ISSN 1822–5543

IISEPS NEWS

Analytical Bulletin of Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies

N 4 (66)	www.iiseps.org; iiseps@iiseps.org	December 2012

IN THIS ISSUE:

Preface 2

Monitoring of public opinion in Belarus

December–2012

Negative stability 3
With or without him comes to the same thing 5
A stable rating against the background of a growing income 6
On the swing of the trust ratings 8
Again about the turnout 10
"A new majority": between the myths and reality 11
The lull at the geopolitical fronts 14
Fruit of the "Dialogue about Modernization of Belarus" 16
"Small border traffic" and big-time politics 18

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in December, 2012 20

Open Forum

Party's legal proceedings with sociologists 39

Bookshelf

Prof. **Stanislav Bogdankevich,** Ph. D.
"A serious contribution to the future modernization of Belarus" 46

Michitaka Hattori, Deputy Director of the Institute for Studying the Economy of Russia and CIS (Japan)
"Important lessons and challenges of twenty years to Belarus independence" 47

Dear readers!

In another issue of the analytic bulletin "IISEPS News" we offer to your attention materials reflecting the most important results of the Institute research in the fourth quarter of 2012.

Our research reveals that the "economic feeling" of Belarusians has virtually "stiffened" at the former level: in spite of the fact that last year was a year of the real income growth for the overwhelming majority, over 40% of respondents said it had turned out to be more difficult than the previous one; the same number of people said it had been the same, and it had been easier for 14% only. The number of those who consider that "in general the state of things is developing in our country in the wrong direction" still considerably exceeds the number of those who gave the opposite answer. Assessing the "success of the Belarusian economic model" a third of respondents said that "Belarusian economy enjoyed no success", about 30% said "Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid", and 28.1% only considered that "success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons".

The unsteadiness of the economic stabilization inevitably influences attitude of Belarusians to the authorities: they hold the president and the government mainly responsible for the present crisis. The skeptical attitude begins to spread to the whole of the authorities' economic policy. At that not only certain decisions begin to be called in question more and more (e.g. placement of the confectionary plants "Kommunarka" and "Spartak" under control of the state), but the ideology of the authorities' economic policy itself. Thus, over half of respondents did not agree with the recent statements of A. Lukashenko that "market ideology was thrust on us to destroy the economy we had had" and that "the basis of policy, mine in the first place, is honesty and justice. It is the basis of everything, including economy, however strange it might seem".

Disagreement and dissatisfaction with the executive policy gradually "concentrate" on its main inspirer. Answering the question "Do you think the fact that virtually all power in the country is now accumulated in the hands of A. Lukashenko is for the benefit of Belarus or does not give the country anything good?" a third of respondents gave the first answer, and half – the second. The president's personal rating has actually "come to a standstill" regardless of achieving the "cherished" 500-dollar salary by the end of the year: in December he was trusted by 39.1% of respondents and 49.1% did not trust him, and 31.5% were ready to vote for him in the new presidential elections. It is obvious that shifting responsibility onto the "negligent officials", which the president has been skillfully using for many years, does not produce the former effect any more.

No considerable changes are being observed in foreign policy orientation of Belarusians. Just as in the third quarter, if the situation requires choosing between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, 37.7% speak for the first option, and 43.4% of respondents – for the second one. However, in a deeper retrospection the public opinion "leeway" from Russia to the European Union becomes more and more obvious. At the same time, "Europeanisation" of public opinion has a pragmatic rather than value response. Giving answers to the question: "What kind of assistance could the European Union render in modernization of Belarus, in your opinion?" Belarusians mentioned sharing of modern technologies and provision of credits in the first place, and not consulting assistance in reform implementing. Such "quiet European invasion" is exemplified by the issue of the "small border traffic" – today 37.7% know about it, and almost half of respondents support it (at that the majority of them are ready to lend active support to its promotion).

As usual, for those readers who are more interested in our figures than in assessments we afford ground for analyzing the research results on their own by means of counting up in terms of the main socio-demographic characteristics.

In the "Bookshelf" rubric the Belarusian economist, Prof. Stanislav Bogdankevich and the famous Japanese scientist (the author of the first book about Belarus in Japan) Michitaka Hattori present to the readers a new book by IISEPS "The Future of Belarus. Sight independent experts".

In the March issue of the bulletin we published the controversy "Sociology: crisis of confidence" which had started in Russia. Today "The Open Forum" presents another example of an uncompromising struggle with sociologists for the "party cause" that has recently unfolded in Ukraine. As it can be seen, Belarusian oppositionists (V. Rymashevsky & C°) who voiced criticism against IISEPS for its opinion polls results after the September parliamentary elections, keep to the beaten track…

As usual your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In December of 2012 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.500 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

DECEMBER – 2012

Negative stability

In his interview to the newspaper "Respublika" minister of economy N. Snopkov mentioned the inflation decrease as the main achievement of the government in 2012: "Last year we had hyperinflation. This year it will not exceed the forecasted limits – it will make up about 21-22%; it has decreased 5 times. This is success of our economic policy and one of the best rates in the world practice of the government antiinflationary measures".

The fivefold inflation decrease and 18.1% income growth (between January and November) could not but tell upon the population's assessments of the previous year's importance for the country (Table 1). The number of those who said that last year had been more difficult than the previous one, declined from 74.7% to 41%. It is the level of 2008; however, at that time respondents were comparing two quite successful for the country years. Such formal match in assessments shows the conditional character of comparison. A comparison is made in the mode of "here and now" which excludes adequacy of assessments if the events are spread far away from one another in terms of time.

In the split Belarusian society assessments of the past year traditionally prove to be politicized (Table 2). Opponents of the authorities are more inclined to reflection already on the strength of their socio-demographic characteristics (their level of education is on average considerably higher) which limits the influence of the state propaganda.

Last year proved to be more successful not only for the country in general, but also for Belarusians (Table 3). Just as in the previous case the share of positive assessments among supporters of the authorities turned out to be noticeably higher than among their opponents – 49.5% vs. 27.2%. As for the negative assessments, the dependency was naturally reverse – 31.9% vs. 51.6%.

In spite of a quite even growth in the population's income during 2012, no adequate increase in the social indices was registered in the second half of the year. The financial standing index (FSI) did not virtually change in December relative to September (Table 4). At that an insignificant polarization of the assessments took place: the positive as well as

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "Was last year more difficult or easier for Belarus in comparison with the previous one?", %

Variant of answer	12'08	12'09	12'11	12'12
More difficult	42.8	52.4	74.7	41.0
The same as the previous one	44.6	38.3	21.6	41.8
Easier	7.7	7.6	2.5	14.0
DA/NA	4.9	1.7	1.2	3.2

Table 2

Distribution of answers to the question: "Was last year more difficult or easier for Belarus in comparison with the previous one?" depending on the attitude to the authorities, %

Variant of answer	Opponents	Supporters
More difficult	56.1	35.9
The same as the previous one	34.8	45.3
Easier	6.3	16.5
DA/NA	2.8	2.3

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "Was last year in general successful or unsuccessful for you personally?", %

Variant of answer	12'08	12'09	12'11	12'12
Successful	46.3	48.2	33.0	44.0
Unsuccessful	33.1	35.1	45.9	35.8
DA/NA	20.6	16.7	21.1	20.2

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	06'11	03'12	06'12	09'12	12'12
It has improved	24.9	1.6	15.3	12.8	14.7	17.4
It has not changed	57.7	23.2	43.4	54.7	58.8	54.0
It has become worse	16.0	73.4	40.6	31.9	25.0	26.7
FSI*	8.9	**–71.8**	–25.3	–19.1	–10.3	–9.3

** Financial standing index (the difference of positive and negative answers)*

Table 5

Dynamics of answering the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	06'11	03'12	06'12	09'12	12'12
It is going to improve	30.6	11.9	22.5	21.4	18.4	23.3
It is not going to change	40.7	20.3	34.4	38.5	43.6	34.6
It is going to become worse	17.2	55.5	32.7	30.4	27.8	29.7
EI*	13.4	**–43.6**	–10.2	–9.0	–9.4	–6.4

** Expectation index*

Table 6

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the state of things is developing in general in the right or in the wrong direction in our country?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	09'11	03'12	06'12	09'12	12'12
In the right direction	54.2	17.0	35.3	32.4	34.1	33.5
In the wrong direction	32.5	68.5	52.5	54.3	47.4	46.1
DA/NA	13.3	14.5	12.2	13.3	18.4	20.4
PCI*	21.7	**–51.5**	–17.2	–21.9	–13.3	–12.6

** Policy correctness index*

negative assessments grew up simultaneously. Let us mention that FSI of the authorities' supporters proved to be appreciably higher than by their opponents (–3.5 vs. –28.5).

Polarization of assessments of the change in socio-economic situation in Belarus within the next few years was also registered in December (Table 5). For the four quarterly opinion polls the expectation index has increased only by 3.8 points. If one compares it with the historic minimum of June 2011 (–43.6) then progress is obvious. Nevertheless, it is impossible to talk about restoration of Belarusians' faith in the future. In December the number of optimists did not even reach a quarter. However, it proved to be almost three times less among supporters of the authorities than among their opponents – 29.1% vs. 10.9%.

Thus, numerous statements of the head of state concerning the optimism with which Belarusians "are looking into the future" are not bolstered with the results of public opinion polls.

No appreciable growth in the policy correctness index was noticed in December either (Table 6). Only every third Belarusian considers that the state of things in the country is developing in the right direction (43.1% – among supporters of the authorities and 15% – among their opponents).

According to the official doctrine, the socio-economic policy pursued in the country protects "interests of the common man". However, even at the height of the head of state electoral support in December 2010 just a little bit more than half of Bela-

Table 7

Dynamics of answering the question: "Who is responsible for the present crisis in Belarus?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	09'11	12'11	03'12	12'12
President	61.2	53.7	48.6	41.0
Government	41.3	44.6	46.6	39.1
Parliament	11.9	19.5	17.4	17.2
USA	16.3	13.8	12.8	14.5
Opposition	5.0	8.8	6.4	11.5
Europe	12.0	11.9	16.0	10.9
People	10.0	10.9	9.9	8.7
Russia	7.3	12.6	6.2	7.5
DA	13.4	16.1	10.1	11.5

Table 8

Dynamics of answering the question: "Who do you mostly pin your hopes for Belarus surmounting the crisis on?", % *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	03'12	12'12
President	35.9	34.1
Businessmen	24.7	28.8
Russia	25.2	24.0
West	19.7	20.7
Government	19.9	20.0
Directors of state enterprises	12.3	19.4
Opposition	8.6	8.6
Labor unions	3.0	5.0

rusians believed in the correctness of the official policy. At the peak of the crisis (September 2011), though, the number shrank to 17%. Such a low level of real support did not serve for the executive power as a reason for reconsideration of the policy conducted in the country. It did not urge legislators to advance the appropriate initiatives either.

Under the conditions of the economic crisis absence of feedback between the authorities and society is fraught with unpredictable consequences. A. Lukashenko's faith that "the limit of color revolutions in Belarus has been exhausted" is based on the faulty assessments of processes going on in economy and society. Revolutions do not happen at the pleasure of representatives of the "fifth column". They spring up spontaneously as a response of the general public to the policy of the authorities which have lost the ability to adequately appraise what is going on.

With or without him comes to the same thing

While A. Lukashenko continues to believe in the correctness of the policy chosen 18 years ago, the majority of Belarusians continue to consider him the main person responsible for the present crisis in Belarus (Table 7). It should be mentioned, however, that in 2011 his fault decreased considerably relative to the government.

It is clear that supporters and opponents of the authorities (and for a typical representative of the Belarusian "majority" authorities is A. Lukashenko) estimate the responsibility of the head of state and government for the crisis to a varying degree. The head of state is an indisputable leader for the opponents of the authorities – 76.5% vs. 57.2%, and the government is "in the lead" by a slender margin for the authorities' supporters – 31.3% vs. 27.5%.

