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Dear readers!

In another issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" we offer to your attention materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute researches in the second quarter of 2014.

Our surveys show that in the second quarter of this year "economic well-being" of Belarusians continued to decrease. Thus, the ratio of those whose financial standing improved over the last three months to those, whose financial standing went downhill, notably decreased. Real incomes of citizens also continued to decrease after a small increase of the previous year: average income per a family member, which in December amounted to \$ 325, in June equaled to \$ 288. Only 36.1% of respondents agreed with President's statement that "power in Belarus prevented society from division into poor and rich people, protected and supported people who work hard", while 54.7% of respondents disagreed. The number of Belarusians considering that Belarusian economy is in crisis increased once again. Despite this, the level of optimism for the future paradoxically increases.

Belarusians' attitude to the state power also shows its ambivalent character. On the one hand, a lot of respondents express dissatisfaction with actions of the state power. For example, a third of respondents, answering why people in Belarus live worse than people in the West, said that "our people can work as hard as in Western countries; bad governmental administration is to blame". Almost each fourth of respondents considers corruption as the most important issue in Belarusian society. As for A. Lukashenko's statement that "Belarusian powers are constantly and severely fighting against corruption", 40% of respondents agreed with it and 48.4% of them disagreed. It's not surprising that less than 40% of respondents, answering the question on the state built under A. Lukashenko's rule, said "it is my state, it safeguards my interests"; more than 43% chose the variant "it is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough" and 12% answered that "it is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it". On the other hand, the level of trust of the head of state continues to grow, and his electoral rating still amounts to almost 40%.

The readiness for changes among Belarusians is quite high, as we have noted it already more than once, but this readiness consists mainly of expectations, and not of intentions. Thus the number of those for whom "maintaining of current situation is more important" steadily decreases: from 53.4% in February 2006 down to 38.3% in June 2014. But the number of those who consider themselves in opposition to the current power is still quite low. Half of respondents think that elections are the most realistic variant of changes in Belarus; almost 30% of respondents think that a national referendum is more realistic, and only 8% of respondents prefer street protests. Although, as it was noted earlier, the idea of a single candidate from opposition was supported by many voters, the level of trust to oppositional parties is still low, and the combined electoral rating of a dozen of oppositional leaders doesn't exceed 20%. The reasons for the fact that opposition is not regarded as a potential source of changes lay not only in the pressure on it or in the power's repressions against it, but also in the fact that its' actions are very far from the views of a "mass Belarusian".

In foreign policy orientations of Belarusians the tendency to a "cold snap" in relation to Europe continues. However, this "cold snap" is not accompanied by a "thaw" in relation to Russia. The number of those who consider "a union of independent states, connected by close political and economical relations" as the most preferable variant of integration of Belarus and Russia decreased notably. As it was noted before, the main reason for the "reverse" in foreign and home policy is the influence of the events in Ukraine. Thus, considering the further course of events in Ukraine, Euromaidan and president V. Yanukovich's overthrow were assessed positively by less than one fourth of respondents and negatively by almost two thirds of respondents. The annexation of Crimea by Russia was called "an imperialistic usurpation and occupation" by slightly more than a fourth of respondents, while more than 60% of them consider it as "a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice". Events which happened in the East of Ukraine, more specifically in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, were evaluated as "a rebellion, organized by Russia" by less than a fourth part of respondents, while two thirds think that it was "a people's protest against the non-legitimate power". 36.4% of respondents consider that it is possible but unlikely that Russia will annex Belarus wholly or partially; 26.3% consider it likely and 4.4% say that it is inevitable. At the same time the results of the survey do not testify that Belarusians are ready to follow either their official leader or his opponents in the case of a treat to the territorial integrity of their country. The hypothesis that propaganda is almighty and Belarusians' evaluations of the crisis in Ukraine are due only to it is true but only partially: the survey showed that initial mindsets of people are not less important than informational influence. So Russian TV is influential, but not almighty.

As usual, those readers who are more interested in our figures than in our assessments can analyze the research results on their own. The results are presented according to the main socio-demographic characteristics.

In our "Open Forum" rubric we present the most interesting results of work of our colleagues from neighboring countries, publishing the most interesting results of their late surveys (with a special focus on dramatic event in Ukraine).

As usual, your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In June of 2014 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.519 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

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Pork price vs. Russian propaganda

March survey recorder a victory of economics over politics. Although the growth of people's income slowed down, expectancy index and policy correctness index increased considerably in comparison with December. As for the most "material" financial standing index, it hasn't changed during the first quarter of the current year.

Mobilization campaign in Russia, started in March, hasn't become less intensive when we started June survey. It hasn't become less effective as well. Social indices and ratings of President V. Putin achieved historical maximums after the annexation of Crimea and they maintain in this position.

uniting slogans. A pause is needed in order to mobilize it once more on the same base.

The process of spontaneous demobilization puts society back into the everyday life, where nothing had changed for the better: salaries didn't grow, prices didn't fall, and corruption didn't disappear. As a result the same problems may cause more negative emotions.

Certainly, mobilization of Belarusians is just a pale shadow of mobilization of Russians. Nevertheless, mobilization effect may be noted in answers to almost all of politically-charged questions. The question "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?" is not one of those questions (Table 1).

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
It has improved	1.6	13.3	13.7	11.6	12.6	10.1	9.3
It has not changed	23.2	56.4	63.1	63.9	58.1	63.3	57.6
It has become worse	73.4	28.7	21.6	21.6	28.4	25.2	32.1
FSI*	-71.8	-15.4	-7.9	-10.0	-15.8	-15.1	-22.8

* Financial standing index (the difference between positive and negative answers)

The question for how long Kremlin can maintain Russian society in the state of mobilization is left open. But Russian case is not unique. Historical experience shows that mobilization based on nationalism is wave-like. General solidarity against a common enemy lasts about 6-8 months in modern society. First three month are the active phase. The next phase of evolution of national excitement is the phenomenon that American sociologist R. Collins described as follows: "nerves of society lose their sensibility after the orgy of communal thrill". After several month of euphoria, when the upsurge of unity goes down, society turns out to be fed up with national-

In April-May pork prices in Belarus increased substantially. Judging by the angry rhetoric of the head of state, officials once more didn't notice an increase of prices for a product of mass demand. There is nothing surprising about it. It is not very likely that officials buy provision in shops and markets by themselves. But the head of state does, and he had announced it on the 27th of May during a working tour in Minsk region: "Don't tell me stories! Because you don't go to shops and markets and you don't see how pork became much more expensive today".

Let us note that the increase of pork price happened against the background of a quite low (by Belarusian measures) increase of real wages. In Janu-

ary-May it grew by 3.6% in comparison to the same period of the previous year (the same figure amounted to 21.5% that year). Thus the financial standing index couldn't maintain in the same level any more. It went down and lost 7.7 points relatively to March.

Economical problems didn't influence the expectation index. It almost hasn't changed (Table 2). However, you should note the simultaneous growth of positive and negative expectations, which is a sure sign of public opinion polarization. Thus the record low (over last 15 months) share of answers "it is not going to change".

We have already noted several times that year 2006 divides the history of Belarusian socio-economic model into two parts: an ascending stage and a descending stage. Let's look at Table 5 which is sorted by the last column. The three leaders today are price growth, impoverishment of people and decrease of industrial output. This is the result of four incomplete presidential terms of A. Lukashenko. Let's point out that the importance of the second and the third issues doubled in comparison with 2006. The only merits of A. Lukashenko are the overcoming of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster and the

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
It is going to improve	11.9	15.3	17.7	17.5	12.5	24.0	28.6
It is not going to change	20.3	44.7	49.1	46.7	46.1	45.0	35.0
It is going to become worse	55.5	27.3	23.7	28.1	35.9	26.1	28.7
EI*	-43.6	-12.0	-6.0	-10.6	-23.1	-2.1	-0.1

* Expectation index

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
In the right direction	17.0	34.5	39.6	39.1	31.9	40.2	42.3
In the wrong direction	68.5	51.4	45.5	46.7	54.1	46.2	42.3
DA/NA	14.5	14.1	14.9	14.2	14.0	13.6	15.4
PCI*	-51.5	-16.9	-5.9	-7.6	-22.2	-6.0	0

* Policy correctness index

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
Yes	87.6	64.8	59.8	57.4	68.6	54.6	57.7
No	8.0	24.6	29.5	32.4	22.2	34.5	30.0
DA/NA	4.4	10.6	10.7	10.2	9.2	10.9	12.3

The policy correctness index left the negative zone for the first time since March 2011 (Table 3). Against the background of minimal (during two years) financial standing index this opposing motion of social indices looks quite strange. This is the direct result of public opinion formation under the influence of economical and political stimuli, working in opposing directions.

The influence of opposed economical and political stimuli is evident in the answers to the question of Table 4 as well. Decreasing number of respondents recognizing economical crisis once again didn't manage to become a stable tendency. The share of economical pessimists in Belarusian society increased once more, though this increase is not very important (+3.1 points).

reduction of unemployment and crime.

As for the achievements, they are not so unambiguous as well. The topicality of the Chernobyl disaster consequences decreases naturally with years. As for the unemployment problem, Belarusians solve it at the expense of Russia where average salary equaled to \$ 915 in 2013.

Attention should be paid to the last row of Table 5. In comparison with December 2008 the number of respondents who think that the problem of Belarus losing its independence had almost doubled (5.2% vs. 9.5%; 7.8% among respondents trusting A. Lukashenko and 12.7% amount those who don't trust him). Considering the events in Ukraine this growth shouldn't be considered as something surprising. Nevertheless the problem of independence is still at the periphery of social consciousness.

In the confrontation of political and economical factors over the right to form public opinion the resource of the political factor is close to its exhaustion. At the same time there are hardly any prospects to

adapt to external changes decreases notably, and dependency on the support from the paternalistic state on the contrary increases. Thus the high level of interest to the speech of the head of state.

Table 5

Dynamics of answering the question: "What are the most important issues that Belarus and Belarusian citizens face today?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	06'99	06'06	12'08	06'14
Prices growth	82.7	60.1	82.5	80.0
Impoverishment of people	73.2	19.5	37.8	41.9
Decrease of industrial output	31.8	18.7	31.7	35.1
Unemployment	35.7	37.0	35.7	25.2
Corruption, bribery	29.7	27.6	26.0	23.8
Fall in population	–	21.9	14.9	16.9
Infringement of human rights	23.3	22.1	20.1	16.0
Lack of law and order	24.6	22.1	20.6	15.8
Threat from the West	9.3	18.2	13.0	15.4
Decay of national culture	13.1	10.8	8.1	13.2
Overcoming of the Chernobyl disaster consequences	29.5	25.5	10.6	11.8
Crime	44.6	23.2	20.8	11.6
International isolation of Belarus	9.1	14.4	9.8	11.0
Social split	5.0	7.3	4.0	10.6
Threat of the loss of independence of Belarus	–	8.3	5.2	9.5

Table 6

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you know that President A. Lukashenko delivered an annual message to Belarusian people and National Assembly on the 8th of May?", %

Variant of answer	06'06	06'08	06'10	06'12	06'13	06'14
Yes	69	50	55	63	59	61
No	31	46	41	34	39	38

break negative trends in economy. Inflation is increasing. During January-May period prices grew by 8.9%, so even the leaders of the National Bank don't expect it to maintain under the planned limit of 11%. If our estimations are right, the policy correctness index will be back to the negative zone very soon.

The consolidating potential of uniqueness

In May A. Lukashenko delivered his annual message to Belarusian people and National Assembly. 61% of respondents answered that they know about the head of state's speech (Table 6). This is a rather high level of awareness.

The least interest in the message was shown by the age group of 18-29 years old – 51.3%. Political apathy of the generation formed under conditions of the independent Belarusian state doesn't surprise experts since long ago. Modern authoritarian regimes, unlike their totalitarian predecessors, are based not on the support of citizens, but on their passivity. Thus the main aim of educational system in Belarus (from kindergartens to universities) is mass production of apolitical citizens. It should be recognized that they accomplish their task quite well.

The peak of attention to the message coincides with age groups of 40-49 years old (67.8%) and 50-59 years old (66.7%). In this age ability of people to

Let us note that, despite the expectations, dependency of answers to the question of Table 1 on education of respondents is not as strong as its dependency on age: 57.9% of respondents with primary education and 65.1% of respondents with higher education showed their interest.

Ratio of agreeing/disagreeing respondents exceeded the value of 1 for 7 of key statements made by A. Lukashenko during his speech (Table 7). In 2013 ratio exceeding one was recorded only for 5 statements of 11.

It should be noted that the top position of Table 7 is occupied by a statement directed at the sense of nationality in Belarusians ("We are neither pro-Russians, nor pro-Ukrainians, nor pro-Polish, we are not Russians, we are Belarusians!"). Its factor of support equals to 3.7. The last row is occupied by the most "material" statement of the head of state (support factor 0.7): "Power in Belarus prevented society from division into poor and rich people, protected and supported people who work hard".

From our point of views this hierarchy of priorities is another evidence of Belarusians' excitement by Russian propaganda. According to President V. Putin Russians today feel "elation", and this "elation" was partially transmitted to Belarusians. Mobilization under nationalist slogans turned out to be contagious. Russians are consolidating around the idea of the

"Russian World", Belarusians – around the idea of their uniqueness.

The share of supporters of the statement "Independence of Belarusians state annoys a lot of people.

the optimism of the head of state. The last but one row of table 2 is a good evidence of it.

