	40.2	35.1	7.9	26.0	35.8	19.2
<i>How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?</i>						
It's a crime, a war against their own people	19.7	42.8	17.1	30.8	43.2	3.6
It's a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion	43.0	31.8	12.3	19.3	38.7	29.8
It's a severe, but a forced measure	38.8	34.6	4.2	19.2	34.3	17.5
<i>Some people in Russia think that Russia must send their troops to help the participants of armed protests in the East of Ukraine. What's your attitude to it?</i>						
Negative	28.5	39.6	10.0	25.4	41.1	11.3
Positive	26.2	24.3	32.4	40.8	31.3	5.2
Indifferent	24.8	50.3	10.7	20.6	44.9	12.7

* The table is read across

Despite the sharpening of the conflict in the East of Ukraine, despite lots of bloodshed there over the last three months, Belarusians' wish to hide from such threats under the "umbrella" of NATO didn't increase, but decreased. On the other hand plans of hosting Russian airbase in the country haven't met great support as well: there are twice as much of opponents of this idea as of adherents (Table 49).

In fine we may say that Belarusians are equally (but not very strongly) inclined to resist up in arms to a foreign armed invasion both from the West and from the East. A considerable share of them (almost each seventh) is ready to resist a military intervention wherever it would come from. However, cultural self-identification and geopolitical preferences quite significantly influence their behavior: respondents are less inclined to resist a hypothetical intervention from geo-

political and cultural "friends" and more inclined to greet them.

Attitude to separatism in Belarus: "doves" and "hawks"

Threat of separatism in Belarus doesn't seem currently important. Over all the years of independence there was only one faint resemblance not even to separatism, but to protoautonomism – movement "Polisse". This movement quickly came (and was brought) to nought amid harshly negative attitude of all Belarusian political elite of that time. Moreover, we may add that ethnically Belarus is rather homogeneous; there are no regions with high shares of representative of non-title ethnos.

Table 48

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, should Belarus aim at joining NATO?", %

Variant of answer	09'02	06'06	09'08	06'14	09'14
Yes	27.0	14.9	13.9	18.1	15.3
No	42.3	71.8	66.0	61.8	71.4
DA/NA	29.7	13.1	20.1	20.1	13.3

Table 49

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force V. Bondarev announced that in 2015 Russia intends to quarter in Belarus an air-base with 24 SU-27 fighters. Some people fell positive about this idea, some people feel negative, and others are indifferent. What is your attitude to it?"

Variant of answer	%
Negative	22.4
Positive	27.6
Indifferent	45.1
DA/NA	4.9

Table 50

Distribution of answers to the question: "If an initiative of separation from Belarus appeared in some region of Belarus, which actions should Belarusian power take?"

Variant of answer	%
To carry out a referendum on separation in this region	10.0
To carry out a national referendum on separation of this region	18.4
To negotiate with people desiring this separation	36.3
To put under arrest the instigators of the initiative	16.9
To suppress this initiative by all means	14.0
DA/NA	4.4

However bolts sometimes come from the blue. Centuries-old experience of Englishmen and Scots living in the same country never resulted in a referendum before. And Donbass people didn't seem so different from the rest of Ukrainian people up until recently.

In a word, in current international context the question on the reaction of Belarusian society to hypothetical separatist aspiration is not devoid of sense (Table 50).

Opinions about desired actions in response to separatism were divided almost into two halves. 46.3% of respondents in one form or another are ready to recognize legitimacy of such initiative, though only 10% of them are ready to let their fellow countrymen decide their fate by themselves (a Scottish variant, conditionally speaking). Negotiations is a somewhat more tough reaction; it makes provision for recognition of legitimacy of separatist demands, but it doesn't stipulate that government will necessarily agree with any form of a "ivorce" desired by separatists or will even agree with it in any form. To wide extent negotiations is also the Scottish variant: there were long negotiations between London and Edinburgh before this year's referendum in Scotland.

However, the relative majority is much less complacent. 49.3% of respondents say "no" to this hypothetical initiative. 18.4% say "no" with a certain taint of slyness. They seem to recognize legitimacy of similar

demands, but there is no need for L. Yermoshina to foresee the results of an all-Belarusian referendum on separation of some region. Opinion of 30.9% of respondents is devoid of any form of slyness: they suppose that such pretensions should be answered with force. 14% of respondents consider that all means are admissible, even an anti-terroristic operation.

The connection between the question under investigation and the age is insignificant. The only thing worth mentioning is the fact that respondents of senior age are less inclined to a liberal solution: the number of "doves" is the smallest among them and the number of supporters of military resistance to separatism is the biggest (Table 51).

The number of "super-doves" is slightly bigger among the supporters of the President than among his opponents; at the same time there are much more "hawks" and "super-hawks" among them. Connection with the attitude to opposition is even clearer: there are much less of "super-doves" and much more of "hawks" and "super-hawks" among those who suppose that opposition doesn't reflect interests of people like them. Adepts of paternalistic view on patriotism are inclined to resist separatism to a record high extent.

It is revealing that among "Belo-Russians" there are more advocates of separatism suppression than among "Euro-Belarusians". Though there is nothing

Table 51

Connection between the answers to the question on reaction to hypothetical separatism in Belarus, socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences*, %

Characteristics	If an initiative of separation from Belarus appeared in some region of Belarus, which actions should Belarusian power take?			
	"Super-doves"***	"Doves"***	"Hawks"****	"Super-hawks"*****
<i>Age:</i>				
18-29	10.9	45.1	49.1	30.7
30-59	10.3	47.7	48.8	30.3
60 +	8.3	44.3	50.6	32.6
<i>Education:</i>				
Primary	4.3	50.5	46.3	27.7
Incomplete secondary	12.3	39.9	54.2	36.6
Secondary	10.5	44.7	51.1	31.7
Vocational	11.6	50.4	46.6	29.5
Higher	7.2	45.6	48.3	29.6
<i>Do you consider yourself closer to Russians or Europeans?</i>				
Russians	10.8	45.8	49.3	31.8
Europeans	7.8	47.5	49.6	28.5
<i>Do you trust the President?</i>				
Trust	11.9	46.0	50.3	34.9
Don't trust	7.2	48.0	47.6	26.9
<i>Do you think that Belarusian opposition understands issues and cares of people like you?</i>				
Yes	12.6	48.7	45.9	22.0
No	8.7	45.5	50.9	35.4
<i>Do you agree that "a patriot should support power whatever it may be"?</i>				
I agree	12.0	36.7	60.1	44.9
I rather agree	11.0	42.9	52.5	35.2
I rather disagree	10.6	48.9	46.6	26.0
I disagree	7.9	50.0	46.9	30.1
<i>If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?</i>				
Integration with the RF	10.2	43.8	52.8	32.7
Joining the EU	10.8	51.6	44.3	29.5
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>				
Completely objective/Mostly objective	10.2	47.6	47.3	31.0
Completely biased/Mostly biased	8.1	44.3	52.4	34.3
<i>How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?</i>				
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	12.3	48.7	47.2	32.5
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	9.2	46.0	51.1	29.9
<i>How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?</i>				
It's a crime, a war against their own people	12.2	48.7	47.5	28.6
It's a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion	6.1	38.9	57.2	35.0
It's a severe, but a forced measure	6.0	45.6	50.2	34.3

* The table is read horizontally

** Respondents who had chosen the variant "To carry out a referendum on separation in this region"

*** Respondents who had chosen the variants "To carry out a referendum on separation in this region" and "To negotiate with people desiring this separation"

**** Respondents who had chosen the variants "To carry out a national referendum on separation of this region", "To put under arrest the instigators of the initiative", "To suppress this initiative by all means"

***** Respondents who had chosen the variants "To put under arrest the instigators of the initiative", "To suppress this initiative by all means"

surprising about it. Scotland, where the problem was solved by means of a peaceful electoral procedure is a part of Europe. Supporters of integration with Russia may approve Russian policy in Ukraine: Moscow supports separatism there. But geopolitical choice is also connected to a certain political philosophy. And Russia very openly showed their philosophy in Chechnya.

Ukraine and adherents of Belarusian power are overlapping but not coinciding sets. People who share Russian TV's position towards Ukraine are more lenient to a prospect of separatism in Belarus than all respondents in average. And the adherents of paternalistic political culture and President's supporters are more severe than all respondents in average.

In fine it should be established that in general dif

Table 52

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, %* (06'14)

Variant of answer	How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?	
	It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation (26.9)	It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice (62.2)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>		
Yes, regularly (32.6)	22.4	69.2
Sometimes (53.8)	26.8	60.3
No, I don't (13.4)	38.7	52.5
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (51.7)	10.6	80.3
Completely/mostly biased (30.6)	56.4	36.3

* Tables are read horizontally except for specifically stated parts. Respondents which had difficulties to answer or didn't answer are not shown for an easier understanding. Shares of all respondents are noted in brackets

Table 53

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?	
	It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation (27.2)	It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice (59.9)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>		
Yes, regularly (36.3)	22.2	69.0
Sometimes (48.5)	28.1	57.8
No, I don't (15.0)	36.0	45.3
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	11.6	78.9
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	48.2	39.8

Ukrainian context, however, influences the answers to a certain extent, causing a cognitive dissonance among some of respondents: their political philosophy, their worldview push them to prefer the tough variant towards Belarusian separatism. But the tragedy in Donbass, the fact that keeping territorial integrity may cost a lot of blood including blood of innocent people, the fact that Russia supports separatism in Donbass and demands negotiations with separatists from Kiev – all these fact "break the mould" of some pro-Russian Belarusians.