Approaching of assessments of the responsibility level of the government and head of state relative to the crisis peak (September 2011) occurred due to a decrease in the responsibility of the latter. At that the level of the government's responsibility has not virtually changed. Responsibility of other policy subjects listed in Table 7 did not change considerably either. Using the stock brokers' terminology one can talk about high volatility of A. Lukashenko's personal responsibility for the country's economy condition. It is not surprising: he, who has concentrated full authority in his hands, has to assume the main responsibility, too.

The key person responsible for the crisis simultaneously plays the role of the key subject Belarusians pin their hopes for surmounting the crisis on (Table 8). Attention should be paid to the following: the number of those who still believe in A. Lukashenko's managerial talents finds itself within his ratings (trust and electoral).

The government as a source of hope yields appreciably to businessmen who have gained considerably since March. Directors of enterprises turned out to be almost level with the government. It is not ruled out that businessmen, as well as directors of enterprises, managed to enhance their reputation

Table 9

Distribution of answers to the question: "Various judgments are being expressed concerning success of the Belarusian economic model. Which of them do you agree with?"

Variant of answer	%
Belarusian economy enjoys no success	33.7
Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid	28.4
Success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons; Russian aid is an important, but not a decisive factor	28.1
DA/NA	9.8

Table 10

Dynamics of answering the question: "Some people think that after A. Lukashenko's stepping down as president life in Belarus will improve, others on the contrary think it will become worse. And what do you think?", %

Variant of answer	10'10	09'11	12'11	03'12	12'12
Life will become worse	28.7	23.8	21.5	26.7	25.9
Life will remain the same	28.6	26.9	29.9	36.5	36.5
Life will improve	25.3	35.2	31.7	26.0	24.5
DA/NA	17.4	14.1	16.9	10.8	13.1

Table 11

Dynamics of A. Lukashenko's electoral rating, %

Date	12'10	03'11	06'11	09'11	12'11	03'12	06'12	09'12	12'12
Rating	53.0	42.9	29.3	20.5	24.9	34.5	29.7	31.6	31.5

Table 12

Dynamics of A. Lukashenko's trust/distrust rating, %

Variant of answer	12'10	03'11	06'11	09'11	12'11	03'12	06'12	12'12
Trust	55.0	47.9	33.6	24.5	31.2	42.2	38.5	39.1
Distrust	34.1	42.0	53.8	62.0	54.5	48.5	51.9	49.1

as anti-crisis managers at the expense of A. Lukashenko's modernization rhetoric. He considers technical modernization of enterprises the main condition of revival for a reason.

Answers to the question of Table 9 divide Belarusians into three approximately equal groups: those who render no success on the part of the Belarusian economic model; those who connect it with the Russian economic aid, and supporters of the official version. Consequently, the "story" the state propaganda had been telling for 18 years did not stand the test of reality. Any propaganda proves to be helpless against a two-digit, and in 2011 tree-digit, inflation. In December even among supporters of the authorities only every fourth person managed to discern progress of Belarusian economy.

Many-valuedness in perception of the Belarusian economic model's success repeats itself in many-valuedness of assessments of consequences after a possible resignation of its main architect (Table 10). The fractions of respondents adhering to the extreme assessments ("life will improve" – "life will become worse") differ slightly. However, the variant of answer "life will remain the same" turned out to be the most popular one. Thus, the condition ofdespair that has been manifesting itself for years in the mass sigh "if he does not do it then who will" is gradually beginning to be diluted.

In conclusion let us mention that answers to the question of Table 10 almost coincided in March and December 2012, in spite of the fact that the income level of the population had substantially grown for nine months. Therefore, the policy of purchasing the population's loyalty begins to seriously stall.

A stable rating against the background of a growing income

Stabilization of social indices led to stabilization of A. Lukashenko's ratings (electoral and trust) (Tables 11-12). The mean value of the electoral rating in 2010 was 44.9%, in 2011 – 29.4%, and in 2012 – 31.8%. Similar mean values of the two last years are connected with the "distortion" brought about by the March opinion poll of 2011 held in the first half of the month, i.e. before halting of free currency sale in currency exchange offices.

According to Belstat, in 2011 real cash income grew by 0.1%, and by 18.1% – between January and November of 2012. Such income growth cost the state treasury $ 3.5 billion. This social outcome should be recognized as insignificant.

Table 13

Distribution of answers to the question: "Not long ago A. Lukashenko said: "The basis of policy, mine in the first place, is honesty and justice. It is the basis of everything, including economy, however strange it might seem". Do you agree with the statement?" depending on the attitude to the authorities, %

Variant of answer	Opponents	Supporters
Yes (34.5)*	11.0	44.4
No (52.6)	83.7	42.9
DA/NA (12.9)	5.3	12.7

** Hereinafter the data referring to the whole sample are cited in parentheses*

Table 14

Dynamics of answering the question: "How do you see the image of the present-day president?", %

Variant of answer	01'07	09'09	06'11	12'12
He slowly but surely follows the course of reforms pursuing his object	38.9	33.1	23.1	27.9
He simply seeks to enhance his power	22.8	30.8	35.8	29.1
He seeks to maintain the previous system of administration	13.0	13.9	18.6	17.3
He advances slogans without concrete actions	8.3	12.7	12.7	15.1
He transforms reality in a qualitative and revolutionary manner	11.0	7.8	9.2	10.2
DA	7.8	9.9	0.6	0.4

Table 15

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the fact that virtually all power in the country is now accumulated in the hands of A. Lukashenko is for the benefit of Belarus or does not give the country anything good?", %

Variant of answer	09'09	06'11	12'12
Does not give the country anything good	36.0	59.1	49.9
Is for the benefit of Belarus	44.4	26.2	33.3
DA/NA	19.6	14.7	16.8

A short planning horizon is typical of the majority of authoritarian political regimes. That is why they often sacrifice strategic benefits to tactic ones, such as e.g. maintaining political stability in the course of another electoral campaign.

After March 2011 the number of Belarusians distrusting A. Lukashenko persistently exceeds the number of those who still trust him (Table 12). In December 2012 the difference made up 10 points. It is appreciably lower than the historic maximum of 37.5 points registered in September 2011. With the best will in the world, one can discern a "new majority" in the tendency of prevalence of those who do not trust over those who do. However, there are quite cogent arguments for doubts that the "new majority" is backed up by a new socio-political quality.

The question of Table 13 is closely sided with the rating question about trust/distrust in A. Lukashenko. The share of respondents who agree that the policy of the head of state is honest and just differs slightly from the trust rating. It is natural that negative answers predominate over positive ones among opponents of the authorities. However, the ratio of negative and positive answers unexpected at first sight, as it has turned out to be among supporters of the authorities may look close to one.

Let us remind the reader that we divide respondents into supporters and opponents of the authorities according to the answers to the question: "Do you consider yourself to be in opposition to the present authorities?" At that the number of those who attribute themselves to opposition as a rule proves to be considerably smaller than the number of those who trust A. Lukashenko. Accordingly, the number of respondents not attributing themselves to opposition considerably exceeds the number of those who trust him.

Due to the official propaganda efforts of many years the word "oppositionist" has become synonymous with the word "enemy" in Belarus. Today not every Belarusian who does not trust the head of state and does not vote for him in elections perceives him/herself as an oppositionist.

Answers to the question of Table 13 can be considered as an illustration of another statement by A. Lukashenko: "Whom do we want to deceive? The people? It will never be possible to deceive the people. They might sometimes say nothing, but they see the truth anyway" (the report at the III All-Belarusian Assembly). Everything is correct. The Belarusian people say nothing, but they see the truth.

Belarusians also perceive the numerous statements of A. Lukashenko in the light of the low trust

Table 16

Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to the decision?" depending on the attitude to the authorities, %

Variant of answer	Opponents	Supporters
I disapprove of it as this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation (36.1)	63.4	27.7
I approve of it, as the plants were privatized illegally at one time. that is why their return to the state does not contradict Belarusian legislation (21.1)	6.9	12.6
I approve of it, in spite of the fact that this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation (10.9)	11.6	25.7
DA/NA (31.9)	18.2	34.1

rating. In particular, only 24% of respondents agreed in December with his statement "Market ideology was thrust on us to destroy the economy we had had", 56.2% did not agree, and 19.8% found it difficult to answer.

Public efforts of A. Lukashenko on modernization of enterprises were not left unnoticed by public opinion (Table 14). In comparison with June 2011 the image of president-the-reformer has added 4.8 points. This is a new tendency – before the reformatory image of the head of state was gradually going down. Contribution of opponents and supporters of the authorities to the turnaround of the tendency proved to be uneven, of course: 9.1% vs. 35.6%.

Public dressing-downs given to officials by the individual personifying state power have always been perceived by the population positively – the pike is there in the pond for the crucian not to sleep. A good tsar is a redoubtable tsar; otherwise bad boyars will lose all sense of shame and begin excessively oppress the ordinary public.

The reformatory efforts in their turn changed the tendency according to which A. Lukashenko was more and more perceived as a fighter for retaining his own power (opponents of the authorities – 45.8%, supporters of the authorities – 22.9%). Other constituents of the image remained virtually unchanged.

The new tendencies mentioned in Table 14 also changed the dynamics of the attitude of Belarusians to the accumulation of power in the hands of A. Lukashenko. If power is accumulated to increase control over officials, then such accumulation of power finds its adherents in Belarusian society (Table 15); naturally, least of all in the opposition-leaning part of society – 12.9% vs. 42.9%.

However, as observations of many years prove, public opinion has a short memory, that is why one-shot public dressing-downs bring one-shot results. Transfer of public dressing-downs into the permanent mode may provoke an undesirable tension among the minions of the individual personifying state power. The experienced politician is very well aware of it and hence alternates public dressing-downs with pauses.

In September A. Lukashenko demanded that the boards of directors of the confectionary plants "Kommunarka" and "Spartak" be done away with and the plants be placed under control of the state. Almost half of Belarusians (46.7%) have not heard anything about the demand actively discussed in the state and independent mass media. It can be concluded from the fact that the other half lives virtually beyond the information flows. This is quite natural for society in the state of political apathy. That is why in particular the amplitude of the tendencies' changes registered in Table 14 did not exceed 7 points.

Mass life beyond the information flows is also manifested in the fact that almost a third of respondents found it difficult to define their attitude to the placement of confectionary plants under the control of the state (Table 16). The main share of those who found it difficult to answer fell on supporters of the authorities. Taking into account the socio-demographic portrait of the latter such redistribution is nothing to be surprised about.

Every fourth supporter of the authorities approved of the decision about placement of the confectionary plants under the control of the state ignoring the fact that the decision contradicts Belarusian legislation, i.e. was made according to the logic of revolutionary suitability. The fact should not be treated as a minor one – we see a relic of the traditional culture which is beyond the legal framework by definition. Even in the XXI century its bearers still make up an appreciable part of Belarusian society (their share is not limited to the 10.9% as they form a considerable majority among those who found it difficult to answer).

Attitude of respondents to another statement by A. Lukashenko: "We mustn't pick on what was going on in 1917 and in general pulp the good ideas with which Lenin and his team agreed to the revolution" confirms that the process of parting with the past is still far from being completed: 35.1% agreed with it, 48.9% disagreed and 16% found it difficult to answer.

