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Dear readers!

In another issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" we offer to your attention materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute researches in the first quarter of 2014.

Our surveys show that in the first quarter of this year "economic well-being" of Belarusians became more complex in comparison with the simple decrease of the previous year. For example, the ratio of those whose financial standing improved over the last three months to those whose financial standing went downhill continues to decrease; real incomes of citizens began to decrease as well after a small increase of the previous year. At the same time, the number of Belarusians considering that Belarusian economy is in crisis decreased, while their optimism for the future strengthened. While Belarusians don't understand economic theory very well, millions of them come to the idea of market economy system by practical considerations: about 40% of respondents consider capitalism to be a better regime for Belarus, the same number prefers socialism.

Stabilization of "economic well-being" of Belarusians influenced their attitude to the state power as well: the number of people trusting A. Lukashenko once again exceeded the number of those who don't trust him, and his electoral rating grew by 5%. At the same time there is an increase in the number of people who understand, that head of state, taking this position for almost two decades, cannot infinitely shift the blame for numerous failures in socio-economic and socio-political development of the country to other shoulders. That is why, despite the once again growing rating of the head of state, the number of people considering that "in general the state of things in our country is developing in a wrong direction" still exceeds the number of those who hold the opposite opinion. And if 53.2% of respondents "knew a person who could successfully compete with A. Lukashenko in the next presidential elections" they would vote for him, while only 34.5% would vote for the incumbent president.

The readiness for changes of Belarusians still has a concealed nature and avoids active forms and support of opposition. The number of those who consider themselves in opposition to the present power decreased once again. If people are dissatisfied with the power, "they can change it only by means of elections" according to almost 40% of respondents; the same number of them thinks that "they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones", and 15.6% of respondents gave the answer "by all means". It is not unlikely that these moods explain the popularity of the idea of "democratic referendum": almost a half of respondents expressed readiness to support it – this is an unprecedented result for oppositional initiatives.

Elections to local Councils were the main political event of the first quarter of the year. The power used the results of these elections to demonstrate their "unity with the people", while opposition used them to criticize political regime and to boost its role in social life. According to the results of the survey, voting turnout was lower by 20% than it was declared by the CEC; less than 19% of respondents voted early, while this figure according to the CEC amounts to 32%. Only one third of respondents know the results of the elections, a half of them trust official results and more than a fourth don't. One of the reasons for this distrust is that there were no equal conditions for all candidates, according to each fifth respondent. In particular, more than a fourth part of respondents said that powers supported one of the candidates in their district. That is why the same number of respondents agrees with the affirmations of opposition independent monitor groups that there were numerous infractions of laws and free-will of elections committees.

What concerns the foreign-policy orientations of Belarusians, the tendency to a thaw in relations to Europe and a cold snap in relations to Russia, observed over the last years, is changing to the opposite one: if there was a hypothetical referendum with a choice between integration with Russia and joining the EU, a half of respondents would choose the first variant, and less than a third of respondents would choose the second one (in December the ratio was 36.6% vs. 44.6%). It appears that the main reason for this "reverse" in foreign and domestic policy is the influence of the events in Ukraine. The turbulent events of last months in Ukraine are considered as "a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness" by almost 37% of respondents; the same share thinks that it was "an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy"; 28% of respondents consider the overthrow of President V. Yanukovich as "a just retribution for bloodletting", while almost 55% consider it as "an uprising and a power grab". 12.6% of respondents consider possible same course of events in Belarus, while 76.7% think it's impossible. Only 3.6% of respondents would like similar events to happen in Belarus, while 70% wouldn't. 21% of Belarusians sympathize opposition and Euromaydan, 16.1% sympathize the powers and President V. Yanukovich, and 56.2% took a neutral attitude. At the same time, "if similar events happen in Belarus today", about 16% are ready to actively participate on the side of Belarusian "Maydan", 11% on the side of the power, and two third of respondents wouldn't participate at all. 78% of respondents answered "no" to the question "Is better future worth the people's blood?", while only 14% answered "yes". Probably it is this mindset, deeply implanted into the history and culture of an "average Belarusian", and not just aggressive propaganda that explains the dynamics of public opinion during the last months.

In our "Open Forum" rubric we continue to present the most interesting results of work of our colleagues from neighboring countries. In the "Bookshelf" rubric Belarusian publicist Konstantin Skuratovich reviews the book of Alexander Tomkovich "The Newest History in Persons" published in English. In this book the well-known "chronicler of the Belarusian civil society" illustrates the newest history of our country with political essays on a hundred of its most active leaders, usually slurred by official sources.

As usual, your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In March of 2014 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.502 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

MARCH – 2014

Price growth is no obstacle to social optimism growth

In short-distance runs politics wins over economics. But in average- and long-distance runs it is economics that wins as a rule. The March survey shows it clearly.

The dynamics of public opinion in March was formed under the influence of events in Ukraine and Russia or, more specifically, under the interpretation of these events by Russian TV-media on the one hand (politics) and under the influence of day-to-day life (economics).

As is well known, this year government has no plans of repeating the record rate of real wages increase, demonstrated in 2013 (22.4% during the first quarter and 15.8% during the whole year). But Belarusians are accustomed to a two-digit increase of wages. Thus its decrease, even an insignificant one, should have had a negative impact on social indices. But this didn't happen. Politics won over economics:

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
It has improved	1.6	13.3	13.7	11.6	12.6	10.1
It has not changed	23.2	56.4	63.1	63.9	58.1	63.3
It has become worse	73.4	28.7	21.6	21.6	28.4	25.2
FSI*	**–71.8**	–15.4	–7.9	–10.0	–15.8	–15.1

** Financial standing index (the difference between positive and negative answers)*

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
It is going to improve	11.9	15.3	17.7	17.5	12.5	24.0
It is not going to change	20.3	44.7	49.1	46.7	46.1	45.0
It is going to become worse	55.5	27.3	23.7	28.1	35.9	26.1
EI*	**–43.6**	–12.0	–6.0	–10.6	–23.1	–2.1

** Expectation index*

Consumer price index amounted to 101.3% in March 2014 in comparison with February 2014 and to 104.9% in comparison with December 2013. Government plans on restricting headline inflation to 11% during the current year are clearly not going to be realized. Real wages (i.e. taking into account the increase of consumer prices for goods and services) in January-February 2014 jumped by 4.4% in comparison to January-February 2013, and dropped by 0.7% in February 2014 comparatively to January 2014.

expectation index jumped by 21 points (Table 2), policy correctness index jumped by 16.2 points (Table 3). Only financial standing index remains unchanged (Table 1). Unlike his "colleagues" he is least of all subjected to the influence of politics.

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
In the right direction	17.0	34.5	39.6	39.1	31.9	40.2
In the wrong direction	68.5	51.4	45.5	46.7	54.1	46.2
DA/NA	14.5	14.1	14.9	14.2	14.0	13.6
PCI*	**–51.5**	–16.9	–5.9	–7.6	–22.2	–6.0

** Policy correctness index*

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
Yes	87.6	64.8	59.8	57.4	68.6	54.6
No	8.0	24.6	29.5	32.4	22.2	34.5
DA/NA	4.4	10.6	10.7	10.2	9.2	10.9

Table 5

Distribution of answers to the question "In your opinion, how will your financial income change in comparison with the price growth in the near future?", %

Variant of answer	%
Financial income will grow faster than prices	6.7
Financial income will grow as fast as prices	27.7
Financial income will grow slower than prices	62.3
DA	3.3

Positive and negative evaluation of country's development policy are now almost equal (Table 3). Share of positive evaluations among Belarusians, who trust state media, amounts to 70.3%, among those, who don't trust them, 21.4%. Does that mean that state mass media significantly influence views of *their* public? We wouldn't haste on making such a conclusion, as the cause-and-effect relationship is not so evident in this case.

Seemingly, despite the considerable domination of state mass media, each Belarusian today has a choice (53% of respondents use Internet every day or several times a week). But the choice is made in favor of mass media, which provide a person with an acceptable "image". Everything which doesn't conform to this acceptable "image" is simply not perceived by information consumers.

33.9% of respondents with secondary education evaluate positively the course of country's development; 34.8% of respondents with higher education share the same opinion. There is nothing to be surprised of. In Belarus most of licentiates are so called "budget-getters", i.e. people whose financial well-being depends of the generosity of the state.

The victory of politics over economics is confirmed by the answers to the following question "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?" as well (Table 4). After the first quarter of 2014 the share of respondents who answered this question affirmatively dropped by 14 points. Among respondents who trust national mass media 34.5% agree, that there is a crisis, among those who don't trust them, the share is twice as big – 67.5%. We do not see any significant difference between respondents with secondary and higher education in this case as well – 58.7% vs. 61.1%.

For reference the first column shows results, recorded at the peak of economic crisis of 2011.

We can make sure that the growth of optimism is formed under the influence of politics while reading the answers to the question "In your opinion, how will your financial income change in comparison with the price growth in the near future?" (Table 5). This question is very earthbound, that is why the answers do not correlate with the positive dynamics, shown in Tables 2-4.

In particular, only 6.7% of respondents think that their personal financial income will grow faster than prices. 62.3% of respondents (almost 10 times bigger) share the opposite opinion! In other words, a mass decrease of life level is not contradictory to a right course of development (40.2%).

Table 6 provides us ground for comparing dynamics of social indices during "a small victorious war of Russia in Georgia" in August 2008 to the present situation. Considering the scale of events, reaction of Belarusian society was the same: in September financial standing index didn't change comparatively to June, while expectation index and policy correctness index grew. Further changes of indices (December 2008) were formed under the influence of another world-scale event – a worldwide financial crisis.

Table 6

Dynamics of financial standing index, expectation index and policy correctness index

Social indices	06'08	09'08	12'08	09'13	12'13	03'14
Financial standing index (FSI)	–6	–5	–21	–10	–16	–15
Expectation index (EI)	10	16	–24	–11	–23	–3
Policy correctness index (PCI)	11	23	11	–8	–22	–6

Table 7

Dynamics of answering the question "Which proprietary type is more effective economically according to you?", %

Variant of answer	12'93	11'94	06'95	06'96	06'97*	03'14
State	29.0	39.7	47.1	44.8	48.3	37.7
Private	52.8	45.9	41.8	42.5	44.0	51.3
Reasonable mix of both	11.7	8.6	8.5	10.0	–	–
Collective	1.0	0.5	0.2	1.0	–	–
Other	0.9	2.9	0.7	0.2	5.7	2.8
NA	4.6	2.4	1.7	1.5	2.0	8.2

** As the list of proposed variants was changed, it wouldn't be correct to compare the results of 1993-96 yrs to the results of 1997-2014*

Table 8

Dynamics of answering the question "What enterprise would you like to work at?", %

Variant of answer	11'97	06'06	09'07	10'08	09'09	09'10	03'11	03'13	03'14
State enterprise	53.5	52.0	47.9	44.9	44.1	42.6	43.0	40.5	40.2
Private enterprise	35.7	33.0	39.3	33.1	28.0	32.9	36.2	41.0	41.1

The ghost of soviet empire (the USSR) is still able to captivate a lot of Belarusians, though not as much as Russians, because after 23 years of independence Belarusians didn't get rid of soviet past. Any actions, perceived as a renewal of past geopolitical power, lower the level of discomfort in society, which is reflected in the growth of social indices.

Guaranteed work on a low salary!

After 23 years of independence Belarusian society still cannot define its attitude towards two main "-isms" of Soviet ideology, i.e. capitalism and socialism. In March the answers on the question "Which regime is more acceptable for Belarus?" were divided almost equally: capitalism – 38.3%, socialism – 39.9% (21.1% of respondents didn't know what to answer).

According to a standard course of Marxism-Leninism the difference between two leading socio-political systems of the XX century lies in the first place in the prevailing type of property. That is why there is nothing surprising in the fact that in Belarusian society there is no consent about comparative efficacy of state and private property (Table 7).

In December 1993, when the disappointment of perestroika hopes didn't come yet, private property's advances were evident for most Belarusians. But two years later state property took the lead. It should be noted that Belarusians, supposedly inclined to collective property, never denoted efficacy of collective property in any of 93-96 yrs' surveys.

Personal experience, acquired by Belarusians after 23 years of constructing Belarusian economic model, boosted "efficiency rating" of private property. In March it amounted to 51.3%, but the share of supporters of state property remains incredibly high in European terms.

The question on comparative efficacy of different proprietary types had naturally turned out to be politically-charged. Among supporters of A. Lukashenko (those who trust him) 61.2% of respondents consider state propriety to be more efficient, while among A. Lukashenko's opponents (those who don't trust him) this share amounts to 16.7%. As for private property, the picture is reverse: 28.3% and 73.6% accordingly.

But to express opinion about "-isms" and basic proprietary types is one thing, and to take into account proprietary type of enterprise while looking for a job is quite another. In 1997 majority of Belarusians preferred state as an employer (Table 8). During economic crises (2009 and 2011), when the feeling of safety disappears, majority of Belarusians look for protection under the wing of state, and it naturally increases the wish to work at state enterprises.

Over the past year the appeal of state and private enterprises almost didn't change, and this testifies of a relative stability of Belarusian economy from public point of view. But it's a survey average. Those who desire to work at state enterprises prevail among the supporters of A. Lukashenko – 56.2% vs. 22.2%. The

Table 9

Dynamics of answering the question "Did you have to participate in non-state economic activities?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	11'94	03'14
Wage labor in non-state sector	9.9	24.7
Reselling of goods	19.6	16.9
Individual labor activity	17.7	14.5
Capital investments (stock items and others)	5.9	6.5
Owning (co-owning) an enterprise, a firm and others	3.2	2.9
Other	2.3	4.8

Table 10

Dynamics of answering the question "What would you choose?", %

Variant of answer	04'92	03'14
A high salary with a high risk of losing your job	51.4	47.1
A low salary on a guaranteed job	45.9	51.8
NA	2.7	1.1

relationship is inverse among his opponents – 24.8% vs. 60.7%.

Young people of age between 18 and 29 years old prefer to work at private enterprises (63.5%), but veteran workers, who are close to retirement age (40-49 years old) prefer state enterprises (23.3%).

Education level doesn't have a significant influence. In particular, 48.9% of respondents with primary education, 48.4% of respondents with unfinished secondary education, 38.3% of respondents with secondary education, 37.1% of respondents with secondary vocational education and 41.1% of respondents with higher education wish to work at state enterprises.

It should be noted once more, that there is a high share of civil servants among Belarusians with higher education, and this naturally has an influence on their preferences when choosing their place of work.

Answers to the question "Did you have to participate in non-state economic activities?" let us evaluate the dynamics of economic activities of Belarusians over the past 20 years (Table 9).

If we exclude the first variant of answer ("wage labor in non-state sector") we may conclude that Belarusian society's development stagnates. This isn't a wrong conclusion. Belarusian model blocks society's economic activity, and its' architects do it on purpose, because they don't know how to build up relationships with free and independent people.

Everything that is able to "stir" independently, beyond the control of "power vertical" (it doesn't matter if we talk about political, economic or social activities) is methodically destroyed or, at best, marginalized.

As a result the only subject of economy in Belarus is bureaucracy. Its ability to modernize state enterprises was clearly shown during the "make-or-break" year 2013.

All stated above is confirmed by the answers to the question of Table 10. Due to the efforts of the paternalistic state the share of Belarusians who prefer a low but a guaranteed salary didn't change in 22 years but even grew up.

It is only possible to rest upon something that resists. Sure, a passive, dependent person is very handy for the authoritarian power. But Belarusian model, no matter what's your attitude to it, functions under the conditions of external competition. Russian subsidies soften the acuteness of competition to some extent, but that is all.

That is why A. Lukashenko is obliged to rush about the country in order to sort out the "mess" on state enterprises. But the employees of state enterprises are only worried about possible loss of guarantees for their low salaries. They got used to the "mess", it doesn't bother them.