That is why respondents that trust Russian TV and share Moscow's position on Crimea and Donbass are somewhat more liberal about hypothetical separatism in Belarus than those who don't trust Russian TV and don't approve Russian policy in Ukraine.

Answers to these questions show that, despite an evident assumption, supporters of Moscow's policy in

ferences between socio-demographic groups and groups with different political setups in their attitude to hypothetical separatism in Belarus are not really big. However, adherents of the current order are less inclined to a tolerant attitude to this phenomenon, as a rule. In general, separatism in Belarus, if it emerges one day, will face quite a negative massive reaction. Almost one third of population will refuse any legitimacy to similar inclinations from the very beginning and will advocate a military response to this initiative.

TV-propaganda and life

In IISEPES publications on the results of June survey the role of propaganda in relation to Belarusians' attitude to events in Ukraine was already analyzed: "There is a hypothesis about the almighty propaganda. According to it Belarusians' evaluations

Table 54

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	If Russia decides to bring their troops into Ukraine, do you think Belarus should permit Russia to do it through Belarusian territory?	
	Yes (15.2)	No (74.8)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>		
Yes, regularly (36.3)	23.5	68.4
Sometimes (48.5)	9.7	80.4
No, I don't (15.0)	12.8	71.7
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	29.9	60.4
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	8.8	85.4

Table 55

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?	
	Unambiguously/Rather positively (59.5)	Rather/Unambiguously negatively (26.8)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>		
Yes, regularly (36.3)	70.9	18.8
Sometimes (48.5)	54.6	33.3
No, I don't (15.0)	48.7	25.2
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	77.8	12.3
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	34.4	50.7

Table 56

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	Do you trust the President?	
	Trust (53.5)	Don't trust (33.3)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>		
Yes, regularly (36.3)	69.8	21.2
Sometimes (48.5)	45.5	40.4
No, I don't (15.0)	40.5	38.8
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	76.5	13.9
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	32.5	56.3

of Ukrainian crisis are defined only by this propaganda. This hypothesis is true only partially. Indeed, the level of support of Russian position is significantly higher among those who regularly watch Russian TV. Still, even the majority of those, who don't watch Russian TV at all, consider Crimea annexation lawful. It is evident that people's mindsets are as important as informational influence. Among those, who don't trust Russian TV, who consider it biased (but still watch it sometimes), the share of those who evaluate negatively the Crimea annexation is not lower, but higher, than among those, who don't watch Russian TV at all. So Russian TV is influential, but not almighty".

However, many people, especially those who don't share the point of view of majority of Belarusians on the events in Ukraine, continue to see the main reason in almightiness of Russian (and Belarusian too)

TV-propaganda: "Belarusians reproduce only what they see on the zombie-box. They have absolutely no critical approach to the information from Russian TV".

This question isn't academic, because there may be various strategies directed at changing the attitude to the events in Ukraine (and to many other things in Belarus): in the case information and propaganda really are main shaping factors and in the case this factor is life "as it is". In the first case "damned Muscovites" may be blamed for everything (or almost everything) and a "strategy of informational security" may be worked out. In the second case it is necessary to listen to interests of millions of people and constantly work on changing their opinions.

As most adepts of "propaganda theory" often use their own logic, IISEPS decided to present "naked figures" with minimal evaluations, supposing that re-

ality is more convincing than any arguments (Tables 52-61).

Belarusians' evaluation of events in Ukraine depends not so much on the frequency of watching

Table 57

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to Russia and the EU after events in Ukraine, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	Did your attitude to Russia change after this year's events in Ukraine?		
	Yes, it became worse (24.3)	Yes, it became better (21.9)	No, it didn't change (51.5)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>			
Yes, regularly (36.3)	18.8	36.9	41.5
Sometimes (48.5)	25.1	15.9	57.3
No, I don't (15.0)	34.5	5.3	57.1
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	9.4	41.5	42.3
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	43.4	9.9	45.3

Table 58

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to Russia and the EU after events in Ukraine, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	Did your attitude to the EU change after this year's events in Ukraine?		
	Yes, it became worse (47.0)	Yes, it became better (5.6)	No, it didn't change (42.4)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>			
Yes, regularly (36.3)	61.9	4.6	29.6
Sometimes (48.5)	40.0	5.9	49.3
No, I don't (15.0)	34.5	6.6	50.9
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	61.7	3.6	31.6
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	36.2	8.7	50.6

Table 59

Connection between attitudes towards Belarusian TV and Russian TV, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	Do you watch Belarusian TV-news?		
	Yes, regularly (35.3)	Sometimes (50.4)	No, I don't (14.1)
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>			
Yes, regularly (36.3)	82.1	16.3	1.5
Sometimes (48.5)	7.5	86.4	5.9
No, I don't (15.0)	12.4	16.4	71.2
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?(read vertically)</i>			
Yes, regularly (36.3)	84.4	10.3	5.3
Sometimes (48.5)	11.7	83.2	4.9
No, I don't (15.0)	3.8	20.3	75.9
<i>How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.9)	64.8	33.4	1.9
Completely/mostly biased (41.0)	19.3	55.4	24.7
<i>How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?(read vertically)</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.9)	74.1	43.1	7.5
Completely/mostly biased (41.0)	23.2	49.1	55.4
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	56.8	39.3	7.1
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	22.0	55.7	21.9
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs? (read vertically)</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	66.9	45.0	12.6
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	24.6	45.4	53.7

Table 60

Connection between attitudes towards Belarusian TV and Russian TV, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?	
	Completely/mostly objective (48.9)	Completely/mostly biased (41.0)
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?(read vertically)</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	82.6	15.9
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	10.1	80.5
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>		
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	84.1	13.6
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	12.5	83.6

Table 61

Connection between attitudes towards Belarusian TV and Russian TV, % (09'14)

Variant of answer	Do you watch Russian TV-news?		
	Yes, regularly (36.3)	Sometimes (48.5)	No, I don't (15.0)
<i>How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?(read vertically)</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.9)	65.7	49.7	22.1
Completely/mostly biased (41.0)	31.7	47.9	40.7
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs? (read vertically)</i>			
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)	70.2	44.2	8.0
Completely/mostly biased (39.4)	26.1	46.8	47.1

Russian TV as on their attitude to it. Hence, we should talk not so much of Russian propaganda influence, as of formation of Belarusians' attitude to the events in Ukraine under the influence of other factors (historical, culturally-psychological, socio-political and, above all, own experience of respondents).

Analysis of September survey results in general confirms main conclusion made from the results of June survey: Belarusians' evaluations of events in Ukraine depend not so much on the frequency of watching Russian TV as on attitude to it. Positive connection between the attitude to Russian TV and

to President A. Lukashenko is also evident.

There is a connection between Belarusians watching Russian TV-news and changing their attitude to Russia and the EU. However, in this question attitude to Russian TV (formed under the influence of factors listed above) is once again more important than frequency of watching it.

Majority of Belarusians perceive Belarusian and Russian TV identically, as a single source of information (differences in attitude to them are very small).

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in September, 2014 (%)

1. "What do you fear most of all today?" (more than one answer is possible)

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Poverty	43.0	46.9	51.3	50.3	40.9	47.1	46.8	31.1
Health loss	62.4	49.0	53.3	62.3	62.5	68.0	65.9	61.1
Job loss	27.9	18.0	31.6	37.4	35.2	38.2	32.5	6.6
Criminality	16.1	22.4	15.9	12.2	17.1	10.0	18.2	19.1
Belarus' loss of independence	13.0	82.0	88.8	85.6	87.9	85.7	89.4	86.3
Foreign aggression	19.9	16.3	21.7	17.7	18.9	16.0	17.0	27.1
Civil war	27.0	16.3	25.7	26.5	22.3	17.5	11.0	8.0
Arbitrary rule	16.7	16.3	25.7	26.5	22.3	17.5	11.0	8.0
Something else	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.7	0.8	1.8	1.5	0.9

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Poverty	16.0	37.9	45.7	47.3	42.9
Health loss	40.4	64.7	62.4	64.9	64.6
Job loss	2.1	8.5	28.7	36.1	33.0
Criminality	28.7	14.3	15.8	15.9	13.7
Belarus' loss of independence	9.6	13.6	11.2	13.3	16.7
Foreign aggression	39.4	20.3	20.8	17.5	15.3
Civil war	61.7	30.7	24.7	24.2	22.1
Arbitrary rule	0	13.0	19.5	16.4	19.4
Something else	0	2.0	1.1	2.6	1.0