On the swing of the trust ratings

Only 14% of Belarusians agree that officials really help people with solving their problems (Table 17). As it has been already noted by us more than once, a typical representative of the Belarusian, as well as of Russian "majority" is simultaneously an anti-statist and an adherent of power. "Power – says the culture expert I. Yakovenko – is

Table 17

Distribution of answers to the question: "President A. Lukashenko announced implementing reforms of the administrative staff machinery. Which statement about Belarusian officials do you agree with?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	%
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because they are not controlled from above	47.6
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because there is no democratic control from below	37.0
Officials really help people solve their problems	14.0
DA	10.8

Table 18

Dynamics of positive answers to the question: "Do you trust the following state and public institutions?", %

Institution	12'10	12'12	+/–
Government	51.6	35.0	–16.6
President	55.0	39.1	–15.9
State mass media	52.9	38.1	–14.8
Central Election Committee	47.5	32.9	–14.6
Local Executive Committees	43.5	30.5	–13.0
Political parties supporting the authorities	33.8	23.7	–10.1
Local Deputy Councils	41.2	31.5	–9.7
Public Prosecutor's Office	47.3	37.8	–9.5
Law courts	49.0	40.8	–8.2
Militia	45.6	37.4	–8.2
International organizations (the UN, the European Union, OSCE, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, etc.)	45.8	38.7	–7.1
KGB	43.2	37.2	–6.0
Human rights organizations (the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and others)	38.0	33.5	–4.5
National Assembly	35.7	33.1	–2.6
Protestant Church	18.4	16.3	–2.1
The Bar	49.9	48.3	–1.6
Labor unions, members of the Labor Unions Federation	35.4	34.1	–1.3
Army	53.6	52.8	–0.8
Independent research centers	44.0	45.1	1.1
Non-state mass media*	46.3	48.1	1.8
Orthodox Church	68.3	70.6	2.3
Opposition political parties	16.3	20.0	3.7
Independent labor unions	33.3	38.7	5.4
Catholic Church	35.4	44.1	8.7
Associations of businessmen	36.2	45.1	8.9

** In December 2010 – "Independent mass media"*

experienced and interpreted by him without correlation with the state. A state is a socio-political institution, an undue and sinful type of historical reality. Power, on the contrary, is a spiritual substance. … In a critical situation an ordinary man sets his hopes not upon the state, but upon power. He complains to it, pins his hopes on it, and appeals to it in case of a conflict with an official".

For an ordinary man power is personified in the first person of the state. The "only Belarusian politician" relies exactly on this "theoretical basis" arranging public "floggings" of officials from time to time. He won the first presidential elections in 1994 also because he was perceived by his electors as a means to keep corrupt officials in check. Today he mercilessly punishes those who frustrate the plans on modernization of enterprises. Judging by the rating, it is not so convincing as it used to be 18 years ago; however, A. Lukashenko has not yet completely exhausted his potential of a defender of the ordinary man's interests from the arbitrary rule of officials.

Let us refer to the data of Table 17 once again. Why are officials deaf to the needs of ordinary people? Because they are not controlled from above, i.e. by the authorities, think 67.7% of the authority's supporters. However, even among those who consider themselves oppositionists, every fifth person agrees with it!

When trust in the individual personifying the authority sinks lower than a critical level, a collapse of the state ensues, as state institutions do not

Table 19

Dynamics of publications in the newspaper "Sovetskaya Belorussiya" containing the word "liberalization"

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number	29	14	8	2	3	5	3	40	72	62	34	27

Table 20

Dynamics of publications in the newspaper "Sovetskaya Belorussiya" containing the word "modernization"

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number	35	82	44	32	46	87	93	91	83	160	155	151

Table 21

Dynamics of answering the question: "Did you take part in the vote in the election for the House of Representatives on 23 September 2012?", %

Variant of answer	10'12	12'12
Voted early (18-22 September)	17.4	21.1
Voted on Sunday, 23 September	49.0	41.6
Boycotted the elections	9.6	9.8
Did not take part in the vote due to other reasons	24.0	27.5
Voted altogether	**66.4**	**62.7**

possess legitimacy of their own from the point of view of the antistate population. Hence it turns out that in a critical moment the state has no defenders. It happened so in 1917 and in 1991.

Absence of legitimacy by the state institutions is confirmed by the data of Table 18. It is ranged in the third column. A. Lukashenko's falling trust rating pulled down trust ratings of all state institutions without exception.

As for the non-governmental institutions, trust in them has, on the contrary, grown. A slight addition by the non-governmental mass media is explained probably by the difference in wording, as public opinion is more inclined to trust independent institutions (candidates) than non-governmental. At that the difference may reach 4-6 points.

Analyzing the decrease in trust in international and human rights organizations one should not forget that before the events of December 19, 2010 a policy of liberalization and closer relations with the West was being pursued in Belarus. After the "Square" not only the real policy with the West, but also its media accompaniment were radically reconsidered. Such change of foreign policy priorities could not but tell on the attitude of Belarusians to the international and human rights organizations (associated with the policy of the West).

Associations of businessmen turned out to be in the lead of the trust growth, which is easily explained by the modernization rhetoric that superseded the liberalization one (Tables 19-20).

Attention should be paid to the growth of independent labor unions' trust rating. If one takes into account the fact that according to the absolute value the independent labor unions' rating exceeded the rating of political parties almost two times in December 2012 (38.7% vs. 20%), and Belarusians' inclination to prefer economic problems to political ones, then Belarusian independent labor unions might get a chance to repeat the success of Polish "Solidarność" in the future. Whether they will use the chance depends, however, on concurrence of a wide range of objective and subjective factors.

Again about the turnout

The turnout issue was the focus of the election campaign of the majority of opposition parties. In the opinion of party activists, the low turnout was supposed to testify to a new quality of Belarusian society which it had acquired after the shock of 2011. Naturally the subject of refusal to implement the "social contract" (loyalty in exchange for an income growth) was broached again. A mass boycott of the elections was to serve as an indicator of such a refusal.

In this connection we would like to remind the optimists registering on a regular basis the transition of quantitative changes in the economy into a new social quality that the main property of any culture consists in resistance to changes. Social systems are rather inert already because their main institution – the man – is inert. Yes, mood swings are peculiar to him, which is regularly registered in the course of public opinion polls. To receive evidence that it is really so, it is enough to look at the amplitude of the social indices for the last two years. However, the man is not able to change his value and basic mindset system like a woman changes clothes. Hence one should not mistake the wish for

Table 22

Dynamics of answering the question: "Were, in your opinion, the past parliamentary elections free and just?", %

Variant of answer	10'08	12'08	10'12	12'12
Yes	56.3	48.7	47.5	42.2
No	24.2	27.1	27.0	38.8
DA/NA	19.5	24.2	25.5	19.0

Table 23

Dynamics of answers to the question: "Do you consider yourself to be in opposition to the present authorities?", %

Variant of answer	12'10	03'12	06'12	12'12
Yes	18.9	23.4	19.2	21.3
No	72.4	66.0	71.6	65.8
DA/NA	8.7	10.6	9.2	12.9

reality.

It should not be forgotten that for the absolute majority the past year became a year of a real income growth. If the authorities did breach the social contract in 2011, then in 2012 they rehabilitated themselves in this respect.

The December opinion poll confirmed again that the turnout in the parliamentary elections had been over 60% (Table 21). A slight decrease three months after the voting should not surprise. A similar decrease was registered in 2008, too. Once again an appreciable redistribution of votes among those who had voted early and on the polling day occurred, just as it had happened four years before.

The number of respondents who said they had boycotted the elections remained unchanged. However, is 10% of the electoral roll a lot or little? Opposition politicians answer this question depending on their attitude to the boycott. If one looks at the result of the boycott not in the light of political commitment, then 10% of the electoral roll means that almost every third person (29.2%) among opponents of the authorities declared his/her boycott of the elections, and among supporters of the authorities – only 4% of respondents. On the whole, electoral activity of the authorities' opponents proved to be 26.2 points lower than electoral activity of their supporters – 42.6% vs. 69.2%.

For three months that passed since the parliamentary elections assessments of their freedom and justice level have noticeably changed (Table 22). At that the negative and positive assessments have almost matched. If one compares the assessments of December 2012 with the assessments of December 2008, then changes will become especially tangible. It is unlikely that they reflect real change in the quality of the election process. The reason for the change should be looked for in the decrease of the level of the population's trust in A. Lukashenko and state institutions in general (if in November 2008 the trust rating of the CEC made up 44.6%, and the distrust rating – 36.6%, then in December 2012 – 32.9% and 52.5% respectively).

Besides subjective reasons which make party activists assess the turnout received in the course of opinion polls skeptically, an objective reason should be mentioned as well. One of the most popular topics in the independent, as well as in the state mass media, is the topic of Belarusians' labor migration. Although different figures are being named, the majority of them go into the range from 600 thousand to 1 million people. If one takes into account the electoral roll equaling 7 million people, then registration of the turnout by the observers will yield the result 9-14% lower in comparison with opinion polls, as the latter cover respondents on the territory of the country only, and opinion of labor migrants is naturally not taken into consideration in their results.

"A new majority": between the myths and reality

In June, 2012 77.3% of respondents agreed that Belarus needed changes, whereas only 15.1% supported the opposite point of view. It should seem that the overwhelming advantage of the former above the latter simply had to materialize into public actions. However, such expectations of opposition politicians were not destined to come true once again.

The mystery in this case is solved quite easily: it is necessary to differentiate between the declared and operational behavior codes of respondents while interpreting the results of public opinion polls. The mentioned distinction also holds true if one analyzes the so-called "new majority". Since June 2011 A. Lukashenko's distrust rating has invariably exceeded his trust rating (49.1% vs. 39.1% in December, 2012). However, does the mentioned fact mean that an electoral situation different in essence has taken shape in Belarus?

Here one has to sort out the criteria. Social and political processes are infinitely diverse. That is why an analysis result will depend on the selection of criteria. A Chinese proverb reminds us about the

Table 24

Dynamics of answering the question: "What do you think opposition should do?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	09'11	12'12
Offer a dialogue to the government	36.1	35.0
Assure resignation of the president	32.9	33.4
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	18.6	19.9
Assure resignation of the government	15.1	17.9
Assure resignation of the parliament	7.3	13.0
Boycott all initiatives of the government	7.8	5.6
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	6.7	4.7
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	2.7	3.1
DA	19.8	16.7

Table 25

Distribution of answers to the question: "What do you think opposition should do?" depending on attitude to the authorities, % *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	Opponents	Supporters
Offer a dialogue to the government	17.6	40.6
Assure resignation of the president	67.7	22.3
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	9.4	22.9
Assure resignation of the government	35.7	12.3
Assure resignation of the parliament	22.3	10.0
Boycott all initiatives of the government	13.5	3.5
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	8.5	3.2
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	9.7	1.2
DA	4.4	19.5

importance of selecting the "right" criteria: "All the dogs in the world can be divided in two groups: those that have crossed *this* road and those that have not crossed *this* road".

Under the conditions of a high level of support of A. Lukashenko his trust rating makes it possible to separate the democratic “minority” from the authoritarian “majority” quite efficiently. However, if attitude to the head of state really acted as a significant factor of the Belarusian society’s split it would mean the split had subjective rather than objective nature. Then a decrease in A. Lukashenko’s trust rating would very likely be accompanied by a growth in his political opponents’ trust ratings. However, such a "flow" of ratings has never been observed so far.

Let us illustrate the above said: in December 2010 at the peak of electoral mobilization 55% of Belarusians trusted A. Lukashenko, and 16.1% – opposition political parties. In two years amidst the economic crisis A. Lukashenko’s trust rating made up 39.1% (–15.9 points), and opposition parties’ rating – 20% (+3.9 points).

A decrease in A. Lukashenko’s trust rating did not lead to a comparable growth in the number of opposition-leaning Belarusians (Table 23). As it was mentioned before, in December 2012 49.1% did not trust A. Lukashenko, whereas only 21.1% considered themselves in opposition to the present authorities, i.e. 2.3 times less.

Following the results of the March opinion poll of 2012 socio-demographic portraits of opponents and supporters of the authorities were compiled. No surprises occurred there. Answering the question "Do you consider yourself in opposition to the present authorities?" men said "yes" 1.6 times more often than women, the young at the age of 18-29 – 3.6 times more often than those who are older than 60 and respondents with higher education – 6.3 times more often than the ones with primary education.

This is a typical distribution for a dependence on the level of human capital. In Belarus, as well as in Russia, the basis of opposition to the authoritarian power is constituted by representatives of the so-called "creative class". The level of human capital is the criterion which takes the population on the opposite sides of the “barricades”. It is clear that the head of state’s personal rating does not influence it.

In 2012 the topic of political modernization was thrown into public opinion once again. Of course, A. Lukashenko initiated it himself. Let us cite an excerpt from his interview for Chinese mass media: "Today we are studying certain tendencies in the world, and of course we will adapt, modernize our political system. We will hold a parliamentary election, and I think we should pay serious attention to the political reform or the reform of our country’s political system".