The Crimea component of A. Lukashenko's ratings

Ukraine wasn't so lucky to have its own Lukashenko. "This is exactly what caused dissatisfaction of some citizens and discords in society. I'm sure, if Ukraine had had its own Lukashenko, there would have been no those troubles that befell our sister nation", – told A. Rubinov on the 2nd of April during the opening of the 4th session of the 5th Congress of the upper house of the Belarusian parliament.

Grateful Belarusians respond to their leader with great support. Electoral rating of A. Lukashenko maintains over the 30% mark during two decades already. There were two exceptions, but they only prove the rule.

The head of state could not but get his dividends from the growth of positive moods in Belarusian society in March. As a result, a negative trend, outlined under the influence of real wages decrease in the end of the previous year, didn't develop. Comparatively to December, electoral rating of A. Lukashenko gained 5 points (Table 11).

Certainly, Belarusian "batka" is still far from the level of support people give to Russian president V. Putin. According to Public Opinion Foundation

Table 11

Dynamics of electoral rating of president A. Lukashenko, %

Date	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
Electoral rating	20.5	33.4	37.3	42.6	34.8	39.8

Table 12

Dynamics of trust rating of president A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	09'11	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
I trust him	24.5	43.4	48.9	46.7	37.7	45.9
I don't trust him	62.0	43.2	40.6	36.7	47.5	44.1
DA/NA	13.5	13.4	10.5	16.7	14.8	10.0

Table 13

Level of trust to president A. Lukashenko depending on sex, age and education of respondents*,%

Socio-demographic characteristics	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
	Trust	Distrust
Sex:		
Male	35.9	53.2
Female	54.2	36.4
Age:		
less than 29 years old	29.4	58.5
30-39	31.2	55.9
40-49	40.1	49.5
50-59	40.1	48.8
60 +	82.3	13.1
Education:		
Primary	93.5	6.5
Incomplete secondary	76.3	18.4
Secondary	37.0	48.6
Vocational	41.9	50.2
Higher	36.5	52.2

** Table is read across*

electoral rating of the "national Russian leader" jumped from 46% to 66% since the 23rd of February until the 30th of March (+20 points). Further rating growth seems to be unlikely, and that was confirmed by a survey, conducted on the 6th of April – 65% (–1 point).

Exhaustion of electoral resources of Russian president under the circumstances of overmobilization of the society and electoral rating stagnation on the mark 66% clearly show the level of objectivity of state sociological services in Belarus: according to their information electoral rating of "batka" never goes below 75% even in absence of mobilization effect.

A. Lukashenko's trust rating gained 8.2 points and exceeded distrust rating: 45.9% vs. 44.1% (Table 12). These are sad news for the supporters of "new majority" theory.

But everything's not so hopeless. According to answers to the question "If you knew a person who could successfully compete with A. Lukashenko in the next presidential elections, would you vote for him or for A. Lukaskenko?", this unknown candidate leaves no chance to the head of state. 53.2% of Belarusians are ready to vote for him, while only 34.5% are ready to vote for A. Lukashenko.

Similar convincing electoral victories of an unknown candidate were recorded earlier as well. In particular, in September 2003 the unknown candidate had even a bigger advance: 55.9% vs. 24.5%. The only thing is that only 13.2% of respondents could name such a candidate.

The question "Do you know such a person?" wasn't asked in March 2014. Among the named politicians the second place was occupied by V. Neklyaev – 7.1% (rating question "If the elections of President of Belarus were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote?" was asked in an open form).

Following the trust rating of A. Lukashenko government's trust rating increased as well, but only by 3.7 points (from 29.4% to 33.1%). Government in Belarus, as it is known, is purely technical and does not aspire to the role of a political subject. That is why the echo of political events in Russia and Ukraine had only a small effect on the government.

Polarization of society is a uniform condition of society mobilization. Sociologist Y. Levada noted in 1994: "The idea of social mobilization since long ago sees a heavy use in sociologic literature for defining

such processes as concentration of mass attention on a narrow group of problems, utmost simplification of social confrontations up to the "our people/enemies" dichotomy, monopolization of power and informational influence and others".

In this case simplification should be regarded as polarization. Let us see Table 13. In March 2014 the share of respondent trusting A. Lukashenko was 2.8-fold higher among the elder age group in comparison to the younger age group; the same share was 2.6-fold higher among Belarusians with primary education than among Belarusians with higher education. In March 2013, when trust rating was almost the same (Table 12), these ratios were lower: 2.3- and 2.5-fold accordingly.

In the first place those were the pensioners who responded to Russian propaganda: in March 2013 70.3% of respondents in the oldest age group trusted A. Lukashenko, in March 2014 this figure equals to 82.3% (+12 points!).

After the failure of state enterprises' modernization campaign (the word "modernization" was used 49 times in the Message-2013) A. Lukashenko decided to raise efficacy at the cost of repressions against managerial body. More and more often his inspectional trips over the country end up with orders "to initiate a criminal case and to sort out all questions".

Modern Belarusian society en masse grew out of "Stalin's overcoat" that is why this policy is approved by many Belarusians (Table 14). 45.9% of respondents agreed to the possibility of the efficacy growth of Belarusian enterprises by means of toughening performance discipline of managers of all levels; 43% of respondents disagreed.

conditions we don't dare to make even short-term forecasts.

Homo sovieticus as the basis of electoral authoritarianism

The reason for the popularity of the Great Patriotic War cult can be explained by the answers to the question "Which regime is more acceptable for Belarus?" (Table 15), even if this may seem kind of strange. After the years of independence political elite of the country didn't manage to create an image of future. There is no such image in public opinion as well. That is why the lack of future may be compensated with past, the heroic past.

In December 1993 the share of socialism adherents exceeded the share of capitalism adherents by 1.3-fold. Two and a half years later this ratio increased up to 1.9. A major part of this time Belarusians under the lead of "nation-wide-elected president" were striving to get back to a similarity of Soviet past. Partly they had managed to do it.

Over the next 18 years the shares of adherents of two mutually excluding economic systems became almost equal. Naturally, among the supporters of A. Lukashenko adherents of socialism prevail, while his opponents mostly adhere to capitalism. But in both groups domination is not overwhelming.

The absence of the variant "Other" in March survey resulted in an increase of the share of respondents, who had difficulties with the answer. It should be noted, that these shares turned out to be almost equal among supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko. This equality is quite unexpected, if you remember that among the opponents of A. Lukashenko dominate people with higher education. Still the share of respondents who had difficulties with the answer among Belarusians with higher education is almost as high as the average – 21.5% (23.7% for respondents with primary education)!

Table 14

Distribution of answers to the question "On the 31st of January president A. Lukashenko gave order to prepare a decree, which will introduce criminal responsibility of managers of all levels for the failure of woodworking enterprises' modernization on time. What do you think about this order?", %

Variant of answer	%
I approve it	39.6
I disapprove it	27.8
I don't care	28.6
DA/NA	4.0

Table 15

Dynamics of answering the question "Which regime is more acceptable for Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	12'93	06'96	03'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
				Trust	Distrust
Capitalism	31.6	28.6	38.3	27.9	51.7
Socialism	40.9	54.7	39.9	51.2	29.2
Other	13.7	9.1	–	–	–
DA/NA	13.8	7.6	21.8	20.9	19.0

Current values of A. Lukashenko's ratings, provoked by the euphoria caused by Crimea joining Russia, won't maintain for a long time. Nevertheless the Russian-Ukrainian crisis continues to deepen, according to last information, and it's probable that this local crisis will become international. In these

However the ever high popularity of socialism in Belarusian society should not be regarded as a wish to go back to the Soviet past. It means that the idealized image of the Soviet past is used as a base for criticizing modern state of things.

Nevertheless "homo sovieticus" is still prevailing in Belarusian society. Choosing between good laws and good leaders, this species confidently prefers leaders (Table 16). Media echo of Euromaydan only strengthened his preferences: there was no "batka" in Ukraine, hence all the troubles.

words, when the level of income increases, the level of economic dependency increases as well. The reason for this paradox is apparent: the main source of income's growth within the framework of Belarusian model is the state!

Belarusians do not show any particular wish to become free of state surveillance, nevertheless they resolutely speak against state limitations of salary growth (Table 18). Over 21 years the share of opponents to such limitations increased from 58.7% to 71% (+14.3 points).

Table 16

Dynamics of answering the question "What is more important for Belarus according to you?", %

Variant of answer	03'13	03'14
Good laws	33.3	31.9
Good leaders	59.7	64.2
DA/NA	7.0	3.9

Table 17

Dynamics of answering the question "Which life principle is more suitable for you?", %

Variant of answer	11'94	03'14
I make all decisions by myself, I rely on myself, I take the consequences of me deeds and decisions	52.3	57.8
I am ready to bring my own interests under the interests of society and I think that state must provide me with an acceptable life level	47.1	41.9
NA	0.6	0.3

Table 18

Dynamics of answering the question "Should state set limits (a "cap") for a maximal personal income of its citizens?", %

Variant of answer	12'93	03'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Distrust
Yes	22.5	21.6	32.0	12.1
No	58.7	71.0	60.2	83.6
DA/NA	18.8	7.4	7.8	4.3

Belarusians, preferring good laws, in a greater extent prefer capitalism as well – 45.2% vs. 31%. Accordingly, their opponents prefer socialism – 45% vs. 34.6%. But the difference is not so great, as you may notice. Which means, that, according to millions of Belarusians, capitalism may function well under the conditions of an authoritarian politic system, and socialism may blossom in a rule-of-law state.

Over two decades of life under the conditions of Belarusian model the share of citizens relying on themselves and not on the state gained only 5.5 points. The share of Belarusians openly admitting their inability to settle their private life without the help of the state dropped by a similar figure (Table 17).

Almost every third opponent of A. Lukashenko pin his hopes on the state – 32.4%, every second of his supporters does the same, 29.3% of men and 52.3% of women chose this variant. We should note a paradoxical dependency of the need in a paternalistic care on the level of income per a family member: up to 1.2 million rubles – 32.3%, 1.9-3.8 million rubles – 44.1% and over 3.8 million rubles – 44.1%. In other

The share of Belarusians supporting the setting of a cap for personal incomes of citizens among the supporters of A. Lukashenko is almost three times as big as it is among his opponents. Taking into account the differences in the age structure of supporters and opponents of the head of state (pensioners prevail among the supporters) there is nothing surprising in this ratio.

A Soviet person cannot imagine anything beyond the state. For him non-state medicine, education, literature, economy and so on – are illegitimate, defective institutions. He himself is a part of the state. He is a state addict.

But at the same time he knows that real state will certainly cheat on him, will gaff something which he is supposed to get "according to the law". That is why he considers that he can neglect what the power demands (he goofs off, he scams, he avoids his duties).

It's a mistake to think that "homo sovieticus" is a "vanishing scenery". After 23 years of independence the share of such people in Belarusian society changed insignificantly. The reason for the durability

of "homo sovieticus" is in purposeful efforts of the state. Under the conditions of electoral authoritarianism it would be impossible to obtain "elegant" victories if there was no such social type.

We vote despite we don't trust the results

During March elections of local Councils' deputies Belarusian people didn't let down their "batka" and were thanked for it: "Thanks to the people for supporting us in these elections, for coming so numerous. Surely, the situation put us on the alert, and I've asked people to come. The fact people come to elections is a strong argument for me. I often take it out of my pocket and put it on the table during important negotiations. And everyone understands: if almost 80% of populations come to elections, it means that they trust the power. It means I have some kind of strength in those negotiations. It's a very big argument".

Speaking accurately to a tenth, voter turnout amounted to 77.4% including early voting before the 23rd of March. All this is according to the information provided by the CEC. This level of turnout is quite adequate to "the Belarusian election standard", established during the constitutional referendum of 1996. This is 20 points less than the average figure over the aughties.

The overall turnout is only 7 points lower than the average figure over the aughties. From the look of it, "responsibility" for the growth of the turnout relatively to December survey should be laid on the mobilization of Belarusian society by Russian mass media.

The decrease of turnout comparatively to the elections of 2010 happened at the cost of voters, that don't trust A. Lukashenko: June 2010 – 49.9%, March 2014 – 39.4% (–10.5 points). As for the voters who trust A. Lukashenko, their "political consciousness" almost hasn't changed: June 2010 – 74.5%, March 2014 – 73% (–1.5 points).

Rural and small town people demonstrated a traditionally high electoral activity – 65.5% and 68.4% accordingly. Turnout in Minsk amounted to 39.7%.

Turnout depends on the level of incomes per family member as well. Incomes which are lower and higher than average are not favorable for the electoral activity of Belarusians. The least financially secured people are busy trying to survive. The most financially secured people do not care about elections anymore: 1.2 million rubles – 53.8%, 1.2-1.9 million rubles – 62.4%, 1.9-3.8 million rubles – 59.4% and more than 3.8 million rubles – 47.6%.

According to the CEC 32% of voters voted early.

Table 19

Dynamics of answering the question "Did you vote on local Councils' deputies elections in March 2014?"*, %

Variant of answer	03'03	01'07	06'10	03'14	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
					Trust	Distrust
Yes	65.8	61.8	64.6	57.0	73.0	39.4
No	33.1	37.7	35.3	43.0	27.0	60.6

** Date had been changing according to the date of elections*

Table 20

Dynamics of answering the question "When did you vote?", %

Variant of answer	01'07	06'10	03'14
I voted early	23.4	17.3	18.9
I voted on the day of the elections	38.5	47.3	37.9
I didn't vote	37.8	35.1	43.2

Table 21

Dynamics of answering the question "Did anyone push you to vote for a specific candidate?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	01'07	06'10	03'14
Yes	3.9	4.4	4.1.	4.2
No	90.3	94.1	94.2	87.6

National survey results deviated from the CEC information by 20 points (Table 19). There was nothing unexpected. Three months prior to the elections, against the background of total apathy in Belarusian society, a record-low level of expected turnout was registered – 44% (67.1% among the supporters of A. Lukashenko and 27.2% among his opponents).

Let us note that official results of early votes steadily grow: 2007 – 24.9%, 2010 – 29.3% and almost every third voter in 2014.

IISEPS results once more turned out to be lower – 18.9% (Table 20). However there is almost no difference with the results of 2010. The decrease of turnout happened at the cost of votes during the main day of elections.

A 60% turnout is considered to be quite high by the standards of democratic countries. In Belarus high turnout is usually explained by Soviet heritage, however there was no mass early vote in the USSR. In this regard the low share of respondents who answer affirmatively the question of Table 21 seems to be quite suspicious.

There are two possible explanations. Firstly, many people (let's not forget that they are grown-ups) are ashamed to admit that they had fulfilled their civil duty under dictation. Secondly, the difference between a request, a recommendation and an open threat of the boss is often very relative. That is why something which would be unambiguously perceived as a dictation by a European, would be interpreted in a wholly different way by a typical Soviet Belarusian.

The same logic should be used while analyzing the changes recorded in the answers to the question "Did the power support any candidate in your district?" (Table 23). Pay attention to the last line of the table. Almost a half of respondents couldn't answer this apparently simple question. And almost every third respondent had difficulties answering the previous question.

For comparison: after presidential elections in 2010 only 11.5% of respondents didn't know how to answer a question about equal conditions for candidates. Presidential elections in Belarus run under the conditions of maximal mobilization of electorate, and majority of Belarusians have no doubts whom favors "the machinery of government".

While analyzing the answers to the question of Table 24 attention should be paid to the "Didn't vote" variant. The share of those who didn't vote jumped by 11.4 points in comparison with 2010, and this once more confirms the low turnout of March elections.