In 1994 the image of a corruption fighter contributed to the triumphal victory of A. Lukashenko on the

Table 7

Distribution of answers to the question: "What's your attitude to the following statements made by A. Lukashenko during his speech?", %

Variant of answer	Agree	Disagree	Agree/ Disagree
"We are neither pro-Russians, nor pro-Ukrainians, nor pro-Polish, we are not Russians, we are Belarusians!"	71.3	19.4	3.7
There should be tolerance to various views, discussions and criticism in society	72.1	20.8	3.5
State support should be equal for state and private enterprises	65.7	22.1	3.0
Independence of Belarusian state annoys a lot of people. And if there is a crack in the unity of the Belarusian society, there will be those who will be interested to use it	67.8	23.8	2.9
Sincere, honest public dialog is the best safeguard from disunity and distemper	62.8	25.8	2.0
The BSSR was the most Soviet republic in the Soviet Union	46.1	29.2	1.6
There is no other country in the world (including Russia) that cares as much of the great Russian language and the great Russian culture	49.6	35.0	1.42
Authority in Belarus is attentive to any criticism caused by sincere concerns of the country and not by external orders	41.1	46.2	0.9
Belarusian powers are constantly and severely fighting against corruption	39.1	48.4	0.8
Power in Belarus prevented society from division into poor and rich people, protected and supported people who work hard	36.1	54.7	0.7

* Table is sorted according to the last column

Table 8

Dynamics of electoral rating of President A. Lukashenko and positive answers to the question "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
Electoral rating	20.5	33.4	37.3	42.6	34.8	39.8	39.8
In the right direction	17.0	34.5	39.6	39.1	31.9	40.2	42.3

And if there is a crack in the unity of the Belarusian society, there will be those who will be interested to use it" is almost three times as high as the share of opponents of this opinion. Even 45.7% of respondents not trusting A. Lukashenko agree with that (87.4% among the respondents trusting him).

What does that mean? It means that the idea of an external enemy is highly popular in Belarusian society, and in case of need Belarusian power will be able to use it on its own account.

For the first time in presidential message there was a special part dedicated to corruption. Its appearance is a direct result of events in Ukraine, as, according to A. Lukashenko, "there are two reasons for Ukrainian crisis: weakness of economy (it has collapsed, in fact) and total corruption. They are absolutely interconnected". Luckily, in Belarus "we constantly and severely fight against corruption".

However, almost a half of Belarusians (48.4%; 29.3% among those who trust A. Lukashenko and 73% among those who don't trust him) don't share

first presidential elections. But you cannot go far in a carriage of past. The image of an implacable corruption fighter is organic for a presidential contender, but when a politician, counting on the fifth consecutive electoral victory, tries to use it, it doesn't look convincing.

Nevertheless, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict opened for A. Lukashenko a window of new electoral possibilities, but only for a period of time. How long will this period last? Perhaps, there is no well-grounded answer to this question today.

Electoral stability and trust increase

Financial standing index's decrease by 7.7 points (from -15.1 in March to -22.8 in June) didn't influence electoral rating of A. Lukashenko. It coincided with the March value accurately to one decimal place (Table 8). This precision is nothing else but a chance. However the very fact of stability of electoral rating of the head of state against the background of a signifi-

cant worsening of economical well-being of Belarusian is a rare phenomenon.

Ability of social being to determine consciousness should not be overestimated. During lean Stalinist five-year plans no one measured ratings of "the father of nations". Nevertheless there are no doubts

mass media's trust rating (34.5% vs. 38.5%) and state sociological services' one (30.1% vs. 38.5%).

Positive dynamics of state sociological services that don't even publish results of their surveys shouldn't surprise you. Respondents react to the

Table 9

Dynamics of trust rating of president A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
I trust him	24.5	43.4	48.9	46.7	37.7	45.9	49.6
I don't trust him	62.0	43.2	40.6	36.7	47.5	44.1	39.0
DA/NA	13.5	13.4	10.5	16.7	14.8	10.0	11.4

Table 10

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which statement about corruption in Belarus do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	06'13	06'14
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	30.2	29.9
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	27.8	26.9
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	19.3	20.9
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	18.2	19.5
DA	4.5	2.8

that the level of support of golodomor-maker was high.

Table 8 illustrates close connection between electoral rating of A. Lukashenko and positive answers to the question "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?"

The fact that values are almost equal in columns means that public opinion is unable to differentiate the personality of the head of state and the direction of country's development. During the stable economic growth this symbiosis was favorable for the only Belarusian politician, but the crisis of 2011 showed that Belarusians mainly blamed A. Lukashenko for the worsening of their financial standing.

Current situation should be regarded as a case apart. It was provoked by certain international events and thus it will disappear right after the end or the ritualization of those events.

Despite the stability of electoral rating, in June A. Lukashenko's trust rating increased by 3.7 points in comparison with March. This was another disappointment for the supporters of the theory of "new majority".

Trust rating is traditionally higher than its "colleague" (Table 9). In June the difference between them amounted to 9.8 points. There is nothing special about it. This is the third similar case over the last year and a half.

Some other trust ratings grew after the growth of president's trust rating, including government's trust rating (33.1% in March vs. 36.9% in June), state

word "state", because today this word is able to generate additional positive emotions.

In articles about A. Lukashenko's message to Belarusian people and National Assembly we've already mentioned high level of respondents' skepticism about power's ability to fight corruption. Answers to the question of Table 10 confirm this skepticism.

The first half of 2013 was marked by active fights against corruption. Nobody is surprised anymore by the news about arrests of high-ranked officials, these news have become a habitual part of news programs. This topic was specially covered in A. Lukashenko's message. But these anti-corruption actions of power and A. Lukashenko in person didn't influence the answers of respondents. Today, just like a year ago, the share of optimists, i.e. those who believe A. Lukashenko's ability to succeed in the fight against corruption, doesn't even reach 30%.

It is not difficult to represent a socio-demographic portrait of optimists: 32.6% of women and only 20% of men; 47.3% of elder people aged 60 years old and only 18.8% of youth aged 18-29 years old; 67% of respondents with primary education and 22.6% of respondents with higher education.

It's easy to guess that A. Lukashenko's supporters prevail among the optimists: 42.6% of his supporters and only 8.4% of his opponents share optimistic views.

Russian propaganda substantially increased Belarusians' ability to respond to ideological slogans and appeals. But when we leave the ideological sphere and enter the sphere of everyday life,

effectiveness of propaganda quickly diminishes. Dynamics (or rather lack of dynamics) of answers, recorded in Table 10, confirms this conclusion.

Honest, but weak and not well-informed

Unexampled in its aggressiveness informational campaign in Russian mass media couldn't but influence public opinion in Belarus (in June 64.5% of respondents answered that they get information on events in Ukraine from Russian TV). In the beginning it meant that pro-Russian moods were strengthening and thus the number of supporters of integration with Russia was growing. Later Russian nationalism began to arouse Belarusian nationalism. In June 71.3% of respondents agreed to A. Lukashenko's statement "We are neither pro-Russians, nor pro-Ukrainians, nor pro-Polish, we are not Russians, we are Belarusians!" which he made during his Message-2014, while only 19.4% of respondents disagreed with that. The number of supporters of integration with Russia went down in comparison with March.

the ratio is 8.5:1. This is probably the best illustration of unity of Belarusian nation.

The growth of positive attitude to the state didn't really influence the attitude to people in power (all the variations in Table 12 do not exceed statistical error). In general the attitude is still negative. High rating of the head of state shouldn't mislead you. It doesn't change the critical evaluations of his entourage. "Paternalistic illusions, – states L. Gudkov, the director of "Levada-center", – don't change the structure of mass consciousness, but they may lead to a high exasperation caused by the power. If the power doesn't fulfill its social commitments of fulfill it worse and worse, a primitive explanation of this appears in mass consciousness: it means that the power is egoistic, thievish and so on".

Even among the supporters of A. Lukashenko only 23.5% of respondents consider people in power as a good team of politicians that lead the country in the right direction. Among the opponents of A. Lukashenko this share is extremely low – only 0.3%. The formulation "the tsar is good, the boyars

Table 11

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which of the following statements on Belarusian state, built under the rule of A. Lukashenko, do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	06'13	06'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Distrust
It is my state, it safeguards my interests	33.2	39.1	66.3	7.8
It is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough	45.2	43.2	27.2	58.2
It is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it	15.5	12.0	2.0	26.8
DA/NA	6.1	5.7	4.4	7.3

Table 12

Dynamics of answering the question: "How would you evaluate people that are currently in power?", %

Variant of answer	03'09	06'13	06'14
These people care only about their own financial well-being and career	43.5	44.4	41.8
These people are honest, but weak, and they don't know how to use their power and provide order and consistent political course	12.7	15.3	18.9
These people are honest, but not well-informed, and they don't know how to lead the country out of economic crisis	11.9	13.8	16.9
This is a good team of politicians that lead the country in the right direction	17.3	13.4	11.8
DA/NA	14.6	13.1	10.6

This aroused national sense prevented electoral rating of "the national leader" from a fall. And this despite the decrease of the financial standing index by 7.7 points (from –15.1 in March down to –22.8 in June)!

Another consequence of national sense agitation is reflected in Table 11. The share of respondents that consider Belarusian state theirs increased by 5.9 points in comparison with last year's June survey.

It is natural that the question on the attitude to the state turned out to be the most politically charged one. 66.3% of A. Lukashenko's supporters and only 7.8% of his opponents consider the state theirs, thus

are bad" wasn't created today, but it's still topical in modern Belarus. And the point is not the personal charisma of "batka". It's not the person or the throne that has the sacred status, but the person on the throne.

While analyzing the dynamics of answering the question of Table 13 one should remember that the results of the second column were obtained at peak of the economic crisis of 2011. That is why one should compare the first and the third columns to see the mobilization effect.

If desired mobilization effect can be seen in the decrease of number of respondents who had difficulties with the answer. In the moments of mobilization

worldview becomes simpler and half-tones disappear.

The growth of popularity of the answer "The power and the people have different interest, but at the most difficult moments of perturbations and external threat

Voting, following, discussing

What is the direction of development of political life in Belarus? Democracy. This is the most popular answer today (Table 14). More than a half of A. Luka-

Table 13

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you recollect the whole history of Belarus, what can you say on the relations between the power and the people in our country?", %

Variant of answer	03'09	06'11	06'14
Most often the power and the people have the same aims and urges	23.3	11.5	20.8
The power and the people have different interest, but at the most difficult moments of perturbations and external threat their aims and urges become the same	33.1	29.7	38.6
Even at the most difficult moments the power lives a particular life different from the life of the people	26.5	37.6	22.8
The power and the people are always opposed	8.7	13.4	13.5
DA/NA	8.4	7.8	4.3

Table 14

Dynamics of answering the question: "What is the direction of development of political life in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	09'10	12'11	06'14
Development of democracy	24.7	16.5	30.0
Reinstallation of past soviet order	19.9	16.5	23.6
Formation of authoritarianism, dictatorship	29.4	31.7	23.1
Intensification of chaos, anarchy, coup d'état threat	7.3	19.5	10.6
DA/NA	18.7	15.8	12.7

Table 15

Dynamics of answering the question: "What's more important for you today: maintaining of current situation or its changing?", %

Variant of answer	02'06	12'10	06'14
Maintaining of current situation is more important	53.4	49.7	38.3
Changing of current situation is more important	37.8	41.2	52.1
DA/NA	8.8	9.1	9.6

their aims and urges become the same" by 5.5 points should be noted as well. The growth of international tension provoked by aggressive politics of Russia is probably regarded by a part of respondents as the approaching of "difficult moments of perturbations".

In the conclusion of this analysis of questions on Belarusians' relation to the state and to the power we want to cite A. Lukashenko's Message-2014: "We, Belarusians, do not want to and should not allow a split of our society. Our independence and young nationhood surely annoy a lot of people. And if there is a crack in the unity of the Belarusian society, there will be those who will be interested to use it".

The road to hell is paved with good intentions. The split of Belarusian society is one of its main characteristics. But not the only one. The state and its head openly neglect the interests of the economically active "minority", while forming the internal and the external policy. Thus there is nothing surprising in the fact that more and more Russian dotations are needed in order to maintain Belarusian economic model.

shenko's supporters think so (51.3%). But what does "democracy" mean in this case? Let us turn to the original source: "We don't need a democracy with up-roars. We need a kind of democracy when people work, get a salary in order to buy some bread, milk, sour cream, cheese, sometimes a piece of meat to feed a child and so on. Well, about meat, let's don't eat too much of it during the summer" (From a speech of A. Lukashenko to the workers of Minsk Automobile Plant, May 28, 1998).

This quoted definition may be reduced a short slogan: "True democracy – is a state-guaranteed standards of life". But in 2011 ability of government to cope with the role of guarantor was doubted, and that has an immediate impact on the evaluations of political life of Belarus (Table 14). There was a decisive shift from democracy to chaos and anarchy (from 7.3% up to 19.5%) and a much smaller shift to authoritarianism and dictatorship (from 29.4% up to 31.7%).

The latter change didn't exceed the statistical error. This stability needs some explanation. Terms of

"authoritarianism" and "dictatorship" are ideologically charged. The survey of 2010 was conducted under the conditions of presidential race, and it is natural that society was politicized at the time. Thus in 2010

tests is 6 times lower (Table 16). This ratio is the reflection of the Kiev's Maidan lesson, which Belarusian society learned with the help of Russian propaganda.

Main supporters of street protests are naturally in the camp of the head of state opponents. Among

Table 16

Distribution of answers to the question: "Which variant of changes do you consider most realistic and desirable in Belarus?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Elections	50.1	67.9	29.2
Republican referendum	29.4	16.7	43.5
Street protests	8.0	2.7	16.0
DA/NA	12.5	12.6	10.8

Table 17

Dynamics of answering the question: "Are most people trustworthy or is it important to be careful in relations with people?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	06'11	03'13	06'14
Most people are trustworthy	24.9	23.7	23.1	26.8
It is important to be very careful in relations with people	69.9	72.0	70.0	66.5
DA/NA	5.2	4.3	6.9	6.7

Table 18

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you are interested in politics, how do you show your interest?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	03'09	06'14
I vote on elections	48.9	57.4
I follow information on political events	31.0	30.8
I discuss political events with my friends	28.0	33.3
I take part in political actions, demonstrations, meetings and strikes	2.4	3.2
I take part in organizing and carrying out election campaigns	2.1	3.5
I sign letters and petitions	1.5	2.6
I attend events of a political party (movement)	1.1	1.5
I'm a member of a political party (movement)	1.0	1.6
I'm not interested in politics at all	26.5	20.2

the main alternative for democracy was not politically neutral chaos, but authoritarianism and dictatorship.

The influence of presidential race can be clearly observed in Table 15 as well. In 2006 survey was conducted a month prior to the main day of elections. In 2010 survey was conducted right after the end of elections. Presidential elections in Belarus are traditionally accompanied by mass "bread distributions". That is why there is nothing surprising that in the first and in the second columns the wish to maintain current situation overwhelms over the wish to change it.