The initiative from above was not left unnoticed either by the independent or state analysts. In particular, in November and December the newspaper "Sovetskaya Belorussiya" published philosopher

Table 26

Distribution of answers to the question: "Representatives of the Belarusian opposition have lately offered various programs and initiatives directed at changes in our country. Which of them have you heard of?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	%
"Civic Agreement", offered by the campaign "Tell the Truth"	23.3
"Just Elections", offered by the party "The Just World"	13.7
"People's Program", offered by the movement "For Freedom"	12.2
"Program of Belarus Modernization", offered by the Joint Civic Party	9.7
The program of European Integration offered by the National Platform of the Civil Society Forum of Eastern Partnership	6.1
DA	50.6

Table 27

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the question whether Belarus should join the European Union were being held now in Belarus, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'02	03'03	03'05	04'06	05'07	03'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	06'11	12'11	06'12	12'12
For	60.9	56.4	52.8	32.4	33.5	35.4	34.9	36.2	48.6	45.1	35.9	**39.3**	**38.9**
Against	10.9	11.9	44.4	33.8	49.3	35.4	36.3	37.2	30.5	32.4	36.9	**38.2**	**37.6**

V. Orgish's reflection on the topic of political modernization. Refusing the right to life to the Belarusian "minority" ("electorate for the most part supports the political system"), the philosopher nevertheless does not rule out the possibility of "electoral mobilization of various electoral strata of society" with the help of modern revolutionary technologies. Representatives of the radical wing of the party opposition will be able to cope with the role of political technologists under certain external conditions. In the opinion of the philosopher, to neutralize it the authorities should support the constructive opposition wing. At that direct financial support of the constructive opposition by the authorities should not be ruled out as one of the forms of such support.

Let us refer to the data of Tables 24-25 which allow us to estimate opposition's strategic missions from the point of view of public opinion. No considerable changes on the given question have occurred in society since November 2011. As it was to be expected, two mutually exclusive opinions predominate in a split society: to carry on a dialogue with the government and press for resignation of the president. Opinions of supporters and opponents of the authorities differ appreciably regarding these options, as well as all the others.

Attention should be paid to the fact that there is no consent either "across" or "down", i.e. inside the groups of opponents and supporters of the authorities. Nevertheless, among opponents of the authorities confrontational sentiment prevails.

Under the conditions of a completely trampled down political field when elections have turned into a fiction, the tactics of "smaller-scale stories" gain popularity among part of the opposition. They were not evaded by the participants of the "round-table conference" organized in December by the activists of a number of civic initiatives and the site "Our opinion" either. Let us give the floor to I. Drako (deputy of the "Civic Agreement"): "Most likely the "smaller-scale stories" tactics are the most beneficial at the moment, bringing however small but obvious and tangible results. Thus we demonstrate our pertinence and helpfulness to the representatives of the "new majority", we earn authority, involve citizens into public processes thus enhancing their social activity. It is quite possible that it will be converted into political activity later".

History does know incidents of temporary overcoming the split; however it happened only in the context of society transition from the condition of political apathy to political excitement (classics of Marxism-Leninism called such transition "a revolutionary situation"). Last time it was observed at the height of Perestroika.

The condition of political apathy is a specific counterpart of a shell when interests of the majority of the population amount to nothing more than the so-called "close-in circle" (family, children, and colleagues at work). In this case initiators of the "smaller-scale stories" can count at most on an increase in their initiatives' recognizability rating (see Table 26).

Concluding the talk on the topic of a "new majority" let us refer to the materials of the "round-table conference" once again: "The term "new majority" is partly rhetorical and manipulative. A new majority is found in Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, Belarus and the USA. One should realize that if the majority does exist in our country, it can hardly be political. It is not at all the right time to talk about mobilization of such a majority for political purposes. This majority is social, and the data of opinion polls confirm the fact. The only thing that unites these people is dissatisfaction with the inability or unwillingness of authorities at all levels to solve brewing social problems.

Table 28

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the question whether Belarus should integrate with Russia were being held today, how would you vote?", %

Variant of answer	11'99	08'01	12'02	03'03	06'04	06'06	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	06'11	12'11	06'12	12'12
For integration	47.0	57.4	53.8	57.5	42.9	44.9	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	31.4	29.0	**34.0**	**28.7**
Against integration	34.1	20.9	26.3	23.8	25.0	28.9	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	47.8	42.9	**44.3**	**47.5**

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	06'06	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	03'11	06'11	09'11	12'11	03'12	06'12	09'12	12'12
Integration with the RF	56.5	47.5	46.0	42.3	38.1	31.5	35.3	41.5	41.4	47.0	43.6	**36.2**	**37.7**
Joining the EU	29.3	33.3	30.1	42.1	38.0	50.5	44.5	42.0	39.1	37.3	39.8	**44.1**	**43.4**

Table 30

Distribution of answers to the question: "Another aggravation of Belarusian-Russian relations has taken shape due to Belarus export of petrochemicals under the guise of "solvents". Have you heard anything about it?"

Variant of answer	%
This is the first time I hear about it	52.7
I have heard something about it	40.1
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	6.9
NA	0.3

This group is too amorphous for a mass public political struggle. Transforming a social majority into a political one is a long-term task which should be solved with the help of tools different from those that Belarusian opposition parties have got accustomed to using" (V. Dunaev, editor of the Political Examination Agency).

The lull at the geopolitical fronts

In September 2012 IISEPS registered an appreciable decrease in sentiment in favor of integration with Russia in comparison with the previous period. The data of the December opinion poll show that, paraphrasing Remarque, "All Quiet on all the Fronts" (Tables 27-29).

However, some changes can none the less be noted. In the "unilateral" question about integration with Russia (where the question was asked without connection with integration with the EU) there is a decrease in the number of "Euro-Belarusians" and an increase in the number of opponents of the Eastern integration vector. The number of the latter has graded up to the record number registered last summer at the height of the crisis.

However, no changes in the level of either pro-Russian or pro-European intentions occurred in the answers to the dichotomic question of Table 29.

Such sensitivity of answers to the wording of the question about integration with Russia reflects, in our opinion, the multi-aspect, ambivalent nature of Belarusians' attitude to their Eastern neighbor.

As it has been already mentioned in IISEPS materials more than once, the overwhelming majority of Belarusians feel a higher cultural propinquity with Russians than with Europeans. On the other hand, exactly in relations with Russia Belarusians might fear that they can lose their national identity, dissolve in the "Russian sea". Finally, relations of Belarus and Russia are far closer and more institutionalized than relations of Belarus with the EU. Closeness and complexity of the relations are fraught with various surprises which at times exert an unexpected influence on the attitude of Belarusians to Russia.

One of such quirks of fate became the conflict concerning "thinners and solvents" that flared up already in summer. The data of Table 30 show that respondents were not well-informed about it.

At that exactly the "Euro-Belarusians" – supporters of Belarus integration with the EU – were informed about the conflict to the fullest extent (Table 31).

A geo-political choice proves to have a somewhat closer impact on the assessments of the economic climate – "Belo-Russians" appraise it higher than adherents of Euro-integration (Tables 32-33).

The dependence is obvious; the question is only over the direction of the connection – what depends on what? Either the people who, e.g. work at the

Table 31

Connection of geo-political orientations with the answers to the question: "Another aggravation of Belarusian-Russian relations has taken shape due to Belarus export of petrochemicals under the guise of "solvents". Have you heard anything about it?", %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
This is the first time I hear about it	56.2	47.4	57.7
I have heard something about it	38.7	43.7	34.9
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	5.1	8.9	5.6

Table 32

Connection of a geo-political choice with the answers to the question: "How has your financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
It has improved	17.3	14.9	23.2
It has not changed	60.4	50.8	48.6
It has become worse	21.2	32.5	24.6
FSI*	–3.9	–17.6	–1.4

** FSI – Financial standing index (the difference of positive and negative answers)*

Table 33

Connection of a geo-political choice with the answers to the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
It is going to improve	27.8	20.5	20.7
It is not going to change	37.0	30.3	39.3
It is going to become worse	22.8	39.8	20.0
EI*	5.0	–19.3	0.7

** EI – expectation index*

enterprises with Russian sales markets really get a higher income in comparison with the rest of the population and feel sympathy for the "provider" – for Russia – to a greater degree, or Belarusians favoring integration with Russia are inclined to appreciate the native socio-economic model and its practical results higher for ideological reasons.

Studying the dynamics of the connection partly gives an answer to the question. A correlation analysis of the results of the last ten opinion polls held by IISEPS (from December 2010 to December 2012) showed that correlation factors of the number of "Belo-Russians" and various indicators of the economic condition assessments are rather small (less than 0.2 according to the absolute value) and insignificant. The financial standing and expectation indices, as well as the shares of those who answered that their financial standing had improved for the quarter and that the socio-economic situation in Belarus was going to improve within the next few years were chosen as such indicators.

In other words, changes in the assessments of the economic situation prove to be not connected in any way with changes in the shares of "Belo-Russians" and "Euro-Belarusians". Although "Belo-Russians" are inclined to appraise the economic condition of the country higher than "Euro-Belarusians", improvement of the condition and accordingly an increase in the share of those who register the improvement is not accompanied by a growth in the number of adherents of integration with Russia.

This testifies to the fact that people are disposed to integration with Russia not because it is accompanied by or can supposedly be accompanied by some improvement of their financial standing, but vice versa – choosing the Eastern vector (conditioned by cultural, ideological and other reasons) causes in its turn more optimistic assessments of the economic condition.

Table 34

Dynamics of answering the question: "Not long ago the European Union announced beginning of a new program "Dialogue about Modernization of Belarus". It provides for an exchange of opinions and ideas between the EU and representatives of Belarusian civil society and political opposition about the reforms necessary in Belarus, development of relations with the EU and possible support on the part of the European Union. Do you know/have you heard anything about this program?", %

Variant of answer	09'12	12'12
No	79.1	74.0
Yes	20.9	25.3
DA	0	0.7

Table 35

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think Belarus needs such a program?", %

Variant of answer	09'12	12'12
Yes	40.3	48.0
No	18.2	23.0
DA	41.5	29.0

Particularly, it follows from here that *overcoming the crisis ensured in no small measure with the help of Russia not necessarily gives rise to a growth in pro-Russian sentiment*. Insignificant (and sometimes considerable) deviations in the direction of one or the other geopolitical magnet occur appreciably less frequently than preservation of a fundamental balance among supporters of the geopolitical choice in favor of Russia or the European Union.

Fruit of the "Dialogue about Modernization of Belarus"

In the IISEPS opinion poll held in December 2012, just as in the previous one, respondents were asked to express their attitude to the program of the European Union for Belarus (Table 34). A compareson of the polls' results shows that slight, but important dynamics are present.

If a quarter ago every fifth respondent simply knew about the existence of such a program of the EU, then in December 2012 – already each fourth respondent did.

The share of the program's supporters has grown even more appreciably, including the a priori ones – the share of those who said that Belarus needed such a program was almost two times larger than of those who answering the question of Table 34 said he/she was aware of its existence (Table 35).

However, there is also evidence of a tangible growth in the number of the program's opponents. Perhaps, Belarusian authorities having familiarized themselves with the opinion poll's results, or otherwise having made sure that the population treated the program of the EU positively, saw to its discredit. Particularly, appearance of a number of information materials in the state mass media "denouncing" this very program testifies to the fact. It did produce a certain effect, though, as we can see, a slight one.

On the other hand, one should not overestimate the importance of such unanimous support of the "Dialogue about Modernization". As the answers to the question of Table 36 reveal, respondents look at the possibilities of European assistance to Belarus in very different ways.

The data of Table 36 show that recognition of the truth of the formula "Don't give the poor man fish, give him a fishing rod" is not alien to Belarusians: the need for technologies is recognized to a greater extent than the need for credits. However, technologies, to all appearances, are recognized in a strictly technological sense (please, excuse the tautology) – as something industrial, manufacturing. The need for social, organizational technologies, for the European reform experience is recognized to a far lesser degree.

Thus, the approach of society in a sense largely coincides with the approach of the Belarusian authorities: give us your high-tech, it would not be a miss for you to offer us some money too, but do not teach us how to live, we know it better than you do.