Table 22

Dynamics of answering the question "Did all the candidates to local Councils' deputies had equal conditions according to you?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	01'07	06'10	03'14
Yes	40.4	47.1	45.6	45.1
No	25.0	26.3	27.2	20.8
DA/NA	34.6	26.6	27.2	34.1

Table 23

Dynamics of answering the question "Did the authority support any candidate in your district?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	01'07	06'10	03'14
Yes	24.7	35.1	32.4	27.7
No	20.1	23.3	23.7	24.0
DA/NA	55.2	41.6	43.9	48.3

Table 24

Dynamics of answering the question "What candidate did you vote for?", %

Variant of answer	06'10	03'14
For a candidate supporting A. Lukashenko	31.2	22.2
For a candidate opposing A. Lukashenko	9.4	10.2
For another candidate	10.7	8.7
"None of the above"	5.9	5.6
I've spoiled the bulletin	0.5	0.5
I didn't vote	31.2	42.6
Refused to answer	7.9	8.4
NA	3.2	1.8

Parliamentary and local elections are dull in Belarus. State mass media, as a rule, only publish official messages from the CEC and accompany them with minimal comments. Judging by the answers to the question "Did all the candidates to local Councils' deputies had equal conditions according to you?" (Table 22) the level of "dullness" was record high in 2014, and that led to a decrease of negative answers by 6.4 points. And that's against the background of lower trust to A. Lukashenko: June 2010 – 54.3%, March 2014 – 45.9% (–8.4 points).

How can we talk about preferences to the candidates from power, when electoral campaign was limited to official declarations by the CEC!

At the cost of lower turnout candidates supporting A. Lukashenko "lost" some votes. Certainly, the distribution of votes between three types of candidates shouldn't be taken literally. Only 689 of 24.858 registered candidates (0.028%) declared their party identification. That is why 10.2% of voters couldn't vote for candidates opposing A. Lukashenko. But it's a thankless and senseless occupation to blame public opinion for the lack of logic.

Table 25

Dynamics of answering the question "Are the announced results of elections to the local Councils trustworthy according to you?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	06'10	03'14
Yes	45.7	52.6	49.3
No	26.2	27.3	28.5
DA/NA	28.1	20.1	22.2

Table 26

Dynamics of answering the question "Opposition and independent monitor groups say that there were numerous infractions of laws and free-will of elections committees during the lections to local Councils. Do you agree with this?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	01'07	06'10	03'14
Yes	19.6	25.7	23.8	25.5
No	36.0	43.4	49.7	46.4
DA/NA	44.4	30.9	26.5	28.1

Table 27

Dynamics of answering the question "Do you know the results of the deputies' elections to the local Councils?", %

Variant of answer	03'03	01'07	06'10	03'14
Yes	51.8	48.2	42.1	32.4
No	45.5	46.9	51.1	63.3
DA	2.7	4.9	6.8	4.3

If a candidate, not demonstrating openly his support to the head of state, is perceived as his opponent, this is the evidence of popularity of black-and-white thinking in the polarized society.

Level of trust to official results of elections didn't change significantly (Table 25). About a half of Belarusians trust them, 28.5% don't trust. Let us remind you that the turnout amounted to 57%. Hence a part of respondents participated in a political event without trusting its results.

A whole bunch of explanations could be proffered here, but we'll give only one: voters do not feel responsibility for the result of elections. Final result of the event they participate in does not depend on them. Thus it is not so important if they trust the results or don't.

Answers to the next question (Table 26) may be regarded as an addition to the answer to the previous one (Table 25). In both cases the share of respondents having difficulties to answer was quite high. This isn't evidence of a difficult question, but of a lack of concern of the respondents.

Let us quote one more citation from A. Lukashenko. We took it from his communication with journalists at voting station on the 23rd of March: "In Minsk, for example, as the mayor said, there were lines at voting stations yesterday, because people were going to the countryside and wanted to vote. This shows that our people are politically active and conscious, that they root for peace and stability, which should be maintained, and they rely on their deputies, they believe that these peace and stability would be maintained".

Let the lines at voting stations remain on the conscience of the mayor. We are going to have a closer look at the voters who rely on their deputies. Let us turn to Table 27. Only one third of voters (57% of those who voted) know the results of the elections. 11 years ago there were more than a half of those, but their share dropped with every election campaign.

Reliability of the results in the fourth column of Table 27 is confirmed by the answers to the question "Did the candidate you voted for become a deputy?": 70.9% of respondents had difficulties answering it (58.8% in 2010), 17.7% of respondents were affirmative and 11.4% – negative.

Political apathy in Belarusian society is growing. This is not contradicted by the growth of positive moods provoked by Russian mass media in March 2014. You should separate chaff from grain not only while preparing a meal. Dynamics of political indifference, reflected in Table 27, is formed by fundamental reasons. It is a direct consequence of the exhaustion of the Belarusian model. While the growth of positive moods is a temporary phenomenon.

Unrestricted authoritarianism and the right for its throw off

Against the background of growth of positive moods in society and of the head of state's ratings, the share of those who declare their readiness to participate in acts of protest against the worsening of financial position grew significantly (Table 28). 22.9% of respondents declared themselves ready for this in

March 2014. This is 8.2 points more than at the peak of the economic crisis of 2011!

Thus the axiom that the worsening of financial position itself doesn't lead to a growth of protest moods was confirmed once more. A typical representative of the "majority" would sooner respond to a crisis with degradation (alcohol addiction, asocial behavior), than with a wish to change something in his life or even more so in the political system of his country.

The growth of protest moods, recorded in March, is a direct consequence of Euromaydan. This is the result of agitation of that part of Belarusian society, which assessed positively mass protests in Ukraine: among Belarusians, who supported V. Yanukovich, only 7.3 of respondents declared their readiness to participate in acts of protest, while this share among the supporters of Euromaydan amounted to 44.8%.

It should be noted that the share of citizens, considering themselves in opposition to the present power, didn't change in comparison with March 2013 even against the background of protest moods' growth (Table 29). The record level of oppositional moods in Belarusian society was recorded during the economic crisis of 2011. The majority of Belarusians held A. Lukashenko responsible for it (in September 2011 61.2% of respondents considered A. Lukashenko as the main originator of the crisis, 41.3% blamed the government and 16.3% blamed the USA).

The absence of direct relation between the level of protest moods and the number of people in opposition should be regarded as a rule and not an exception.

Rating of trust of opposition parties lives a life of its own as well, not depending on the level of protest and oppositional moods (Table 30). Neither mass protests on Maydan, nor economic crisis did not increase trust in opposition.

At the same time general growth of positive moods, provoked by Russian news shown by Belarusian TV, increased the trust rating of state mass media by 2.9 points (December 2013 – 31.6%, March 2014 – 34.5%). As for the trust rating of independent mass media, it dropped by 9.3 points (from 41% to 31.7%).

According to the Declaration of Independence of the USA of the 4th of July, 1776, "when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security".

15.6% of Belarusians agree that they have this right to throw off their Government (Table 31). There are those, who agree with this, even among A. Lukashenko's supporters – 7%. Among those, who don't trust A. Lukashenko, the share of those who think that people dissatisfied with the power can

Table 28

Dynamics of answering the question "If there will be acts of protest against the worsening of financial position in your town or region, are you ready to participate in them?", %

Variant of answer	09'07	12'08	09'11	03'14
Yes	17.4	18.6	14.7	22.9
No	72.7	71.8	73.9	68.3
DA	9.9	9.6	11.4	8.8

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question "Do you consider yourself in opposition to the present power?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	09'11	03'13	03'14
Yes	18.9	28.3	16.9	16.6
No	72.4	56.0	72.0	74.3
DA/NA	8.7	15.7	11.1	9.1

Table 30

Dynamics of trust rating of opposition parties, %

Date	09'11	12'12	03'13	06'13	09'13	12'13	03'14
Rating	12.3	20.0	13.1	15.4	15.3	15.8	14.9

Table 31

Distribution of answers to the question "Which opinion do you agree to most of all?"

Variant of answer	%
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	39.3
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	40.5
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	15.6
DA/NA	4.6

change it by all means is almost 4-folds higher – 27.2%.

The share of "revolutionaries" among Belarusians who trust national mass media amounts only to 2%, among those, who trust non-state mass-media – 21.8%.

(particularly on annexation of Crimea and troubles in the East of Ukraine) were not included in March poll.

Overwhelming majority of Belarusians was following the events in the Southern neighbor with great attention (Table 32). Not many events in the internal social life of the country receive such attention.

Table 32

Distribution of answers to the question "Were you following the political conflict which led to the overthrow of Ukraine's president Victor Yanukovich?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes, every day	35.4
Yes, from time to time	53.5
No	11.1

Table 33

Distribution of answers to the question "Which side had your sympathies in the Ukrainian conflict?"

Variant of answer	%
Power and president Yanukovich	16.1
Opposition, Euromaydan	21.0
None of the above	56.2
DA/NA	6.7

Table 34

Distribution of answers to the question "According to you, who is responsible for these protests?" (01'14)

Variant of answer	%
Ukrainian opposition	32.4
Ukrainian government	22.9
Russia	9.1
The European Union	13.1
Ukrainian people	11.9
DA/NA	10.6

Majority of people sincerely think that they analyze a situation while often they only repeat over and over what they have been told or showed on TV. Belarusian "minority" is not an exception to this rule. TV images from Maydan strengthened their wish to protest, or, more specifically, their wish to declare this readiness.

As for the "majority", the same images were perceived by them as chaos, and they try to overcome it by orientation to the order pole, i.e. the power.

Ukrainian revolution in the mirror of public opinion in Belarus

Ukrainian revolution, months-long Euromaydan and the overthrow of president V. Yanukovich significantly influenced Belarusian politics. However, these events influenced Belarusian public opinion as well. During March survey respondents were asked a wide range of question concerning different aspects of their opinion on dramatic events in the neighboring country. Further we are going to comment on the results of this survey using also the results of earlier surveys. You should note as well, that questions on the events after V. Yanukovich's deserting

With hindsight sympathies to opposing parties were divided almost equally in March poll with a little domination in favor of Euromaydan, while the majority of respondents expressed neutral attitude (Table 33).

As you can see, Table 33 contradicts popular version that attitude to Ukrainian revolution in Belarus was completely formed under the influence of Russian and Belarusian state mass media. The idea that V. Yanukovich was right and Maydan was maleficent was particularly supported by Russian mass media which tried to engraft this idea in the minds of their audience. The results of the survey don't testify of high efficiency of this efforts, at least in Belarus.

However, there is another explanation. By the time of the survey V. Yanukovich had already spilled blood and, what is probably even more important, by that time he had already lost, moreover, according to many people, including many of his former supporters, had lost shamefully. This attitude could be projected in the past in the minds of respondents, thus decreasing the number of answers in favor of V. Yanukovich. Belarusians do not quite sympathize to losers.

In the previous IISEPS survey a question some

what contrary to the question of Table 33 was asked (Table 34).

As you can see, at that time it was opposition who was the leader of responsible parties, though the second place was occupied by the government. In March, as it can be seen from Table 33, evaluations of public opinion were swapped.

didn't spoke about objective reasons for Maydan.

However, evaluations of reasons and even process is one thing, and evaluations of the results is quite another. If there was certain parity in the evaluations of opposing sides as it was shown above, the overthrow of V. Yanukovich was evaluated negatively by the majority of respondents (Table 36).

Table 35

Dynamics of answering the question "How do you assess the turbulent events of last months in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	03'05	03'14
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	47.0	36.9
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	45.6	36.8
Other	5.0	17.6
DA/NA	2.4	8.7

Table 36

Distribution of answers to the question "President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was overthrown from the power. How do you evaluate this course of events?"

Variant of answer	%
It's an uprising and a power grab	54.7
It's a just retribution for bloodletting	27.7
DA/NA	17.6

Table 37

Distribution of answers to the question "Is a better future worth the people's blood?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	14.1
No	78.0
DA/NA	7.9

Table 38

Distribution of answers to the question "Which opinion do you agree to most of all?"

Variant of answer	%
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	39.3
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	40.5
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	15.6
DA/NA	4.6

Let's get back to the results of March poll. It should be noted that, according to the evaluations of Belarusian public opinion, Russian mass media didn't succeeded in their propaganda of conspiracy theory that all the events in Ukraine were inspired from outside (Table 35). Though it should be noted as well that A. Lukashenko, even during the last phase of Maydan and after the victory of revolution, spoke about objective reasons for it, about economic collapse and corruption which led Ukrainians to the protests. Version of the head of state, repeated many times, could have influenced the evaluations of people. If we compare the evaluations of the "orange revolution" to present results, we may note that 9 years ago public opinion was more inclined to the conspirological version. But then A. Lukashenko

The answers to the politico-philosophical question, which substance is wider than the events in Ukraine, are quire revealing (Table 37).

Situation in Belarus is quiet, so the answers were given somewhat abstractedly. Probably, if there was a conflict, the results would be different. Still the crashing domination of those who think that better future is not worth the blood is quite revealing.

Answers to the question of Table 37 match the answers to a more practical question about acceptable actions of people or to some extent about the notorious "right of revolution" (Table 38).

As you can see, 14.1% of those who think that better future is worth the blood and 15.6% of those who recognize the right of revolution – is the approximate evolution of (quite hypothetical) radical potential

Table 39

Distribution of answers to the question "Would you like events, similar to those happening in Ukraine, happen in Belarus?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	3.6
Yes, but without violence	23.0
No	70.0

Table 40

Distribution of answers to the question "If similar events would have happened today in Belarus, would you participate in them?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	15.5
Yes, on the side of power	10.7
No	65.3
DA/NA	8.5

Table 41

Relation between the readiness to participate in protests and answers to the question if better future is worth of people's blood and the question about acceptable methods of changing the power, %

Variant of answer	If similar events would have happened today in Belarus, would you participate in them?		
	Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	Yes, on the side of authorities	No
Which opinion do you agree to most of all?			
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	13.8	46.6	42.3
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	43.1	41.0	41.1
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	39.7	5.0	11.8
Is a better future worth of people's blood?			
Yes	44.4	8.1	8.2
No	38.8	89.4	86.0

in Belarusian society. This mindset against violence probably influenced the answers to the questions on different projections of Ukrainian revolution into the future of Belarus (Table 39).

Conspicuous is the fact that the share of respondents who wish Ukrainian events to be repeated in Belarus with all its excesses is lower than the share of those who gave radical answers in two previous questions. Transition to practice, as we may see, abates radicalism. The overall number of supporters of "Ploshcha" (Belarusian Maydan) is nearly the same as the number of opposition electorate in general. However it should be noted that there were almost no indifferent answers and the number of opponents of Maydan in Belarus is significantly higher than the number of those who are ready to vote for A. Lukashenko (39.8%).

But if Euromaydan happens in Belarus, then quite a big number of respondents are ready to participate in it (at least at the assertion level). It's interesting that this number is almost equal to the radical potential fixed above (Table 40).

In other words it's possible to presume that people who are ready to participate in Belarusian "Ploshcha" are people who are ready not only for the peaceful way of political opposition. But deeper analysis doesn't confirm this presumption (Table 41).

As you can see only 40% of respondents who declared readiness to participate in a Belarusian Maydan declare radical views.

At the same time very few respondents consider possible such course of events in Belarus. In Table 42 we compare the results of March 2014 survey to the results of March 2005 survey.