We still have one year before the next presidential elections. Under the conditions of weak economical growth during the current year power will need to abandon the two-digit growth of real incomes, which became habitual for the citizens. However this social innovation doesn't suit a majority of Belarusians. Thus the asymmetrical answers in comparison with "fat" 2006.

For a half of respondents elections are the most desirable variant of changes. Popularity of street pro-

street protests supporters 41.3% of respondents are in the age of 18-29 years old, 19.2% are people with higher education.

Popularity of elections is 2.3 times higher among the supporters of the head of state than among his opponents. This is quite natural, as majority of Belarusians, who don't trust A. Lukashenko, do not consider elections honest and just. In this connection belief of the head of state's opponents in a republican referendum looks quite strange.

Technologies of elections and referendums in Belarus have no principal differences. But the previous referendum was held 10 years ago, plus opposition constantly advances initiatives to carry out republican referendums. Probably this is the reason for the big difference between the evaluations of referendum as a source of changes made by supporters and opponents of the head of state.

The constantly high numbers of supporters of changes registered during sociological surveys shouldn't be misleading. The need of changes is

caused by the dissatisfaction of Belarusians with their financial standing, but this dissatisfaction is diffusive. It doesn't generate solidarity between dissatisfied citizens and thus it doesn't turn into joint protests.

down (Table 18). The interest in politics is still the interest of piqué waistcoats: we are voting, we are following, we are discussing. But anything connected to

Table 19

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you consider yourself in opposition to the present power?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	09'11	03'13	12'13	06'14
Yes	18.9	28.3	16.9	18.9	17.8
No	72.4	56.0	72.0	73.5	70.6
DA/NA	8.7	15.7	11.1	7.6	11.6

Table 20

Distribution of answers to the question: "Belarusian team took part in the World Hockey Championship, held recently in Minsk. Are you proud of your country and team?"

Variant of answer	%
I am very proud	32.1
I am mostly proud	38.9
I am not proud at all	26.2
DA/NA	2.8

Table 21

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which state symbols (flag and national emblem) better correspond to historical and cultural heritage of the Belarusian nation according to you: those which were in use since 1991 till 1995 (with the Pahonya coat of arms) or the present ones (reminding of the BSSR symbols)?" , %

Variant of answer	12'09	06'13	06'14
The pre-1995 symbols (with the Pahonya coat of arms)	27.7	33.9	31.7
Symbols such as now (resembling BSSR symbols)	54.7	51.5	54.9
DA/NA	17.6	14.6	13.4

Level of mutual trust in Belarus is one of the lowest in Europe (Table 17). The leaders of this rating are Scandinavian countries: Denmark – 66.5%, Sweden – 66.3% and so on.

Radius of trust is an important characteristic of mutual trust. In particular, short radius of trust means that people trust only other people they know, i.e. the representatives of a close circle. In Belarus the difference of trust index between two utmost age groups is almost two-fold: 18-29 years old – 20.5%, 60 years old and older – 43.2%. Even a bigger difference is observed between the groups with primary and higher education: primary education – 61.7%, higher education – 22%.

Thus active life involvement doesn't promote trust to people around. They are mainly retired people who trust one another, because their contacts with strangers are minimal.

Trust level increase by 3.7 points in comparison with March 2013 exceeds the statistical error. This is another evidence of mobilization effect provoked by Russian propaganda. It formed a community feeling of... TV-watchers. Thus it is not surprising that all contribution to the growth of trust was made by people from the older age group: March 2013 – 33.6%, June 2014 – 43.2%.

By the reason mentioned above the share of respondents, which are not interested in politics, went

active personal participation in politics is still within the frames of the statistical error.

A notable increase of electoral activity is explained by elections of deputies to the local Councils, which were held in March, i.e. three month prior the survey. It should be noted that the share of respondents that noted their participation in elections coincided with the turnout registered in March.

In comparison with March 2009 the age structure of respondents, that follow political information, changed. In the younger group of 18-29 years old there was a decrease of the share from 30.6% down to 26.5%. At the same time there is an increase in the group of people of 60 years old and older: from 20.5% up to 29.5%. The share of elder people discussing political events with their friends increased accordingly: from 18.5% up to 26.4% (+7.9 points!)

The surge of interest in politics of the respondents didn't influence the level of oppositional moods in Belarusian society (Table 19). Oppositional activists should greet this stability, as the joint efforts of state mass media of Belarus and Russia, aimed to discredit Maidan and its activists, were not successful. As for the trust rating of oppositional political parties, it even grew by 3.4 points in comparison with March (from 14.9% up to 18.3%). However, importance of this should not be overestimated.

Today the main input in dynamics of social opinion is made by the representatives of the elder age group. They are main consumers of media production, and, for obvious reasons, they are the most susceptible to external influence. At the same time they

these celebrations used official red-and-green flags to express their feelings. White-red-white flags were much rarer. However, it should be noted that in Belarus utilization of these flags is not welcome and may be even prosecuted. However, according to

Table 22

Connection between preferred national symbols and socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences*, %

Variant of answer	"Which state symbols (flag and national emblem) better correspond to historical and cultural heritage of the Belarusian nation according to you: those which were in use since 1991 till 1995 (with the Pahonya coat of arms) or the present ones (reminding of the BSSR symbols)?"		
	The pre-1995 symbols	Symbols such as now	DA/NA
<i>Age:</i>			
18-29	37.6	45.3	17.1
30-59	34.5	51.4	14.1
60+	19.0	72.7	8.2
<i>Internet usage:</i>			
Everyday	43.4	42.8	13.8
Several times per week	36.8	47.1	16.1
Several times per month	33.3	55.6	11.1
Several times per year	27.3	72.7	0
No	17.6	68.9	13.4
I don't know what is this	33.3	66.7	0
<i>Trust to President:</i>			
Trust	19.2	71.6	9.2
Don't trust	49.9	34.7	15.7
<i>Trust to opposition:</i>			
Trust	49.3	38.1	12.6
Don't trust	24.5	64.8	10.7
<i>Geopolitical choice:</i>			
Integration with the RF	21.1	70.8	8.1
Joining the EU	53.3	30.6	16.1
<i>How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?</i>			
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	58.4	30.8	10.8
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	22.0	65.6	12.4
<i>If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?</i>			
I'd resist up in arms	60.2	34.7	5.1
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	30.2	56.0	13.8
I'd greet these changes	18.3	71.3	10.4

* Table is read across

are the least economically secured social group. That is why the victory of politics over economy, which can be observed today, is only temporary. A notable decrease of financial standing index, registered in June, is a clear signal of it. Now, according to W. Churchill, this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

Symbols of Belarusians

The recent World Hockey Championship, held in Minsk, became, in addition, a demonstration of Belarusians' unity (Table 20).

During the days of the championship there were massive outdoor celebrations. A lot of participants of

IISEPS surveys, adherents of these symbols are a minority in Belarus (Table 21).

Table 22 gives an idea of symbols preferences of different groups of Belarusian society.

Numerical superiority of supporters of current national symbols is observed in all age groups, though their share decreases with age decrease. Similar connection is observed with the frequency of internet usage. Among the everyday users of internet there is parity of evaluations, but with the frequency of usage decrease the share of supporters of white-red-white flag and Pahonya coat of arms decreases as well.

Influence of political preferences is much more evident. However, there is a certain pattern. The share of those who make a choice in favor of the red-and-

Table 23

Distribution of answers to the question: "Wearing of ribbons of Saint George have become quite popular recently. What does this ribbon mean for you?"

Variant of answer	%
A remembrance of the victory in the Great patriotic War, the colors of decorations from that war	68.5
A symbol of glory of Russian arms, of victories of pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR	12.7
A symbol of imperial aggressive politics of Russia	7.2
A symbol of "Russian world"	4.3
DA/NA	7.3

Table 24

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	12'11	12'12	06'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
Integration with the RF	47.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	41.4	37.7	40.8	36.6	51.5	46.9
Joining the EU	33.3	30.1	42.1	38.0	39.1	43.4	41.0	44.6	32.9	33.1
DA/NA	19.2	23.9	15.6	23.9	19.5	18.9	18.2	18.8	15.6	20.0

Table 25

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the integration of Belarus and Russia was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	12'11	12'12	06'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
For	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.0	28.7	31.2	23.9	29.3	24.8
Against	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	42.9	47.5	46.5	51.4	47.7	54.8

green flag is high among the supporters of president, opponent of opposition and adherent of integration with Russia. At the same time among their opponents almost each second makes their choice in favor of the white-red-white flag.

And, finally, what's really impressive is the connection between the choice of flag and readiness to resist a hypothetical annexation of Belarus by Russia. It's hard to assess if this course of events is probable and if the intentions of respondents will correspond to their real actions. But under a certain condition we may conclude that this resistance would happen under the white-red-white flag.

In conclusion let us mention another symbol. On the eve of Victory Day celebrations Belarusian powers imposed a mild ban on usage of ribbons of Saint George. After the annexation of Crimea and disturbances in Donbass for a lot of people this symbol is associated with the Russian expansion and visits of "polite people". There were no real protests against the ban as there was no massive usage of these ribbons. However the survey shows that majority of Belarusians associates this symbol with the 69 year old Victory and not with present Russian policy in Ukraine (Table 23).

Certainly, the ribbon of Saint George is not a symbol which can be used to resist the ideology of "Russian world". But, as you can see from Table 22, the red-and-green flag can hardly be helpful in this case.

Geopolitical trends

June survey testifies that respondents' support of

Eastern vector slightly decreased over the last quarter. Nevertheless its level is still quite high (Table 24).

The share of "Belo-Russians" in the answer to the question of Table 24 decreased slightly but significantly (about 5 points). The share of Euro-Integration supporters hasn't changed.

The answers to the "one-sided" question on integration with Russia confirmed the trend discovered in Table 24 (Table 25).

Both the decrease of the share supporters of integration with Russia and the increase of the share of its opponents attract our attention in Table 25.

As for Euro-Integration, despite a slight increase of the share of "Euro-Belarusians" in the answers to the "two-sided" question, the answers to the "one-sided" question show a noticeable increase of the share of opponents of Euro-Integration (Table 26).

If you want to make an additional evaluation of dynamics, it makes sense to have a closer look at the answers to the question on preferred relations with Russia (Table 27). These variants of relations cover different degrees of integration, as the term "integration with the RF", that is used in the questions of Tables 24 and 25, may have various connotations for the respondents.

As you can see over a long time interval there was no special increase in pro-Russian moods in June 2014. On the one hand, general number of integration supporters (first two variants) makes up more than a half of respondents (53.3%). But it was the same in previous surveys. As a rule, this sum was even significantly higher, than in June 2014.

Table 26

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	05'07	09'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	12'12	06'13	12'13	03'14	06'14
For	33.5	26.7	34.9	36.2	48.6	38.9	37.7	35.9	30.2	27.4
Against	49.3	51.9	36.3	37.2	30.5	37.6	38.1	34.6	44.3	50.8

Table 27

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which variant of integration of Belarus and Russia would you prefer?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	06'04	12'05	08'06	12'07	12'08	03'09	06'12	06'14
Belarus and Russia should create a union of two independent states, connected by close political and economical relations	48.0	49.7	52.3	52.2	43.8	43.9	44.0	53.7	43.5
Relations between Russia and Belarus should be the same as relations between other countries of CIS	19.3	25.5	20.7	29.1	36.3	31.0	35.8	28.5	42.5
Belarus and Russia should become a single state with common president, government, army, flag, currency and so on	25.6	15.5	12.0	14.4	13.1	12.1	10.9	13.0	9.8

Table 28

Dynamics of answering the question on the relation to the Eurasian Economic Union, %

Variant of answer	06'12	09'13	06'14
Positive	48.7	37.6	49.8
Indifferent	31.4	37.4	15.1
Negative	10.7	13.8	29.6
DA/NA	9.2	11.2	5.5

On the other hand, the share of supporters of full integration into a single country is record low. Probably, fear caused by the events in Ukraine, has more than one dimension. Respondents may even approve Russian policy in Ukraine, but still projection of Crimea and Donbass on their own country doesn't enthruse them.

About a half of respondents answered in favor of a more or less close integration with Russia (Table 27). This fact explains why practical realization of this integration under the form of the Eurasian Economic Union has practically the same level of support. Agreement about creation of this union was signed by A. Lukashenko, N. Nazarbaev and V. Putin in May in Astana (Table 28).

The level of the EEU support is lower than the share of "Belo-Russians" in the answers to the "two-sided" question of Table 24. This is probably explained by the fact that the first question is on a geopolitical choice, while the latter one is on attitude to a practical project, which has its pros and cons. The cons, by the way, are vividly discussed by Belarusian power. A. Lukashenko harshly criticized Russia's position during the talks about the EEU even shortly before signing the agreement. The decrease of project's support in September 2013 may be explained by this criticism. Return of the support to the two-year-ago level in June 2014 may be explained by strengthening

of pro-Russian moods against the background of Ukrainian events.

Countries, even the most authoritarian ones, cannot be reduced to their leaders. Nevertheless, the game, which was proposed to respondents by sociologists, may be a subject of interest. They had to decide who would be a better president for a union of Russia and Belarus. These questions are not destined to find out how people would vote on a very hypothetical referendum like this, but to measure and compare authority of two leaders (Table 29).

As you can see V. Putin's rating increased not only in comparison with 2008 and 2010, when in the eyes of Belarusian public opinion he competed with the other Russian top figure, but also in comparison with, say, 2005-2006. Probably, this increase was influenced by decisive Russian actions in Ukraine, as these actions are approved by many Belarusians. However, this approval didn't cause an equivalent growth of Russian President's popularity. His rating in comparison with, say, 2006 increased by few percentage points and didn't even get close to his level of popularity in Belarus in the beginning of aughties. It should also be noted that A. Lukashenko significantly increased his rating in comparison with the previous years.

In fine, it should be said that Ukrainian events didn't substantially change geopolitical priorities of Belarusians. Despite the fact that majority of re-

spondents supported Russian policy in Ukraine, spring increase of pro-Russian moods changed to a certain decrease in the beginning of summer. At the same time the share of respondents who support merging of Belarus and Russia into a single state turned out to be record low. As it is known, V. Putin's rating in Russia is beyond the clouds right now. Even

Distribution of evaluations of the annexation of Crimea by Russia and of riots in the south-east of Ukraine has almost the same proportion (two thirds vs. one fourth) (Tables 31 and 32).