A negative attitude of the official Minsk to the program is conditioned, of course, in the first place by the fact that no talk with the Belarusian authorities is planned within the framework of the "Dialogue about Modernization". However, the data of Table 36 reveal that not only the Belarusian authorities, but Belarusian society too, have a somewhat different idea about the subject matter of such a talk, in case it began, than the European partners (Table 37-39).

The connection is quite natural – there are appreciably more of those who heard about the program among "Euro-Belarusians" than in the groups with other geopolitical preferences. Also among "Euro-Belarusians" there are more of those who believe that the country needs such a program. What stands out is that in this question "Belo-Russians" prove to be more pro-European than those who

Table 36

Dynamics of answering the question: "What kind of assistance could the European Union render in modernization of Belarus, in your opinion?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	%
Sharing of modern technologies	42.2
Provision of credits	36.0
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	34.4
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	28.4
Other	2.4
DA	17.4

Table 37

Connection of answering the question: "Not long ago the European Union announced beginning of a new program "Dialogue about Modernization of Belarus". It provides for an exchange of opinions and ideas between the EU and representatives of Belarusian civil society and political opposition about the reforms necessary in Belarus, development of relations with the EU and possible support on the part of the European Union. Do you know/have you heard anything about this program?" with geopolitical preferences, %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
Yes	19.3	35.7	13.4
No	80.4	63.7	84.9

Table 38

Connection of answering the question: "Do you think Belarus needs such a program?" with geopolitical preferences, %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
Yes	34.9	69.5	24.9
No	35.2	12.3	23.2
DA/NA	29.9	18.2	51.9

Table 39

Connection of answering the question: "What kind of assistance could the European Union render in modernization of Belarus, in your opinion?" with geopolitical preferences, %

Variant of answer	"If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?"		
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
Sharing of modern technologies	37.9	48.6	36.3
Provision of credits	36.4	40.6	25.0
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	27.3	43.7	27.5
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	20.3	39.4	19.4

abstain from a geopolitical choice – among the latter there is the largest number of those who have also abstained from answering the question about the need and needlessness of the "Dialogue about Modernization".

Apparently the reason for it is that the group of respondents abstaining from a geopolitical choice includes for the most part not the people with a third articulated political position ("you would be yourself, if you were neither Eastern, nor Western"), but simply the people who are far from the lofty political matters, the ones who do not have a distinct political position. High politics are far from them.

Finally, the last part of Table 37-39 reveals that the hierarchy of the preferred forms of collaboration with the EU is similar in all the groups of a geopolitical choice, but, of course, at different levels: sharing of technologies ranks first in all the groups, and assistance in reform implementing occupies the last place.

Table 40

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you know about the "small border traffic" (an initiative of the European Union and Eastern European countries, including Belarus, which provides for a visa-free border crossing by the residents of border territories living within 30-50 km from both sides of the border)?"

Variant of answer	%
Yes	37.7
No	47.9
Difficult to answer	14.1
NA	0.3

Table 41

Region-wise awareness of the "small border traffic"*, %

Region	"Are you aware of the "small border traffic"?"		
	Yes	No	DA/NA
Minsk	29.4	63.5	7.2
Minsk region	24.0	62.7	13.3
Brest	**37.8**	50.2	12.0
Grodno	**69.2**	18.3	12.4
Vitebsk	**51.5**	29.3	19.2
Mogilev	20.7	62.6	16.7
Gomel	39.4	37.6	23.0

** The table is read across*

Table 42

Region-wise attitude to the "small border traffic"*, %

Region	"Do you support the initiative of the "small border traffic"?"			
	Yes	No	It's all the same to me	NA
Belarus	49.5	11.9	35.0	3.6
Minsk	**59.0**	3.1	36.9	1.0
Minsk region	36.4	5.8	56.0	1.8
Brest	**54.2**	16.7	26.4	2.8
Grodno	**72.0**	13.7	14.3	0
Vitebsk	**58.1**	8.1	31.8	2.0
Mogilev	23.7	1.2	60.7	14.5
Gomel	40.7	35.0	18.6	5.8

** The table is read across*

"Small border traffic" and big-time politics

Some years ago Belarus signed an agreement for the so-called "small border traffic" with the neighboring countries of the EU Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The matter concerns visa-free trips to the neighboring countries of the border territories residents. The agreement with Latvia has already come into effect; with Lithuania and Poland – has not.

In May 2012 the unregistered party Belarusian Christian Democracy began collecting signatures on the Internet to the petition for realization of the appropriate agreement between Belarus and Poland. Authors of the petition are "deeply concerned about the government's procrastination of realization of the agreement for the small border traffic with the Republic of Poland".

It is reported that a thousand of signatures to the document has been collected for half a year. However, there are much more supporters of the "small border traffic" between Belarus and its neighbors. The IISEPS opinion poll of December 2012 proved that Belarusians are quite well-informed about the initiative (Table 40).

At that the level of awareness is much higher among residents of the border regions than on average in the country (Table 41).

It happens quite seldom that the capital is not a leader as far as awareness of European initiatives is concerned. Here is the case when self comes first for the residents of Brest, Grodno and Vitebsk. Support of the initiative also proves to be rather high in these regions (Table 42).

Table 43

Distribution of answers to the question: "Are you ready to give active support to promotion of the "small border traffic"?", % *(more than one answer is possible)*

Variant of answer	Respondents treating the "small border traffic" positively
Ready to do nothing (61.7)*	39.0
Ready to sign a petition (21.6)	39.2
Ready to distribute leaflets and information (7.6)	13.1
Ready to collect signatures (7.4)	12.2
Ready to write a submission letter to the responsible officials (5.9)	8.8

** The whole sampling data are given in parentheses*

Table 44

Distribution of answers to the question: "Why do you think the agreement for the "small border traffic" with Lithuania and Poland has not come into effect yet?"

Variant of answer	%
The Belarusian party impedes it	22.7
The Polish and Lithuanian parties impede it	13.0
Due to technical reasons	10.3
Due to other reasons	17.2
DA/NA	36.8

Table 45

Connections of answers about the reasons for failure to become effective of the agreement for the "small border traffic" with Poland and Lithuania with readiness to act in support of the initiative, %

Variant of answer	"Why has not the agreement for the "small border traffic" with Lithuania and Poland come into effect yet?"				
	The Belarusian party impedes it	The Polish and Lithuanian parties impede it	Due to technical reasons	Due to other reasons	DA/NA
Ready to do nothing	45.6	39	71.9	71.7	76.1
Ready to sign a petition	25.2	44.6	16.9	14.0	16.6
Ready to distribute leaflets and information	19.1	5.7	5.2	4.3	3.7
Ready to collect signatures	15.5	6.7	5.8	7.0	3.7
Ready to write a submission letter to the responsible officials	10.0	8.2	2.6	6.2	3.7

However, Minsk finds itself already among the leaders of a positive attitude to the initiative of the "small border traffic"; it happens to all appearances due to the fact that the question is political, and the capital is politically more inclined to liberal approaches. Also the fact that attitude to the initiative does not divide the country into the East and the West draws attention to itself – the eastern part of the Vitebsk region bordering on Latvia treats the "small border traffic" as positively, as the capital and the Brest region. On the other hand, in the Mogilev and Gomel regions that are contiguous with the countries trips to which do not require visas support of the EU initiative is appreciably lower.

However, not all respondents put their positive attitude to the "small border traffic" into readiness to achieve its realization even with the help of actions that do not require much effort (Table 43).

Approximately half of those who expressed approval of the EU initiative are ready to do at least something for it to become reality. On the other hand, every fifth respondent ready to sign a petition to support the undertaking equals almost one and a half million of adult Belarusians. As it has been mentioned above, the petition initiated by BCD was signed by only a thousand of people for six months.

On the one hand, it testifies to the fact that words about readiness to act do not always mean the readiness itself. On the other hand, it might testify to an insufficient political art of politicians. In particular, authors of the BCD petition expressly lay the blame for procrastination of embodying the "small border traffic" on Belarusian authorities. At the same time the population is far from such univocacy (Table 44).

Only about every fifth respondent expressly blames Belarusian authorities for not having opened the "small border traffic" so far. The data of Table 45 reveal the levels of motivation of actions in

support of the initiative among the respondents who gave different answers to the question of Table 44.

Contrary to all expectations, those who lay blame on Belarus' foreign partners prove to be potentially the readiest for active actions on promotion of the "small border traffic". At that the most popular and acceptable form of such activity for them is signing a petition. Those who blame Belarusian authorities declare a greater readiness for more resolute actions.

It follows from what has just been said above that the potential of the public activity for promoting the "small border traffic" is quite high. At the same time it includes a large number of people who are not at all opposition-leaning and do not blame the authorities for the fact that the project has not been put into effect yet, as far as Poland and Lithuania are concerned.

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in December, 2012 (%)

1. "Was the year of 2012 more difficult or easier for Belarus in comparison with the previous one?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
More difficult	41.0	38.3	42.4	55.1	42.0	39.5	39.8	36.0
The same as the previous one	41.8	48.9	40.4	31.3	42.4	41.6	41.3	45.9
Easier	14.0	10.6	11.1	9.5	11.7	17.1	15.9	15.5
DA/NA	3.2	2.2	6.1	4.1	3.9	1.8	3.0	2.6

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
More difficult	35.1	27.1	41.2	41.5	46.3
The same as the previous one	40.2	50.5	42.6	42.8	35.8
Easier	19.6	16.8	12.9	12.1	16.3
DA/NA	5.1	5.6	3.3	3.6	1.6

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
More difficult	47.7	39.5	42.7	35.4	43.7
The same as the previous one	38.5	41.8	42.7	46.7	35.6
Easier	10.8	15.7	12.0	15.5	11.5
DA/NA	3.0	3.0	2.6	2.4	9.2

Table 1.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
More difficult	54.5	29.8	32.3	45.5	44.9	28.7	45.6
The same as the previous one	34.2	53.3	47.0	41.3	40.4	52.3	28.3
Easier	9.6	14.7	19.4	10.8	11.1	16.1	17.3
DA/NA	1.7	2.2	1.3	2.4	3.6	2.9	8.8

Table 1.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
More difficult	54.5	41.5	41.6	32.8	35.2
The same as the previous one	34.2	45.6	40.6	45.7	43.1
Easier	9.6	12.6	12.1	19.5	16.2
DA/NA	1.7	0.3	5.7	2.0	5.5

2. "Was the expiring year of 2012 in general successful or unsuccessful for you personally?"

Table 2.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Successful	44.0	58.3	39.1	37.4	43.9	44.3	43.8	46.9
Unsuccessful	35.8	31.3	43.0	40.8	36.7	34.8	38.1	29.4
DA/NA	20.2	10.4	17.9	21.8	19.3	20.9	18.1	23.7

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Successful	64.6	46.2	41.3	39.8	47.7
Unsuccessful	25.0	31.1	38.8	39.5	30.4
DA/NA	10.4	22.7	19.9	20.7	21.9

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Successful	42.1	42.0	57.3	47.0	42.5
Unsuccessful	38.6	37.0	29.3	30.4	44.8
DA/NA	19.3	21.0	13.4	22.6	12.7

Table 2.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Successful	42.7	55.1	29.5	51.2	40.1	45.7	45.6
Unsuccessful	30.0	32.4	58.1	42.8	26.4	24.0	37.2
DA/NA	27.3	12.5	12.4	6.0	33.5	30.3	17.2

Table 2.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Successful	42.7	53.7	48.3	35.9	40.1
Unsuccessful	30.0	26.3	37.9	42.6	41.1
DA/NA	27.3	20.0	13.8	21.5	18.8

3. "Who is responsible for the present crisis in Belarus?" (*more than one answer is possible*)

Table 3.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
President	41.0	50.0	54.3	55.1	52.7	40.6	34.8	24.2
Government	39.1	49.2	45.7	48.3	47.5	42.6	37.0	24.2
Parliament	17.2	25.7	19.6	12.4	16.7	20.2	3.4	16.8
Opposition	11.5	6.3	3.9	8.2	7.6	9.3	13.3	20.4
People	8.7	2.1	5.9	6.8	8.3	8.9	9.8	10.8
Russia	7.5	8.3	11.2	6.1	4.5	5.7	9.8	8.5
USA	14.5	14.6	9.9	8.8	12.9	13.9	15.9	19.8
Europe	10.9	8.3	10.5	7.5	7.6	11.4	12.8	13.7
DA	11.5	8.3	9.9	9.5	10.6	15.3	14.0	9.3