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Poverty	49.7	44.4	51.0	31.6	40.9
Health loss	68.3	63.3	40.2	61.4	55.4
Job loss	37.5	36.9	25.0	5.9	21.1
Criminality	14.9	13.3	15.6	19.5	27.3
Belarus' loss of independence	11.9	12.0	17.7	12.5	24.6
Foreign aggression	13.8	19.8	21.9	26.1	21.5
Civil war	15.4	26.5	30.9	41.2	20.0
Arbitrary rule	26.9	13.5	23.7	7.4	19.7
Something else	2.1	1.1	3.1	0.3	4.5

Table 1.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Poverty	26.4	50.9	65.3	78.7	51.8	87.4	60.4
Health loss	86.7	57.0	60.2	44.4	76.9	50.3	48.9
Job loss	39.4	30.3	28.7	13.0	43.7	17.1	15.0
Criminality	17.8	23.2	20.8	6.5	15.1	7.4	16.7
Belarus' loss of independence	8.5	12.3	8.8	25.4	13.1	14.4	12.8
Foreign aggression	6.8	16.6	28.8	11.2	19.1	33.1	29.1
Civil war	12.3	47.1	31.0	5.9	29.8	19.4	41.4
Arbitrary rule	22.3	19.3	12.5	6.5	12.1	11.4	26.4
Something else	2.0	1.8	2.3	0.6	0.5	1.7	1.3

Table 1.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Poverty	26.4	64.5	64.2	60.3	67.3
Health loss	86.7	59.0	63.2	53.3	51.9
Job loss	39.4	23.9	26.5	22.7	26.6
Criminality	17.8	9.9	11.1	13.2	24.7
Belarus' loss of independence	8.5	9.6	15.0	12.5	18.0
Foreign aggression	6.8	23.3	26.9	22.7	20.3
Civil war	12.3	18.5	26.1	40.2	36.7
Arbitrary rule	22.3	15.1	17.5	18.0	12.2
Something else	2.0	1.4	1.1	1.2	2.1

2. "Does any of the members of your family work overboard at present?"

Table 2.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	23.5	32.7	25.8	28.6	25.5	23.9	21.2	18.8
No	75.8	67.3	72.8	70.7	73.8	75.0	78.4	80.6
DA	0.7	0	1.4	0.7	0.7	1.1	0.4	0.6

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	7.4	24.0	26.2	25.4	20.7
No	92.6	74.7	73.1	73.5	78.9
DA	0	1.3	0.7	1.1	0.4

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	29.4	20.2	27.8	18.4	33.3
No	69.4	79.1	72.2	81.1	66.7
DA	1.2	0.7	0	0.5	0

Table 2.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	23.6	18.5	33.5	30.8	30.2	20.6	9.7
No	76.0	81.5	65.1	69.2	68.3	79.4	88.5
DA	0.4	0	1.4	0	1.5	0	1.8

Table 2.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	23.6	22.3	30.7	18.3	22.4
No	76.0	76.4	68.6	81.6	76.8
DA	0.4	1.3	0.7	0.1	0.8

3. "Do you trust the President of Republic of Belarus?"

Table 3.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Trust	53.5	44.9	25.2	36.1	39.8	53.9	60.6	78.6
Don't trust	33.3	42.9	58.9	46.3	45.5	31.8	27.3	12.3
DA	13.2	12.2	15.9	17.6	14.7	14.3	12.1	9.1

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Trust	84.0	79.9	50.6	47.7	43.5
Don't trust	9.6	11.7	35.9	36.6	42.5
DA	6.4	8.4	13.4	15.7	13.9

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Trust	34.6	52.6	36.5	81.1	53.0
Don't trust	50.2	32.4	49.0	10.7	34.8
DA	15.2	15.0	14.5	8.2	12.2

Table 3.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Trust	37.9	49.8	53.2	67.5	41.9	67.4	66.5
Don't trust	54.9	39.2	31.0	25.4	39.9	12.0	18.1
DA	7.2	11.0	15.8	7.1	18.2	20.6	15.4

Table 3.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Trust	37.9	52.9	61.3	50.2	62.1
Don't trust	54.9	30.4	28.0	32.3	23.6
DA	7.2	16.7	10.7	17.5	14.3

4. "Do you feel yourself protected by law?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	54.7	55.1	37.1	40.1	37.5	47.0	64.0	80.6
No	37.0	38.8	54.3	48.3	50.4	43.4	30.3	14.0
DA/NA	8.3	6.1	8.6	11.6	12.1	9.6	5.7	5.4

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	92.6	79.2	53.2	47.2	43.2
No	7.4	16.2	38.3	43.4	45.6
DA/NA	0	4.6	8.5	9.4	11.2

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	33.6	55.2	46.4	80.9	50.8
No	57.5	35.4	41.2	14.4	40.0
DA/NA	8.9	9.4	12.4	4.7	9.2

Table 4.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	46.4	58.8	54.4	44.0	53.0	60.3	66.5
No	50.9	37.7	32.3	50.0	36.5	24.8	22.9
DA/NA	2.7	3.5	13.3	6.0	10.5	14.9	10.6

Table 4.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	46.4	53.9	54.5	52.1	63.4
No	50.9	32.4	37.6	37.7	29.1
DA/NA	2.7	13.7	7.9	10.2	7.5

5. "20 years ago in July A. Lukashenko won on the first presidential elections in Belarus. According to you, in 1994 Belarusian people...

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
...made the right choice	55.7	38.8	28.9	36.1	44.9	54.6	64.2	80.3
...made the wrong choice	29.9	44.9	49.3	42.2	37.6	30.7	24.5	11.7
DA/NA	14.4	16.3	21.8	21.7	17.5	14.7	11.3	8.0

Table 5.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
...made the right choice	87.2	79.9	51.8	52.0	45.1
...made the wrong choice	12.8	10.4	33.3	29.9	39.7
DA/NA	0	9.7	14.9	18.1	15.2

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
...made the right choice	34.0	56.9	38.1	82.4	59.1
...made the wrong choice	50.1	27.8	35.1	9.3	27.3
DA/NA	15.8	15.4	26.8	8.2	13.6

Table 5.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
...made the right choice	36.2	52.2	59.7	67.5	43.7	65.1	74.0
...made the wrong choice	56.7	42.1	23.6	22.5	29.6	8.0	12.3
DA/NA	7.1	5.7	16.7	10.0	26.7	26.9	13.4

Table 5.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
...made the right choice	36.2	52.4	63.9	57.2	65.7
...made the wrong choice	56.7	24.0	26.8	22.2	21.6
DA/NA	7.1	23.6	9.4	20.6	12.7

6. "Do you think that changes which you personally expect are possible under A. Lukashenko's rule?"

Table 6.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, they are possible	48.9	42.9	29.8	39.5	36.0	45.4	57.6	68.6
No, they are impossible	38.4	44.9	58.3	46.3	48.9	41.1	32.2	10.7
DA/NA	12.7	12.2	11.9	14.2	15.1	13.5	10.2	10.7

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, they are possible	82.8	66.0	43.9	47.7	40.1
No, they are impossible	17.2	18.3	43.2	39.9	44.2
DA/NA	0	15.7	12.9	12.4	15.7

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes, they are possible	35.2	45.7	37.5	71.5	52.3
No, they are impossible	56.9	37.8	47.9	16.8	30.8
DA/NA	7.9	16.5	14.6	11.7	16.9

Table 6.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes, they are possible	33.9	45.4	50.7	62.1	40.5	65.1	55.3
No, they are impossible	64.4	44.9	34.1	27.2	37.0	22.9	23.7
DA/NA	1.7	9.7	15.2	10.7	22.5	12.0	21.1

Table 6.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, they are possible	33.9	50.9	50.7	53.3	54.5
No, they are impossible	64.4	27.6	38.6	31.9	30.9
DA/NA	1.7	21.5	10.7	14.8	14.6

7. "Next presidential elections in Belarus will take place in 2015. How do you think, can a candidate of democratic forces won?"

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, if Russia supports him	12.6	10.2	9.3	10.2	12.5	10.7	13.2	16.3
Yes, if the West supports him	4.3	6.1	7.3	4.8	6.0	2.9	4.9	1.7
Yes, if he is the single candidate of democratic forces	16.8	26.5	18.5	19.0	19.6	20.0	15.8	10.0
No whatsoever	52.0	40.8	16.6	51.7	46.8	50.3	54.3	59.1
DA/NA	14.3	16.4	47.3	14.3	15.1	16.1	11.8	12.9

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, if Russia supports him	34.0	9.7	11.0	11.2	11.2
Yes, if the West supports him	0	2.6	6.6	2.9	4.4
Yes, if he is the single candidate of democratic forces	4.3	12.3	18.2	18.5	18.4
No whatsoever	48.9	60.5	48.3	54.6	51.9
DA/NA	12.8	14.9	15.9	12.8	14.1

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes, if Russia supports him	11.2	11.1	9.3	16.8	13.6
Yes, if the West supports him	4.9	5.4	5.2	2.1	4.5
Yes, if he is the single candidate of democratic forces	20.0	18.1	22.7	9.3	19.7
No whatsoever	54.1	49.6	43.3	56.4	45.5
DA/NA	9.8	15.8	19.5	15.4	16.7