After the first "velvet" Maydan the share of those who considered possible its repetition in Belarus was almost twice as high as the share of those who consider possible repetition of Euromaydan 2013-2014. So about 13% of respondent's don't share A. Lukashenko's opinion that Maydan in Belarus is impossible. If we extrapolate this figure on all adult population of the country, we get almost 880 thousand of people, and not 400 "hoodlums", whom

Table 42

Dynamics of answering the question "According to you, is similar course of events possible in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	03'05	03'14
Yes	22.4	12.6
No	61.2	76.7
DA/NA	16.4	10.7

Table 43

Distribution of answers to the question "What will be the further development of the vents in Ukraine?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	%
President Yanukovich's power will be restored	4.6
A civil war will begin	17.3
A disintegration of Ukraine	34.9
New power will be elected and situation will stabilize	36.4
DA	10.1

Table 44

Relation of evaluations of certain aspects of Ukrainian revolution to socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences, %

Characteristics	Which side had your sympathies in the Ukrainian conflict?		President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was overthrown from the power. How do you evaluate this course of events?		Is a better future worth of people's blood?	
	Power and president Yanukovich	Opposition, Euromaydan	It's an uprising and a power grab	It's a just retribution for bloodletting	Yes	No
Age:						
18-29	6.1	30.3	42.8	33.9	17.0	72.0
30-59	14.4	20.9	56.0	26.9	15.2	76.1
60 +	29.9	12.0	63.5	23.1	8.8	87.7
Education:						
Primary	28.0	12.9	68.5	21.7	6.5	93.5
Incomplete secondary	34.0	9.8	62.7	20.3	14.4	77.8
Secondary	13.5	21.2	50.5	29.5	15.5	77.3
Vocational	13.5	24.5	54.3	30.7	15.7	74.0
Higher	11.3	24.0	54.6	25.6	11.3	79.9
Usage of Internet						
Everyday	10.3	28.9	45.7	34.0	17.0	73.0
Trust to the president						
Trust	27.2	9.9	68.2	19.7	8.1	87.1
Don't trust	6.2	34.5	41.2	38.2	21.9	68.3

** The table is read across*

president knows personally according to his own words. But it's not a majority.

As for the post-Maydan future of Ukraine, a relative majority of respondents predicted a positive scenario (Table 43). Though there was no lack of negative predictions.

In fine it should be said that Belarusians' attitude to Ukrainian revolution is quite contradictory, while the attitude to bloodletting and its consequences is rather negative. Bloodless solution approach to political conflicts is an imperative for the overwhelming majority of Belarusian citizens. This approach is also supported by the majority of those who are ready to participate in Belarusian protests; they think that blood is a wrong price for better future.

In conclusion we specify data describing the relation of evaluations of certain aspects of Ukrainian revolution to socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences (Table 44).

Ukrainian push for geopolitical swing

The survey of March 2014 recorded a significant strengthening of pro-Russian moods and a weakening of pro-European moods in Belarusian society. Least of all it influenced the results of the question

about voting on a hypothetical referendum about integration of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation: in fact figures here jumped back to the level of last year's spring and thus compensated December decrease (Table 45).

Table 45

Dynamics of answering the question "If a referendum on the integration of Belarus and Russia was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	12'11	12'12	03'13	06'13	12'13	03'14
For	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.0	28.7	28.1	31.2	23.9	29.3
Against	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	42.9	47.5	51.4	46.5	51.4	47.7

Table 46

Dynamics of answering the question "If a referendum on the question whether Belarus should join the European Union was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	05'07	09'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	12'12	03'13	06'13	12'13	03'14
For	33.5	26.7	34.9	36.2	48.6	38.9	37.9	37.7	35.9	30.2
Against	49.3	51.9	36.3	37.2	30.5	37.6	39.2	38.1	34.6	44.3

Table 47

Dynamics of answering the question "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	12'11	12'12	03'13	06'13	12'13	03'14
Integration with the RF	47.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	41.4	37.7	37.2	40.8	36.6	51.5
Joining the EU	33.3	30.1	42.1	38.0	39.1	43.4	42.1	41.0	44.6	32.9
DA/NA	19.2	23.9	15.6	23.9	19.5	18.9	20.7	18.2	18.8	15.6

Table 48

Distribution of answers to the question "Which side had your sympathies in the Ukrainian conflict?"

Variant of answer	%
Power and president Yanukovich	16.1
Opposition, Euromaydan	21.0
None of the above	56.2
DA/NA	6.7

Table 49

Distribution of answers to the question "How do you assess the turbulent events of last months in Ukraine?"

Variant of answer	%
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	36.9
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	36.8
Other	17.6
DA/NA	8.7

Much more apparent is the dynamics of the share of "Euro-Belarusians". This share dropped down to a record low value over the past 6 years, accordingly high is the share of respondents, that would vote against Euro-integration of Belarus on a hypothetical referendum (Table 46).

The growth of pro-Russian moods in the answers to the question of Table 45 is quite insignificant, but is clear in the answers to the dichotomous question on the choice between the RF and the EU: the share of "Belo-Russians" jumped by 15 points over the quarter; it is record high over the last years and close to the values of the beginning of the aughties (Table 47). The level of support of Euro-integration decreased quite significantly, just like in Table 46.

What caused these tectonic changes of geopolitical preferences of Belarusians, which were floating around the same level over the last years? From our point of view, the reason is quite clear – revolutionary events in Ukraine, months-long Maydan, and desertion of president V. Yanukovich. Not only these events in themselves, but also their interpretation and rendering in mass media and Internet, were an important factor for the changes. Here are some results on this account (Tables 48-52).

From our viewpoint, data of Tables 48-52 deny the opinion that state propaganda machinery is omnipo-

Table 50

Distribution of answers to the question "President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was overthrown from the power. How do you evaluate this course of events?"

Variant of answer	%
It's an uprising and a power grab	54.7
It's a just retribution for bloodletting	27.7
DA/NA	17.6

Table 51

Distribution of answers to the question "Is a better future worth of people's blood?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	14.1
No	78.0
DA/NA	7.9

Table 52

Distribution of answers to the question "Would you like events, similar to those happening in Ukraine, happen in Belarus?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	3.6
Yes, but without violence	23.0
No	70.0
DA/NA	3.4

Table 53

Relation between geopolitical choice and attitude to different aspects of revolutionary events in Ukraine*, %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
Which side had your sympathies in the Ukrainian conflict?			
Power and president Yanukovich	81.0	6.6	12.4
Opposition, Euromaydan	22.9	71.1	6.0
None of the above	54.3	26.7	18.9
How do you assess the turbulent events of last months in Ukraine?			
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	69.3	17.5	13.2
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	35.1	48.9	15.9
President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was overthrown from the power. How do you evaluate this course of events?			
It's an uprising and a power grab	65.2	19.5	15.3
It's a just retribution for bloodletting	32.8	56.1	11.1
Is a better future worth the people's blood?			
Yes	28.3	62.3	9.4
No	58.4	25.8	15.8
Would you like events, similar to those happening in Ukraine, happen in Belarus?			
Yes	11.1	87.0	1.9
Yes, but without violence	31.2	56.1	12.7
No	61.3	21.3	17.3

** Table is read across*

tent, that people only retransmit imposed stereotypes. Thus, Tables 48 and 49 mean that condemnation of the protests in themselves was not universal: there are even more of supporters of Maydan than of supporters of V. Yanukovich, while the majority of respondents took a neutral stance, and the conspiracy theory about the reasons of the protest attracted the same amount of supporters as the version about ob-

jective reasons for the protests.

However, Tables 50-52 show what exactly pushed the balance of evaluations to the disfavor of revolution – blood, violence, overthrow of the President. Relation to the revolution also had its effect on the relation to geopolitical centers behind the rival forces (Table 53).

As you can see, close connection between the relation to different aspects of Ukrainian revolution and its possibility in Belarus and the geopolitical choice is evident. Moreover, even a very close connection between preferences to certain forces in the Ukrainian confrontation and evaluations of driving forces of the revolution and geopolitical preferences couldn't significantly influence the balance between "Euro-Belarusians" and "Belo-Russians", because the shares of supporters of V. Yanukovich and of Maydan and of adherents of the objective and the subjective versions of the reasons of Ukrainian events were almost equal.

But the evaluations of V. Yanukovich's overthrow and possibility of similar events in Belarus influenced the results quite significantly. According to Table 47, the share of "Belo-Russians" among all respondents amounts to 51.5%. A simple calculation shows that the share of those, who think that better a future is not worth the people's blood and at the same time support integration with Russia, amounts to 45.5%, and the share of respondents, who are simultaneously against of similar events in Belarus and for integration with Russia amounts to 42.9%.

In other words, the lion's share of "Belo-Russians" consists of those, who reject blood and don't want Maydan to happen in Belarus. As these two latter groups are very big, and corresponding correlation is very tight, this led to the growth of pro-Russian moods.

From the other side, conspicuous is the structure of those who would like Maydan to happen in Belarus, no matter of how it would happen. This group is not big, but it is very revealing that it almost entirely consists of "Euro-Belarusians". From our point of view, this is an indication of a high level of discontent and frustration, which feel supporters of European choice in modern Belarus. Not so many people in Belarus are ready for decisive actions, but those who are ready support Euro-integration.

Still the odds today are in favor of those who make the other geopolitical choice.

Supporters of changes still dominate

Answers to the question "What's more important for you today: maintaining of the current situation in the country or changing it?" always provoke active discussion of Belarusian experts. A specialized term was introduced – "supporters of changes". When their share exceeds the share of supporters of maintaining the current course, optimistically-oriented experts have a convincing reason in favor of inevitability of real changes (Table 54).

In the meantime dynamics of answering the question of Table 54 (along with social indices and head of state's ratings) is only one of indicators of social moods, which are formed under the influence of current economic events and TV-images.

During "fat" years (in Belarus these years strangely coincide with the years of presidential elections) changes index (CI) goes below zero, i.e. the number of supporters of stability exceeds the number of supporters of changes. During the years of economic stagnations and crises CI goes above zero. Absolute maximum was recorded in 2011, and there is nothing surprising about it if you remember the three-digit

Table 54

Dynamics of answering the question "What's more important for you today: maintaining of the current situation in the country or changing it?", %

Variant of answer	03'05	02'06	06'08	12'10	12'11	03'14
Changing of the situation is more important	48.2	37.8	53.8	41.2	70.1	55.1
Maintaining of the situation is more important	51.1	53.4	37.4	49.7	18.0	36.5
Changes index (CI)*	–2.9	–15.6	16.4	–8.5	52.1	18.6

** The difference between the first and the second line*

Table 55

Distribution of answers to the question "According to you, what happens when power remains in the same hands for a long time?", %

Variant of answer	Belarus (03'14)	Russia (12'13)*
It leads to a growth of iniquity, corruption and malversation	21.6	26
It provides stability and order in the country	25.0	20
It leads to stagnation and lagging behind other countries	24.5	20
It's not important who is in power, the most important is that laws should be observed	25.0	15

** "Levada-center" data (Russia)*

headline inflation and three-fold devaluation of Belarusian ruble.

Current value of CI (18.6) explicitly testifies that majority of Belarusians are not happy with their financial standing. But it's an average value. CI is negative (–34.8) for the supporters of A. Lukashenko and positive (68.8) for his opponents. The impression is that each part of the divided Belarusian society lives in its own Belarus.

In fact it is true, if you remember that people react not to the real world, but to their conception of it. In the world of youth (18-29 years old) CI amounts to 47, in the world of pensioners (60 years old and older) it amounts –41.1, in the world of people with primary education it amounts –71, in the world of licentiates it amounts 35.2. Women's need for changes in Belarus is significantly lower than men's – 6.6 vs. 32.9.

Table 55 lets us compare answers of Russians and Belarusians to the question "According to you, what happens when power remains in the same hands for a long time?" (Russian survey was conducted before the beginning of March events). Evaluations of "two branches of one nation" are quite close for the majority of variants. Each forth Belarusian and each fifth Russian agrees that irremovability of power is condition of order and stability in the country. The same ratio may be observed in the variant of answer "It leads to stagnation and lagging behind other countries".

Despite the fact that majority of Belarusians prefer good leaders to good laws (59.7% vs. 33.3%), the advanced level of Belarusians (comparatively to Russians) in understanding of the role of laws in modern world cannot but rejoice (see the last line of Table 55).

The theory of electorate's tiredness of longstanding Belarusian president is very popular among independent Belarusian experts and activists of oppositional political parties. However the dynamics of answering the question "According to you, is a significant improvement of life of Belarusian people possible under the present leadership of the country and their policy?" doesn't support this theory.

As it is easy to see, the belief in the ability of "the present leadership" to improve people's life doesn't depend on the number of A. Lukashenko's terms as head of state (Table 56). If there is a result (a two-digit growth of incomes), there is a belief.

No one ever grew tired of a leader providing success for a group. This doesn't mean that such a leader will be refused credence after the first failure after long years of success.

A massive refusal of support to the previous leader is possible under one condition: after being a guarantor of success, he has to become the main source of the threat to stability and order. The example of M. Gorbachov and B. Yeltsin shows how it can happen.

But until it happened, the demand for alternative

Table 56

Dynamics of answering the question "According to you, is a significant improvement of life of Belarusian people possible under the present leadership of the country and their policy?", %

Variant of answer	06'01	02'06	03'14
Possible	36.1	57.5	47.1
Impossible	44.2	30.4	43.8
DA/NA	19.7	12.1	9.1

Table 57

Distribution of answers to the question "Movement for Freedom" implements a "People Program" now. Its goal consists in elaboration of positive vision of the future of Belarus by way of public and experts discussions of urgent questions of country's development. What's your attitude towards it?"

Variant of answer	%
Positive	14.1
Indifferent	17.2
Negative	3.7
I don't know anything about it	60.7
DA/NA	4.3

Table 58

Dynamics of answering the question "According to you, what should state do in the current situation?", %

Variant of answer	11'94	03'14
Increase gradually salaries and social transfers (pensions, scholarships, allowances) to compensate the price growth	32.5	50.9
Stop the price growth, even at the cost of temporary drop in production and rise in unemployment	65.8	43.0
DA	1.7	6.1

leaders and alternative programs of development is limited to the "oppositional ghetto". No one ever managed to extricate from its gripe, at least in Belarus.

Answers to the question of Table 57 may serve as an example to the aforementioned. Taking into account the structure of Belarusian electorate, 14.1% of positive evaluations of the initiative of "Movement for Freedom" should be regarded as a success. Further promotional efforts may significantly raise its awareness rating, which won't have a great impact on the increase of positive evaluations.

20 years ago, under the conditions of galloping inflation, 65.5% of Belarusians agreed that the price growth should be stopped even at the cost of temporary drop in production and rise in unemployment (Table 58). After "fat" aughties Belarusians got used to a two-digit growth of real incomes. Such growth became the main criterion of stability for many people.

People quickly get used to something good. Today majority of Belarusians is sure that price growth should be combated by means of increasing salaries and social transfers. They are ready for such changes. In this regard they are all supporters of changes. Therefore they dominate in Belarus.

Money can't buy happiness, but political loyalty can

A. Lukashenko likes to play off the beginning of nineties when, under "nationalists", average salary amounted to $ 20, against "fat" aughties. According to official information from Belstat, in February 2014 (information for March was not yet available when the article was prepared) an average Belarusian earned 5.4 million rubles or $ 557.

In dollar equivalent average salary increased 28-fold over the past 20 years, while the share of Belarusians considering themselves poor decreased from 17.7% down to 10.8%, i.e. 1.6-fold (Table 59). You shouldn't be surprised by this lack of proportion. Poverty and wealth are relative.

Today and in the beginning of nineties majority of Belarusians assess their financial standing as average. The reason is clear as day. When someone is constantly told that being poor means that he is a douche and a looser, then classifying himself as a part of middle class means that he wants to be "like everyone". To confirm this status he spends his money for attributes of apparent wealth – an expensive phone, fashionable clothes and so on.

Table 60 shows a socio-demographic portrait of Belarusians, who evaluate their financial standing as poor, lower than average and average (groups with higher than average and high incomes are excluded because of their small number).

The first thing that sticks out is the dependency of financial standing's perception on the attitude to A. Lukashenko. The share of poor people is three times (!) lower among his supporters than among his opponents. At the same time sex, age and settlement type don't have any significant influence. But education has: almost every fifth (19.6%) Belarusian with primary education considers that he's poor, while this share among licentiates is considerably lower – 6.2%.