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
President	34.4	21.5	38.7	45.5	48.0
Government	30.9	30.8	37.6	39.9	46.3
Parliament	25.7	9.6	13.1	16.0	19.9
Opposition	22.9	23.4	8.9	10.5	10.1

People	12.4	7.5	7.3	8.6	10.5
Russia	8.3	15.0	5.1	7.5	9.1
USA	17.7	17.9	14.2	15.0	12.1
Europe	4.1	16.8	9.8	11.4	12.4
DA	6.3	10.4	12.3	12.8	10.1

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
President	56.1	39.7	44.0	25.1	49.1
Government	50.5	39.4	44.0	22.9	50.0
Parliament	25.1	15.2	12.0	13.2	17.4
Opposition	6.1	10.9	5.3	19.8	9.3
People	6.9	9.2	2.7	9.9	12.8
Russia	4.5	8.5	8.0	7.7	11.5
USA	8.5	16.6	8.0	19.6	10.5
Europe	4.5	14.4	8.0	13.8	6.9
DA	12.2	12.1	13.3	11.0	3.5

Table 3.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
President	58.7	47.8	27.2	23.4	52.3	20.1	43.8
Government	50.2	35.6	26.4	31.5	40.4	25.9	54.9
Parliament	25.7	19.6	12.4	16.7	20.2	3.4	16.8
Opposition	6.8	13.8	11.6	8.9	8.1	8.0	23.0
People	11.6	11.1	6.9	4.2	4.6	10.3	9.7
Russia	8.9	5.8	8.3	15.0	2.0	0	11.5
USA	7.9	11.6	31.3	26.2	3.0	21.3	5.8
Europe	6.5	3.1	21.2	30.4	2.5	9.2	8.4
DA	5.1	2.7	12.4	13.2	20.2	24.1	8.8

Table 3.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
President	58.7	38.9	34.9	39.3	34.6
Government	50.2	38.5	34.6	42.2	32.5
Parliament	25.7	9.6	13.1	16.0	19.9
Opposition	6.8	9.6	16.1	8.2	15.2
People	11.6	6.3	10.1	3.5	11.0
Russia	8.9	4.4	7.0	4.3	11.0
USA	7.9	13.7	13.4	16.8	19.1
Europe	6.5	14.1	12.4	10.1	11.3
DA	5.1	26.6	10.7	8.2	8.9

4. "Not long ago A. Lukashenko said: "Market ideology was thrust on us to destroy the economy we had had". Do you agree with the statement?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	24.0	18.4	9.3	11.6	14.1	21.7	30.7	40.9
No	56.2	55.1	61.6	68.0	70.7	56.9	54.9	38.3
DA/NA	19.8	26.5	29.1	20.4	15.2	21.4	14.4	20.8

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Yes	30.2	48.6	23.8	19.3	20.3
No	36.5	30.8	57.5	61.4	61.7
DA/NA	33.3	20.6	18.7	19.3	18.0

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	15.9	21.6	10.7	40.6	18.6
No	69.2	60.0	54.7	37.8	52.3
DA/NA	14.9	18.4	24.6	21.6	29.1

Table 4.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	20.5	21.7	27.3	45.5	10.2	24.1	23.9
No	68.3	65.5	50.0	34.7	66.5	51.7	47.8
DA/NA	11.2	12.8	22.7	19.8	23.3	24.2	28.3

Table 4.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	20.5	19.3	26.1	25.8	27.0
No	68.3	55.2	52.2	59.8	48.7
DA/NA	11.2	25.5	21.7	14.4	24.3

5. "Various judgments are being expressed concerning success of the Belarusian economic model. Which of them do you agree with?"

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons; Russian aid is an important, but not a decisive factor	28.1	33.3	15.8	15.0	17.9	27.4	30.3	45.1
Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid	28.4	22.9	30.3	24.5	31.2	26.3	27.3	30.2
Belarusian economy enjoys no success	33.7	35.4	42.1	51.7	43.3	35.2	34.1	13.4
DA/NA	9.8	8.4	11.8	8.8	7.6	11.1	8.3	11.3

Table 5.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons; Russian aid is an important, but not a decisive factor	51.5	41.1	**2**6.0	21.6	29.1
Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid	25.8	26.2	29.9	29.8	25.5
Belarusian economy enjoys no success	8.2	15.0	34.7	39.1	38.9
DA/NA	14.5	17.7	9.4	9.5	6.5

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons; Russian aid is an important, but not a decisive factor	20.1	26.0	29.3	42.5	16.1
Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid	24.6	30.7	24.0	29.6	28.7
Belarusian economy enjoys no success	47.9	35.5	34.7	15.2	36.8
DA/NA	7.4	7.8	12.0	12.7	18.4

Table 5.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons; Russian aid is an important, but not a decisive factor	21.4	29.8	18.4	39.9	9.6	56.0	30.0
Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid	27.9	22.7	26.7	40.5	27.4	14.9	38.3
Belarusian economy enjoys no success	48.3	45.3	34.6	18.5	46.7	16.6	15.9
DA/NA	2.4	2.2	20.3	1.1	16.3	12.5	15.8

Table 5.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Success of Belarusian economy is explained by inner reasons; Russian aid is an important, but not a decisive factor	21.4	33.7	28.9	28.8	28.0
Belarusian economy would not be a success but for the Russian aid	27.9	30.7	28.5	22.2	31.2
Belarusian economy enjoys no success	48.3	28.1	31.9	39.3	24.3
DA/NA	2.4	7.4	10.7	9.7	16.5

6. "Not long ago A. Lukashenko said: "The basis of policy, mine in the first place, is honesty and justice. It is the basis of everything, including economy, however strange it might seem". Do you agree with the statement?"

Table 6.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	34.5	26.5	21.1	16.9	22.6	29.8	41.1	56.9
No	52.5	57.1	64.5	72.3	62.6	53.9	49.1	31.5
DA/NA	13.0	16.4	14.4	10.8	14.8	16.3	9.8	11.6

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Yes	62.5	53.8	33.4	29.6	27.8
No	30.2	27.4	54.4	57.4	58.5
DA/NA	7.3	18.8	12.2	13.0	13.7

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	20.1	31.3	28.9	58.0	25.3
No	67.0	56.3	48.7	30.1	60.9
DA/NA	12.9	12.4	22.4	11.9	13.8

Table 6.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	27.7	32.9	36.4	55.4	13.7	40.2	41.0
No	66.1	61.3	48.8	36.9	66.0	37.4	41.4
DA/NA	6.2	5.8	14.8	7.7	20.3	22.4	17.6

Table 6.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	27.7	40.7	38.3	32.0	33.7
No	66.1	41.1	47.7	57.4	50.9
DA/NA	6.2	18.2	14.0	10.6	15.4

7. "What do you think opposition should do?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Assure resignation of the president	33.4	38.8	41.7	44.2	43.2	34.9	28.3	19.5
Assure resignation of the government	17.9	16.3	19.9	26.5	25.0	18.5	15.5	9.6
Assure resignation of the parliament	13.0	10.4	11.3	18.9	19.7	14.2	9.4	7.9
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	4.7	2.1	2.0	2.0	5.7	2.8	4.2	8.2
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	19.9	12.5	14.5	12.2	16.3	20.6	24.2	25.4
Offer a dialogue to the government	35.0	32.7	30.5	20.4	27.3	37.4	40.9	43.1
Boycott all initiatives of the government	5.6	8.3	13.9	8.2	4.9	3.2	1.1	6.1
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	3.1	6.3	5.3	2.0	4.9	2.8	1.9	2.0
DA	16.7	16.7	18.4	21.1	13.6	12.5	17.4	19.5

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Assure resignation of the president	15.6	20.8	34.6	37.8	35.0
Assure resignation of the government	6.3	9.3	17.8	20.0	21.6
Assure resignation of the parliament	5.2	10.3	11.4	15.9	15.3
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	7.3	9.3	3.3	6.4	2.6
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	20.8	23.6	17.6	19.6	23.1
Offer a dialogue to the government	30.9	42.1	31.0	33.0	43.6
Boycott all initiatives of the government	9.4	5.6	4.5	4.6	7.8
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	2.1	2.8	2.5	3.6	3.6
DA	33.0	26.2	19.2	13.4	8.5

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Assure resignation of the president	47.9	33.3	33.3	17.1	39.5
Assure resignation of the government	28.1	16.1	13.3	9.1	27.6
Assure resignation of the parliament	20.6	12.1	6.7	6.6	18.4
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	3.4	3.4	2.7	8.6	4.6
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	16.9	20.3	9.3	25.9	14.9
Offer a dialogue to the government	24.6	38.5	30.3	43.8	23.3
Boycott all initiatives of the government	4.2	4.2	14.7	5.8	12.8
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	4.0	2.2	5.3	2.8	5.7
DA	15.9	14.4	21.3	20.9	13.8

Table 7.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Assure resignation of the president	51.9	35.6	32.7	16.8	37.4	9.1	35.4
Assure resignation of the government	28.0	22.7	6.9	10.2	19.3	8.0	22.6
Assure resignation of the parliament	21.2	19.6	6.0	7.1	12.6	6.3	12.8
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	1.0	1.8	6.0	8.4	5.1	0.6	11.5
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	17.1	17.3	24.5	29.8	19.7	14.4	18.1
Offer a dialogue to the government	20.5	31.1	44.7	36.3	37.6	57.5	28.3
Boycott all initiatives of the government	5.1	5.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	4.6	11.9
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	6.5	3.6	0.5	1.2	4.1	0	4.0
DA	12.6	13.8	13.0	19.2	21.2	23.6	17.7

Table 7.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Assure resignation of the president	51.9	23.7	29.9	36.6	26.6
Assure resignation of the government	28.8	6.3	14.8	20.6	19.1
Assure resignation of the parliament	10.4	11.3	18.9	19.7	14.2
Assure imposition of economic sanctions against Belarus	1.0	1.5	3.4	3.9	11.0
Assure rescinding of economic sanctions against Belarus	17.1	22.1	19.5	17.5	22.3
Offer a dialogue to the government	20.5	49.1	40.6	38.5	29.5
Boycott all initiatives of the government	5.1	2.6	3.7	3.1	11.0
Organize an armed rising or a revolution	6.5	0.7	4.7	1.6	2.1
DA	12.6	22.6	18.8	11.3	17.8

8. "Do you think the fact that virtually all power in the country is now accumulated in the hands of A. Lukashenko is for the benefit of Belarus or does not give the country anything good?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Is for the benefit of Belarus	33.3	25.5	15.2	17.0	18.9	30.6	37.5	59.5
Does not give the country anything good	49.9	53.2	68.9	68.1	61.7	54.5	40.2	28.3
DA/NA	16.8	21.3	15.9	14.9	19.4	14.9	22.3	12.2

Table 8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Is for the benefit of Belarus	72.9	57.0	31.3	22.3	31.9
Does not give the country anything good	20.8	26.2	51.6	55.5	55.7
DA/NA	6.3	16.8	17.1	22.2	12.4

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Is for the benefit of Belarus	19.0	31.8	21.6	57.0	16.3
Does not give the country anything good	64.0	52.1	59.4	26.7	62.8
DA/NA	17.0	16.1	19.0	16.3	20.9

Table 8.4. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Is for the benefit of Belarus	26.6	30.2	23.6	61.7	13.2	45.7	41.0
Does not give the country anything good	67.6	61.8	52.8	30.5	54.8	26.0	40.5
DA/NA	5.8	8.0	23.6	7.8	32.0	28.3	18.5

Table 8.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Is for the benefit of Belarus	26.6	27.5	36.5	35.9	38.0
Does not give the country anything good	67.6	48.0	40.8	49.2	45.3
DA/NA	5.8	24.5	22.7	14.9	16.7

9. "In September A. Lukashenko demanded that the boards of directors of the confectionary plants "Kommunarka" and "Spartak" be done away with and the plants be placed under control of the state. Have you heard anything about it?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	46.7	22.4	37.5	40.1	49.2	51.1	62.1	39.4
No	52.8	75.5	62.5	59.9	50.0	48.9	36.4	39.4
NA	0.5	2.1	0	0	0.8	0	1.5	0.2