As you can see, evaluating these events majority of respondents answered in favor of Russian interpretation.

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a post of a President of Belarus and Russia was established, for whom would you vote on elections to this post?", %

Variant of answer	11'99	08'01	09'02	09'03	11'04	12'05	03'06	06'08	06'10	06'14
A. Lukashenko	31.6	19.5	15.0	21.1	29.8	38.8	44.4	27.7	28.6	33.6
V. Putin	13.2	41.4	53.9	45.2	24.3	19.8	22.0	21.6	16.2	25.3
D. Medvedev	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.9	9.8	—
Other politician	17.9	8.8	5.1	6.9	2.0	3.5	5.1	4.5	4.2	2.0
NA/DA/I wouldn't vote	37.3	30.3	26.0	26.8	43.9	37.9	28.5	35.3	41.2	39.1

Table 30

Distribution of answers to the question: "Considering the further course of events in Ukraine, what's your attitude to Euromaidan and President V. Yanukovich's overthrow?"

Variant of answer	%
Positive	23.2
Negative	63.2
DA/NA	13.6

Table 31

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?"

Variant of answer	%
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	26.9
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.2
DA/NA	10.9

though in Belarus his rating slightly increased, it is still significantly lower than A. Lukashenko's rating.

Is propaganda almighty?

According to the results of March 2014 IISEPS survey we had noted a significant growth of pro-Russian moods in the country. After the past quarter, according to the results of June survey, level of those moods went down, though not notably. In March survey, in a choice between integration with Russia and joining the EU, Russian vector was chosen by 51.5% of respondents, while 32.9% preferred Europe. In June 46.9% of respondents answered in favor of integration with the RF and 33.1% – in favor of Europe.

As we've noted in March, strengthening of pro-Russian moods was the direct consequence of Belarusians' reaction to dramatic events in Ukraine. June survey adds several important arguments in favor of this version.

In March only 27.7% of respondents considered President V. Yanukovich's overthrow as "a just retribution for bloodletting", while 54.7% of them called it "an uprising and a power grab". Over the past quarter the share of negative answers only increased (Table 30).

However, there are some nuances. The proportion of evaluations changes slightly in favor of the Ukrainian side, when respondents had to answer more specific questions on armed clashes in Donbass and choose between strict definitions of conflict participants. However, the ratio is still in favor of the Russian interpretation of events (Tables 33-35).

General evaluation of Russian part turns out to be even more careful (Table 36).

In this question the share of those who think that Russia influences Ukraine positively is almost the same as the share of supporters of integration with the RF.

Thus the hypothesis that there is a connection between the growths of pro-Russian moods and the events in Ukraine seems to be well-grounded. This growth is caused by the fact that many Belarusians consider Russia's actions right and just. At the same time acuteness of the conflict in the neighboring country reinforces the readiness to make a choice. This reinforcement is not simple, however; there is no direct projection, as the share of those who believe in the Russian interpretation of Ukrainian conflict is notably higher than the share of those who are ready for the integration with Russia. But even a partial realiza-

tion of the potential of solidarity leads to the growth of number of "Belo-Russians".

Presidential elections, which were held in Ukraine on the 25th of May, and the convincing victory of P. Poroshenko in the first round, had a significant influence. But this didn't influence Belarusians' evaluations. The new leader of the neighboring country is evaluated quite low (Table 37).

Quite revealing is the fact that the first place is occupied by the disarmament of paramilitary units born on Maidan. From our viewpoint this is a clear reflection of Belarusians' ideas on state and revolution. They do not swear it off, but they prefer that revolution, if it happened already, quickly ate up its children and changed to order.

This thirst for order is also expressed in compara-

Table 32

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you evaluate the events that happened in the East of Ukraine, in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in the first place?"

Variant of answer	%
It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	65.5
It's a rebellion, organized by Russia	23.2
DA/NA	11.3

Table 33

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you evaluate the use of armed forces by Ukrainian powers in Spring 2014 for the restoration of control over Donbass?"

Variant of answer	%
It's a crime, a war against their own people	57.7
It's a lawful neutralization of an armed rebellion	14.0
It's a severe, but a forced measure	19.5
DA/NA	8.8

Table 34

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you agree with the definition of participants of armed riots in the east of Ukraine as "terrorists"?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	30.1
No	54.1
DA/NA	15.8

Table 35

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you agree with the definition of the Ukrainian power, which was installed after Yanukovich's overthrow, as "fascists"?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	50.9
No	28.8
DA/NA	20.3

Table 36

Distribution of answers to the question: "How does Russia influences Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
Positively	46.1
Negatively	30.5
DA	23.4

There are twice as much of negative evaluations as of positive ones. Indifferent attitude is prevailing. The share of those who don't consider P. Poroshenko legitimate is quite high.

Respondents' ideas about settling crisis in Ukraine are quite revealing as well (Table 38).

First three solutions, that are the most popular ones, are exactly what Moscow desires Kiev to do.

tively low shares of supporters of extreme solutions: neutralization of riots and division of Ukraine, i.e. a complete defeat of one of the sides. This can be achieved only via a big mess and it would be a big mess itself, and Belarusians do not like this.

To what extent are the above evaluations conditioned by the informational influence of Belarusian and Russian mass media? According to the survey,

majority of Belarusians regularly (32.6%) or sometimes (53.8%) watch Russian news programs. Do they believe in what they see?

To a certain extent almost 52% of respondents consider the information received from Russian TV-channels objective (Table 39). It is somewhat less than the share of those who completely share the official Russian viewpoint on the Ukrainian conflict. So

the influence of Russian TV-channels is high, but not everyone who shares Russian viewpoint does it under the influence of Russian propaganda.

Belarusian and Russian TV are the main sources of information on the events in Ukraine for Belarusians (Table 40).

It should be noted, that if there is certain parity

Table 37

Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to the new President of Ukraine, elected on the 25th of May 2014?"

Variant of answer	%
Positive	12.0
Negative	21.2
Indifferent	36.0
I don't consider him a legitimate President of Ukraine	15.0
I don't know who was elected	10.6
DA/NA	5.2

Table 38

Distribution of answers to the question: "According to you, which measures could improve the situation in Ukraine?" (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	%
Disarmament of organizations connected with Euromaidan	34.0
Introducing the Russian language as the second official language	24.4
Federalization	23.4
Joining the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia	20.8
Nationalization of oligarch's property	18.9
Neutralization of riots in the East of the country	18.4
Country division	14.0
Joining NATO	9.1
DA	15.1

Table 39

Distribution of answers to the question: "How objective are the news in Russian news programs?"

Variant of answer	%
Completely objective	14.0
Mostly objective	37.7
Mostly biased	21.6
Completely biased	9.0
DA/NA	17.7

Table 40

Distribution of answers to the question: "What were your sources of information on the events in Ukraine?" (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	%
Belarusian TV	66.6
Belarusian state radio	8.7
Belarusian state newspapers	8.7
Belarusian non-state newspapers	6.6
Russian TV	64.5
Russian radio	5.6
Western radios	2.0
Belarusian web-sites	15.4
Russian web-sites	20.4
Ukrainian web-sites	12.9
DA	1.8

between Belarusian and Russian TV, there is a clear prevalence of Russian web-sites over Belarusian ones. The contents of Russian sites is, however, not as one-sided as the contents of Russian TV-programs. Also Belarusian and Ukrainian web-sites in total prevail over Russian ones.

ions, and they choose it depending on their mindsets. And their mindsets are often immune to mass media influence.

The differences between evaluations of events in Crimea and Donbass are quite notable too. Diligent consumers of Russian TV-products are less unani-

Table 41

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to Ukrainian events*, %

Variant of answer	"How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?"		"How do you evaluate the events that happened in the East of Ukraine, in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in the first place?"	
	It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	It's a rebellion, organized by Russia
<i>Do you watch Russian TV-news?</i>				
Yes, regularly	22.4	69.2	74.6	17.3
Sometimes	26.8	60.3	64.3	24.8
No, I don't	38.7	52.5	48.0	30.9
<i>How objective are the news in Russian news programs?</i>				
Completely/mostly objective	10.6	80.3	84	8.7
Completely/mostly biased	56.4	36.3	41.9	48.0
<i>What were your sources of information on the events in Ukraine?</i>				
Belarusian TV	21.9	66	69.5	18.8
Belarusian state newspapers	18.0	75.2	76.7	11.3
Belarusian non-state newspapers	40.0	55.0	64.0	30.0
Russian TV	24.3	64.7	69.1	21.6
Belarusian web-sites	40.6	50.9	49.8	36.1
Russian web-sites	38.4	53.5	57.4	29.4
Ukrainian web-sites	54.6	37.8	40.3	45.9

* Table is read across

To what extent does the trust to informational sources, used by respondents, define their attitude to Ukrainian events? The answer to this question is in Table 41.

There is a hypothesis about the almighty propaganda. According to it Belarusians' evaluations of Ukrainian crisis are defined only by this propaganda. Table 41 shows that this hypothesis is true only partially. Indeed, the level of support of Russian position is significantly higher among those who regularly watch Russian TV. Still, even the majority of those, who don't watch Russian TV at all, consider Crimea annexation lawful.

It appears that people's mindsets are as important as informational influence. Among those, who don't trust Russian TV, who consider it biased (but still watch it sometimes), the share of those who evaluate negatively the Crimea annexation is not lower, but higher, than among those, who don't watch Russian TV at all. One can watch it, consume information, but still make conclusions different from those suggested by D. Kiselev and his colleagues. So Russian TV is influential, but not almighty. TV forms opinions, but people choose mass media which will form their opin-

ions about Moscow's position regarding Crimea than regarding Donbass. Probably, the reason is following: in June, when the survey was conducted, the focus of interest of Russian TV was on events in the East of Ukraine. "Crimea is ours" was also mentioned, but informational influence was much lower, accordingly its support was lower as well.

Among those, who turned out to be immune to Russian propaganda, the evaluations are different in another way: majority of those who don't watch Russian TV at all, support Russia in regard to Crimea and do not support it in regard to Donbass. For majority of those, who watch Russian TV, but consider it biased, those results are inversed.

These positions seem to be contradictory from the viewpoint of consistent political discourses of both Moscow and Kiev. Still, these contradictions are another argument in favor of the theory that people are not puppets directed by mass media.

Analysis of connection between information sources and evaluations demonstrates some interesting things. It seems that the most powerful repeater of the Russian position is not Russian TV, but Belarusian state newspapers. An additional disproof of the

hypothesis on almighty Russian mass media is the evaluations of those who use Belarusian independent mass media and web-sites as a primary source of information. Majority of them support Moscow position in regard to both Crimea and Donetsk. This majority is not as convincing as the majority of those who

This data shows the effectiveness of "five minutes hate" against external and internal enemies, which are broadcasted on Russian TV 25 hours a day since March.

Enemies are a simple and lucid explanation for economic failures; their presence relieve power and

Table 42

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do our people and our country have enemies?", %

Variant of answer	03'11	06'14
Our country is surrounded by enemies	8.3	12.8
Our most dangerous enemies are hidden insiders	22.6	29.2
There will always be enemies for our nation on the way of revival	22.4	20.8
Why look for enemies when the root of evil is in our own mistakes	35.1	29.2
DA/NA	11.6	8.0

Table 43

Connection between informational behavior and attitude to Ukrainian events*, %

Characteristics	1*	2*	3*	4*
<i>Sex:</i>				
Male	12.3	34.7	17.5	29.6
Female	13.3	24.6	23.5	28.8
<i>Age:</i>				
18-29	10.8	30.9	17.8	30.9
30-39	10.8	26.9	17.2	38.4
40-49	9.5	34.6	21.2	28.3
50-59	12.1	28.0	24.6	28.0
60 +	19.8	25.7	23.2	22.3
<i>Education:</i>				
Primary	32.6	12.6	31.6	13.7
Incomplete secondary	19.2	28.2	23.7	19.9
Secondary	11.8	28.9	19.5	30.4
Vocational	10.4	30.3	19.6	33.6
Higher	8.5	33.6	20.0	31.2
<i>Attitude to A. Lukashenko:</i>				
Trust	15.9	28.3	27.0	18.7
Don't trust	9.8	29.2	12.5	42.9

* 1 – Our country is surrounded by enemies; 2 – Our most dangerous enemies are hidden insiders; 3 – There will always be enemies for our nation on the way of revival; 4 – Why look for enemies when the root of evil is in our own mistakes

consume information of Belarusian TV, Russian TV and Belarusian state newspapers, but still it are a majority. This can hardly be explained by propaganda influence, because we are talking about people who use sources of information that are at least not unanimously supporting Russian position.

As you can see, the balance of evaluations is different only among those people who use Ukrainian web-sites as their source of information.

So the primary mindset of people and their choice in favor of certain sources of information is probably even a more important factor, than the direct informational influence.

As good as in the West

In 1989 13% of Russians agreed that Russia had enemies, in 2013, before Euromaidan, already 78% of respondents believed that. This is the dynamics.

society of responsibility. Here is an example of how A. Lukashenko used it in his Message-2011, two months after the ruble devaluation: "Analyzing what have happened, last year's end, this year's beginning, you may understand that somebody wants to hump our young independent state, which has its own internal and external policy, to make us dance to a whistle. Belarus is under a massive pressure. They begin with political threats: they don't accept the results of the last presidential campaign, they make lists of travel banned people, they introduce economic sanctions. Then they create panic and rush on currency and consumer markets at the instigation of some "locals" and other foreign "analytics". Then there is "a dancing on the bones" after what have happened on subway station "Oktyabrskaya".

The head of Belarusian state regularly says that "they want to hump us". And there is no shortage of grateful audience. Table 42 confirms this. March 2011

survey was conducted before the crisis, nevertheless 53.3% of respondents agreed that Belarus has internal and external enemies. Today 62% of Belarusians share this point of view. In this case, as you can understand, it is Russian TV that has contributed to this situation.

(Table 44). We don't know the results of all-Union surveys in the period of "the cold war", so we have no materials for comparison, but we have an impression that long forgotten slogan "lest war break out" gains his popularity again.