Table 7.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes, if Russia supports him	12.0	17.1	10.2	25.0	9.1	6.9	8.8
Yes, if the West supports him	3.8	5.7	5.1	5.4	4.5	1.7	3.5
Yes, if he is the single candidate of democratic forces	7.2	25.0	23.6	10.1	23.7	18.4	12.8
No whatsoever	71.9	43.9	52.8	50.6	49.5	55.7	34.9
DA/NA	5.1	8.3	8.3	8.9	13.2	17.3	40.0

Table 7.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, if Russia supports him	12.0	12.6	10.8	13.6	13.5
Yes, if the West supports him	3.8	1.4	7.9	5.8	3.4
Yes, if he is the single candidate of democratic forces	7.2	16.7	15.8	24.9	19.7
No whatsoever	71.9	46.4	56.3	39.3	46.5
DA/NA	5.1	22.9	9.2	16.4	16.9

8. "What could improve your attitude to democratic forces in Belarus and raise their authority in your eyes?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Nomination of a single candidate for the presidential elections in 2015	16.9	18.0	21.9	20.4	18.9	16.8	18.9	10.3
A convincing plan of Belarus' development after A. Lukashenko's resignation	32.0	42.0	31.8	34.0	38.1	28.9	29.9	29.3
Activities, supporting simple people	39.8	34.0	35.8	40.1	33.2	39.6	44.7	43.6
DA/NA	11.3	6.0	10.6	5.5	9.8	14.7	6.5	16.8

Table 8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Nomination of a single candidate for the presidential elections in 2015	10.6	11.0	16.5	17.3	21.8
A convincing plan of Belarus' development after A. Lukashenko's resignation	19.1	33.1	33.5	32.0	33.1
Activities, supporting simple people	48.9	39.0	40.4	40.7	34.8
DA/NA	21.4	16.9	9.6	10.0	10.3

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Nomination of a single candidate for the presidential elections in 2015	22.5	15.3	22.7	10.9	18.2
A convincing plan of Belarus' development after A. Lukashenko's resignation	37.7	30.3	29.9	27.7	37.9
Activities, supporting simple people	34.0	42.1	40.2	44.1	33.3
DA/NA	5.6	12.3	7.2	17.3	10.6

Table 8.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Nomination of a single candidate for the presidential elections in 2015	16.1	21.5	10.2	25.4	31.7	7.4	7.5
A convincing plan of Belarus' development after A. Lukashenko's resignation	44.2	23.2	41.7	18.3	28.1	29.7	30.8
Activities, supporting simple people	38.7	43.0	38.4	46.7	29.6	43.4	40.5
DA/NA	1.0	12.3	9.9	9.6	10.6	19.5	21.2

Table 8.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Nomination of a single candidate for the presidential elections in 2015	16.1	19.5	16.8	17.9	14.8
A convincing plan of Belarus' development after A. Lukashenko's resignation	44.2	22.3	36.2	28.4	29.9
Activities, supporting simple people	38.7	42.8	39.3	38.5	39.5
DA/NA	1.0	15.4	7.9	15.2	15.8

9. "Recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force V. Bondarev announced that in 2015 Russia intends to quarter in Belarus an air-base with 24 SU-27 fighters. Some people fell positive about this idea, some people feel negative, and others are indifferent. What is your attitude to it?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positive	22.4	20.0	15.8	16.3	17.1	22.5	23.5	31.3
Indifferent	27.6	44.0	42.1	29.9	25.9	25.4	21.6	25.9
Negative	45.1	34.0	38.8	49.0	52.1	48.2	50.0	36.5
DA/NA	4.9	2.0	3.2	4.8	4.9	3.9	4.9	6.3

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	24.5	39.9	22.1	19.5	17.7
Indifferent	37.2	24.1	31.1	26.6	21.4
Negative	38.3	26.1	43.4	48.2	55.8
DA/NA	0	9.9	3.4	5.7	5.1

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positive	19.9	20.9	13.5	30.3	18.2
Indifferent	27.6	26.5	42.7	25.0	30.3
Negative	49.3	47.8	38.5	37.6	48.5
DA/NA	3.2	4.8	5.1	7.1	3.0

Table 9.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positive	27.7	22.5	15.3	14.8	33.2	21.0	19.4
Indifferent	41.8	29.1	29.3	27.2	21.1	16.5	21.1
Negative	30.5	46.7	42.8	57.4	36.2	57.4	53.7
DA/NA	0	1.7	12.6	0.6	9.5	5.1	5.8

Table 9.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	27.7	15.7	26.4	18.0	23.6
Indifferent	41.8	23.9	27.9	24.6	21.8
Negative	30.5	56.3	43.2	52.7	43.8
DA/NA	0	4.1	2.5	4.7	10.8

10. "Did your attitude to Russia change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, it became worse	24.3	20.0	31.8	29.3	26.0	25.0	27.3	15.4
Yes, it became better	21.9	16.0	15.9	15.6	16.2	20.0	22.7	33.0
No, it didn't change	51.5	60.0	51.0	53.7	55.1	53.6	47.3	48.1
DA	2.3	4.0	1.3	1.4	2.7	1.4	2.7	3.5

Table 10.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, it became worse	16.0	10.5	22.8	26.1	34.0
Yes, it became better	50.0	26.8	20.0	18.2	18.4
No, it didn't change	28.7	58.8	54.2	53.8	45.9
DA	5.3	3.9	2.0	1.9	1.7

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes, it became worse	25.9	25.0	27.8	17.6	40.0
Yes, it became better	15.9	21.3	19.6	32.5	9.2
No, it didn't change	55.5	52.1	50.5	46.4	50.8
DA	2.7	1.6	2.1	3.5	0

Table 10.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes, it became worse	19.8	22.8	20.7	43.5	35.4	12.0	20.4
Yes, it became better	18.8	32.9	21.7	17.6	5.6	37.7	20.4
No, it didn't change	61.4	43.9	56.7	38.2	55.6	47.4	51.2
DA	0	0.4	0.9	0.7	3.4	2.9	8.0

Table 10.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, it became worse	19.8	28.4	26.9	24.9	22.4
Yes, it became better	18.8	17.8	21.1	29.2	23.2
No, it didn't change	61.4	49.0	51.3	44.0	51.0
DA	0	4.8	0.7	1.9	3.4

11. "Did your attitude to the EU change after this year's events in Ukraine?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, it became worse	47.0	38.8	33.8	36.5	42.2	45.6	51.1	60.2
Yes, it became better	5.6	6.1	6.6	8.1	4.9	5.3	3.8	5.4
No, it didn't change	42.4	44.9	57.6	50.7	47.1	42.3	40.9	29.5
DA	5.0	10.1	2.0	4.7	5.8	6.8	4.2	4.9

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, it became worse	69.5	53.9	43.8	44.5	45.9
Yes, it became better	6.3	3.9	4.6	7.3	5.4
No, it didn't change	18.9	36.4	47.4	43.1	42.2
DA	5.3	5.8	4.2	5.1	6.5

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes, it became worse	36.0	49.6	40.6	60.5	30.4
Yes, it became better	4.0	4.8	10.4	5.9	13.6
No, it didn't change	54.7	40.8	43.8	28.5	51.5
DA	5.3	4.8	5.2	5.1	4.5

Table 11.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes, it became worse	33.9	41.2	61.6	35.5	42.2	65.1	55.3
Yes, it became better	2.7	9.2	5.1	6.5	7.0	4.0	4.9
No, it didn't change	61.3	46.9	27.8	53.8	43.7	28.6	28.3
DA	2.1	2.5	5.5	4.2	7.1	2.3	11.5

Table 11.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, it became worse	33.9	42.1	47.9	45.9	60.9
Yes, it became better	2.7	6.8	6.1	7.0	5.4
No, it didn't change	61.3	43.8	42.5	40.5	28.0
DA	2.1	7.3	3.5	6.6	6.1

12. "How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?"

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	27.2	35.4	37.1	33.3	27.0	27.9	30.7	16.3
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	59.9	52.1	44.4	54.4	55.5	57.9	61.7	73.7
DA/NA	12.9	12.5	18.5	12.3	17.5	14.2	7.6	10.0

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	19.1	12.4	28.1	27.6	35.0
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	75.5	73.9	57.7	59.1	53.1
DA/NA	5.4	13.7	14.2	13.3	11.9

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	36.2	23.9	33.3	18.6	36.4
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	50.0	63.5	47.9	71.5	47.0
DA/NA	13.8	12.6	18.8	9.9	16.6

Table 12.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	33.2	25.0	13.9	49.1	35.7	18.9	16.7
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.7	68.9	74.1	41.4	45.7	61.1	59.5
DA/NA	4.1	6.1	12.0	9.5	18.6	20.0	23.8

Table 12.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	33.2	23.3	29.6	25.3	24.9
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.7	54.5	59.6	58.4	63.4
DA/NA	4.1	22.2	10.8	16.3	11.7

13. "According to you, what is President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?"**Table 13.1. Depending on age**

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
He completely supports the policy of Russian power	18.2	18.4	23.8	21.8	18.2	20.6	15.5	14.6
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	2.7	4.1	6.0	0	3.4	1.4	2.3	2.6
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties	35.5	22.4	30.5	39.5	39.0	40.2	42.8	26.1
He maintains neutrality	36.3	40.8	30.5	29.9	33.0	29.5	33.7	50.7
DA	7.3	14.3	9.2	8.8	6.4	8.3	5.7	6.0