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Yes	19.6	29.0	42.0	50.3	64.7
No	80.4	71.0	57.4	48.5	35.3
NA	0	0	0.6	1.2	0

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	50.9	53.3	30.7	39.4	27.6
No	48.8	46.2	68.0	59.8	71.3
NA	0.3	0.5	1.3	0.8	1.1

Table 9.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	47.6	46.2	55.1	50.0	51.8	51.1	27.9
No	52.4	53.8	43.1	49.4	47.7	47.7	71.7
NA	0	0	1.8	0.6	0.5	1.2	0.4

Table 9.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	47.6	60.5	51.5	44.1	34.2
No	52.4	38.0	48.5	55.1	65.3
NA	0	1.5	0	0.8	0.5

10. "What is your attitude to the president's decision on placing the confectionary plants under control of the state?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I disapprove of it as this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	36.1	38.8	39.7	44.2	42.8	42.0	37.7	19.5
I approve of it, in spite of the fact that this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	10.9	2.0	6.6	12.2	8.0	6.0	15.5	16.0
I approve of it, as the plants were privatized illegally at one time, that is why their return to the state does not contradict Belarusian legislation	21.0	10.2	9.3	12.2	18.6	20.3	26.4	29.7
DA/NA	32.0	49.0	36.3	31.4	30.6	31.7	20.4	34.8

Table 10.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
I disapprove of it as this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	13.4	22.4	34.4	43.4	40.4
I approve of it, in spite of the fact that this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	18.6	12.1	9.6	8.9	13.0
I approve of it, as the plants were privatized illegally at one time, that is why their return to the state does not contradict Belarusian legislation	23.7	31.8	22.7	18.9	16.9
DA/NA	44.3	33.7	33.3	28.8	29.7

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
I disapprove of it as this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	48.4	36.8	41.9	19.6	41.4
I approve of it, in spite of the fact that this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	8.2	11.4	3.7	14.9	9.2
I approve of it, as the plants were privatized illegally at one time, that is why their return to the state does not contradict Belarusian legislation	16.1	22.1	8.1	29.8	11.5
DA/NA	27.3	29.7	47.3	35.7	37.9

Table 10.4. Depending on region

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I disapprove of it as this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	45.5	46.7	41.7	17.4	35.0	14.4	39.8
I approve of it, in spite of the fact that this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	10.6	16.0	12.0	7.2	5.6	15.5	8.4
I approve of it, as the plants were privatized illegally at one time, that is why their return to the state does not contradict Belarusian legislation	23.6	19.1	19.9	24.6	14.7	17.8	26.1
DA/NA	20.3	18.2	26.4	50.8	44.7	52.3	25.7

Table 10.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I disapprove of it as this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	45.5	32.6	32.1	38.9	32.4
I approve of it, in spite of the fact that this decision contradicts Belarusian legislation	10.6	10.4	10.7	5.8	14.6
I approve of it, as the plants were privatized illegally at one time, that is why their return to the state does not contradict Belarusian legislation	23.6	17.4	26.8	18.3	19.3
DA/NA	20.3	38.6	30.4	37.0	33.7

11. "Some people think that after A. Lukashenko's stepping down as president life in Belarus will improve; others on the contrary think it will become worse. And what do you think?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Life will improve	24.5	25.0	36.4	34.0	32.6	27.1	18.5	11.4
Life will remain the same	36.5	45.8	32.5	40.1	37.1	38.9	38.5	31.3
Life will become worse	25.9	12.5	21.2	10.2	18.2	21.1	31.7	42.1
DA/NA	13.1	16.7	9.9	15.7	15.1	12.9	11.3	15.2

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Life will improve	10.3	10.4	26.7	26.2	27.5
Life will remain the same	26.8	29.2	37.6	39.4	35.9
Life will become worse	40.2	44.3	23.6	21.9	24.8
DA/NA	22.7	16.1	12.1	12.5	11.8

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Life will improve	33.1	24.2	36.0	11.9	31.0
Life will remain the same	46.0	33.4	33.3	32.6	35.6
Life will become worse	14.3	26.3	14.7	42.3	16.1
DA/NA	6.6	16.1	16.0	13.2	17.3

Table 11.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Life will improve	33.1	37.6	20.4	18.5	16.8	16.7	21.3
Life will remain the same	42.3	34.1	46.8	30.4	34.7	35.6	28.4
Life will become worse	18.8	23.0	24.7	39.9	27.6	29.3	26.7
DA/NA	5.8	5.3	8.1	11.2	20.9	18.4	22.6

Table 11.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Life will improve	33.1	24.0	20.9	23.0	21.9
Life will remain the same	42.3	35.4	38.0	44.0	26.4
Life will become worse	18.7	22.9	31.0	22.2	32.1
DA/NA	5.8	17.7	10.1	10.8	19.6

12. "President A. Lukashenko announced implementing reforms of the administrative staff machinery. Which statement about Belarusian officials do you agree with?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because there is no democratic control from below	37.0	35.4	42.4	40.5	44.5	39.0	35.8	26.8
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because they are not controlled from above	47.6	47.9	48.7	53.7	49.1	45.9	47.9	44.6
Officials really help people solve their problems	14.0	12.5	7.9	6.8	7.6	14.6	15.8	22.7
DA	10.8	10.4	11.3	11.6	10.2	8.5	10.2	12.5

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because there is no democratic control from below	15.6	28.3	36.2	39.4	44.6
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because they are not controlled from above	40.6	46.2	49.3	49.9	44.1
Officials really help people solve their problems	26.0	17.8	13.2	11.8	13.1
DA	21.6	11.3	11.4	8.7	9.1

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because there is no democratic control from below	49.2	37.0	24.0	27.5	35.6
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because they are not controlled from above	48.8	49.3	53.3	44.4	38.4
Officials really help people solve their problems	8.5	13.6	9.3	21.2	14.9
DA	8.5	9.2	14.7	13.2	17.4

Table 12.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because there is no democratic control from below	58.4	29.3	24.4	43.1	39.6	37.9	21.7
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because they are not controlled from above	50.5	43.6	59.9	33.9	36.4	53.4	51.5
Officials really help people solve their problems	8.5	26.2	13.8	18.5	9.1	9.2	14.1
DA	8.9	7.1	8.8	5.4	22.7	10.9	12.8

Table 12.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because there is no democratic control from below	58.4	34.7	33.6	29.6	30.3
Officials are deaf to people's needs, because they	50.5	49.6	45.3	50.2	43.7

are not controlled from above					
Officials really help people solve their problems	8.5	10.4	14.4	21.8	15.2
DA	8.9	9.3	13.8	7.4	13.6

13. "Not long ago A. Lukashenko said: "We mustn't pick on what was going on in 1917 and in general pulp the good ideas with which Lenin and his team agreed to the revolution". Do you agree with the statement?"

Table 13.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	35.1	20.5	21.1	23.1	33.3	34.5	38.5	47.1
No	48.9	50.0	53.3	59.9	54.9	51.6	47.2	36.5
DA/NA	16.0	29.5	25.6	17.0	11.8	13.9	14.3	16.4

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Yes	40.6	39.6	37.0	31.9	33.0
No	31.3	40.6	45.9	54.2	54.9
DA/NA	28.1	19.8	17.1	13.9	12.1

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	40.6	39.6	37.0	31.9	33.0
No	31.3	40.6	45.9	54.2	54.9
DA/NA	28.1	19.8	17.1	13.9	12.1

Table 13.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	29.4	32.4	29.0	47.0	39.3	51.4	25.7
No	59.7	57.8	53.5	39.3	42.3	29.7	49.6
DA/NA	10.9	9.8	17.5	13.7	18.4	18.9	24.7

Table 13.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	29.4	42.8	44.0	28.1	31.7
No	59.7	39.9	40.6	55.5	49.2
DA/NA	10.9	17.3	19.4	16.4	19.1

14. "In November 2012 explosive assemblies were thrown in the territory of the Lithuanian embassy, and an explosive assembly went off near the building of the KGB administration in Vitebsk. Who do you think is at the back of these actions?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Authorities	15.2	16.0	16.6	23.6	14.8	16.7	14.0	10.8
Opposition	16.3	12.0	10.6	11.5	12.5	16.4	18.9	22.4
West	6.0	4.0	4.0	4.7	6.1	5.3	4.5	9.6
Russia	2.2	2.0	2.0	0.7	1.5	1.4	3.8	2.6
Certain people from Belarusian security services	11.7	12.0	16.6	11.5	18.2	11.4	9.1	7.0
Insane persons	33.7	40.0	33.8	29.1	31.4	33.1	37.5	33.8
DA/NA	14.9	14.0	16.4	18.9	15.5	15.7	12.2	13.8

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Authorities	19.8	17.0	13.4	18.2	12.4
Opposition	32.3	23.6	15.1	13.4	15.0
West	10.4	7.5	6.4	4.1	5.9
Russia	2.1	4.7	2.7	1.4	1.3
Certain people from Belarusian security services	0	3.8	10.9	13.2	17.3
Insane persons	21.9	30.2	36.8	33.0	33.9
DA/NA	13.5	13.2	14.7	16.7	14.2

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Authorities	16.4	16.2	22.4	9.3	22.1
Opposition	12.2	16.4	10.5	23.1	9.3
West	5.3	5.5	1.3	9.1	3.5
Russia	1.3	2.0	3.9	2.5	4.7
Certain people from Belarusian security services	18.3	9.7	14.5	7.1	14.0
Insane persons	29.9	36.3	31.6	35.7	24.4
DA/NA	16.6	13.9	15.8	13.2	22.0

Table 14.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Authorities	11.3	24.9	4.1	14.9	20.7	4.6	23.9
Opposition	5.5	8.9	15.2	30.4	19.7	26.6	17.7
West	2.7	4.4	4.6	9.5	4.5	8.1	9.7
Russia	1.7	1.8	1.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	7.5
Certain people from Belarusian security services	22.9	9.8	17.1	4.2	9.6	6.9	5.8
Insane persons	42.3	44.0	41.9	28.0	28.9	26.6	18.6
DA/NA	13.6	6.2	15.3	12.4	16.1	26.6	16.8

Table 14.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Authorities	11.3	11.4	13.5	16.3	21.4
Opposition	5.5	10.7	22.9	18.6	21.7
West	2.7	1.1	7.4	9.3	8.4
Russia	1.7	1.5	0.7	3.1	3.9
Certain people from Belarusian security services	22.9	10.7	10.4	8.5	7.0
Insane persons	42.3	34.3	35.0	31.4	27.2
DA/NA	13.6	30.3	10.1	12.8	10.4

15. "Has your attitude to the sentence on the case of explosion committed in the Minsk underground in April 2011 changed after the actions at the Lithuanian embassy and near the building of the KGB administration in Vitebsk?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It has not. I have considered and consider that the real perpetrators of the explosion in the Underground were convicted	33.0	29.2	23.2	25.2	23.2	32.4	33.6	48.8
It has not. I have considered and consider that innocent people were con-	31.5	33.3	36.4	40.8	38.4	33.5	29.1	19.9

victed								
It has. I considered that the real perpetrators of the explosion were convicted, but now I doubt it	17.2	18.8	22.5	12.2	19.4	17.8	18.9	13.5
DA/NA	18.3	18.7	17.9	21.8	19.0	16.5	18.6	17.8

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
It has not. I have considered and consider that the real perpetrators of the explosion in the Underground were convicted	55.7	48.6	32.1	27.6	29.6
It has not. I have considered and consider that innocent people were convicted	19.6	25.2	31.7	31.9	36.5
It has. I considered that the real perpetrators of the explosion were convicted, but now I doubt it	7.2	10.3	17.4	21.6	16.0
DA/NA	17.5	15.9	18.8	18.9	17.9

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It has not. I have considered and consider that the real perpetrators of the explosion in the Underground were convicted	29.4	29.6	25.3	45.9	25.6
It has not. I have considered and consider that innocent people were convicted	37.8	33.2	33.3	20.4	37.2
It has. I considered that the real perpetrators of the explosion were convicted, but now I doubt it	15.3	17.9	26.7	14.9	20.9
DA/NA	17.5	19.3	14.7	18.8	16.3