While the share of poor amounts to 10.8% on average, 6.6% of Belarusians with more than 3.8 million rubles' income per family member consider themselves poor. Indeed, some people cry because they have no feet, others cry because they have no shoes.

31% of respondents answered affirmatively the question "Do you think you are a happy person?" in March 2014. 13.4% think that are not happy. More than half of respondents (52.9%) chose the variant "Depends".

If a citizen of Belarus wants to feel happy, then he should make up his mind about his relationship to "batka", for this purpose it is preferable to trust him (Table 61). Compare: the share of happy people among A. Lukashenko's supporters amounts to 53.2%, among his opponents only 35.4% are happy, and among those, who didn't make up their minds, only 11.4% are happy! To explain this paradox let's remember the words of Ostap Bender, the main protagonist of "The Little Golden Calf": "Girls love young, long-legged, **politically literate** ones" (emphasis added).

This is not a joke. A person, who cannot pin down his political preferences in divided Belarusian society, can be considered as an outcast. Such a person is not only beyond politics, he's probably beyond social life in general. You cannot feel happy under these conditions.

Despite popular conversations on the heavy burden of women, the share of happy women is higher than the share of happy men, though the difference is insignificant (+4 points). There is no significant difference between young and old people as well. The lowest share of happy people is observed in the pre-

Table 59

Dynamics of answering the question "How do you evaluate your financial standing?", %

Variant of answer	11'93	03'14
Poverty	17.7	10.8
Lower than average	37.7	31.6
Average	39.7	51.3
Higher than average	3.8	5.3
High level of financial security	0.4	0.7
NA	0.7	0.3

Table 60

Distribution of answers to the question "How do you evaluate your financial standing?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko and socio-demographic characteristics*, %

Characteristics	Poverty	Lower than average	Average
Attitude to A. Lukashenko:			
Trust	5.8	25.7	60.1
Don't trust	17.4	36.9	42.1
Sex:			
Male	10.5	31.9	49.8
Female	11.0	31.4	52.6
Age:			
18-29	11.8	31.5	53.2
30-39	11.4	31.2	47.9
40-49	9.0	31.2	50.2
50-59	12.6	29.5	53.6
60 +	9.4	34.2	51.3
Education:			
Primary	19.6	30.4	46.7
Incomplete secondary	13.1	34.6	49.7
Secondary	11.2	34.6	49.4
Vocational	10.5	27.6	53.3
Higher	6.2	30.5	54.5
Settlement type:			
Minsk	12.7	33.2	52.1
Rural villages	13.2	33.2	46.5
Average income per family member:			
Up to 1.2 million rubles	28.0	41.9	29.0
1.2-1.9 million rubles	17.4	35.9	45.0
1.9-3.8 million rubles	7.3	32.7	55.0
Over 3.8 million rubles	6.6	21.9	57.1

** Table is read across*

retirement age group (50-59 years old). It can be explained: the advances of youth are already gone, the advances of retirement age are still to come.

Despite the popular Western idea that education makes people free but unhappy (E. M. Remarque), this idea doesn't proliferate upon people with higher education in Belarus. The reason for it probably lies in the fact that their internal freedom is almost the same as the freedom of their compatriots with primary education. The latter in the overwhelming majority of cases (93.5%) are supporters of A. Lukashenko, and this is an additional reason to feel happy.

The biggest surprise of Table 61 lies in the more than 3-fold difference of "relative density" of happy people between residents of villages and Minsk citizens. The reason for this is the abnormally high share of Minsk residents that feel themselves now happy, and then unhappy (the variant "it depends").

Fast-moving life of a megalopolis is fundamentally different from sluggish life of a country province. This dynamism causes uncertainty expressed in the everyday formulation "it depends".

For the same reason the "density" of happy people among Belarusians with an average income per family member exceeding 3.8 million rubles is lower, than among people who earn less. Money comes with a price. They need to swim in it, to risk. Hence the second result in column "it depends".

If we "interbreed" the answers to the questions "How do you evaluate your financial standing?" and "Do you think you are a happy person?" we won't see any surprises. The share of happy people among Belarusians, who qualify their financial standing as poor, amounts to 14.2%, lower than average – 21.7%, average – 37.1%.

Happy Belarusians are more active in fulfilling their civil duties during the elections than their unhappy compatriots – 37.5% vs. 24.8%. They also trust official results to a greater extent – 38% vs. 21.3%.

According to Marx, poor people have nothing to lose but their chains. Belarusians belonging to a virtual middle class stick to the stability. Living in the world of illusions and hopes, they don't cause problem for the powers. The powers in return guarantee them happy chair days with a low pension.

Who roots for Belarus?

Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, success of Belarusian sportsmen, A. Lukashenko's gestures towards the Triple Olympic Champion Darya Domracheva, approaching World Hockey Championship in Belarus – all these events made actual the problem of connection between sport and politics.

Table 61

Distribution of answers to the question "Do you think you are a happy person?" depending on the attitude to A. Lukashenko and socio-demographic characteristics*, %

Characteristics	Yes	It depends	No
Attitude to A. Lukashenko:			
Trust	53.2	48.0	13.1
Don't trust	35.4	59.5	13.5
Sex:			
Male	28.8	54.9	14.2
Female	32.8	51.2	12.8
Age:			
18-29	33.4	52.4	13.0
30-39	32.7	55.1	10.3
40-49	29.3	58.9	10.0
50-59	26.3	54.6	16.0
60 +	32.5	45.3	16.8
Education:			
Primary	35.5	39.8	20.4
Incomplete secondary	26.3	43.4	24.3
Secondary	26.9	56.7	14.6
Vocational	32.4	52.9	11.7
Higher	37.5	55.3	6.1
Settlement type:			
Minsk	11.0	80.8	6.8
Rural villages	37.0	44.4	15.6
Average income per family member:			
Up to 1.2 million rubles	28.0	40.9	29.0
1.2-1.9 million rubles	26.0	48.6	21.1
1.9-3.8 million rubles	37.7	48.3	11.2
Over 3.8 million rubles	24.1	69.0	6.0

** Table is read across*

Table 62

Distribution of answers to the question "Do you root for sports team from any countries?"
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	%
For the Belarusian team	46.5
For the Russian team	20.3
For a team from one of countries of the EU	8.9
For the US team	1.7
For some other team	2.7
I don't root for any team	20.4
I don't follow sports events	20.0
DA	1.0

Who, saying metaphorically, roots for Belarus? What is the connection between the support to national sport and demographic characteristics and political preferences? The answers to these questions are partly available via the results of March survey.

Thus, almost a half of respondents root for the national team (Table 62).

At the same time success of native sportsmen triggers positive emotions even in those people who don't consider themselves as sports fans (Table 63).

Table 62 means that geography of "rooting" serves to some extent as a projection of mental political world map of Belarusians: the first place is taken by their own country, then comes Russia, then the EU, and then… well, basically that's all. A lot of countries in the world have successful teams, for example, China. But success is not enough to root for sportsmen from one or another country, what's important is a kind of proximity. Proximity is present in the relation to own country and two main geopolitical "magnets" – Europe and Russia.

Table 64 shows the relation between "rooting" for Belarusian sportsmen and "rooting" for teams from other countries.

As you can see, there is no significant category of sport fans not rooting for Belarusian sportsmen.

Table 63

Distribution of answers to the question "During the Winter Olympic Games which were held in February in Sochi Belarusian team displayed great results. Do you feel proud for the team and your country?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes, I feel very proud	35.3
I suppose that I'm proud	45.0
I don't feel proud	17.1
DA/NA	2.6

Table 64

Relation between "rooting" for the Belarusian team and "rooting" for teams from other countries, %

Variant of answer	Don't root for the Belarusian team	Root for the Belarusian team
Root for the Russian team	10.2	31.9
Root for a team from one of countries of the EU	10.2	7.4
Root for the US team	2.7	0.4
Root for some other team	4.4	0.9
Don't root	38.1	0
Don't follow sports events	36.8	0.4

Table 65

Relation of sports "rooting" to socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences?*, %

Characteristics	Don't root	Don't root for the Belarusian team	Root for the Belarusian team
Sex:			
Male	15.7	46.7	53.3
Female	24.3	59.2	40.8
Age:			
18-29	19.3	51.3	48.7
30-59	19.8	50.5	49.5
60 +	24.1	62.6	37.4
Education:			
Primary	30.1	90.3	9.7
Incomplete secondary	22.9	59.5	40.5
Secondary	18.2	52.1	47.9
Vocational	21.6	50.2	49.8
Higher	18.2	45.9	54.1
Internet usage:			
Every day	15.9	46.1	53.9
Trust to the president:			
Trust	17.1	52.4	47.6
Don't trust	24.5	56.0	44.0
Geopolitical choice:			
For integration with Russia	18.6	51.9	48.1
For joining the EU	20.6	52.8	47.2

** Table is read across*

Table 66

Distribution of answers to the question "Some politicians from Belarus and from the West urge not to carry out the World Hockey Championship 2014 in Belarus, if human rights abuse won't stop till then. What's your attitude to this?"

Variant of answer	%
Positive	8.6
Negative	47.9
Indifferent	39.3
DA/NA	4.2

Number of respondents who don't root for the Belarusian team, but root for somebody else is comparatively low. In this latter group there are more fans of teams from the EU, the USA and other countries than in the group of fans of the Belarusian team, but these differences are insignificant. The overwhelming majority of those who don't root for the Belarusian team don't root for anybody else. Conspicuous is the fact that among the fans of the Belarusian team almost each third roots for Russia as well. A calculation shows that they constitute 73% of all respondents who root for the Russian team.

Table 65 describes the relation of sports "rooting" to socio-demographic characteristics, political preferences and attitude to the president.

In Table 65 only the differences on grounds of sex are expected. Women are less inclined to "rooting", though there not so few fans among them as well. The relation to other characteristics is quite unexpected. People with higher education and those who use Internet every day, let us say, the high-browed ones, are not less, but more inclined to root for the Belarusian team. However what's more surprising in the results of Table 65, it is not the positions where there are differences, but those, where there is no difference at all. "Euro-Belarusians" and "Belo-Russians", supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko are political antagonists. However these differences do not influence their attitude to sport and "rooting" for the Belarusian team: the shares are almost equal.

So sport is a uniting, not a dividing factor.

In this connection it is not surprising that the idea of boycott on the World Hockey Championship in Belarus is not very popular (Table 66).

In fine it should be said that the idea to use sport as a political protest is not very good. Relation to sport has very little connection to political preferences.

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in March, 2014 (%)

1. "What's more important for you today: maintaining current situation in the country or changing it?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Maintaining is more important	36.5	28.6	21.9	20.5	21.0	29.7	36.6	67.7
Changing is more important	55.1	67.3	70.2	69.9	67.9	62.0	54.2	26.6
DA/NA	8.4	4.1	7.9	9.6	11.1	8.3	9.2	5.7

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Maintaining is more important	83.9	52.9	30.4	32.9	29.5
Changing is more important	12.9	37.9	60.0	57.9	64.7
DA/NA	3.2	9.2	9.6	9.2	5.8

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Maintaining is more important	20.8	31.7	22.7	64.8	16.2
Changing is more important	69.3	59.4	73.3	29.2	70.6
DA/NA	9.9	8.9	4.0	6.0	13.2

Table 1.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Maintaining is more important	39.9	33.9	38.0	34.9	19.1	49.4	40.1
Changing is more important	54.3	58.0	50.9	59.2	61.8	44.3	56.8
DA/NA	5.8	8.1	11.1	5.9	19.1	6.3	3.1

Table 1.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Maintaining is more important	39.9	33.3	36.3	30.0	41.0
Changing is more important	54.3	58.4	54.3	62.6	48.8
DA/NA	5.8	8.3	9.4	7.4	10.2

2. "According to you, is a significant improvement of life of Belarusian people possible under the present leadership of the country and their policy?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Possible	47.1	42.9	31.1	39.5	38.0	37.6	46.9	72.3
Impossible	43.8	44.9	60.3	52.4	52.9	50.5	43.9	20.9
DA/NA	9.1	12.2	8.6	8.1	9.1	11.9	9.2	6.8

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Possible	75.3	67.3	40.9	46.3	40.1
Impossible	24.7	21.6	48.4	43.2	53.8
DA/NA	0	11.1	10.7	10.5	6.2

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Possible	33.9	42.7	34.2	71.6	30.4
Impossible	56.4	47.2	52.6	21.4	65.2
DA/NA	9.7	10.1	13.2	7.0	4.4

Table 2.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Possible	46.9	40.9	45.4	53.3	35.4	61.9	49.8
Impossible	51.7	50.7	40.7	39.6	51.5	21.0	43.2
DA/NA	1.4	8.4	13.9	7.1	13.1	17.1	7.0

Table 2.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Possible	46.9	48.3	44.8	45.7	48.8
Impossible	51.7	40.0	47.0	43.4	38.4
DA/NA	1.4	11.7	8.2	10.9	12.8

3. "Which regime is more acceptable for Belarus?"

Table 3.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Capitalism	38.3	44.9	48.3	42.5	45.2	39.6	35.4	27.1
Socialism	39.9	30.6	23.8	35.6	33.9	37.9	47.1	50.9
DA/NA	21.8	24.5	27.9	21.9	20.9	22.5	17.5	22.0

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Capitalism	26.9	28.1	39.3	39.8	43.3
Socialism	49.5	51.0	38.2	39.8	34.5
DA/NA	23.6	20.9	22.5	20.4	22.2

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Capitalism	53.7	35.6	42.7	27.3	43.5
Socialism	25.8	42.2	32.0	51.8	30.4
DA/NA	20.5	22.2	25.3	20.9	26.1

Table 3.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Capitalism	54.1	44.9	38.4	43.5	24.2	24.6	30.4
Socialism	27.1	45.3	37.5	42.9	39.9	39.4	51.5
DA/NA	18.8	9.8	24.1	13.6	35.9	36.0	18.1

Table 3.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Capitalism	54.1	33.3	41.7	33.2	30.8
Socialism	27.1	44.0	35.6	51.6	42.5
DA/NA	18.8	22.7	22.7	15.2	26.7

4. "If you are asked to sign in favor of a "democratic referendum", will you agree?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	49.0	44.0	47.7	53.1	56.1	51.8	46.8	42.9
No	31.2	34.0	34.4	25.2	24.4	31.4	36.1	33.1
DA/NA	19.8	22.0	17.9	21.7	19.5	16.8	17.1	24.0

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	46.2	38.6	46.8	49.5	58.7
No	25.8	39.9	33.5	30.5	25.3
DA/NA	28.0	21.5	19.7	20.0	16.0

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	52.3	50.9	56.0	41.9	44.9
No	33.0	30.4	25.3	32.3	29.0
DA/NA	14.7	18.7	18.7	25.8	26.1

Table 4.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	43.6	60.6	60.2	32.7	37.1	40.3	63.4
No	47.1	29.2	15.7	38.1	21.3	31.8	30.8
DA/NA	9.3	10.2	24.1	29.2	31.6	27.9	5.8

Table 4.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	43.6	52.8	49.5	51.6	48.2
No	47.1	19.7	26.9	32.0	30.8
DA/NA	9.3	27.5	23.6	16.4	21.0

5. "Movement for Freedom" implements a "People Program" now. Its goal consists in elaboration of positive vision of the future of Belarus by way of public and experts discussions of urgent questions of country's development. What's your attitude towards it?"