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
He completely supports the policy of Russian power	18.1	20.9	19.5	19.0	12.9
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	2.1	1.3	4.8	1.2	1.7
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties	9.6	25.5	34.7	37.6	47.6
He maintains neutrality	67.0	45.1	33.3	35.5	28.6
DA	3.2	7.2	7.7	6.7	9.2

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
He completely supports the policy of Russian power	21.9	17.6	16.8	14.9	19.7
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	2.8	2.0	4.2	1.9	7.6
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties	46.4	35.6	23.2	27.7	28.8
He maintains neutrality	24.5	36.5	38.9	48.7	34.8
DA	4.4	8.3	16.9	6.8	9.1

Table 13.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
He completely supports the policy of Russian power	31.3	23.2	13.0	16.0	20.1	7.4	9.6
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	2.4	3.5	1.9	7.7	0	0.6	3.1
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties	37.1	30.3	44.0	33.7	41.7	30.9	30.3
He maintains neutrality	28.9	37.7	38.0	40.2	16.1	55.4	42.5
DA	0.3	5.3	3.1	2.4	22.1	5.7	14.5

Table 13.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
He completely supports the policy of Russian power	31.3	10.2	17.2	13.6	18.2
He completely supports the policy of Ukrainian power	2.4	1.7	5.7	1.9	2.1
He maneuvers between the conflicting parties	37.1	38.2	31.5	31.9	37.7
He maintains neutrality	28.9	41.4	35.5	43.7	33.5
DA	0.3	8.5	10.1	8.9	8.5

14. "If Russia decides to bring their troops into Ukraine, do you think Belarus should permit Russia to do it through Belarusian territory?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	15.2	16.3	11.2	6.8	15.2	14.6	12.8	22.9
No	74.8	73.5	80.9	85.0	74.6	76.5	76.6	65.4
DA/NA	10.0	10.2	7.9	8.2	10.2	8.9	10.6	11.7

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	36.6	18.8	17.3	10.0	10.2
No	59.1	65.6	72.9	79.0	82.0
DA/NA	4.3	15.6	9.8	11.0	7.8

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	11.4	12.8	13.5	22.6	20.0
No	81.4	76.8	75.0	65.2	73.8
DA/NA	7.2	10.4	11.5	12.2	6.2

Table 14.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	13.7	25.4	11.1	16.6	17.2	19.4	5.3
No	84.6	69.7	70.8	79.9	66.7	62.9	83.3
DA/NA	1.7	4.8	18.1	3.6	16.2	17.7	11.4

Table 14.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	13.7	11.6	14.6	17.9	17.7
No	84.6	71.7	75.4	70.8	71.9
DA/NA	1.7	16.7	10.0	11.3	10.4

15. "How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko's policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Unambiguously positively	14.8	14.0	5.9	8.8	9.1	13.2	18.5	24.0
Rather positively	44.7	38.0	36.2	44.6	43.9	46.6	43.8	49.1
Rather negatively	17.2	28.0	21.7	22.3	20.1	18.5	18.1	8.0
Negatively	9.6	8.0	13.2	11.5	12.1	8.2	8.3	7.7
DA/NA	13.7	12.0	23.0	12.8	14.8	13.5	11.3	11.2

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Unambiguously positively	29.8	24.0	11.8	14.0	11.9
Rather positively	56.4	44.2	44.5	41.9	45.2
Rather negatively	2.1	9.7	17.5	19.7	22.1
Negatively	6.4	6.5	11.2	10.7	8.2
DA/NA	5.3	15.6	15.0	13.7	12.6

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Unambiguously positively	9.3	14.8	7.2	23.1	15.2
Rather positively	37.3	49.0	40.2	48.9	39.4
Rather negatively	28.2	15.2	13.4	9.0	13.6
Negatively	11.2	9.0	11.4	7.7	13.6
DA/NA	14.0	12.0	27.8	11.3	18.2

Table 15.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Unambiguously positively	14.8	18.9	11.2	17.1	7.5	17.1	17.2
Rather positively	38.5	52.9	42.8	28.8	44.2	55.4	51.1
Rather negatively	35.4	11.9	20.0	11.8	16.6	9.7	6.6
Negatively	7.6	7.0	15.8	30.0	7.5	2.9	1.3
DA/NA	3.7	9.3	10.2	12.3	24.1	14.9	23.8

Table 15.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Unambiguously positively	14.8	13.7	12.9	10.5	20.0
Rather positively	38.5	45.4	34.3	55.3	49.9
Rather negatively	35.4	15.1	15.7	12.5	9.1
Negatively	7.6	7.9	17.1	7.4	8.3
DA/NA	3.7	17.9	20.0	14.3	12.7

16. "According to you, should Belarus aim at joining NATO?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	15.3	16.3	29.6	18.9	16.0	14.3	14.0	8.6
No	71.4	67.3	57.9	62.8	69.2	72.1	70.5	83.1
DA/NA	13.3	14.4	12.5	18.3	14.8	13.6	15.5	8.3

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	9.6	9.1	15.6	16.9	17.7
No	88.3	79.2	72.4	67.9	64.6
DA/NA	2.1	11.7	12.0	15.2	17.7

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	21.2	13.4	24.0	8.5	18.5
No	66.2	71.6	57.3	81.6	66.2
DA/NA	12.6	15.0	18.7	9.9	15.3

Table 16.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	18.1	20.6	11.6	21.9	9.1	4.0	18.5
No	80.2	74.6	72.1	67.5	63.1	80.6	59.9
DA/NA	1.7	4.8	16.3	10.6	27.8	15.4	21.6

Table 16.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	18.1	16.7	12.1	20.3	11.2
No	80.2	63.8	76.1	62.1	73.2
DA/NA	1.7	19.5	11.8	17.6	15.6

17. "If NATO countries tried to change the politics of Belarus with the help of armed forces, what would you do?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I'd resist up in arms	26.0	24.0	22.4	29.1	28.8	27.1	26.4	22.6
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	40.0	44.0	40.8	35.8	37.1	39.6	34.3	47.9
I'd greet these changes	9.7	14.0	19.7	14.2	11.0	9.4	9.4	2.3
DA/NA	24.3	18.0	17.1	20.9	23.0	23.9	29.9	27.2

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I'd resist up in arms	9.7	27.3	26.5	28.2	26.3
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	73.1	39.0	37.9	37.8	37.2
I'd greet these changes	4.3	2.6	12.3	10.0	9.6
DA/NA	12.9	31.1	23.3	24.0	26.9

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I'd resist up in arms	25.4	31.0	25.0	22.1	10.8
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	41.7	36.0	38.4	44.3	40.0
I'd greet these changes	15.9	7.2	17.7	2.9	15.4
DA/NA	17.0	25.8	18.9	30.7	33.8

Table 17.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I'd resist up in arms	13.7	8.3	44.0	20.0	21.5	41.7	38.6
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	63.8	58.8	25.9	27.1	41.5	22.9	25.4
I'd greet these changes	14.7	18.0	7.9	13.5	8.0	1.1	1.8
DA/NA	7.8	14.9	22.2	39.4	29.0	34.3	34.2

Table 17.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I'd resist up in arms	13.7	24.6	36.4	27.0	28.1
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	63.8	34.8	28.2	40.2	34.1
I'd greet these changes	14.7	7.5	9.3	10.5	7.3
DA/NA	7.8	33.1	26.1	22.3	30.5

18 "Western countries have introduced strict sanction against Russia for its policy in Ukraine. How do you evaluate these measures?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positively	20.0	14.3	24.5	26.5	22.3	19.6	23.5	12.2
Negatively	67.4	73.5	57.6	61.9	64.4	70.0	62.5	76.9
DA/NA	12.6	12.2	17.9	11.6	13.3	10.4	14.0	10.9

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positively	14.0	10.5	16.4	23.0	29.2
Negatively	83.9	74.5	69.8	65.1	57.6
DA/NA	2.1	15.0	13.8	11.9	13.2

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positively	27.2	18.0	21.9	12.0	28.8
Negatively	63.4	68.3	60.4	75.7	50.0
DA/NA	9.2	13.7	17.7	12.3	21.2

Table 18.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positively	24.9	20.2	13.0	38.3	21.6	8.6	14.1
Negatively	71.7	71.9	75.5	48.8	51.8	82.9	63.4
DA/NA	2.4	7.9	11.5	12.9	26.6	8.5	22.5

Table 18.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positively	24.9	21.8	18.2	18.3	17.4
Negatively	72.7	59.7	66.4	66.5	70.3
DA/NA	2.4	18.5	15.4	15.2	12.3

19. "How objective are the news in Russian news programs?"**Table 19.1. Depending on age**

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Completely objective	10.3	6.0	7.9	5.4	4.9	9.6	9.1	19.4
Mostly objective	37.9	28.0	33.8	25.0	33.0	8.9	39.2	48.0
Mostly biased	24.8	32.0	23.8	32.4	28.4	27.1	24.2	16.6
Completely biased	14.6	12.0	19.9	20.9	19.3	11.5	15.1	8.6
DA/NA	12.4	22.0	14.6	16.3	14.4	12.9	12.4	7.4