Table 44

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you think, is there a threat of war for Belarus from other countries?", %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Certainly yes/Probably yes	37.1	42.3	32.6
Probably no/Certainly no	58.4	54.5	61.7
DA/NA	4.5	3.2	5.6

Table 45

Dynamics of answering the question: "If "yes", than why, according to you, people in Belarus live worse?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	04'02	06'14
Our people can work as hard as in Western countries; bad governmental administration is to blame	60.1	47.1
We don't have raw material resources	17.9	23.7
Our people are in general less hard-working than Western people	10.0	13.0
It's all because of internal and external enemies	8.0	5.6
Other	4.0	10.6
Total:	100.0	100.0

** Data was reduced to 100% for the sake of comparability*

Table 43 gives an opportunity to compare socio-demographic characteristics of respondents that agree and disagree that Belarus has enemies.

Women, unlike men, are busier with everyday problems and are less interested in politics (especially, external politics). That is why they more often mention presence of internal enemies than men (+10.1 points). People from the age group of 40-49 years old agree with women.

Retired people "drop out" as usual. They agree that our country is surrounded by enemies twice as often as other age groups. This is a typical example of displaced reaction: they compensate their miserable lives at the expense of realization of their own virtues against the background of guile and inferiority of the enemies.

This very reason may explain the "drop-out" of respondents with primary education. They feel the presence of a circle of enemies around Belarus four times as often as people with higher education.

Taking into account that women, retirees and people with low level of education are the basis of electoral support of the "national leader", the distribution of answers depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko looks quite natural.

But it's one thing to admit the presence of external and internal enemies, and totally another – to believe in a real threat of war. Nevertheless, 37.1% of Belarusians consider it real. Among the supporters of A. Lukashenko this share is even higher – 42.3%

Survey results show that 31.2% of respondents disagree with the statement that in Belarus people live worse than in the West, while 29.7% of respondent agree with it. 52.8% of respondents from the age group of 60 years old and elder, for whom pensions are the main source of income, disagreed with that statement. Among A. Lukashenko's supporters the share of disagreement amounted to 49.4%. It should be noted that among young people (18-29 years old) this viewpoint is shared by every fifth respondent.

Belarus is still on the first place according to the number of Schengen visas per capita among all the countries that have visa regime with the EU (there are about 140 of them). In 2013 80 visas were issued per 1000 Belarusians. Compare with 48 visas in Russia or 34 visas in Ukraine. But these intensive contacts are weak in the face of purposeful propaganda. And it's not about professional level of propagandists. From a stream of information people choose only those chunks that correspond to his "picture of the world". And the centre of a Belarusian pensioner's "picture" is occupied by the paternalistic state and its permanent leader. Agreeing with the fact that people in the West live well than Belarusians means for them loss of last hopes on life improvement.

It is natural that in split Belarusian society every part has their own mass media: "majority" has the state media, "minority" – non-state. That is why it is difficult to answer the question "Does a person choose mass media, or do mass media choose a

person?" unambiguously. In June 27.2% of Belarusians, that trust state mass media, disagreed with the statement that people in Belarus live worse than people in the West. Among those who trust non-state mass media this indicator amounted to 41.8%.

over the last months, in particular, the annexation of Crimea. This approval is not as unanimous as in Russia, but the share of approval is notably higher than 50%.

Table 46

Distribution of answers to the question: "According to you, is it likely that Russia will annex the territory of Belarus, wholly or partially?"

Variant of answer	%
No, it's unlikely	30.0
It's possible, but unlikely	36.4
It's quite likely	26.3
It's inevitable	4.4
DA/NA	2.9

Table 47

Distribution of answers to the question: "Are the rights of Russian-speaking population infringed in Belarus?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	4.8
No	93.2
DA/NA	2.0

Table 48

Distribution of answers to the question: "Are the rights of Belarusian-speaking population infringed in Belarus?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	15.5
No	78.9
DA/NA	5.6

Only 13% of respondents think that it is the people that are to blame for the worse standard of living (Table 45). It is natural: power blames external enemies and people agree with the power. But avoiding responsibility for their own destinies, they add the power to the list of sources of problems. And they even put it on the first place!

Such distribution of responsibility doesn't arrange the power, thus it tries to shift it on "objective circumstances", in particular, on the absence of raw materials in the country. They have achieved a certain success over the last 12 years.

For the "homo sovieticus", who is the basis of the so-called "majority", social reality is divided into *our people* and *strangers*, into *us* and *them*. Thus the eternal search for enemies, either internal, or external. But the habit of evaluating all the negative events as a result of intentional sabotage and machinations of the world evil lowers the chances to adequately evaluate what's going on. And without this it is impossible to find effective answers on internal and external challenges.

If tomorrow war breaks out...

According to June survey, in general Belarusians evaluate positively the actions of Russia in Ukraine

How probable do respondents consider the repetition of the Crimean script in Belarus?

It is revealing that the share of those who don't expect that Crimea's lot will be repeated in Belarus is almost equal to the share of those who approve this lot of Crimea (Table 46). It seems that one of reasons for this is the fact that a lot of respondents think that spring situation in Crimea was fundamentally different from the current situation in Belarus (Tables 47 and 48).

One of main reasons that Russia used to justify the annexation of Crimea was infringement of the rights of Russian-speaking people. A very insignificant part of respondents agreed that similar infringement may be observed in Belarus. Almost four times as much of respondents mentioned that in fact there is a certain infringement of Belarusian-speaking people. However, an overwhelming majority of respondents replied that there are no infringements of rights of Belarusian-speaking people as well.

If nevertheless Russia tries to annex Belarus wholly or partially, what will be the answer of Belarusians? President A. Lukashenko told that he will personally struggle for every inch of native land. Oppositional politicians declare their readiness to resist as well. But moods of the masses are different (Table 49).

Table 49

Distribution of answers to the question: "If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?"

Variant of answer	%
I'd resist up in arms	14.2
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	47.7
I'd greet these changes	16.5
DA/NA	21.6

Table 50

Connection between political preferences and attitude to the possible annexation of Belarus*, %

Variant of answer	"If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?"		
	I'd resist up in arms	I'd try to adapt to a new situation	I'd greet these changes
<i>Do you trust the President?</i>			
Yes	8.9	49.1	21.8
No	23.1	43.1	12.5
<i>Do you trust opposition?</i>			
Yes	29.5	39.2	12.2
No	10.4	48.9	19.6
<i>If presidential elections were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote for?</i>			
A. Lukashenko	9.1	49.2	24.0

* Table is read across

Table 51

Connection between political preferences and attitude to the possible annexation of Belarus*, %

"Do you trust the following state and public institutions?"	"How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?"		"How do you evaluate the events that happened in the East of Ukraine, in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in the first place?"	
	It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	It's a rebellion, organized by Russia
<i>President:</i>				
Yes	17.1	73.4	77.0	14.8
No	42.2	50.5	52.2	35.6
<i>Opposition:</i>				
Yes	41.6	52.0	51.8	39.2
No	21.6	67.1	72.0	17.7
<i>State mass media:</i>				
Yes	18.3	70.6	78.5	15.5
No	36.2	55.8	54.8	31.1
<i>Non-state mass media:</i>				
Yes	38.6	52.5	56.5	32.1
No	20.6	70.7	71.5	17.9

* Table is read across

Answers to the question of Table 49 don't testify great readiness of Belarusians to follow either the official leader or his opponents in case of a threat to territorial integrity of the country. Besides, President's supporters are much less inclined to resist this threat than his opponents (Table 50).

So A. Lukashenko shouldn't better preach to Ukrainians how they had to protect Crimea using as an example his own fearlessness and determination. It seems that this is precisely the case when it's better not to trouble.

Two-faced politics of A. Lukashenko in relation to the Ukrainian crisis was vividly criticized over the last months. Belarus voted against the resolution on territorial integrity of Ukraine in the UN. Minsk consented to accommodate Russian combat aircraft on the territory of our country. At the same time Belarusian leader spoke against the federalization of Ukraine, met the stand-in President of Ukraine A. Turchinov, assisted at the inauguration of President P. Poroshenko. Belarus refused to join restrictive measures towards Ukraine, which were proposed by

Table 52

Distribution of answers to the question: "In the context of Ukrainian-Russian conflict certain political parties in Ukraine suggest to restore the status of a nuclear state and the production of materials for nuclear weapons, considering this may help to "restrain external aggression". 20 years ago Belarus also refused the status of a nuclear state and handed over all nuclear weapons to Russia. How do you think, should Belarus restore its status of a nuclear state in the context of a new international situation?"

Variant of answer	%
Belarus should restore its nuclear power status	35.5
Belarus shouldn't restore its nuclear power status	53.6
DA/NA	10.9

Table 53

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, should Belarus aim at joining NATO?", %

Variant of answer	09'02	06'06	09'08	06'14
Yes	27.0	14.9	13.9	18.1
No	42.3	71.8	66.0	61.8
DA/NA	29.7	13.1	20.1	20.1

Russia as a response to the signing of agreement on association with the EU in Kiev.

Table 51 partially explains this two-faced politics.

As you can see, these are mostly President's supporters who support the actions of Russia in Ukraine. So when he makes a step towards Kiev, in a sense he acts in defiance of the opinion of his supporters. However, it should be noted that Moscow's position on Crimea and Donbass is also shared by the respondents who trust opposition and non-state mass media, though the level of support in these groups is not as impressive as among those who trust president and state mass media.

Since Belarusians are not really inclined to fight against a hypothetical Russian aggression, as table 4 shows it, they don't approve special measures of preventing such threat (Table 52).

It is notable that the share of those who support the restoration of nuclear power status for Belarus is twice as big as the share of those who are ready to protect their country up in arms in the case of annexation. However, the majority is against.

The idea of obtaining guarantees by joining NATO doesn't enjoy great support as well (Table 53).

It should be noted that the idea of Belarus joining NATO enjoyed its biggest level of support in September 2002, shortly after V. Putin proposed that Belarus should be integrated in Russia as 6 provinces. At the time the threat of independence loss might seem real. A threat to other countries doesn't provoke a similar wish to hide under NATO's "security umbrella". Neither the Russian-Georgian war, nor the present actions of Russia in Ukraine didn't cause an upsurge of pro-NATO moods. Today their level is higher than 6 years ago, after the Russian-Georgian war, but is still insignificant.

Belarusians don't expect that Crimean script will be repeated in Belarus. However, in case it happens, the readiness to resist it is quite low. The idea of Belarus joining NATO enjoys almost the same level of popularity. The number of supporters of the idea of nuclear power status restoration is slightly higher.

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in June, 2014 (%)

1. "Do you think that people in Belarus live worse than people in Western countries?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	59.7	72.5	74.8	78.7	70.1	65.8	52.3	35.8
No	31.2	23.6	21.2	16.0	20.1	23.6	37.5	52.8
DA	9.1	3.9	4.0	5.3	9.8	10.6	10.2	11.4

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	28.4	38.9	65.4	64.2	63.9
No	64.2	45.9	27.0	26.2	27.4
DA	7.4	15.2	7.6	9.6	8.7

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	74.0	62.4	75.2	34.6	75.4
No	17.7	29.9	19.8	52.1	16.4
DA	8.3	7.7	5.0	13.3	8.2

Table 1.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	66.9	48.0	55.8	63.6	69.3	44.6	65.9
No	29.7	38.9	33.2	32.9	16.6	39.0	28.8
DA	3.4	13.1	11.0	3.5	14.1	16.4	5.3

Table 1.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	66.9	53.9	56.5	65.9	56.6
No	29.7	33.4	32.2	24.0	34.7
DA	3.4	12.7	11.3	10.1	8.7

2. "What's more important for you today: maintaining of current situation or its changing?"

Table 2.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Maintaining of current situation is more important	38.3	22.0	24.3	25.3	27.1	32.9	38.3	65.1
Changing of current situation is more important	52.1	70.0	59.9	66.0	63.6	58.7	51.5	26.4
DA/NA	9.6	8.0	15.8	8.7	9.3	8.4	10.2	8.5

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Maintaining of current situation is more important	68.1	63.5	33.9	30.9	34.5
Changing of current situation is more important	25.5	31.4	55.9	57.1	56.8
DA/NA	6.4	5.1	10.2	12.0	8.7

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Maintaining of current situation is more important	27.5	31.1	22.5	65.1	30.6
Changing of current situation is more important	63.7	58.3	64.7	26.4	59.7
DA/NA	8.8	10.6	12.8	8.5	9.7

Table 2.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Maintaining of current situation is more important	34.5	37.1	36.1	41.6	29.0	54.8	39.1
Changing of current situation is more important	57.8	53.3	53.2	56.6	52.0	33.3	53.5
DA/NA	7.7	9.6	10.7	1.8	19.0	11.9	7.4

Table 2.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Maintaining of current situation is more important	34.5	38.4	44.2	38.2	36.5
Changing of current situation is more important	57.8	51.7	47.3	50.2	52.7
DA/NA	7.7	9.9	8.5	11.6	10.8

3. "Which statement about corruption in Belarus do you agree with?"**Table 3.1. Depending on age**

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	26.9	19.6	16.6	21.5	18.7	20.1	25.7	47.3
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	29.9	37.3	21.9	21.5	29.9	30.0	37.0	30.0
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	20.9	19.6	30.5	26.8	22.0	23.0	20.4	12.2
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	19.5	19.6	27.2	27.5	28.7	22.3	13.2	8.2
DA	2.8	3.9	4.8	2.7	0.7	4.6	3.7	2.3

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	67.4	41.7	23.1	20.0	22.6
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	25.5	32.7	31.0	31.1	26.0
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	0	14.7	23.3	21.2	26.0
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	7.1	7.7	19.5	23.8	23.3
DA	0	3.2	3.1	3.9	2.1

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	15.5	22.5	20.8	47.9	19.4
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	26.5	33.2	23.8	30.5	25.8
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	22.4	24.5	29.7	11.3	25.8
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	32.9	17.3	21.7	6.9	24.2
DA	2.7	2.5	4.0	3.4	4.8

Table 3.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	29.5	19.7	22.2	27.9	21.0	31.1	36.1
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	18.0	30.1	39.4	43.6	23.5	27.7	32.6
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	15.9	15.7	21.8	17.4	38.0	24.9	16.5
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	34.9	31.0	16.2	9.9	11.5	11.3	11.7
DA	1.7	3.5	0.4	1.2	6.0	5.0	3.1