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Positive	14.1	22.0	17.2	17.0	18.3	13.3	12.6	9.1
Indifferent	17.2	14.0	18.5	15.6	16.7	20.8	16.8	15.1
Negative	3.7	0	4.0	4.1	3.4	3.6	3.1	5.1
I don't know anything about it	60.7	56.0	58.9	60.5	55.1	59.1	62.6	65.8
DA/NA	4.3	8.0	1.4	2.8	6.5	3.2	4.9	4.9

Table 5.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	6.5	7.8	13.6	15.0	19.5
Indifferent	8.7	15.7	20.3	16.4	15.8
Negative	7.6	3.9	2.2	4.0	4.8
I don't know anything about it	73.9	67.3	60.6	59.5	55.1
DA/NA	3.3	5.1	3.3	5.1	4.8

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positive	17.6	15.2	26.7	7.3	11.6
Indifferent	16.7	18.1	20.0	14.3	24.6
Negative	2.9	4.8	0	3.9	0
I don't know anything about it	58.4	58.3	50.7	69.5	56.5
DA/NA	4.4	3.6	2.6	5.0	7.3

Table 5.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positive	16.8	13.3	14.4	11.2	9.6	6.8	23.0
Indifferent	17.5	4.4	19.9	25.4	11.6	19.3	23.9
Negative	2.4	0.9	1.9	5.3	5.1	4.0	6.6
I don't know anything about it	61.9	80.0	58.8	47.9	67.7	64.2	42.2
DA/NA	1.4	1.4	3.0	10.1	6.0	5.7	3.3

Table 5.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	16.8	14.5	13.3	12.1	13.8
Indifferent	17.5	22.8	11.8	21.0	14.0
Negative	2.4	4.1	2.5	6.6	3.1
I don't know anything about it	61.9	50.3	70.3	57.2	63.1
DA/NA	1.4	8.3	2.1	3.1	6.0

6. "How do you think, is A. Lukashenko able to raise efficacy of Belarusian state enterprises by means of toughening performance discipline of managers of all levels?"

Table 6.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	45.9	42.9	32.7	35.6	36.1	39.1	47.3	68.7
No	43.0	42.9	54.0	54.1	52.1	50.2	41.6	22.0
DA/NA	11.1	14.2	13.3	10.3	11.8	10.7	11.1	9.3

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	66.7	66.0	44.6	39.0	41.4
No	26.9	22.2	45.7	48.2	46.2
DA/NA	6.4	11.8	9.7	12.8	12.4

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	29.3	44.0	44.7	67.4	28.6
No	60.7	44.1	38.2	22.1	64.3
DA/NA	10.0	11.9	17.1	10.5	7.1

Table 6.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	30.2	37.8	42.6	48.2	54.8	61.6	55.9
No	66.3	55.6	37.0	42.9	26.9	24.9	34.4
DA/NA	3.5	6.6	20.4	8.9	18.3	13.5	9.7

Table 6.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	30.2	56.6	47.5	49.6	46.4
No	66.3	26.9	43.2	38.3	40.4
DA/NA	3.5	16.5	9.3	12.1	13.2

7. "New presidential elections will be held in 2015. According to you, does opposition need a single candidate?"

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	40.9	40.8	52.3	52.1	47.3	49.6	38.9	20.8
No	14.1	8.2	4.6	11.0	12.6	12.1	13.0	23.6
It's not important	33.1	38.8	25.8	30.1	29.4	26.8	38.2	40.7
DA	11.9	12.2	17.3	6.8	10.7	11.5	9.9	14.9

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	16.0	19.1	43.2	44.5	50.5
No	28.7	23.0	11.4	11.4	13.3
It's not important	35.1	48.0	34.7	30.7	25.3
DA	20.2	9.9	10.7	13.4	10.9

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	52.5	45.3	54.7	20.5	42.0
No	9.4	12.2	9.3	23.4	8.7
It's not important	31.1	30.4	24.0	41.0	33.4
DA	7.0	12.1	12.0	15.1	15.9

Table 7.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	41.2	50.4	40.3	27.6	44.9	38.1	40.1
No	7.9	8.0	10.6	18.8	13.6	24.4	19.8
It's not important	49.5	31.7	26.9	37.7	21.7	23.9	33.0
DA	1.4	9.9	22.2	15.9	19.8	13.6	7.1

Table 7.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	41.2	37.6	43.2	44.1	39.4
No	7.9	19.0	15.1	12.9	15.0
It's not important	49.5	27.9	34.2	28.1	27.2
DA	1.4	15.5	7.5	14.9	18.4

8. "If you knew a person who could successfully compete with A. Lukashenko in the next presidential elections, would you vote for him or for A. Lukaskenko?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
I would vote for this candidate	53.2	63.3	71.5	66.4	68.3	61.5	52.7	21.1
I would vote for A. Lukashenko	34.5	16.3	12.6	16.4	20.2	27.7	34.3	69.8
DA/NA	12.3	20.4	15.9	17.2	11.5	10.8	13.0	9.1

Table8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I would vote for this candidate	12.9	30.5	55.9	59.8	63.4
I would vote for A. Lukashenko	79.6	54.6	29.0	29.3	27.1
DA/NA	7.5	14.9	15.1	10.9	9.5

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I would vote for this candidate	73.6	56.7	69.7	23.2	68.6
I would vote for A. Lukashenko	15.2	31.1	9.2	65.6	15.7
DA/NA	11.2	12.2	21.1	11.2	15.7

Table 8.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I would vote for this candidate	63.6	64.4	56.7	34.3	65.8	34.1	43.2
I would vote for A. Lukashenko	27.8	26.7	31.2	47.3	18.6	46.6	48.9
DA/NA	8.6	8.9	12.1	18.4	15.6	19.3	7.9

Table 8.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I would vote for this candidate	63.6	48.8	56.8	46.9	50.3
I would vote for A. Lukashenko	27.8	37.7	32.4	39.8	35.0
DA/NA	8.6	13.5	10.8	13.3	14.7

9. "Which opinion do you agree to most of all?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	39.3	34.7	26.0	32.0	33.2	37.3	39.8	54.1
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	40.5	44.9	43.3	36.7	43.1	44.1	43.9	33.0
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	15.6	16.3	25.3	27.2	18.8	14.3	10.6	9.1
DA/NA	4.6	4.1	5.4	4.1	4.9	4.3	5.7	3.8

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	59.1	47.7	39.9	35.4	33.1
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	30.1	36.6	37.8	45.4	43.7
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	7.5	11.8	16.8	15.4	18.4
DA/NA	3.3	3.9	5.5	3.8	3.8

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	26.7	40.2	28.0	52.2	31.9
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	46.0	40.2	41.3	35.1	46.4
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	22.9	14.7	21.3	8.8	20.3
DA/NA	4.4	4.9	9.4	3.9	1.4

Table 9.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	14.7	46.2	53.2	30.2	50.3	55.1	35.8
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	54.1	32.0	34.7	56.8	32.7	33.0	37.2
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	29.8	20.4	8.3	8.3	9.0	7.4	16.8
DA/NA	1.4	1.4	3.8	4.7	8.0	4.5	10.2

Table 9.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it only by means of elections	14.7	37.4	46.4	50.0	47.3
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by means of elections and protestations, but only peaceful ones	54.1	44.6	33.5	32.0	37.9
If people are dissatisfied with the regime, they can change it by all means	29.8	12.1	12.1	13.7	11.2
DA/NA	1.4	5.9	8.0	4.3	3.6

10. "Which life principle is more suitable for you?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
I make all decisions by myself, I rely on myself, I take the consequences of me deeds and decisions	57.8	68.0	59.6	70.1	67.3	62.4	54.2	42.3
I am ready to bring my own interests under the interests of society and I think that state must provide me with an acceptable life level	41.9	30.0	39.7	29.9	32.7	37.3	45.8	57.1
NA	0.3	2.0	0.7	0	0	0.3	0	0.6

Table 10.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I make all decisions by myself, I rely on myself, I take the consequences of me deeds and decisions	45.2	36.4	61.4	60.5	62.3
I am ready to bring my own interests under the interests of society and I think that state must provide me with an acceptable life level	54.8	62.3	38.4	39.5	36.6
NA	0	1.3	0.2	0	1.1

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I make all decisions by myself, I rely on myself, I take the consequences of me deeds and decisions	68.1	61.6	59.2	42.2	56.5
I am ready to bring my own interests under the interests of society and I think that state must provide me with an acceptable life level	31.9	38.0	39.5	57.3	43.5
NA	0	0.5	1.3	0.5	0

Table 10.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
I make all decisions by myself, I rely on myself, I take the consequences of me deeds and decisions	46.9	51.6	62.8	58.6	52.0	64.2	72.6
I am ready to bring my own interests under the interests of society and I think that state must provide me with an acceptable life level	53.1	47.6	36.7	41.4	47.5	35.8	27.0
NA	0	0.8	0.5	0	0.5	0	0.4

Table 10.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I make all decisions by myself, I rely on myself, I take the consequences of me deeds and decisions	46.9	71.0	58.4	52.3	59.2
I am ready to bring my own interests under the interests of society and I think that state must provide me with an acceptable life level	53.1	29.0	41.2	46.5	40.3
NA	0	0	0.4	1.2	0.5

11. "Did you vote on local Councils' deputies elections in March 2014?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	57.0	40.0	42.4	39.7	52.5	55.7	62.6	73.1
No	43.0	60.0	57.6	60.3	47.5	44.3	37.4	26.9

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	69.1	64.1	53.4	57.6	54.9
No	30.9	35.9	46.6	42.4	45.1

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	34.0	64.7	50.7	70.8	30.0
No	66.0	35.3	49.3	29.2	70.0

Table 11.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	39.7	68.4	65.1	50.3	59.1	64.8	57.1
No	60.3	31.6	34.9	49.7	40.9	35.2	42.9

Table 11.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	39.7	64.8	44.6	68.4	65.5
No	60.3	35.2	55.4	31.6	34.5

12. "Do you know the results of the deputies' elections to the local Councils?"

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	32.4	16.3	24.0	19.9	34.7	32.6	37.8	37.4
No	63.3	79.6	72.7	76.7	60.3	60.9	59.5	58.9
DA/NA	4.3	4.0	3.3	3.5	5.0	6.5	2.7	3.7

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	32.3	35.3	29.3	33.1	35.5
No	67.7	60.1	66.4	61.9	59.7
DA/NA	0	4.6	4.2	5.0	4.8

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	21.9	36.6	25.0	37.2	26.5
No	72.5	59.6	72.4	59.1	64.7
DA/NA	5.6	3.8	2.6	3.7	8.8

Table 12.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	14.8	36.0	32.9	38.7	47.5	39.8	27.3
No	83.2	61.8	53.8	58.3	49.5	54.5	66.5
DA/NA	2.1	2.2	8.8	3.0	3.0	5.7	6.2

Table 12.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	14.8	33.3	36.7	37.0	38.7
No	83.2	58.8	58.6	62.6	55.3
DA/NA	2.1	7.9	4.7	0.4	6.0

13. "Are the announced results of elections to the local Councils trustworthy according to you?"

Table 13.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	49.3	36.0	34.7	36.1	38.8	41.2	50.8	76.3
No	28.5	28.0	35.3	40.8	36.1	32.6	27.5	12.3
DA/NA	22.2	36.0	30.0	23.1	25.1	26.2	21.7	11.4

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	82.8	70.6	42.9	47.4	42.0
No	9.7	14.4	30.4	30.5	35.5
DA/NA	7.5	15.1	26.7	22.1	22.5

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	29.0	49.0	36.0	73.2	34.3
No	42.5	29.3	36.0	12.5	32.9
DA/NA	28.5	21.7	28.0	14.3	32.8

Table 13.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	39.2	53.8	56.5	55.4	39.1	49.7	55.3
No	45.0	27.1	16.2	21.4	25.4	23.7	32.3
DA/NA	15.8	19.1	27.3	23.2	35.5	26.6	12.4

Table 13.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	39.2	49.7	47.3	54.3	54.9
No	45.0	25.9	25.4	23.8	23.3
DA/NA	15.8	24.4	27.3	21.9	21.8

14. "Will Belarus be closer to Russia or to the EU in 10 years?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
To Russia	63.8	50.0	50.3	43.8	59.7	67.0	65.6	79.1
To the European Union	19.2	28.0	28.5	34.9	25.1	16.5	15.6	7.4
DA/NA	17.0	22.0	21.2	21.3	15.2	16.5	18.8	13.5

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
To Russia	83.0	75.8	61.0	62.7	58.0
To the European Union	10.6	11.1	22.1	19.2	20.5
DA/NA	6.4	13.1	16.9	18.1	21.5

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
To Russia	62.2	60.4	48.7	76.3	49.3
To the European Union	23.8	21.0	27.6	8.6	27.5
DA/NA	14.0	18.6	23.7	15.1	23.2

Table 14.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
To Russia	70.4	65.8	66.0	66.7	44.4	61.6	67.4
To the European Union	19.7	20.0	16.7	21.4	22.7	16.4	18.1
DA/NA	9.9	14.2	17.3	11.9	32.8	22.0	14.5

Table 14.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
To Russia	70.4	58.6	73.4	57.6	60.0
To the European Union	19.7	22.4	14.7	21.0	18.2
DA/NA	9.9	19.0	11.9	21.4	21.8

15. "How do you assess the turbulent events of last months in Ukraine?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	36.9	24.0	28.7	27.2	33.0	36.1	40.1	47.9
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	36.8	38.0	40.7	47.6	41.7	36.4	33.6	29.3
Other	17.6	20.0	22.0	19.7	16.3	18.2	17.9	14.5
DA/NA	8.7	18.0	8.6	5.5	9.0	9.3	8.4	8.3

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	43.0	42.5	33.4	38.8	36.2
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	33.3	25.5	37.5	36.2	43.3
Other	14.0	19.0	18.5	17.1	17.1
DA/NA	9.7	13.0	10.6	7.9	3.4

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	31.9	37.2	18.4	46.9	24.3
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	43.0	37.0	43.4	29.2	38.6
Other	19.3	16.9	25.0	15.4	20.0
DA/NA	5.9	8.9	13.2	8.6	17.1

Table 15.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	32.2	30.5	37.0	35.1	24.6	60.8	42.7
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	40.4	37.6	34.7	41.1	45.7	21.6	34.4
Other	22.3	14.6	21.8	13.7	13.6	15.9	18.5
DA/NA	5.1	17.3	6.5	10.1	16.1	1.7	4.4

Table 15.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power's weakness	32.2	41.6	44.2	32.3	34.8
It's an objective process caused by people's dissatisfaction of power's policy	40.4	30.9	29.1	43.6	39.7
Other	22.3	17.9	17.3	17.1	14.6
DA/NA	5.1	9.6	9.4	7.0	10.9

16. "President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was overthrown from the power. How do you evaluate this?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
It's an uprising and a power grab	54.7	46.0	38.4	46.6	49.8	57.5	60.1	63.5
It's a just retribution for bloodletting	27.7	36.0	32.5	34.9	31.2	23.9	25.9	23.1
DA/NA	17.6	18.0	29.1	18.5	19.0	18.6	14.0	13.4

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It's an uprising and a power grab	68.5	62.7	50.5	54.3	54.6
It's a just retribution for bloodletting	21.7	20.3	29.5	30.7	25.6
DA/NA	9.8	17.0	20.0	15.0	19.8

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It's an uprising and a power grab	50.3	54.1	40.0	64.1	45.7
It's a just retribution for blood-letting	30.7	27.4	30.7	23.2	37.1
DA/NA	19.0	18.5	29.3	12.7	17.2

Table 16.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
It's an uprising and a power grab	61.3	49.8	46.8	44.0	45.5	75.6	58.6
It's a just retribution for blood-letting	20.2	27.1	27.8	41.7	32.8	18.2	29.1
DA/NA	18.5	23.1	25.4	11.6	21.7	6.2	12.3

Table 16.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It's an uprising and a power grab	61.3	52.8	55.8	55.6	49.9
It's a just retribution for bloodletting	20.2	27.9	27.7	31.9	30.1
DA/NA	18.5	19.3	16.5	12.5	20.0