Table 19.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Completely objective	38.3	13.6	7.7	9.2	5.8
Mostly objective	47.9	46.8	37.4	37.7	31.3
Mostly biased	5.3	16.9	25.8	25.1	33.0
Completely biased	8.5	5.7	16.0	15.4	17.3
DA/NA	0	11.0	13.1	12.6	12.6

Table 19.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Completely objective	4.4	9.8	4.1	19.7	7.7
Mostly objective	28.0	41.3	38.1	46.1	26.2
Mostly biased	36.1	22.8	16.5	16.0	29.2
Completely biased	20.0	13.3	18.6	8.5	18.5
DA/NA	11.5	12.8	22.7	9.7	18.4

Table 19.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Completely objective	5.5	19.3	5.5	18.8	2.5	14.3	9.3
Mostly objective	42.8	39.0	32.7	27.1	19.1	50.1	50.0
Mostly biased	29.8	20.2	29.0	33.5	12.1	22.9	24.8
Completely biased	18.8	10.1	7.8	6.5	33.2	9.1	9.7
DA/NA	3.1	11.4	17.0	14.1	29.1	9.1	10.2

Table 19.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Completely objective	5.5	4.1	10.0	10.9	18.2
Mostly objective	42.8	43.5	32.1	37.7	34.3
Mostly biased	29.8	26.0	26.8	25.7	17.9
Completely biased	18.8	13.7	20.0	9.3	11.7
DA/NA	3.1	12.7	11.1	16.3	17.9

20. "Do you consider yourself closer to Russians or Europeans?"**Table 20.1. Depending on age**

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
To Russians	73.6	63.3	58.3	63.3	68.4	69.8	77.7	89.7
To Europeans	25.4	32.7	41.1	35.4	31.2	28.5	20.8	10.3
NA	1.0	4.0	0.6	1.3	0.4	1.7	1.5	0

Table 20.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
To Russians	88.3	92.2	72.9	71.7	63.3
To Europeans	11.7	7.2	26.0	27.1	36.1
NA	0	0.6	1.1	1.2	0.6

Table 20.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
To Russians	61.3	75.0	61.5	90.1	63.6
To Europeans	38.2	23.0	36.5	9.9	34.8
NA	0.5	2.0	2.0	0	1.5

Table 20.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
To Russians	64.7	65.8	74.4	67.5	78.8	90.9	78.9
To Europeans	34.9	34.2	23.7	32.0	20.2	7.4	19.4
NA	0.4	0	1.9	0.5	1.0	1.7	1.7

Table 20.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
To Russians	64.7	75.3	80.3	70.3	76.6
To Europeans	34.9	24.3	19.4	28.1	21.6
NA	0.4	0.4	0.3	1.6	1.8

OPEN FORUM

In this issue of the IISEPS analytical bulletin under the heading "Open Forum" we continue to publish a selection of data from sociological surveys conducted by our colleagues in foreign countries with our brief comments.

Despite purposeful efforts of the Belarusian leadership to design their own model of development, its uniqueness is relative. This conclusion applies to economic, political, social and other components of the Belarusian model. We believe that the comparative analysis of social processes in other countries will allow readers to better understand the results of researches on the Belarusian society.

DESPITE THE FORECASTS OF MOST EXPERTS

As Russian sociologist Y. Levada noted it, when various events arouse excitement in society, deep layers and internal structures of mass consciousness open up, although usually they are erased or hidden.

Processes of this kind happen today in Russian society; and they define basic setups in attitude to powers, hence the types of life strategies of population, including the ways of adaptation to the repressive state.

Society's switch to the state of excitement, which started this March ("Crimea is ours!"), gave possibility to define precisely the true share of authoritarian part of Russian population. Today we can affirm with confidence that it makes up to no less than 70%. This is confirmed in particular by President V. Putin's ratings.

Public Opinion Foundation (POF) in the course of weekly surveys registered historical maximum of electoral rating of the Russian president (71%) on the 24th and the 31st of August (in answers to a closed question: "Imagine that there will be presidential elections next Sunday. Which politician would you vote for?").

amid artificially caused patriotic upsurge: a conservative consolidation of the society around the power. The level of supports testifies to an almost total unity – a very rare situation for sociological researches. "Such conditions, – states the head of Levada-center L. Gudkov, – appear only in the moments when the most important symbolic moments of the whole collective unity are affected, like a threat to existence or something similar to it".

Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) also registered maximal values of trust index of the Russian president in August (trust index = trust – distrust). Its values were oscillating between 63 and 67 during the last summer month. And it should be noted that the share of respondents, not trusting the President, never exceeded margins of the statistical error!

As for the indices, evaluating the state of things in the country, according to WCIOM, they've also reached maximal values in August. In particular, the state of things index (difference between positive and negative answers to the question "Do you agree that things are going in the right direction?") over the three summer months jumped from 63 up to 72. Previous maximal value (59) was registered in the first quarter

Table 1

Dynamics of electoral rating of Russian President Vladimir Putin, %

2011*	2012	2013	2014							
			01**	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
48	49	46	46	45	58	64	67	68	68	70

* Annual average

** Monthly average

Table 1 testifies on the switch of Russian society to the state of excitement. President Putin's electoral rating had a rapid start in March. Over the next five months despite the forecast of most experts there was no return to the base level. Moreover, since April till August his rating had jumped by 12 points.

The reason for this anomaly lies on the surface. Russian mass media continue to aggravate the extraordinary aggressive patriotic psychosis. TV reports from Crimea gave place to TV reports from East Ukraine. They activated the stereotypes and myths of great-power consciousness which seemed fallen asleep since long ago. A new phenomenon appeared

of 2008.

However, values of more "materially-grounded" social indices started to decrease in August relatively to July. The champion of decrease was the financial standing index ("How would you evaluate financial standing of your family today?"), which dropped by 5 points (from 76 to 71).

Food price hikes, provoked by reciprocal sanctions of the Russian government, couldn't but influence public opinion. That is why evaluations of private lives and symbolical plan "Russia as a world power!" started to diverge.

WHO SHOULD PAY FOR "CRIMEA IS OURS!"

On the 5th of September in Minsk Ukrainian powers and separatists through the intermediary of Russia and OSCE agreed the terms of the truce and a range of questions on the region's status (the Minsk Protocol)

The overwhelming majority of Russians (86% according to WCIOM) knows about these negotiations, among them 35% know the details and 51% have heard about it but don't know the details. Traditionally the level of awareness is significantly higher among senior people (43% of people over 60 years old) than among youth (21% of people between 19 and 24 years old).

Negotiations in Minsk encouraged optimism in Russians. As a result, the share of respondents, that had noted a normalization of the situation, grew from 2% up to 24% in comparison with August (Table 2). On the contrary, the share of those who consider that situation continues to aggravate decreased threefold (from 72% down to 24%).

Crimea must be a part of the Russian Federation jumped from 64% in March up to 73% in the end of August; accordingly the number of those who think that Crimea should have stayed a part of Ukraine fell from 14% down to 4%.

Russian society is more and more aware of the fact that provoking a civil war in Ukraine and playing on the side of separatists trigger the growth of hatred towards Russia from Ukraine. For the majority of Russians this fact is quite upsetting, as in their perception Ukraine was a friendly country, very close to Russians.

Moreover, each third or fourth respondent thinks that there is a war between Russia and Ukraine, no matter what powers say (57-59% of respondents don't agree with this opinion). Level of approval of a military intervention to Ukraine, which was quite high in March (74% of respondents approved this opinion) in August fell down to 41%, while disinclination or disapproval of this policy jumped up to 43%. That means that almost each second Russian wouldn't like Russia to enter a war with Ukraine.

Table 2

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you think, in what direction has the situation in Ukraine been going recently?"*

Variant of answer	March 1-2	March 8-9	March 15-16	April 26-27	June 21-22	August 9-10	September 13-14
Situation gradually goes back to normal	7	10	9	4	2	2	24
Situation gets neither better nor worse, it doesn't change	22	35	36	22	19	23	46
Situation becomes more and more strained, it get significantly worse	68	51	52	69	78	72	24
DA	4	4	3	6	1	3	6

* Percentage of those who follow Ukrainian events

Majority of Russians (61%) don't believe in observing the agreed ceasefire. Young people (58% of people between 18 and 24 years old) and senior generation (62%) equally agree with this; at the same time people living in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg share this point of view more rarely than rural population (51% vs. 63% accordingly). In turn, 28% of respondents suppose that terms of truce won't be violated.

Debating on the measures that should be taken to solve the conflict in Donbass, 18% of respondents advise Ukrainian powers to cease military actions against civilian population (comparatively to April this share grew by 8 points); 12% of respondents consider it necessary to satisfy the requirements of separatists. Some people suggest to pro-Russian fighters to solve their issues by diplomatic ways (12%), to cease military actions (4%); others are sure that they should continue to stand for their interests (5%), to struggle for independence (5%), to "hold the fort" (4%).