Table 3.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	29.5	23.9	25.8	30.1	25.8
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	18.0	35.5	29.7	28.6	35.6
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	15.9	26.3	19.4	23.6	19.8
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	34.9	11.6	19.1	15.4	16.8
DA	1.7	2.7	6.0	2.3	2.0

4. "Which of the following statements on Belarusian state, built under the rule of A. Lukashenko, do you agree with?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It is my state, it safeguards my interests	39.1	34.0	23.8	28.9	26.1	31.4	40.5	65.7
It is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough	43.2	46.0	51.0	51.7	51.9	50.2	43.6	23.2
It is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it	12.0	16.0	16.6	17.4	15.3	12.7	9.5	5.7
DA/NA	5.7	4.0	8.6	2.0	6.7	5.7	6.4	5.4

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It is my state, it safeguards my interests	76.6	64.1	34.4	31.6	33.4
It is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough	21.3	21.2	46.3	50.0	45.9
It is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it	2.1	5.8	13.7	12.3	14.9
DA/NA	0	8.9	5.6	6.1	5.8

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It is my state, it safeguards my interests	23.8	33.0	29.7	67.4	31.1
It is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough	46.9	53.8	49.5	22.4	42.6
It is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it	21.9	7.7	16.8	4.6	24.6
DA/NA	7.3	5.5	4.0	5.6	1.6

Table 4.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
It is my state, it safeguards my interests	36.3	38.7	37.5	41.3	29.6	52.7	39.7
It is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough	36.9	45.2	50.4	47.7	46.2	31.6	45.9
It is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it	21.0	10.4	9.3	9.9	12.6	6.8	9.6
DA/NA	5.8	5.7	2.8	1.1	11.6	7.9	4.8

Table 4.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It is my state, it safeguards my interests	36.3	34.8	40.4	40.5	42.4
It is only partially my state, it doesn't safeguard my interests enough	36.9	50.5	35.5	46.7	45.5
It is not my state, it does not safeguard my interests and I do not trust it	21.0	9.6	14.1	8.1	8.2
DA/NA	5.8	5.1	10.0	4.6	3.9

5. "Which variant of changes do you consider most realistic and desirable in Belarus?"

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Elections	50.1	32.0	38.7	42.7	38.1	45.6	50.4	73.1
Republican referendum	29.4	38.0	32.7	29.3	40.7	33.2	30.3	15.3
Street protests	8.0	14.0	14.6	13.3	8.6	8.8	6.4	1.7
DA/NA	12.5	16.0	14.0	14.7	11.6	13.4	12.9	9.9

Table 5.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Elections	77.7	65.0	47.1	44.2	47.8
Republican referendum	14.9	14.0	30.3	34.3	33.6
Street protests	0	5.1	9.1	9.2	7.8
DA/NA	7.4	15.9	13.5	12.3	10.8

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Elections	41.9	47.2	32.4	71.5	25.8
Republican referendum	35.5	32.2	36.3	15.6	40.3
Street protests	13.3	5.7	16.7	2.1	14.5
DA/NA	10.3	14.9	14.6	10.8	19.4

Table 5.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Elections	44.7	44.8	50.0	51.4	53.3	55.6	53.7
Republican referendum	34.6	38.3	30.1	37.6	15.6	18.0	28.4
Street protests	9.5	6.5	8.3	6.4	11.6	6.7	5.7
DA/NA	11.2	10.4	11.6	4.6	19.5	19.7	11.2

Table 5.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Elections	44.7	53.6	52.3	52.9	48.1
Republican referendum	34.6	23.2	22.4	34.4	32.1
Street protests	9.5	6.5	9.6	7.3	6.9
DA/NA	11.2	16.7	15.7	5.4	12.9

6. "If opposition doesn't propose a single candidate, how will your choice change?"**Table 6.1. Depending on age**

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I will vote for Lukashenko	31.2	13.7	11.8	21.5	19.0	23.7	36.1	57.7
I will vote for one of democratic candidates	16.5	21.6	21.1	22.1	22.4	17.7	16.3	6.3
I won't vote	17.0	23.5	26.3	19.5	20.9	18.4	14.4	9.1
I don't care if opposition proposes one or several candidates	29.2	31.4	34.2	30.9	28.0	35.0	27.4	23.3
DA/NA	6.1	9.8	6.6	6.0	9.7	5.3	5.8	3.6

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I will vote for Lukashenko	67.4	51.9	26.8	24.1	27.0
I will vote for one of democratic candidates	6.3	5.1	14.4	21.2	23.0
I won't vote	8.4	7.7	20.8	17.9	15.9
I don't care if opposition proposes one or several candidates	17.9	28.8	31.9	29.7	27.4
DA/NA	0	6.5	6.1	7.1	6.7

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I will vote for Lukashenko	19.6	26.3	11.9	57.5	19.7
I will vote for one of democratic candidates	23.8	16.1	26.7	5.4	26.2
I won't vote	24.0	15.4	17.8	9.8	27.9
I don't care if opposition proposes one or several candidates	17.2	33.2	37.7	24.0	23.0
DA/NA	5.4	9.0	5.9	3.3	3.2

Table 6.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I will vote for Lukashenko	24.1	26.8	25.0	41.9	29.8	37.1	39.5
I will vote for one of democratic candidates	21.4	18.9	19.9	18.6	12.6	5.6	14.9
I won't vote	27.2	16.7	22.7	11.6	8.1	11.8	14.0
I don't care if opposition proposes one or several candidates	24.5	33.3	28.7	24.4	39.4	28.7	26.8
DA/NA	2.8	4.6	3.2	3.5	10.1	16.8	4.8

Table 6.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I will vote for Lukashenko	24.1	33.3	32.5	32.7	32.7
I will vote for one of democratic candidates	21.4	12.9	18.0	15.0	15.7
I won't vote	27.2	11.2	18.0	12.7	15.5
I don't care if opposition proposes one or several candidates	24.5	33.7	25.4	30.8	31.2
DA/NA	2.8	8.9	5.8	8.8	4.9

7. "If you are interested in politics, how do you show your interest?" (more than one answer is possible)

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I vote on elections	57.4	25.5	41.1	51.7	53.0	54.1	62.7	73.3
I follow information on political events	30.8	26.0	21.2	32.2	31.6	33.9	34.1	29.5
I discuss political events with my friends	33.3	24.0	32.5	33.3	40.7	36.4	33.7	26.4

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I vote on elections	77.7	69.2	53.7	54.5	55.4
I follow information on political events	15.8	30.1	26.6	31.1	43.2
I discuss political events with my friends	10.6	26.9	30.1	37.5	43.7

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I vote on elections	47.1	60.5	38.6	71.0	42.6
I follow information on political events	35.9	32.0	26.0	27.4	14.8
I discuss political events with my friends	42.3	35.1	28.7	24.9	19.7

Table 7.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I vote on elections	42.7	58.5	58.1	70.5	64.8	55.1	59.8
I follow information on political events	57.6	83.8	52.3	77.3	75.4	85.3	61.6
I discuss political events with my friends	41.0	24.5	48.4	20.3	31.2	30.5	31.7

Table 7.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I vote on elections	42.7	61.6	54.3	64.1	63.2
I follow information on political events	42.4	31.4	28.6	25.1	26.8
I discuss political events with my friends	41.0	35.7	24.0	33.6	32.4

8. "Belarusian team took part in the World Hockey Championship, held recently in Minsk. Are you proud of your country and team?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I am very proud	32.1	43.1	31.1	32.0	29.6	33.2	29.3	43.3
I am mostly proud	38.9	31.4	45.0	42.7	39.7	38.9	43.3	31.4
I am not proud at all	26.2	19.6	22.5	22.7	29.6	25.9	25.1	29.4
DA/NA	2.8	5.9	1.4	2.6	1.1	2.0	2.3	5.9

Table 8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I am very proud	28.4	35.9	32.1	30.6	33.1
I am mostly proud	23.2	35.9	40.7	38.8	41.9
I am not proud at all	43.2	23.1	25.2	27.1	23.0
DA/NA	5.2	5.1	2.0	3.5	2.0

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I am very proud	25.3	36.1	31.4	34.6	23.3
I am mostly proud	43.2	39.6	48.0	30.8	40.0
I am not proud at all	30.7	21.8	16.7	28.7	36.7
DA/NA	0.8	2.5	3.9	5.9	0

Table 8.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I am very proud	26.4	22.7	35.5	32.9	29.1	39.0	41.7
I am mostly proud	39.0	36.2	35.0	38.7	44.7	41.8	37.0
I am not proud at all	32.5	38.4	24.9	26.0	23.6	15.2	18.3
DA/NA	2.1	2.7	4.6	2.4	1.6	2.0	4.0

Table 8.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I am very proud	26.4	42.5	36.2	22.4	32.0
I am mostly proud	39.0	34.7	39.0	40.9	40.5
I am not proud at all	32.5	19.7	22.7	33.2	24.2
DA/NA	2.0	3.1	2.1	3.5	3.3

9. "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Integration with the RF	46.9	33.3	35.3	30.7	35.3	41.3	53.4	69.0
Joining the EU	33.1	52.9	46.0	53.3	43.1	37.5	23.5	12.2
DA/NA	20.0	13.8	18.7	16.0	21.6	21.2	23.1	18.8

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Integration with the RF	74.5	66.2	44.8	41.5	39.2
Joining the EU	4.3	13.4	32.8	39.6	43.9
DA/NA	21.2	20.4	22.4	18.9	16.9

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Integration with the RF	36.2	43.5	30.7	67.9	42.6
Joining the EU	47.9	33.6	47.5	11.8	41.0
DA/NA	15.9	22.9	21.8	20.3	16.4

Table 9.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Integration with the RF	41.4	41.9	38.0	48.0	48.2	50.3	63.3
Joining the EU	44.4	34.9	41.2	20.8	32.2	24.3	25.3
DA/NA	14.2	23.2	20.8	31.2	19.6	25.4	11.4

Table 9.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Integration with the RF	41.4	48.8	51.9	47.3	45.6
Joining the EU	44.4	29.2	31.8	28.7	31.3
DA/NA	14.2	22.0	16.3	24.0	23.1

10. "Considering the further course of events in Ukraine, what's your attitude to Euromaidan and president V. Yanukovich's overthrow?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positive	23.2	22.0	27.2	32.7	29.4	25.4	15.5	17.0
Negative	63.2	58.0	59.6	48.0	55.4	59.4	70.8	75.1
DA/NA	13.6	20.0	13.2	19.3	14.6	15.2	13.7	7.9

Table 10.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	10.6	16.6	21.9	25.5	29.7
Negative	87.2	72.0	63.9	59.4	59.4
DA/NA	2.2	11.4	14.2	15.1	15.9

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positive	34.1	19.1	24.8	15.1	36.7
Negative	52.0	63.6	62.4	75.6	53.3
DA/NA	13.9	17.3	12.8	9.3	10.0

Table 10.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positive	30.2	14.4	28.6	27.9	21.1	14.7	22.3
Negative	60.0	68.1	52.1	67.4	52.3	75.7	69.4
DA/NA	9.8	17.5	19.3	4.7	27.6	9.6	8.3

Table 10.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	30.2	19.4	25.1	20.8	20.9
Negative	60.0	64.6	59.4	68.3	63.9
DA/NA	9.8	16.0	15.5	10.9	15.2

11. "How does Russia influence Ukraine?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positively	46.1	41.2	37.7	36.7	41.8	41.0	48.1	60.1
Negatively	30.5	33.3	38.4	35.3	35.1	27.6	29.2	24.1
DA	23.4	25.5	23.9	28.0	23.1	31.4	22.7	15.8

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positively	62.8	54.5	48.4	42.7	37.2
Negatively	30.9	22.4	28.1	30.7	38.5
DA	6.3	23.1	23.5	26.6	24.3

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positively	36.8	45.4	40.6	59.2	39.3
Negatively	37.2	28.1	36.6	24.6	34.4
DA	26.0	26.5	22.8	16.2	26.3

Table 11.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positively	39.7	46.7	38.4	42.2	42.0	67.2	50.9
Negatively	39.3	23.6	32.9	42.8	26.5	14.1	30.9
DA	21.0	29.7	28.7	15.0	31.5	18.7	18.2

Table 11.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positively	39.7	51.5	47.9	48.8	43.7
Negatively	39.3	18.4	31.2	29.3	33.2
DA	21.0	30.1	20.9	21.9	23.1

12. "How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?"

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	26.9	34.0	31.1	32.7	32.0	27.2	25.8	18.2
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	62.2	60.0	54.3	56.7	58.4	60.4	64.8	70.7
DA/NA	10.9	6.0	14.6	10.6	9.6	12.4	9.4	11.1

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	20.0	19.7	22.6	29.4	37.3
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	72.6	66.9	65.8	59.8	52.9
DA/NA	7.4	13.4	11.6	10.8	9.8

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	36.0	24.5	29.7	20.1	26.2
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	54.2	64.4	59.4	68.9	59.0
DA/NA	9.8	11.1	10.9	11.0	14.8

Table 12.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	39.3	22.2	29.5	33.1	22.6	12.4	23.6
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	50.2	67.4	54.4	62.2	63.8	74.6	68.6
DA/NA	10.5	10.4	16.1	4.7	13.6	13.0	7.3

Table 12.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It's an imperialistic usurpation and occupation	39.3	15.6	24.0	26.3	28.5
It's a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice	50.2	70.7	67.5	63.7	59.6
DA/NA	10.5	13.6	8.5	10.0	11.8

13. "How do you evaluate the events that happened in the East of Ukraine, in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in the first place?"