17. "Is better future worth people's blood?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes	14.1	18.0	17.3	16.3	16.7	15.4	13.0	8.8
No	78.0	74.0	72.7	70.8	73.5	76.3	78.6	87.7
DA/NA	7.9	8.0	10.0	12.9	9.8	8.3	8.4	3.5

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	6.5	14.4	15.5	15.7	11.3
No	93.5	77.8	77.3	74.0	79.9
DA/NA	0	7.8	7.2	10.3	8.8

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	17.3	15.0	18.4	9.1	13.0
No	70.5	76.7	75.0	86.7	81.2
DA/NA	12.2	8.3	6.6	4.2	5.8

Table 17.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes	9.6	29.3	11.6	13.6	9.0	11.4	14.1
No	88.7	62.2	72.6	81.7	73.4	82.4	82.4
DA/NA	1.7	8.5	15.8	4.7	17.6	6.2	3.5

Table 17.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	9.6	11.0	16.5	17.6	15.8
No	88.7	80.7	76.3	71.9	73.0
DA/NA	1.7	8.3	7.2	10.5	11.2

18. "If similar events would have happened today in Belarus, would you participate in them?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	15.5	22.4	29.8	25.2	19.1	15.0	13.3	3.4
Yes, on the side of power	10.7	4.1	5.3	8.8	8.8	12.5	12.9	13.1
No	65.3	61.2	55.6	56.5	63.7	63.2	63.9	77.7
DA/NA	8.5	12.2	9.3	9.5	8.4	9.3	9.9	5.8

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	4.3	6.5	18.4	15.7	18.1
Yes, on the side of power	12.9	15.0	7.7	63.9	65.0
No	76.3	71.9	63.9	65.0	61.4
DA/NA	6.5	6.6	10.0	8.4	8.0

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	23.4	14.2	31.6	4.7	29.0
Yes, on the side of power	6.7	12.2	2.6	14.3	5.8
No	61.1	63.1	56.6	76.0	56.5
DA/NA	8.8	10.5	9.2	5.0	8.7

Table 18.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	17.1	26.2	10.7	18.9	17.7	4.0	11.5
Yes, on the side of power	8.2	3.1	11.2	11.8	11.1	25.6	8.0
No	69.2	62.2	65.1	63.9	51.0	64.2	77.9
DA/NA	5.4	8.4	13.1	5.3	20.2	6.2	2.7

Table 18.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, on the side of Belarusian "Maydan"	17.1	11.3	20.4	17.9	11.9
Yes, on the side of power	8.2	11.0	11.8	8.2	13.2
No	69.2	71.1	58.4	64.2	63.2
DA/NA	5.4	6.5	9.3	9.7	11.7

19. "Some politicians from Belarus and from the West urge not to carry out the World Hockey Championship 2014 in Belarus, if human rights abuse won't stop till then. What's your attitude to this?"

Table 19.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Positive	8.6	8.0	8.6	11.6	11.1	7.9	6.8	7.7
Negative	47.9	56.0	47.7	42.2	46.2	50.4	51.3	45.9
Indifferent	39.3	30.0	39.1	44.2	38.9	37.5	37.3	41.6
DA/NA	4.2	6.0	4.6	2.0	3.8	4.2	4.6	4.8

Table 19.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive	7.6	5.2	7.0	7.9	14.3
Negative	29.3	50.3	48.6	53.1	44.0
Indifferent	59.8	37.9	39.0	35.7	39.2
DA/NA	3.3	6.6	5.4	3.3	2.5

Table 19.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Positive	11.1	7.6	13.0	7.3	7.3
Negative	43.3	51.6	54.5	44.7	44.9
Indifferent	41.2	36.8	26.0	43.4	44.9
DA/NA	4.4	4.0	6.5	4.6	2.9

Table 19.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Positive	6.5	5.3	7.4	7.6	6.6	7.4	18.9
Negative	38.5	34.2	56.2	50.0	65.7	58.5	40.5
Indifferent	53.3	55.6	30.4	39.4	20.2	31.3	36.1
DA/NA	1.7	4.9	6.0	3.0	7.5	2.8	4.5

Table 19.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive	6.5	11.4	7.9	7.0	9.6
Negative	38.5	54.5	52.0	47.3	47.4
Indifferent	53.3	29.7	35.5	40.3	38.1
DA/NA	1.7	4.4	4.6	5.4	4.9

20. "Do you think you are a happy person?"

Table 20.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Yes, I think I'm happy	31.0	34.0	32.0	34.7	32.7	29.3	26.3	32.5
It depends	52.9	52.0	52.7	52.4	55.1	58.9	54.6	45.3
No, I don't think I'm happy	13.4	14.0	12.7	12.9	10.3	10.0	16.0	16.8
DA/NA	2.7	0	2.6	0	1.9	1.8	3.1	5.4

Table 20.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, I think I'm happy	35.5	26.3	26.9	32.4	37.5
It depends	39.8	43.4	56.7	52.9	55.3
No, I don't think I'm happy	20.4	24.3	14.5	11.7	6.1
DA/NA	4.3	6.0	1.9	3.0	1.1

Table 20.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes, I think I'm happy	31.3	29.1	48.7	31.8	24.6
It depends	58.8	55.7	43.4	45.1	49.3
No, I don't think I'm happy	58.8	55.7	43.4	45.1	49.3
DA/NA	1.5	2.6	0	5.2	0

Table 20.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and region	Grodno and region	Vitebsk and region	Mogilev and region	Gomel and region
Yes, I think I'm happy	11.0	35.0	19.1	40.2	50.5	28.0	42.5
It depends	80.8	48.7	59.5	43.2	33.8	42.9	46.5
No, I don't think I'm happy	6.8	15.0	19.1	15.4	12.1	20.6	8.8
DA/NA	1.4	1.3	2.3	1.2	3.6	8.5	2.2

Table 20.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Regional centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, I think I'm happy	11.0	35.2	36.7	34.0	37.1
It depends	80.8	45.9	47.8	47.3	44.4
No, I don't think I'm happy	6.8	14.1	15.1	15.3	15.6
DA/NA	1.4	4.8	0.4	3.4	2.9

OPEN FORUM

In this issue of the IISEPS analytical bulletin under the heading "Open Forum" we continue to publish a selection of data from sociological surveys conducted by our colleagues in foreign countries with our brief comments.

Despite purposeful efforts of the Belarusian leadership to design their own model of development, its uniqueness is relative. This conclusion applies to economic, political, social and other components of the Belarusian model. We believe that the comparative analysis of social processes in other countries will allow readers to better understand the results of researches on the Belarusian society.

RUSSIA: VICTORY OF EMOTIONS OVER THE WALLET'S CONTENTS

On March 1 president of Russia V. Putin has asked the Federation Council for permission to use Russian armed forces in Crimea. Senators issued this permission almost without any discussions. Further events, or more specifically their interpretation by the mass media (in particular, by TV), over several weeks turned Russian society from the state of political apathy to the state of political excitement (or to the state of patriotic euphoria approaching mass hysteria).

All the social indices (including evaluations of the state of things in the country, approval of the policy of the president, of the government, of the governors and even of the state duma) have risen altogether. And this is despite the evident deterioration of economic indices.

Thus, according to Public Opinion Foundation, electoral rating of V. Putin fluctuated between 44% and 46% percent during January-February 2014 (45% on average in 2013). But over the period from the 2nd to the 30th of March it has climbed 18 percentage points up to 66%! An interesting detail: Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, which were very successful for Russian sportsmen and cost almost $50 billion dollars, had almost no effect on the electoral rating of the president.

Approval indices (the difference between the answers "I approve his actions" and "I don't approve his



Source: "Levada-Center"

actions" of president V. Putin and prime minister D. Medvedev) were constantly decreasing since 2010 (according to "Levada-Center"). It would seem that the process of the loss of legitimacy by the power was irreversible. It was caused by two reasons at least: social-economic reason (stagnant poverty of the province) and by lack of prospects for the middle class, which was devoid of future by the irremovability of the elite in power.

But in March approval indices of the president and the prime minister jumped up. They did not yet achieve record figures of August 2008, provoked by the "small victorious war in Georgia". But if we take into consideration the starting levels before the growth, then the special character of the event becomes evident.

Approval index is a difference between positive and negative answers. The share of Russians approving V. Putin's activities increased (the survey was conducted on March 21-24) from 69% in February up to 80% in March.

Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) recorded a significant improvement of social well-being of Russians. Some indices were that high that they made sociologists speak about returning to the pre-crisis level.

Thus, index of evaluations of the economic situation jumped from 40 points in February up to 58 points in March. "Higher figures were observed only before 2009", note the researchers.Index of social optimism, expressing Russian's evaluations of the future, has climbed by 9 points and achieved 71 points. Index of satisfaction with life, which has also amounted to 71 points, has repeated last year's historical maximum.

Optimism, recorded by sociologists, is not supported by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). Consumer confidence index over the first quarter of 2014, calculated in February, had not predicted any significant changes in near future. It amounted to –11%, just like in the previous quarter. Russians were looking pessimistically into the future: only 15% of 5 thousand respondents expected any positive changes over the next year, and twice as more, 30%, expected negative changes. The rest of respondents (55%) were neutral.

These differences are due to the fact, that WCIOM measures moods and subjective evaluations of economic prospects (emotions), while Rosstat measures the contents of the wallet. In regard to Rosstat's data it should be noted that main reason for pessimism is undoubtedly the continuation of the ruble fall, which had already led to the rise of import prices.

Mobilization polarizes public opinion. The usual, "normal" state of mass consciousness represents a cloud of different ideas. "But when a certain "force field" of external ideological impact is turned on, these ideas immediately get configured in a certain scheme, just as iron dust on a sheet of paper when a magnet is put below" (L. Gudkov, director of "Levada-Center").

Today it is hardly possible to see the border between the nationalists, the Left, the Right, the bog, the fans of Zhirinovsky and others. There is only the colossal nation, consolidated around the national leader, and the national-betrayers. This consolidation is reflected in the growth of V. Putin's rating.

THE HEAVY-HANDED APPROACH TO THE RETURN OF THE PRODIGAL PENINSULA

According to the WCIOM survey, which was conducted on March 22-23, the overwhelming majority of Russians (96%) considers right the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation. This resolution is equally supported by citizens of million-plus cities (98%) and rural settlements (95%), by youth (96%) and elder people (97%), by supporters of the United Russia (97%) and the CPRF (99%).

Accession of Crimea to Russia will benefit the country – this affirmation is supported by three quarters of respondents (76%). Citizens of smaller cities (78%) and people with higher education (76%) more often note plus sides than Muscovites and Petersburgers (69%) and not so well educated respondents (68%). Only 6% of respondents suppose that it may possibly lead to negative effects.

More than 85% of Russians, interrogated in the end of March by the "Levada-Center", felt an emotional lift and happiness on the occasion of the accession of Crimea. Such a high share of people, feeling the emotional lift, means, that only those, who don't watch TV, those who are barely literate and those living in backwater districts, where not influenced by the purposeful effect of propaganda.

58% of Russians supported bringing of Russian troops in Crimea, 26% didn't. As you can see from Table 1, the most popular of the reasons for this bringing of troops are those that are constantly repeated by the state propaganda (see lines 1 and 2).

According to Russians, the list of forces, responsible for the escalation of the situation in Crimea, is headed by radical Ukrainian nationalist organizations (67%). They are followed far behind by mafia formations (16%), Crimean-Tatar nationalists (9%), supporters of V. Yanukovich (5%), and Russian leaders (2%).

54% of respondents interrogated by "Levada-Center" think that bringing of Russian armed forces to Crimea and other regions of Ukraine is legal, 26% think that it's illegal. The main reason for this "legality", according to the respondents, is that Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are substantially Russian territories (Table 2).

Events in Ukraine, the possibility of accession to the European Union and the protests that followed could not only put an end on the main geopolitical project of V. Putin (creation of a union of authoritarian regimes under the egis of "Great Russia"), but also could give an example of social consolidation of those who were strictly dissatisfied with the situation in the country because of very different reasons.

This explanation of V. Putin's actions conforms

Table 1

Distribution of answers to the question "Which opinion on the official explanation of bringing armed forces to Crimea do you share?"

Variants of answer	%
Nationalist and bandits really threaten Russians in Ukraine, and only Russian armed forces are able to protect them	43
The rights of Russian-speaking population are adversely affected in Ukraine, but this problem should be solved by political means and by means of negotiations	28
The threats to Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are only an excuse for creating problems to the present power in Kiev and preventing Ukraine from accession to the EU	8
Russian leadership needs "a small victorious war" to distract population from internal problems in the country (economic crisis, corruption, mass protests and so on)	6
Other	3
DA	13

Table 2

Distribution of answers to the question "According to you, why bringing Russian troops to Crimea and other regions of Ukraine can be regarded as legal?" *(% of the number of those, who consider it legal)*

Variants of answer	%
Crimea and Eastern regions of Ukraine are substantially Russian territories, and Russia has a right to use armed forces to protect its' population	65
Ukrainian state had crashed and there is a danger to life and security of Ukrainian population, and reduction to order needs disaster emergency forces	32
Other	1
DA	2

well the popular American formulation: all politics is local. But why was external (i.e. internal) politics of the head of state so actively supported by the society?

Let's mark out three reasons. Firstly, the actions of the power were perceived by the majority of Russians as a noble rescuing of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine and as a preventing of country's disintegration and a reduction to order in general. All state TV-channels in Russia are constantly speaking of chaos and mayhem in the streets of Ukrainian towns, and they are the main source of information for 90% of citizens. Paradoxically, "gathering of Russian lands" is perceived by the population of Russia as an act of benevolence in regard of not only Crimeans, but all Ukrainians in general. Secondly, it's important that accession of Crimea happened relatively peacefully and smoothly. The possibility of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine still worries 66% of Russians. Lastly, the return of the peninsula to Russia is perceived as "putting straight the historical record".

But March events should be distinguished from "long-time tendencies". If in 1989 during the first surveys of WCIOM only 13% of Russians agreed that Russia had enemies and up to 50% of respondents though that "the seat of the trouble is in us", today the situation is completely opposite: 78% of respondents say that Russia has enemies.

The level of mass xenophobia started to rise since the last summer, in particular since autumn. Magnitsky Act and the following aggressive propagandist campaign, that mixed anti-Americanism, pedophilia and homophobia, played an important role in all this.

Majority of independent Russian experts agree, that problems, accumulated before the crisis in Ukraine (deterioration of economic growth, growing lack of confidence in the future, the loss of legitimacy by the power and others) will be evident again very soon. Russian powers have less and less maneuver space because of the growing external isolation. That is why the actions of the power in Crimea may give a very different result in long-term prospect. By the end of the year ratings may return to the level of January-February and continue to deteriorate provided there is no economic break-through.

RUSSIAN UKRAININANS STAND FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE

According to Public Opinion Survey (March 14-26), the majority of Ukrainian population (54%) considers Russian action in Crimea as invasion and occupation of independent Ukraine. Only 13% of country's population believe in Putin's version of Russian actions in Crimea ("protection of Russian-speaking population of Ukraine"). Even in the East of the country 30% of respondents consider Putin's actions as invasion and occupation, and only 22% of respondents believe in "protection of Russian-speaking citizens". The ratio of supporters of anti-Putin and pro-Putin versions of Russian actions in Crimea is positive both in Ukraine in general, and in all its regions (Table 3).