As for the "incorporation" of Crimea, Levada-center's data testifies: popularity of the opinion that

This is one point. Another point lies in a quite stable public opinion that the very Russian powers should be in response for their politics, including the politics towards Ukraine; and the burden of sanctions should lie on the shoulders of politicians, and not simple people who made no decisions. Only 5% of respondents are ready to put up with the costs of Crimea annexation and policy towards Ukraine in general (under the costs we mean limited growth of salaries and pensions, cutting down of social programs and so on) in full measure, another 12% are ready to do it "in large measure". An absolute majority says: we don't want and we won't pay for it.

Understanding of negative consequences (first of all the price hikes because of sanctions and particularly anti-sanctions) to this policy is gradually increasing. Virtual events, comparatively bloodless, like a parade in Sebastopol or fireworks in Moscow because "Crimea is ours!", are one thing. In this case people are ready to support and approve, as it doesn't affect them personally. But a completely different factor begins to work; and very soon this factor will demand not a symbolic but a practical attitude to this policy. In

August every third respondent noted price hikes over the previous month because of a ban on food import from European countries. Another 41% said that prices will grow later.

For the moment it isn't a serious problem for the majority of population: one third of Russians fear the prospect of tougher sanctions and the threat of an international isolation of Russia (and only 6% to 11% of respondents say that these measures of punishment and warning seriously hurt their consumption). 45% of respondents expect a significant worsening of economical situation in the country, a rise in inflation and unemployment because of the sanctions.

Naturally, Russia people blame the West for the negative economical consequences of Crimea "incorporation" (Table 3).

Ukraine in March 2014) always led to an increase in number of those who would like an integration with the Eastern neighbor. On the contrary, authors of the report found that in Ukraine rapid increases of populations' support to Ukrainian sovereignty coincided with Russian military actions.

The first escalation of independence support which wasn't economically motivated was registered in the second half of 1994 after the level of support had fallen from 76% down to 56% (Pict. 1) over the first two years of independence amid a significant decrease of life standards under the influence of hyperinflation. Although economic situation continued to deteriorate, the number of people wishing that Ukraine incorporated Russia decreased after the presidential elections of 1994, while the number of

Table 3

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you think, what does explain reaction of the West to the events in Crimea and the East of Ukraine in the first place?"*

Variant of answer	%
Hostile attitude to Russia, an attempt to use the moment to put pressure upon Russia	58
Condemnation of annexation of foreign territories by Russia, violation of international law	13
Lack of understanding of the real situation in Ukraine	18
DA	10

* August 22-25

A new peak of anti-West moods in Russia was registered amid the Ukrainian events. According to a survey of Levada-center, conducted in July, most of all Russians dislike the USA: "generally bad"/"very bad" – 74%. In January 2014 only 44% of respondents expressed a negative attitude to the USA. Over the last 20 years this is the fourth peak of anti-American moods: the first one happened in 1999, when NATO was bombing Serbia, the second one coincided with the beginning of war with Iraq in 2003, and the third one occurred during the war with Georgia in 2008.

UKRAINE IS NOT BELARUS

In the third quarter of 2014 Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published a report called "Dynamics of Ukraine's sovereignty support from the population over the first decades of state independence (1991-2014)".

It is natural that most oscillations of the number of supporters of independent Ukraine through time testify to the fact that for a lot of people changes in adherence to state independence are connected to changes of economic life conditions. Such connection is well-defined for Belarus as well. However, report authors note that "there are quite a few changes of the number of supporters of state sovereignty through time, increases and decreases, which cannot be interpreted as due to changes of some economic conditions".

In Belarus, as it may be seen in IISEPS surveys, Russian military activities (Georgia in August 2008,

supporters of Ukraine's independence accordingly increased (from 56% up to 62%). By the end of 1996 under the influence of Chechen war the share of independence supporters grew up to 71%.

Under the conditions of financial crisis of 1997-1998 there was a decrease of independency support down to 60%. This decrease was accompanied by an increase of adherents of integration with Russia. However, in 1999-2000, during the second Chechen war there was another significant increase (up to 72%) of support of national sovereignty of Ukraine.

There is a range of short-term changes, which cannot be interpreted as conditioned by economic factors. These changes testify to consequence of noneconomic factors on the level of Ukrainian sovereignty support. Thus, in 2003, when there was a threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine because of Russia's actions in the region of Tuzla Island, the share of Ukrainian independence supporters grew from 71% up to 77%.

Another rapid growth was registered in August 2008. At that time, during Russia's military intervention to Georgia, support of state independence of Ukraine grew even more significantly: from 72% up to 83% over one month.

How did intervention to Georgia influenced Belarusians' attitude to sovereignty is unknown due to the absence of corresponding data. But the ratio of geopolitical preferences of Belarusians in September 2008 diverged in favor of Russia (Table 4).

Recent reaction of public opinion to the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 proves that aforementioned reactions to Russia's actions in Tuzla and

Georgia are not accidental. Over less than two months (since mid-February until the first decade of April) the number of adherents of state independence rapidly jumped from 83% up to record-high 90%.

becomes more and more popular among Ukrainian citizens".

The growth of support of national independence under the influence of Russian factor couldn't but in-

Picture 1. Dynamics of Ukrainian independency support



Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	03'08	09'08	12'08
Integration with the RF	50.3	54.0	46.0
Joining the EU	32.4	26.2	30.1

Table 5

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which integration direction should Ukraine choose?", %

Variant of answer	10'11	12'12	05'13	04'14
Joining the EU	43.7	42.4	41.7	52.4
Joining the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan	30.5	32.1	31.0	18.0
Neither of two	9.3	10.5	13.5	20.8
DA	16.4	15.0	13.7	8.9

In 2003 President of Ukraine L. Kuchma published a book named "Ukraine is not Russia". Sociological data mentioned above illustrate the topicality of writing a book called "Ukraine is not Belarus". Little is left to do: finding an author corresponding to the problem.

We'd like to back our conclusion by a citation from the report: "It turns out that there is a part of our citizens who don't demonstrate adherence to state independence under the conditions when nothing really disposes them to meditations on possible threats in the case of independence loss by way of integration with Russia. However, when the threats become more sensible, they realize that independence of their own country is important to them, that it is a genuine value. And these lessons don't end without leaving a trace: year after year support of national sovereignty

fluence geopolitical preferences of Ukrainians. According to surveys, conducted by Razumkov Center, over the years 2011-2013 the ratio of adherents of joining the EU and the Customs Union was stable. Accordingly, numerical preponderance of the former over the latter was stable as well (Table 5).

However, a survey conducted in April 2014, i.e. a month after the annexation of Crimea, registered a significant geopolitical shift in favor of the EU.

Naturally, attitude of Russians to Ukrainians couldn't but change under the later events. According to Levada-Center, negative attitude to Ukraine and its citizens prevails today (Table 6). Although only a small part of Russian population openly states its' hostile attitude, the virus of hostility towards Ukraini-

Table 6

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you think, which sensations does the incorporation of Crimea into Russia provoke in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	03'14	04'14	05'14	06'14	07'14
It doesn't provoke any negative sensations towards Russia	17	19	16	15	9
Negative sensations which doesn't transform into hatred towards Russia and its leadership	25	29	22	15	15
Hatred towards Russian leadership, but not towards Russia in general	18	19	20	20	23
Hatred towards Russia in general	24	29	26	37	38
DA	17	4	16	12	15

Table 7

Dynamics of answering the question: "Did the respect for Russia increase, decrease or didn't it change in the world over the last 10 years?"*, %

Variant of answer	06'12	07'14
Increased	25	44
Decreased	32	22
Didn't changed	34	25
DA	9	9

* Levada-Center

ans infected quite a number of Russians. Over half a year major part of Russians changed their attitude from positive to negative (in January 66% of respondents had a positive attitude towards Ukraine, in August – only 35%; 25% and 55%, accordingly, expressed a negative attitude).

Thus, literally in several months, Russia lost its political influence on Ukraine which was quite significant before. This had completely buried the old hope, cherished by B. Yeltsin, that Russia will dominate the post-Soviet area.

RUSSIA IS LIKED IN VIETNAM, BUT DISLIKED IN POLAND

Massive brainwashing of public opinion not only provided support to actions of power, but also changed population's ideas on the impression that Russia makes in the world (Table 7). At the same time an upsurge of nationalistic euphoria strengthened Russians' self-respect. In June 2012 only 27% of respondents considered that people's self-respect in Russia increased over the previous 10 years; in July 2014 this share already amounted to 45%. The share of respondents with the opposite opinion accordingly dropped from 29% down to 18%.

It is natural that Russians' evaluations don't find support in the West. Thus, according to a monthly German survey of ARD-DeutschlandTrend, 80% of Germany's population consider that it is Russia that mostly should be blamed for the destabilization of the situation in Ukraine; 70% of respondents consider right the EU's reaction to Russia's actions. And even if sanctions have a negative effect on German economy, 49% of Germans will support them anyway.

At the same time 58% of Germans believe that

Russia still can become a partner to the West, while 36% of respondents think that relations with Russia are broken for a long time.

An international survey conducted by Pew Research Center, an authoritative research organization from the USA, registered a worsening of attitude towards Russia in the world. Experts particularly point out the fact that planetary neighbors dislike both external policy of Kremlin (in Ukraine, for instance) and Russian powers' attitude to their own citizens.