Table 13.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	65.5	62.7	57.2	60.9	60.6	61.5	63.9	79.5
It's a rebellion, organized by Russia	23.2	29.4	28.9	25.8	27.1	27.2	20.9	14.0
DA/NA	11.3	7.9	13.8	13.2	12.3	15.1	6.9	6.3

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	85.1	75.6	67.5	63.8	52.7
It's a rebellion, organized by Russia	12.8	14.7	21.5	23.6	33.4
DA/NA	2.1	9.7	11.0	12.6	13.9

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	53.1	65.8	61.8	78.7	68.9
It's a rebellion, organized by Russia	34.6	20.8	29.4	13.6	18.0
DA/NA	12.3	13.4	8.8	7.7	13.1

Table 13.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	58.6	68.9	59.7	63.6	58.3	74.2	77.0
It's a rebellion, organized by Russia	29.8	19.7	31.9	30.6	23.1	10.1	14.3
DA/NA	11.6	11.4	8.4	5.8	18.6	15.7	8.7

Table 13.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It's a people's protest against the non-legitimate power	58.6	70.7	59.9	72.2	66.21
It's a rebellion, organized by Russia	29.8	13.9	24.5	20.5	26.0
DA/NA	11.6	15.4	15.6	7.3	7.9

14. "Do you agree with the definition of the Ukrainian power, which was installed after Yanukovich's overthrow, as "fascists"?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	50.9	48.0	43.0	44.7	43.7	49.1	51.7	63.4
No	28.8	30.0	36.4	30.7	35.5	30.0	29.1	18.8
DA/NA	20.3	22.0	20.6	24.6	19.8	20.9	19.2	16.8

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	71.6	59.2	49.7	48.0	46.4
No	12.6	18.5	29.1	31.4	34.9
DA/NA	15.8	22.3	21.2	20.6	18.7

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	46.3	50.0	40.6	61.5	38.7
No	33.6	29.8	37.6	19.6	32.3
DA/NA	20.1	20.2	21.8	18.9	29.0

Table 14.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	47.5	51.5	40.7	46.5	40.0	71.3	61.1
No	28.1	29.3	30.6	37.2	32.5	16.9	27.5
DA/NA	24.4	19.2	28.7	16.3	27.5	11.8	11.4

Table 14.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	47.5	62.6	50.9	46.9	47.2
No	28.1	16.7	30.6	31.9	16.5
DA/NA	24.4	19.7	19.1	19.2	16.5

15. "According to you, is it likely that Russia will annex the territory of Belarus, wholly or partially?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
No, it's unlikely	30.0	33.3	27.2	28.0	26.0	27.9	33.0	34.0
It's possible, but unlikely	36.4	41.2	38.4	42.7	45.0	39.9	27.3	30.0
It's quite likely	26.3	19.6	29.8	24.0	21.9	25.8	31.1	26.9
It's inevitable	4.4	2.0	2.6	3.3	4.8	3.9	3.8	6.5
DA/NA	2.9	3.9	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1	4.9	2.5

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
No, it's unlikely	34.0	31.4	31.0	30.1	26.2
It's possible, but unlikely	12.8	29.5	37.7	37.2	44.2
It's quite likely	42.6	26.9	25.0	24.9	25.5
It's inevitable	10.6	7.1	3.5	4.7	1.7
DA/NA	0	5.1	2.8	3.1	2.4

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
No, it's unlikely	29.6	28.9	22.5	34.9	25.8
It's possible, but unlikely	40.0	37.9	44.2	28.5	38.7
It's quite likely	25.6	26.3	26.5	27.4	24.2
It's inevitable	2.9	3.8	2.9	6.2	9.7
DA/NA	1.9	3.1	3.9	3.0	1.6

Table 15.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
No, it's unlikely	34.6	20.1	26.9	27.7	32.2	52.2	19.7
It's possible, but unlikely	38.6	17.9	42.1	30.6	47.2	31.5	45.4
It's quite likely	22.7	49.3	26.4	29.5	17.1	5.6	29.7
It's inevitable	2.7	10.5	3.2	11.0	0.5	0.6	3.1
DA/NA	1.4	2.2	1.4	1.2	3.0	10.1	2.1

Table 15.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
No, it's unlikely	34.6	28.3	34.6	27.1	26.5
It's possible, but unlikely	38.6	45.4	35.7	32.9	31.1
It's quite likely	22.7	18.8	20.5	30.6	36.2
It's inevitable	2.7	2.7	7.4	4.7	4.4
DA/NA	1.4	4.8	1.8	4.7	1.8

16. "If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I'd resist up in arms	14.2	23.5	24.7	19.6	18.3	16.2	9.1	5.4
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	47.7	54.9	42.0	48.0	51.9	45.4	48.9	46.7
I'd greet these changes	16.5	7.8	9.3	7.4	12.3	15.8	18.2	26.9
DA/NA	21.6	13.8	24.0	24.0	17.5	22.6	23.8	20.0

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I'd resist up in arms	0	8.9	13.8	16.3	19.3
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	50.0	41.4	49.5	45.5	49.8
I'd greet these changes	34.0	27.4	15.5	15.3	9.2
DA/NA	16.0	22.3	21.2	22.9	21.7

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I'd resist up in arms	23.0	13.0	25.0	4.4	9.8
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	43.1	51.8	45.0	47.0	50.8
I'd greet these changes	12.5	13.2	7.0	27.2	21.3
DA/NA	21.4	22.0	23.0	21.4	18.1

Table 16.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I'd resist up in arms	13.9	16.2	13.8	12.2	19.5	11.9	12.2
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	49.8	45.0	54.8	65.1	27.5	44.1	48.1
I'd greet these changes	13.6	26.2	11.1	18.6	19.0	6.8	19.6
DA/NA	22.7	12.6	20.3	4.1	34.0	37.2	20.1

Table 16.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I'd resist up in arms	13.9	13.6	13.8	14.6	15.2
I'd try to adapt to a new situation	49.8	48.3	47.7	45.0	47.3
I'd greet these changes	13.6	10.5	17.0	20.8	20.1
DA/NA	22.7	27.6	21.5	19.6	17.4

17. "On the 29th of May Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement on the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. How do you evaluate Belarus' membership in this union?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positively	49.8	31.4	34.4	35.3	44.8	46.3	56.3	67.3
Negatively	15.1	25.5	16.6	20.0	18.2	13.4	13.3	10.8
Indifferently	29.6	41.1	43.7	38.7	31.0	34.6	23.2	17.9
DA	5.5	2.0	5.3	6.0	6.0	5.7	7.2	4.0

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positively	75.5	64.7	44.6	47.5	46.4
Negatively	8.5	9.0	12.6	16.7	22.7
Indifferently	16.0	19.9	37.3	29.9	24.4
DA	0	6.4	5.5	5.9	6.5

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positively	38.2	50.0	32.4	67.9	38.3
Negatively	24.5	11.3	22.5	9.0	15.0
Indifferently	32.1	31.8	41.2	18.3	45.0
DA	5.1	7.0	3.9	4.9	1.7

Table 17.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positively	42.4	51.1	41.0	64.5	30.5	62.1	62.4
Negatively	21.0	15.3	21.2	12.2	14.5	11.9	6.6
Indifferently	33.2	29.3	34.6	20.4	35.5	24.9	25.8
DA	3.4	4.3	3.2	2.9	19.5	1.1	5.2

Table 17.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positively	42.4	51.2	45.7	55.4	53.5
Negatively	21.0	11.3	19.5	12.3	12.1
Indifferently	33.2	33.1	29.1	26.2	27.0
DA	3.4	4.4	5.7	6.1	7.4

18. "What is your attitude to the new president of Ukraine, elected on the 25th of May 2014?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positive	12.0	12.0	13.8	15.3	13.4	9.5	13.6	9.3
Negative	21.2	16.0	18.4	10.0	18.3	21.6	24.6	26.9
Indifferent	36.0	50.0	36.2	40.0	39.9	37.1	33.3	30.6
I don't consider him a legitimate president of Ukraine	15.0	10.0	13.2	15.3	13.4	18.7	14.0	15.3
I don't know who was elected	10.6	10.0	9.2	10.7	10.8	8.1	7.6	15.6
DA/NA	5.2	2.0	9.2	8.7	4.2	5.0	6.9	2.3

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	9.6	10.1	10.7	12.7	14.9
Negative	29.8	22.8	19.5	22.2	19.3
Indifferent	30.9	32.3	35.7	37.7	37.5
I don't consider him a legitimate president of Ukraine	2.1	18.4	17.1	15.3	13.2
I don't know who was elected	27.6	13.9	11.1	7.2	7.8
DA/NA	0	2.5	5.9	4.9	7.3

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positive	18.4	9.3	12.9	8.5	12.9
Negative	16.5	23.6	15.8	25.7	12.9
Indifferent	37.3	36.7	42.6	31.9	35.5
I don't consider him a legitimate president of Ukraine	14.5	15.2	12.9	16.2	14.5
I don't know who was elected	7.6	8.4	8.9	15.4	22.6
DA/NA	5.7	6.8	6.9	2.3	1.6

Table 18.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positive	14.2	12.7	12.0	25.6	13.1	3.4	3.9
Negative	14.9	11.4	17.5	26.2	13.6	28.7	39.7
Indifferent	48.1	34.5	45.6	27.3	30.7	28.1	30.6
I don't consider him a legitimate president of Ukraine	4.4	12.7	14.7	10.5	23.6	30.3	14.8
I don't know who was elected	13.9	27.1	4.1	7.0	3.5	5.6	8.7
DA/NA	4.5	1.6	6.1	3.2	15.5	3.9	2.3

Table 18.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	14.2	5.1	12.5	14.3	13.7
Negative	14.9	25.9	27.4	15.8	21.4
Indifferent	48.1	29.9	33.5	36.7	33.0
I don't consider him a legitimate president of Ukraine	4.4	24.8	18.1	12.0	15.2
I don't know who was elected	13.9	9.5	4.3	15.8	10.1
DA/NA	4.5	4.8	4.2	5.4	6.6

OPEN FORUM

In this issue of the IISEPS analytical bulletin under the heading "Open Forum" we continue to publish a selection of data from sociological surveys conducted by our colleagues in foreign countries with our brief comments.

Despite purposeful efforts of the Belarusian leadership to design their own model of development, its uniqueness is relative. This conclusion applies to economic, political, social and other components of the Belarusian model. We believe that the comparative analysis of social processes in other countries will allow readers to better understand the results of researches on the Belarusian society.

RUSSIA, THE COUNTRY OF UNSATISFIED LEFTISM

Things in the country are going in the right direction. This point of view, according to "Levadacenter", was shared by 43% of Russians in January 2014, by 47% in February and by 60% in March already. Despite the forecast of most independent analytics, March euphoria didn't wear off in April and May (55% and 60% accordingly).

40% of respondents were going to vote for him, while 39% were not. Now only 13% of respondents are not going to vote for V. Putin. Other 14% of Russians didn't know how to answer.

V. Putin's popularity is unarguably connected to the Ukrainian events, as the head of All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (WCIOM) V. Fedorov stated it. But, according to him, this is a whole new rating: "the annexation of Crimea" played a crucial part in the political destiny of the President, just like the "one hundred eighty degrees turn of the

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, which prospects does Vladimir Putin have as a politician?", %

Variant of answer	2012	2013	2014
This politician has good future prospects	40	42	69
He has achieved a lot, but he can hardly achieve more	38	33	20
This politician is geared to yesterday, his authority decreases	15	19	5
DA	7	6	6

During his speech in Kremlin dedicated to the celebration of the Russia Day on the 12th of June, President V. Putin emphasized that "This year we are celebrating our national holiday in especially lifted spirits. Crimea and Sevastopol have returned to Russia, to their Motherland. This historic reunion was peaceful, it happened at the will of the people and in full compliance with international law. What is especially important is that this was fair, and this was 'for real', as they say".

A particular elation made Russians not only positively evaluate the development of the country despite the stagnation in economy, but also reevaluate electoral rating of the national leader. In February its average value amounted to 45% (POF measures electoral ratings weekly) and this corresponded to the average value over 2013. In March it already amounted to 58%, in April – 64%, in May – 67%. Two first measurements of June don't leave a reason to think that Kremlin propaganda campaign starts to wear off.

According to All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion surveys in May, three fourths of Russians are ready to vote for V. Putin in the next presidential elections in 2018. The number of electoral supporters of the President grows monthly since "Crimea is ours". In April this share amounted to 62%, in May – to 73%. In the beginning of 2012 only

plane above the Atlantics" played a similar role for the then prime minister E. Primakov. "Putin made it into history," – says the head of WCIOM, and that is why "all the weariness that was accumulated over the years of his rule disappeared".

Majority of Russians think that V. Putin has "good future prospects" in politics (Table 1).

On the political stage of Russia "there is in fact only one pole – Putin, and there is no one who can be anything like anti-Putin", reckons E. Minchenko, the head of International Institute for Political Expertise. But President's authority "more than ever depends on the foreign policy factor, including events in Ukraine". According to E. Minchenko's forecast, further non-intervention in the armed conflict in Donbass "may reduce V. Putin's popularity down to the pre-Crimea level". But armed intervention will save President's popularity only in the case if "the war will really be small and really victorious".

The historic reunion which happened "in full compliance with international law", contributed to Russians' reassessment of the attitude not only to the national leader, but to the power in general (Table 2). Russians are rather skeptical about the power in general unlike about the first person of the state whose popularity is generally defined by the sacredness of his status. In particular, in the beginning of

the second term of B. Yeltsin, only 4% of respondents perceived people in power as a good team of politicians that lead the country in the right direction.

We've already noted more than once that bureaucracy and people in power lack their own legitimacy in the minds of people with pre-state way of thinking. Their ratings follow the rating of the head of state like a thread follows a needle.

think about Motherland in the first place and only then about themselves, exceeded the share of their anti-patriotic opponents (Table 3).

However, passing from interests of an abstract person to self-interests ("What's more important for you: the interests of the country and the state, or your own interests, the interests of your family?") the share of patriotic respondents becomes twice as low: 23%

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "How would you evaluate people that are currently in power?", %

Variant of answer	06'97	12'00	02'04	03'08	11'10	03'13	05'14
These people care only about their own financial well-being and career	59	55	53	31	43	50	36
These people are honest, but weak, and they don't know how to use their power and provide order and consistent political course	4	10	13	26	18	15	22
These people are honest, but not well-informed, and they don't know how to lead the country out of economic crisis	15	13	14	11	11	13	12
This is a good team of politicians that lead the country in the right direction	11	11	9	13	10	10	9
DA/NA	10	13	11	20	19	11	22

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you think, what's more important: the interests of the state, the country in general, or the interests of each individual person?", %

Variant of answer	03'01	12'05	05'14
The interests of the state, the country in general	53	41	47
The interests of each individual person	37	52	39
DA	10	8	14

The first Kremlin casting in 2008 gave birth to a flood of "bright hopes" on a new governor. The question "who?" was always important for the conscience of masses. This is the tradition, which has its roots deep in the past centuries. Thus the painful reaction of cities' citizens on the second casting (protests on Bolotnaya square and so on). Mass conscience didn't see V Putin as a new governor and thus there was no flood of "hopes" because of his return.