Table 3

Distribution of answers to the question "How do you assess Russian actions in relation to Crimea? According to you, these actions are…", %

	Variants of answer	All Ukraine	West	Center	South	East
1	... invasion and occupation of independent Ukraine	54	74	75	37	30
2	...threat to new Ukrainian leaders	17	20	16	15	17
3	...protection of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine	13	1	2	31	22
4	...the answer for the request for help of new Crimean leaders	5	1	3	7	10
5	...protection of the Russian military facility in Sebastopol	4	1	1	2	8
6	All "anti-Putin" variants of answer (1+2)	71	94	91	52	47
7	All "pro-Putin" variants of answer (3+4+5)	22	3	6	40	40
8	Difference between the supporters of "anti-Putin" variants and the supporters of "pro-Putin" variants (6-7)	49	91	85	12	7

Table 4

Distribution of answers to the question "Which relations between Ukraine and Russia would you like to see?", %

Variants of answer	All Ukraine	West	Center	South	East
The same as with other states: with closed borders, visas, customs	14.7	24.0	20.9	10.5	2.0
Ukraine and Russia must be independent but friendly states: with open borders, without visas and customs	68.0	66.7	69.7	63.8	72.2
Ukraine and Russia must be unified in one single state	12.5	0.7	5.4	19.4	25.8
DA	4.7	8.6	3.9	6.3	0

Three quarters of Ukrainians (74%) support the unitary principle of Ukraine's existence, and only 14% of respondents support its federalization. Maximum number of supporters of Ukraine's federalization is in the East of the country – 26%. However, even in the East the number of supporters of the unitary state is two times bigger than the number of supporters of federalization (53% vs. 26%).

Let us now turn to the results of the survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) and by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology since the 8th till the 18th of February 2014, i.e. before the occupation of Crimea (Table 4).

12% of respondents expressed themselves in favor of unification with Russia. Over the past years this number dropped from 20% to 9%, but after Maydan it grew by 3%. Supporters of unification with Russia are most numerous in the East (26%) and in the South (19%), in the Center (5%) and the West (1%) there are considerably fewer of them.

According to the regions, the biggest number of supporters of unification with Russia was recorded in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (41%, and this is quite natural), in Donetsk region (33%), in Lugansk region (24%), in Odessa region (24%), in Zaporozhye region (17%), and in Kharkov region (15%). But even in these regions prevails support of current status of relations with Russia: as two independent friendly states.

Let us remind you that according to official results, 96.77% of voters in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 95.6% of voters in Sebastopol voted for the reunification of Crimea with Russia with all the rights of the federal subject of the Russian Federation (the turnout amounted to 89.5%).

According to the data of the leader of Crimean Tatars M. Dzhemliev, which were made public on the UN Security Council session, only 32.4% of population of the peninsula took part in the referendum. The number of supporters of unification with Russia really turned out to be 97% of those who voted.

In general Russian citizens of Ukraine, as well as ethnic Ukrainians, wish that Ukraine and Russia were independent, but friendly states: with open borders, without visas and customs (68% and 63% respectively). 9% of Ukrainians and 32% of Russian-Ukrainians wish to unite in a single state. We may observe a direct dependency of the wish of unification on age of respondents: 5% of young respondents (up to 30 years old), 11% of respondents between 30 and 54 years old and 17% of respondents older than 55% wish that.

It is clear that there are more supporters of unification with Russia (26.5%) among those who choose accession to Customs Union, than among those who are oriented to joining the EU (1%), however the majority would prefer to maintain a status quo (69%). Even among those who are negative in relation to Maydan only 21% want to unite with Russia.

Presidential elections in Ukraine will be held on the 25th of May. They were planned for 2015, but were rescheduled due to the throw off of

V. Yanukovich by the Verkhovna Rada. According to the results of the all-Ukrainian sociological survey, conducted in March by four sociological agencies (the Kiev International Institute of Sociology; the Center for Social and Marketing Research "SOCIS"; the sociological group "Rating" and the Razumkov's Center) about 84% of voters are ready to take part in the elections.

24.9% of respondents (36.2% of those who are going to vote) are ready to support the politician and businessman, one of Euromaydan's sponsors, P. Poroshenko (according to the last evaluations of "Forbes" he takes the 7th place among Ukrainian oligarchs and his fortune equals to $ 1.3 billion dollars).

The second place is occupied by the politician, professional boxer and leader of party "UDAR" (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform) V. Klitschko with 8.9% (12.9%); Yu. Tymoshenko, the ex-prime minister of Ukraine, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" political party, takes the third place with 8.2% (12%). 7.3% of respondents (10% of voters) support S. Tihipko, the politician and businessman, ex-Chairman of National Bank; 4.2% of respondents (5.3% of voters) support M. Dobkin, former governor of Kharkov region, the candidate of the Party of Regions. About 20% of voters say that they don't know yet who they are going to vote to or if they are going to vote at all, 9.7% are ready to vote for "none of the above" variant.

The leading position of P. Poroshenko in the presidential race is unmistakable according to the results of the survey. The low percent of support of the candidate from South-Eastern Ukraine M. Dobkin is worth mentioning. This is the direct result of disappointment of Russian-speaking voters in the politics of "the runaway president" V. Yanukovich. But the lack of a strong candidate from the South-East may turn presidential elections into another factor of political destabilization in the country instead of uniting it.

EUROPE: OPTIMISM RISE WITHIN STATISTICAL ERROR

In the first quarter of 2014 Eurobarometer published newest results of a public opinion survey. The survey was conducted in November 2013 in 34 European countries (the 28 European Union Member States and the six candidate countries).

The previous survey of spring 2013 was marked by relatively stable indicators regarding the evaluation of the current economic situation, while pessimism for the next twelve months was in decline. This is validated by the autumn 2013 forecasts of the European Commission. According to it GDP growth in the second half of 2013 is expected to stand at 0.5% compared to the same period in 2012, while economic activity is forecast to expand by 1.4% in the EU and 1.1 % in the euro area.

The proportion of Europeans for whom the EU conjures up a positive image has risen slightly (31%, +1 comparatively to the spring survey) while there has been a slight decrease in the number of Europeans with a negative image of the EU (28%, –1). A relative majority of Europeans have a neutral image of the EU (39%, unchanged since spring 2013). Maximum of positive perception of the EU (52%) was recorded in autumn 2007.

Positive trends in economy recorded in the second quarter increased the share of Europeans optimistic about the future of the EU (51%, +2 percentage points since spring 2013). Conversely, pessimism has decreased (43%, –3). But the record dominance of the optimists over the pessimists registered in autumn 2007 (69% vs. 24%) is still far.

Three Europeans in ten (29%) consider that their voice counts in the EU, while two-thirds of Europeans consider that their voice does not count in the EU (66%, –1 percentage point since spring 2013). Only in one European country (Denmark) the share of optimists exceeded the share of pessimists: 57% vs. 41%. Among the closest neighbors of Belarus most of all believe in the importance of their voices respondents from Poland (39%), Lithuania (23%), Estonia (19%) and Latvia (15%).

Unemployment remains the main concern of Europeans at national level: close to half of Europeans cite this item (49%, –2 percentage points, the first time this item has lost ground since spring 2011) when answering the question "What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment?" The second place is occupied by the economic situation (33%, unchanged), then come the rising prices (20%, unchanged), and government debt (14%, –1), confirming the emphasis on economic matters.

In addition to the 2-point decrease for unemployment, we observe a 2-point increase in concern about immigration (at 12%). Taxation is also mentioned more than in spring 2013 (11%, +2).

In the closest neighbor countries of Belarus (Table 5) European problems are perceived quite differently. In particular, Estonians are almost not troubled

Table 5

Distribution of answers to the question "Which relations between Ukraine and Russia would you like to see?", %

Variants of answer	Poland	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia
Unemployment	63	37	48	31
Economic situation	23	31	37	33
Rising prices	32	40	26	50
Government debt	12	8	5	1
Health and social security	17	9	18	25
Immigration	13	8	11	2

by government debt and immigration, but they are three times more troubled by their health and social security, than Latvians.

In fine it should be noted, that a relative majority of European citizens considers that the European Union is going "in the right direction" (43%, +1). Only around three Europeans in ten consider that the EU is going "in the wrong direction" (29%, –1). The answer "in the right direction" has gained +5 percentage points since autumn 2011. Within the euro area, this opinion is less widespread than outside the euro area (38% vs. 51%).

This sociological review was based on the materials of Public Opinion Foundation (fom.ru), "Levada-Cnter" (levada.ru), WCIOM (wciom.ru), Public Opinion Survey (ifes.org), Kiev Internationa Institute of Sociology (kiis.com.ua), Center for Social and Marketing Research "SOCIS" (socis.kiev.ua), Sociological group "Rating" (ratinggroup.com.ua), Razumkov's Center (razumkov.org.ua), Eurobarometer (ec.europa.eu)

BOOKSHELF

Tomkovich A. L. "The Newest History In Persons". *– 2013, – 692 pp.*

Hasty History

They say that people make their history. Just the way they can do it. History suffers from it, but people suffer even more. They harry up to become history, and that is why they often get into tragic, comic and improbable situations.

Other leader would nourish and deliver a statement, willing to change life of a country, but it would only make the papers. Several years after it would be forgotten to the joy of the leader, who would think that he had nearly got into a mess, but everything had worked out.

It happens that an evident pompous triviality is remembered by the public and repeated obstinately, because not every leader is able to avow his mistakes. According to Albert Einstein, a scientist willingly and openly takes part in discussing his theories and avows his mistakes in order to avoid them in future. A politician, who starts his career with a program statement, cannot admit that those were intrigues of opponents that kept us from reaching the promised results. And if we were mistaken, this mistake consisted only in a too tolerant attitude to those enemies of humanity. But thanks to our own bitter experience we had learnt, that is why you shouldn't change us, who had learned, to new unlearned ones, you should entrust us with the power again.

It turns out, that normal social life, which normally goes spiral, develops and changes, in Belarus reminds of a circle, approaching an absolute geometrical shape. It provides stability of the regime at the cost of "non-development", "non-evolution" of the country and the society.

The comparison comes to mind, the one with an animal trainer standing with a whip in the center of arena, surrounded by various animals: herbivorous, predators, reptiles and even long-extinct Belarusian dinosaurs. All of them implicitly obey the trainer. Some buck, others grizzle, but still obey. Because they do understand that they ham up for the crowd. They are fed for this. And our nation stands for the crowd.

If we remember, that in Belarus the adjective "state" is especially cherished, we can consider one metaphorical definition very suitable for Belarusian model – "State circus".

Once Balzac conceived and realized a grandiose project which he called "The Human Comedy", like Dante, but using new literary and philosophical methods. It was written on France, but in the result it spoke of the whole humanity. Social types, which were depicted there, where, dare I say this swear word, cosmopolite, but still French through and through. You may call them "accidental" or "ordinary" or as you want…

I don't know if the journalist Alexander Tomkovich intended to create a landmark study of this scale. I think no. But several of his books, that saw the light of the day, took a shape of the modern history of Belarus. Its tragicomic history.

Tomkovich didn't overthink the methods. He just talked to the characters, recorded their talks with a tape recorder and prepared them for newspaper publishing. What came out as a result is a kind of an encyclopedia of persons, characters and deeds of prominent Belarusian leaders in the crucial moments of country's life. It doesn't happen so often, not every people manage to become a nation, to create its own state. It's a banality to say that the way for this event was paved by the previous history, that Belarus didn't grow on a roadside, that other people wanted to disperse, to scatter Belarus, but it remains where it was, in the same very place, once chosen for life and work, in the same place which received a "residence permit" from God.

We can suppose that any other people, who would be born here, in this place, or who would have forced the Belarusians out, would become resembling Belarusians, would became Belarusians. And they would certainly get their part of the cake with mustard. A lot of Belarusians are trained exclusively to the cake, which harms their health, while others get only the mustard. Sometimes they are even fed by force.

Tomkovich tells how once he had compared the contents of two encyclopedic publications: one printed in 1995 and a modern one. The names of those took active part in country's life during the last two decades are almost not mentioned in the first one, as they were too young and "Not-Honored". Two decades later their names are omitted (almost buried in oblivion) exactly because they had stood out, because they had made a lot for the country and for the nation. Their deeds were good and bad, but they were important.

It is a case of about a hundred of politicians and public persons who, as Alexander Tomkovich puts it, created the past and the future of Belarus: "I'd like to make a mistake, but decades and centuries will pass, and our descendants will never know what really happened nowadays".

Same "cuts" were made during the Soviet history; same methods are used in the modern Belarusian history. It's sad, but people die, and we are left to regret that the journalist did not have time to record memoirs of Boris Zvozskov or Victor Ivashkevich.

As Tomkovich notes, the idea of "The Newest History of Belarus" was suggested by the editor of "Novy Chas", Alexey Korol. In this newspaper there was column by the same name, and readers were really interested by the articles published in that column. Because of this interest the series transformed into a publicist project, which gained in solidity, thoroughness and, dare I say it, academism. The literary fraternity in the world is regarded without piety since long ago, no one considers writers as "engineers of the human soul", but they are considered as intellectuals who produce some professional output which can be trusted.

This is what the last Tomkovich's book "The Newest History In Persons" convinces of. He dedicated it to his wife Irina, and this only confirms what was told above. In fact, no one would dedicate a random, passable book to his beloved woman.

Though it happens.

It happens, but only when the author is complete cynic.

The book starts classically, ab ovo. No one would contest Zenon Poznyak's "right of the first night". Tomkovich devoted to him only four and a half pages, but managed to create an ultimate portrait of him. A museum piece. From time to time it will be included into the display, from time to time it will be moved to the depot, but no one will ever say that it should be scrapped. No, once we'll need this piece. As they say, presidents come and go, but Poznyak remains.

Because presidents do go away after all.

As Tomkovich notes it, from the very beginning Poznyak was considered as a Russophobe and an anti-Semite. As for the latter, I don't think so, but the question of Russophobia is more acute. When Poznyak was writing on Russian imperialism, same things were published in Moscow, in "Pamyat'", but then Russia's imperial background was recognized as a compliment for the nation. Own money, own army – all those ideas were not original, because the opposition of the Baltic states demanded the same since long ago. While reading Poznyak's articles, electorate was leery: it could be yes, it could be no. But then the moment of truth came in August 1991, and this moment was fixed in history by Poznyak. The clever ones understood that the game of jackstraws was over and Belarus needed statehood – own army, own money, own Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead of the puppet one, guided from Moscow in case of the need of an additional vote in the UN.

If you still have doubts, have a look at Crimea.

New Tomkovich's book may serve as a reference book for specialists, not to mention mass readers with universal cognitive requests, as the subjects of essays are very different in regard to the professions and personalities. The author let to have a say to a general and a corporal, to a social-democrat and a nationalist, to men and women in the very proportions defined by life itself.

The characters should not take offence as well. I think every one of them got a present from the author in the form a finished literary work, laconic in form and rich in content. I'm not going to recall Chekhov's criteria or writer's talent. Tomkovich will get from the history what he deserves. But every reader of these essays will remember the famous saying: "Don't lay the blame at someone's door!" For this purpose the history of Leonid Sinitsyn painting a new national emblem instead of "Pogonya" is extremely interesting. I know that a lot of people considered and still consider Sinitsyn intelligent, though maybe too pragmatic, but this detail is more than enough to see a Solzhenitsyn's "lumpen-intelligent" ready to obey to any command, to fail everything, to fuck up everything human in himself and people around.

The distinguishing trait for "The Newest History" consists of the fact that the materials of it are already being shelved, while they are still on the pages of

mass media, in the "main storage" of contemporaries and specialists, who are obliged to shelf only the cases with expired statute of limitation according to the law.

And I'm not speaking of the cases without statute of limitation.

I think that author sometimes speeds things up, prods some of his heroes who are interested to bury in oblivion some of their "famous deeds", and to shelf documental records.

On these issues Tomkovich feels understandably uneasy as a well brought-up person who is witnessing someone's false step by accident.

There is a note of the author repeated several times: "Let this question remain for history".

Don't hurry up…

Konstantin Skuratovich, Ph. D.

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IISEPS Executive Director:

Dr. **Algirdas Degutis**

IISEPS News
Jogailos g. 4, LT-01116 Vilnius
Editor Algirdas Degutis (+370-6) 887-50-00
E-mail: *iiseps@iiseps.org; iiseps.iiseps@gmail.com*
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