The most favorable to Russia respondents live in Vietnam (75%), China (66%), Greece (61%) and Bangladesh (60%). A relative majority of respondents expressed positive attitude to Russia in Kenya and Tanzania (49% in both countries), Thailand (48%) and the Philippines (46%).

Mostly negatively Russia is perceived in Poland (81%), Germany (79%), Jordan (75%), Italy and Spain (74%), Turkey and France (73%), the USA (72%) and even in Egypt, so cherished by Russians (71%). Negative attitude dominate over positive one among more than a half of respondents in Japan (69%), Israel (68%), Ukraine (60%), Brazil (59%), Lebanon (54%), Venezuela and the Republic of South Africa (51%).

The only undecided country is Pakistan: 60% of respondents there haven't decided their attitude to Russia yet. What's most interesting in this research is the fact that countries with a colossal touristic stream from Russia (Turkey and Egypt) expressed a negative attitude. That means that these negative appreciations cannot be attributed to a bad TV image, accompanying events in Ukraine.

But absolute numbers are not so important. Much more important is their dynamics. In Table 8 you may

Table 8**Dynamics of answering the question: "Does Russia provoke positive (+) or negative (–) sensations in you?", %**

Country	2013		2014		Negative evaluations change
	+	–	+	–	
The USA	37	43	19	72	+29
Poland	36	54	12	81	+27
Ukraine	38	39	25	63	+24
Spain	38	51	18	74	+23
Germany	32	60	19	79	+19

see a top five countries with the record high increase of negative attitude towards Russia over the year.

Ukrainian topic, as it has emerged, had its influence, but still it wasn't the main reason for the worsening of attitude to Russia, which has already been negative since long ago. For example, an overwhelming majority of respondents in Western countries explained to sociologists, that firstly they don't like external policy of Moscow, and secondly they don't like President V. Putin's attitude to his own nation.

Russian political analyst N. Petrov emphasizes that planetary neighbors dislike Russia's behavior: "The problem is in unpredictable actions of Kremlin. These actions violate the rules of the game, and it seems that majority of Russians support it". Hence,

according to him, there is quite an unfavorable tendency: "In Soviet times they liked Russian people but disliked Soviet power; during perestroika both people and power were liked". Today, according to his words, "there is a bad attitude to both external policy of Kremlin and to people supporting it".

Public Opinion Foundation (fom.ru), "Levada-Center" (levada.ru), WCIOM (wciom.ru), Kiev International Institute of Sociology (kiis.com.ua), Razumkov Center (razumkov.org.ua), ARD-DeutschlandTrend (infratest-dimap.de), Pew Research Center (pewglobal.org).

BOOKSHELF

Yuri Drakokhrust "Seven years of famine. Polemics". – (*Library of Freedom. XXI century*) – Radio Free Europe/Radio Svoboda, 2014, 406 pp.


A Book on the Big Context

Books, which journalists write on the basis of their old articles, always provoke some suspicions. Journalism in general is an evanescent matter: people leave magazines in subway, and insights are never admitted in the internet. Well, insights are, anyhow, not expected from a journalist. Seriously, who will care tomorrow, what people on Maidan thought in the days when everyone was still alive? And who needs to remember today Lukashenko's rating seven years ago? And, most importantly, who cares what thinkers thought about it then and there?

So it was a big risk, but Yuri Drakokhrust wrote a book of his blogs as if he wanted to put himself at that risk, as if he threw another bundle of wood in the bonfire of polemics: why a journalist even writes books? It is certainly evident: the ones, whose nightly writings fall into oblivion the next morning, want to remain under a book cover on a bookshelf, and no matter who, why and how often would touch that book cover. But is a journalist in his understandable vanity able to conceive and manage what he knows only how to observe? Moreover, is he able to do it only by gathering his already published articles and calling them blogs? Defending, so to speak, the totality of articles.

Reverse is the case of the book written by Drakokhrust. As well as reverse is the case of the author himself, because conceiving is primary for him, no matter if he works as a mathematician (in the past) or as a journalist (in the present). It seems that Drakokhrust was writing this book from the very beginning, just calling each chapter of it a blog, passing it off as a result of his journalistic activities. That is a game: here and now. Though it is not only here and certainly not only now.

Some time ago, in Soviet times, somebody perfectly defined the main issue with teaching history. This issue wasn't only due to the fact that this was the history of the USSR with all the genre consequences of it. No, the issue was in the fact that all its personages existed out of context, which was strictly limited by chronology and jurisdictional territory. But Ivan the Terrible, killing his son, is not the same as



Ivan the Terrible, the contemporary of Henry VIII and Suleiman the Magnificent – these are two different histories. Let me say, that the first case is just journalism, which people are used to see everywhere for a reason, even if by mistake. But the person, who cares about the context, writes a book. On Maidan. On Belarus.

Though in fact Yuri Drakokhrust wrote a book on the Big Context. It is easy to write about it, when everything is clear, when the colors are distinct because of the distance or because of passing time. It is valid for the Soviet Union or Stalin. And it is much more difficult to write about the context when you live in it, when you experience it every day in every though, in every look. It is difficult to write about a war, which is not yet understood by everyone, in a way like it had already

changed the world. Especially, when it had.

Drakokhrust wrote such a book, interpreting every day and fighting the temptation of easy answers. Maybe Drakokhrust had luck not only with the context, but also with his profession. In this profession writing books is suspicious. But in the case of Drakokhrust everything worked out: a journalist is more than the others apt to realize that past never ends and that it is stupid to wait for the future to be clear. And, what's more important, it is not interesting. Maidan is the culmination of a grandiose spectacle, taking place in limitless space over a whole epoch. It falls into an infinite number of subjects of any genre; this is a feast for analysts, adventurers, and idealists; this is a merciless diagnosis which is still to be deciphered and understood; or at least we need to see that this is a diagnosis.

Yuri Drakokhrust doesn't answer questions – TV-commentators and professional bloggers do this. There can be no answers, when even the questions are not formulated, when the only thing possible is to look for sore spots and to define the place for coordinate axes. For example, the author asks who is Putin today – a Hitler or a William II? A sly move. Homeys and chair-warmers will really think that everything will be painted by the numbers, and they will follow the illusion without fears of disappointment. A sophisticated reader will ask himself: could it be that the author

is so didactically simple? And thus he will be intrigued as well. But as a matter of fact, author simply builds a system of images, a coordinate axes, which is in reality more like a system of two opposed distorting mirrors, but still it is somewhat of a reference point.

There are no simple answers, and all comparisons are poor, even if Crimea really fits into the formulation “the Sudetes of today”, all the more the logic is adequate. But for Drakokhrust, who seems to feel that there is a system of traps, the Sudetes are not a statement, not a result of reasoning. On the contrary, this is a reference point, probably, a relative and questionable one, like any image, this is a premise which leads to a further reasoning and proofing, including probably the proofing of the premise.

Maidan is primary; and the history is not linear, at least for a book consisting of blog-chapters. The year 2014, with its Crimea and starting Donetsk events, suddenly whirls back to the year 2012 in Belarus, and then it whirls back further, to the year 2008. The march of time isn't dogmatic, and it is true as well. The author himself constructs the sequence of what is primary and what is secondary, because political history is somewhat like hypertext and internet: you may start reading from any place and build logical bridges anywhere until your logic isn't too cubic and banal. Lukashenko-2014, who is interesting for the author as the Belarusian continuation of the plot Maidan-Russia, and Lukashenko-2008, who seemingly makes steps towards Europe in order to destroy everything after the elections in 2010, – are not personality swings or an evolution. It is a stereo sound of the same theme, where variations are so whimsical, that they distract the listener from the main subject. For the author Lukashenko is quite a post modernistic character, much more multidimensional than most of his contemporary colleagues. But for Drakokhrust Lukashenko seems to be interesting in his tripersonality: as a person who over 20 years had

laughed at history and its interpreters, who had recently stopped trying to bury him; as an object (and not a subject) of this history, which, trying to control him, was obliged to agree that Belarusian space has a right for some warping; and as a part of the same coordinate axes, which he had surmounted and which will continue to exist even after he will no longer be there, because you cannot skip these 20 years.

The universe, which author was describing in his blogs before, could disintegrate in time and space. Maidan as a modern institution, or Lukashenko looking for variations of new European adventures, or sociological polaroids – blog after blog, like frame after frame turning into a series. But these blogs grew together in a book, where the author in partnership with the history varies the plot according to his plans. And interframe partitions disappeared, and the picture became laid-back and impressionistically multidimensional.

It turns out that when you write a book on the Context while living inside of it, it is even easier to lay back and achieve a timeless effect. This effect is not cheapened by the voices of epoch in the form of particular comments of particular people, as is common in blogs; here these comments are like additional strokes, like passers-by on the photo of a bridge. The author is really very lucky. His luck is in his profession, in the context and in the epoch. And in the *locus in quo* as well. A book of blogs is fortunately not a chronicle or an epos. It is an attempt to conceive what the author had seen, had already conceived once, and then had received the chance to re-conceive it later from a distance. And Yuri Drakokhrust took this chance.

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