But what was not fulfilled with the second casting is being fulfilled now at the expense of the historic reunion. You should pay attention to the last row of Table 2. The record share of respondents that didn't know how to answer was caused by the reassessment of the people in power. There is nothing strange about it. It is difficult for public opinion to make a one hundred eighty degrees turn in a short period of time. That is why despite a decrease of negative assessments by 14 points (the first row), positive assessments gained only 7 points (the second row), and all this led to a decrease in the last row of the table.

Under the conditions of a political excitement against the background of artificially exaggerated state of a "besieged fortress" the need to unite around the national leader rises, and thus his electoral rating rises as well. The need of feeling of complicity with the country and the state grows as well. The share of those who think that Russians should

in December 2005 and in May 2014. Accordingly, the share of personal interests' supporters rises up to 69%.

Main request of Russians to the state concerns the care of their financial well-being (43% vs. 14% that consider protection of human rights and freedoms as the main concern).

Homo post-sovieticus, just as his predecessor *homo sovieticus*, still bears the socio-centric culture. However, this doesn't mean that he is ready to unite with anyone to act together. His socio-centrism is just a declaration. But he is not inclined to individualism (in the Western interpretation) as well, because individualism under the conditions of low social capital creates atomized persons and not active citizens.

All of the aforesaid, according to the analytics of "Levada-center", means that current patriotic pump can hardly have an independent and long-lasting effect without constant growth of social obligations.

Russia is a country of unsatisfied leftism. People here always demand from the state more than it can give – now or in general. Crimean or Ukrainian story may serve as a rating addition only provided there is no decrease of financial well-being. If the power has no resources for satisfying left requests, Crimea won't help.

The fact that Russians put their own interests higher than the governmental interests means that to-

talitarianism can hardly be restored in Russia. But the realization of an authoritarian script is highly probable. Russian individualism presumes indifference as for the choice of the way of providing well-being; that is why an exchange of a part of human rights and liberties (especially political ones) against the financial well-being is considered acceptable.

SOCIAL DEMAND FOR THE SUPERPOWER STATUS RESTORATION

"Majority of Russians think that our country's influence in the world increases. In this context the idea of restoration of the superpower status of Russia, lost after the break-up of the USSR, gains more and more supporters". This is the headline of a press release by All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (WCIOM), which was published on their website. This press release is dedicated to the results of a survey called "Is Russia a great power?"

In all fairness it should be noted that Russians were always optimistic about the RF's prospect to become a "superpower". But during the current year these viewpoints gained more foundation. First of all, in connection with the events that Russians regard as a demonstration of superiority, power and appeal of the country, i.e. in connection with the annexation of Crimea.

Majority of Russians (82%) are sure that Russia has a very notable influence on the global stage. Over six years the share of respondents sharing this point of view grew by more than a third (from 58% in 2008). To this evaluation of Russia's influence all ages yield surrender: 86% among youth (18-24 years old) and 79% among retired people (60 years old and older).

Since 2003 the share of respondents who point out that Russia needs to restore its superpower status increased from 34% up to 42% (Table 4). At the same time the share of respondents who deny Russia aspiration for any global aim decreased almost down to the level of statistical error.

THE CEC AND EXIT-POLLS: TOGETHER, NOT INSTEAD

Presidential elections were held in Ukraine on the 25th of May. According to official data from the CEC, P. Poroshenko (independent candidate) achieved a convincing victory in the first round by getting 54.7% of votes. The second and the third place were occupied, as it was expected, by Y. Tymoshenko (Batkivshchyna Party) – 12.8% and O. Lyashko (Radical Party) – 8.3%.

Official results of the voting are not so important for our bulletin. What's interesting is their practical co-

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you think, which aim should Russia aspire for in the XXI century?", %

Variant of answer	2003	2007	2008	2010	2013	2014
To restore the superpower status, which had the USSR	34	34	36	33	37	42
To be one of 10-15 economically developed and politically influential countries	35	47	45	42	44	41
To obtain leadership over the post-Soviet space	16	9	8	8	9	10
Russia should not aspire for any global aim	7	5	6	9	7	4
DA	8	5	5	8	3	3

Table 5

Results of exit-polls conducted in Ukraine on the 25th of May (% of votes)

Politician	The CEC results	National exit-poll	TNS exit-poll	Savik Shuster Studio exit-poll
P. Poroshenko	54.7	55.9	57.3	55.7
Y. Tymoshenko	12.8	12.9	12.4	12.9
O. Lyashko	8.3	8.0	8.7	8.8

According to V. Solovey, professor in Moscow State Institute of International Relations, "because of the events in Ukraine Russians have a vague feeling of power. <...> And what's the most important, it is the media reality, which is created by the informational and propagandist machine of Russia. In this reality Russia occupies a very important place; it is a kind of "Russia-centrism". Majority of people perceives reality through the prism of TV, and it creates an image of the world where Russia occupies the central place: everyone considers or hates Russia".

incidence with exit-poll data, which were published by three independent groups of sociologists right after polling stations were closed.

First exit-poll was conducted by several public organizations, in particular by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF), the Razumkov Center and the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (17 thousand of respondents were interrogated on 400 polling stations).

Second exit-poll (All-Ukrainian TV exit-poll) was

conducted by the staff of "TNS in Ukraine", executing orders of TV-companies "1+1", TV channel "Ukraine", "Inter" and ICTV (20 thousand of respondents were interrogated on 610 polling stations).

Third exit-poll was conducted by sociologists of "Savik Shuster Studio" (no data of number of respondents and polling stations).

Even under the conditions of unstable socio-political situation in Ukraine all three groups of sociologists managed to obtain results close to official ones. Table 5 clearly demonstrates professionalism of Ukrainian sociologists and efficiency of modern polls on the exit from polling stations.

That is why there is nothing strange in the fact that Belarusian power actively opposes to exit-polls conducted by independent sociological services.

V. PUTIN VS. S. BANDERA

Policy, which drew president V. Putin's electoral support to the maximum level over the last 14 years, naturally led to a completely opposite result in Ukraine.

Sociological group "Rating" conducted a research on the topic "Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and the attitude to separate persons" during the period of April 5-15, 2014. This research showed that according to the level of negative attitude of Ukrainians V. Putin outran not only Peter I, whose troops ravaged Baturyn, the capital of the Cossack Hetmanate in 1708 and Zaporizhian Sich in 1709; not only I. Mazepa who was represented as traitor of Russian and Ukrainian people by Russian and Soviet propaganda during several generations; but even I. Stalin, who organized golodomor which killed millions of Ukrainians.

Only 16% of respondents have a positive attitude to V. Putin, while 76% have a negative attitude. Almost each one in ten couldn't define his attitude. Over the last year negative attitude to the national leader of Russia almost doubled (from 40% up to 76%), whereas in October 2013 number of those who had a positive attitude to V. Putin (47%) exceeded number of respondents with negative attitude (40%). Positive attitude is observed only in Donbass (66%), while in other regions negative attitude dominates – from almost 70% in the South and in the East and up to more than 90% in the Center, in the North and in the West of the country. Less than a half of ethnic Russians have a positive attitude to V. Putin, as for ethnic Ukrainians, only each one in ten has a positive attitude.

20% of respondents have a positive attitude to I. Stalin, while 70% have a negative one. Almost one in ten couldn't define his attitude. Over the last two years the level of negative attitude to I. Stalin grew from 62% up to 70%. The person of I. Stalin is more positively evaluated in Donbass (36%) and in the South (32%) of the country. The older the respondents are and the lower their level of education is, the more positive is their attitude to I. Stalin. Ethnic

Russians are twice as positive about I. Stalin as ethnic Ukrainians.

Quite high level of positive attitude to S. Bandera (31%) is worth mentioning. At the same time the share of negative evaluations amounted almost to a half of respondents (48%). Almost one in five couldn't express his attitude. Over the last two years the level of positive attitude to S. Bandera grew from 22% up to 31%. More positively S. Bandera is perceived in the West (76%). This share is twice as low in the Center and in the North of the Country. The interesting fact is that the younger the respondents are and the higher their level of education is, the better their attitude to S. Bandera is. Only ethnic Ukrainians evaluate the person of S. Bandera positively.

As for the nostalgia for the USSR, in April 2014 one third (33%) of respondents regret the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the same time almost half of respondents (49%) have no regrets. It should be noted that since 2010 the number of those who have nostalgia for the USSR dropped from 46% down to 33%. Accordingly the number of those who don't regret the breakup of the Soviet Union grew from 36% up to 49%. The changes in Ukrainian society were occurring increasingly: in 2010 46% of respondents regretted the breakup of the USSR, in 2013 – 41%, in 2014 – already 33%.

This dynamics is quite surprising. Stormy political events of the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 had a negative influence on the living standard of people. Experience of Russian sociologists testifies that under similar conditions there is usually an increasing demand for the "great soviet past". However, Ukrainian trend is inverse, and this is an indirect evidence of the depth of changes that happen in the country.

One third of people living in the Center, one half of residents of the East and the South, and more than 60% of residents of Donbass regret the breakup of the USSR. In the Center, the East and the South their number decreased over the last year, while in Donbass – increased. The older the respondents are and the lower their level of incomes and education is, the more they regret the USSR. At the same time, if we analyze the dynamics, we can see that the number of people regretting the USSR decreased in all age groups without exception. Yet their number among ethnic Russians increased from 55% up to 60% over the year, while it went down among ethnic Ukrainians – from 38% down to 29%.

Among those who are nostalgic for the USSR, 70% have a positive attitude to Peter I, 40% – to I. Stalin, 34% – to V. Putin. Among those who don't regret the breakup of the Soviet Union, 50% have a positive attitude to S. Bandera, 40% – to Peter I, and they have an extremely negative attitude to I. Stalin (87%) and V. Putin (94%).

LIEUTENANT'S SALVATION COST OBAMA MUCH

While Russian president quickly gains electoral points, American sociologists fix an opposite trend for

his American colleague. In fact B. Obama's rating fell from incredible heights already in 2010. Since that it is floating around 50-60%. In May another milestone was reached: according to Gallup agency, only 47% of respondents expressed support to B. Obama, while 52% expressed disapproval. This means that for the first time over 6 years of B. Obama's presidency his combined rating fell down to -5%.

An overwhelming majority (89%) of Republicans consider that B. Obama is a weak leader. Among independents this opinion is shared by 59% of respondents. There are quite many of dissatisfied people even among Democrats – 22%.

Americans' evaluations of different qualities of their president go from bad to worse. Only 48% of respondents are convinced that B. Obama understands problems which simple Americans face every day. 47% of respondents consider him honest and trustworthy. 45% of respondents called him a strong and decisive leader. 43% of respondents are sure that the President shares their values. 39% of respondents think that B. Obama can manage government effectively. Only one third of respondents (34%) hope that B. Obama has a clear plan for solving the country's problems.

By comparison, his ratings on four of these characteristics measured in April 2009, roughly 100 days into his presidency, ranged from 60% for shares your values to 73% for being a strong and decisive leader.

Unlike Russians, who can love their national leader exclusively for "small victorious wars", Americans are egocentric. They don't give a damn about international situation, and they love or hate their political leaders only for their achievements on the "internal front".

Thus, previous B. Obama's rating falls happened in the end of 2013, when mass media were widely discussing problems, which were caused by realization of B. Obama's NSA reform plan, which was the main legislative innovation of American presidency.

Over the last weeks American media were perpetrating two scandals. One of them is connected with help to veterans in hospitals, which are subject of Veteran Affairs department. The second one is due to the fact that 5 Guantanamo Bay detainees were returned to the Taliban in exchange for the release of Army Sgt. B. Bergdahl.

It may seem that American administration's actions in this case shouldn't trigger any questions. Citizens of the state should be saved under any conditions; otherwise no one would serve in the army. Still some questions were triggered. It turned out that

B. Bergdahl had walked off his base and away from his unit after becoming disillusioned with the efforts of America in Afghanistan. Besides, as CNN states it, at least 6 people perished during his research.

All this doesn't mean that an American citizen should have been left in Afghanistan. What is questionable is the fact that this decision was made solely by the White House without consulting Congress, and why they try to represent him as a hero.

Certain Republican congressmen stated that administration infringed some standard procedures while carrying out the operation, and didn't notify Congress a month before releasing of the Guantanamo detainees. House Speaker J. Boehner noted that the swap of an American soldier versus militants exposes to the world the fact that the USA compromised their principle not to negotiate with terrorists.

"Taliban factor" was also recorded by the Fox TV channel (they had ordered a survey which was conducted by three American sociological services). According to June survey, 55% of respondents are convinced that the USA became weaker under the rule of the 44th President. The other point of view is shared by 35% of respondents. The number of Americans convinced that the President made the USA weaker, increased by 10% since 2010. 68% of respondents also consider that current administration is less qualified than the team of his Democrat predecessor B. Clinton.

What's interesting is that these are Republicans that are most positive about B. Clinton now. According to a survey, 84% of Republicans and only 53% of Democrats note his advantages over the current American leader. At the same time majority of independent voters (69%) also consider B. Clinton's administration more qualified than B. Obama's.

Moreover, in the eyes of Americans B. Obama loses even to the least popular over the last years President, G. Bush, Jr.: 48% of respondents consider current administration less qualified than G. Bush's. Though, in this case the gap is not as big: the other point of view is shared by 42% of Americans, while others didn't know how to answer.

Sociological review was adapted from materials of Public Opinion Foundation (fom.ru), "Levada-Center" (levada.ru), WCIOM (wciom.ru), Kiev International Institute of Sociology (kiis.com.ua), Center for Social and Marketing Research "SOCIS" (socis.kiev.ua), Sociological group "Rating" (ratinggroup.com.ua), Razumkov Center (razumkov.org.ua), Gallup (gallup.com).

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