Table 15.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
It has not. I have considered and consider that the real perpetrators of the explosion in the Underground were convicted	46.6	40.6	19.9	50.6	19.7	27.0	23.9
It has not. I have considered and consider that innocent people were convicted	28.4	32.1	38.0	32.7	34.3	25.3	29.6
It has. I considered that the real perpetrators of the explosion were convicted, but now I doubt it	9.2	18.4	21.3	10.7	17.7	21.3	23.5
DA/NA	15.8	8.9	20.8	6.0	28.3	26.4	23.0

Table 15.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It has not. I have considered and consider that the real perpetrators of the explosion in the Underground were convicted	46.6	22.9	37.1	28.0	30.1
It has not. I have considered and consider that innocent people were convicted	28.4	25.1	38.8	36.2	29.3
It has. I considered that the real perpetrators of the explosion were convicted, but now I doubt it	9.2	25.1	10.4	19.5	21.2
DA/NA	15.8	26.9	13.7	16.3	19.4

16. "Another aggravation of Belarusian-Russian relations has taken shape due to Belarus export of petrochemicals under the guise of "solvents". Have you heard anything about it?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
This is the first time I hear about it	52.7	75.0	53.6	52.7	53.4	47.5	47.3	56.9
I have heard something about it	40.1	22.9	42.4	42.6	38.6	48.6	41.7	33.2
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	6.9	0	3.3	4.7	8.0	3.6	10.2	9.9
NA	0.3	2.1	0.7	0	0	0.3	0.8	0

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
This is the first time I hear about it	62.5	69.2	52.6	50.1	47.4
I have heard something about it	30.2	26.2	41.0	44.0	41.2
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	7.3	4.6	6.2	5.0	11.4
NA	0	0	0.2	0.9	0

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
This is the first time I hear about it	48.1	50.4	60.5	57.2	61.6
I have heard something about it	43.9	43.6	38.2	32.3	34.9
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	7.9	5.7	0	10.2	2.3
NA	0.1	0.3	1.3	0.3	1.2

Table 16.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
This is the first time I hear about it	57.3	60.0	62.5	35.7	44.7	54.6	48.2
I have heard something about it	35.5	33.3	33.3	57.7	42.1	44.8	40.7
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	7.2	6.7	4.2	6.0	12.7	0.6	9.7
NA	0	0	0	0.6	0.5	0	1.4

Table 16.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
This is the first time I hear about it	57.3	36.7	54.0	57.6	56.2
I have heard something about it	35.5	55.9	40.9	35.4	35.2
I attentively watch the development of affairs connected with the export of "solvents"	7.2	6.3	5.0	7.0	8.1
NA	0	1.1	0.1	0	0.5

17. "How do you assess the protests which took place in Ukraine after the elections in the Verkhovna Rada in October 2012?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It is an insignificant event, and it does not lead to anything	19.6	18.4	24.3	25.2	19.3	14.5	20.5	18.4
Elections in Ukraine are more or less free, and there is no reason for protesting	14.6	12.2	13.8	11.6	16.7	17.7	11.0	15.5
It is a provocation of the Ukrainian opposition	20.0	10.2	13.8	10.9	14.8	20.9	25.0	27.7
Voters in Ukraine have freer elections and stand for their rights	22.4	22.4	23.0	26.5	25.0	25.2	23.1	15.7
DA/NA	23.4	37.8	25.1	25.8	24.2	21.7	20.4	22.7

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
It is an insignificant event, and it does not lead to anything	27.1	14.8	18.9	20.2	19.3
Elections in Ukraine are more or less free, and there is no reason for protesting	8.3	18.5	16.3	13.2	14.1
It is a provocation of the Ukrainian opposition	33.3	18.5	16.3	13.2	14.1
Voters in Ukraine have freer elections and stand for their rights	5.2	21.2	23.4	23.6	24.8
DA/NA	26.1	24.0	24.1	24.8	22.7

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
It is an insignificant event, and it does not lead to anything	27.4	16.4	15.8	17.4	19.8
Elections in Ukraine are more or less free, and there is no reason for protesting	13.7	14.0	13.2	15.5	19.8
It is a provocation of the Ukrainian opposition	16.4	18.4	15.8	28.2	16.3
Voters in Ukraine have freer elections and stand for their rights	23.2	25.8	28.9	14.6	23.3
DA/NA	19.3	25.4	26.3	24.3	20.8

Table 17.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
It is an insignificant event, and it does not lead to anything	39.9	21.0	10.1	17.4	9.6	12.1	16.4
Elections in Ukraine are more or less free, and there is no reason for protesting	10.9	18.8	19.8	19.2	8.6	9.8	16.4
It is a provocation of the Ukrainian opposition	18.8	15.2	16.6	22.4	18.2	28.7	23.1
Voters in Ukraine have freer elections and stand for their rights	19.8	32.1	16.6	17.4	29.3	27.6	15.6
DA/NA	10.6	12.9	36.9	24.6	34.2	21.8	28.5

Table 17.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It is an insignificant event, and it does not lead to anything	39.9	8.5	24.6	11.3	13.3
Elections in Ukraine are more or less free, and there is no reason for protesting	10.9	13.0	15.8	10.1	20.9
It is a provocation of the Ukrainian opposition	18.8	18.1	25.9	21.0	17.0
Voters in Ukraine have freer elections and stand for their rights	19.8	20.0	18.5	33.9	21.4
DA/NA	10.6	40.4	15.2	23.7	27.4

18. "Not long ago the European Union announced beginning of a new program "Dialogue about Modernization of Belarus". It provides for an exchange of opinions and ideas between the EU and representatives of Belarusian civil society and political opposition about the reforms necessary in Belarus, development of relations with the EU and possible support on the part of the European Union. Do you know anything about this program?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	25.3	12.2	26.5	31.3	27.7	26.3	29.9	17.5
No	74.0	83.7	72.8	68.0	70.0	73.7	70.1	81.6
NA	0.7	4.1	0.7	0.7	2.3	0	0	0.9

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Yes	17.7	15.9	22.1	27.3	33.7
No	80.2	84.1	77.5	72.0	65.0
NA	2.1	0	0.4	0.7	1.3

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	32.0	26.5	21.1	17.4	24.4
No	67.7	72.7	76.3	81.8	75.6
NA	0.3	0.8	2.6	0.8	0

Table 18.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	29.1	25.3	20.7	41.1	16.2	20.6	24.7
No	70.9	74.2	79.3	58.9	83.8	79.4	70.9
NA	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	4.4

Table 18.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	29.1	19.2	19.1	28.0	29.6
No	70.9	79.3	80.9	70.4	69.6
NA	0	1.5	0	1.6	0.8

19. "Do you think Belarus needs such a program?"

Table 19.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	48.0	58.3	55.0	55.4	52.3	53.9	49.1	31.5
No	23.0	18.7	18.5	19.6	16.7	18.1	26.0	33.6
DA/NA	29.0	23.0	26.5	25.0	31.0	28.0	24.9	34.9

Table 19.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Yes	28.1	31.8	46.1	50.2	60.5
No	33.3	34.6	23.2	20.9	18.0
DA/NA	38.6	33.6	30.7	28.9	21.5

Table 19.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Yes	56.9	52.6	50.7	30.9	46.0
No	20.1	20.6	14.7	33.2	16.1
DA/NA	23.0	26.8	34.6	34.9	37.9

Table 19.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	62.1	52.2	55.3	53.6	43.4	30.5	31.4
No	27.3	30.9	12.9	15.4	19.7	13.2	35.8
DA/NA	10.6	16.9	31.8	31.0	36.9	56.3	22.6

Table 19.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	62.1	50.0	41.1	47.1	41.9
No	27.3	13.0	21.1	25.7	26.2
DA/NA	10.6	37.0	37.8	27.2	31.9

20. "What kind of assistance could the European Union render in modernization of Belarus, in your opinion?" *(more than one answer is possible)*

Table 20.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years old						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	28.4	30.6	31.8	33.3	30.7	33.5	25.4	20.8
Provision of credits	36.0	45.8	39.5	41.5	34.5	36.7	35.8	31.5
Sharing of modern technologies	42.2	44.9	45.7	49.7	47.7	44.5	41.3	31.8
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	34.4	27.1	33.6	39.5	41.5	37.7	36.0	24.2
Other	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.8	1.1	4.4
DA	17.4	10.2	10.5	12.2	14.0	16.0	14.7	29.4

Table 20.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (incomplete higher)
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	9.4	16.8	29.6	32.8	29.7

Provision of credits	22.7	34.6	40.2	36.0	33.6
Sharing of modern technologies	26.0	26.2	44.4	41.7	50.0
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	15.6	21.5	30.7	38.0	46.4
Other	8.2	2.8	2.0	2.3	1.6
DA	41.2	30.2	15.4	16.6	10.1

Table 20.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	The unemployed, housewives
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	35.8	29.3	25.3	19.6	28.7
Provision of credits	38.6	37.5	25.3	30.6	47.1
Sharing of modern technologies	47.9	45.7	44.0	30.0	42.5
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	40.7	38.2	34.7	23.7	25.6
Other	1.3	2.3	1.3	4.4	1.1
DA	9.0	15.1	13.3	31.4	14.9

Table 20.4. Depending on residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	35.8	34.7	34.6	20.8	23.2	31.0	15.0
Provision of credits	40.3	28.9	53.2	46.7	33.5	24.1	24.3
Sharing of modern technologies	46.8	40.9	54.2	44.0	40.4	35.6	31.4
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	46.1	33.3	39.2	28.1	28.4	42.5	19.0
Other	5.1	1.3	3.2	1.8	1.5	2.9	0.4
DA	5.8	21.3	7.9	22.6	26.8	20.1	23.0

Table 20.5. Depending on the type of settlement

Variant of answer	Type of settlement				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Consulting assistance in reform implementing	35.8	26.3	28.9	24.5	26.4
Provision of credits	40.3	39.9	37.6	35.5	29.3
Sharing of modern technologies	46.8	38.9	40.9	54.9	33.7
Modernization of the infrastructure (transport, banking, trade, etc.)	46.1	41.5	26.5	32.4	27.9
Other	5.1	2.6	1.3	2.0	1.3
DA	5.8	16.7	23.2	14.0	24.6

OPEN FORUM

In the March issue of the bulletin we published the controversy "Sociology: crisis of confidence" which had started between head of Levada-center sociologist Lev Gudkov and a famous opposition politician, chairman of the INDEM Foundation Georgy Satarov. Today we offer to the readers another example of an uncompromising struggle with sociologists for the "party cause" that has recently unfolded in Ukraine. As it can be seen, Belarusian oppositionists (V. Rymashevsky & C°) who voiced criticism against IISEPS for its opinion polls' results after the September parliamentary elections, keep to the beaten track…

PARTY'S LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WITH SOCIOLOGISTS

Natalia Korolevska's "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party was at law with Kyiv International Institute of Sociology which had shown the party's rating of 2% (it actually won 1.6% in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada). Professor Vladimir Paniotto, director-general of KIIS is recounting to us how the trial went on and what it ended in.

V. Paniotto – to the sociologists of St. Petersburg and Moscow

Dear friends and colleagues,

We were sued by Natalia Korolevska's "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party.

It attracted a lot of attention on the part of the press, embassies of some countries, and the OSCE mission. Ukraine's sociological association and WAROP (the World Association of Public Opinion Research) supported us.

This whole story took a lot of time and frayed our nerves, but finally came to an end. In the appendix you can find a summary of the story with references; it might be interesting for you.

This is a precedent which still needs to be comprehended.

Best wishes, V.P. 7.12.2012

Appendix

The trial of Natalia Korolevska's "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party with sociologists (some references)

A statement was expressed in the media that Natalia Korolevska's party had to all appearances paid a number of PR and consulting companies unknown to sociologists for rigging the data of opinion surveys concerning her party. They showed its rating at the level of 6.5-10%, whereas sociological companies showed no more than 2-3% (the electoral threshold for the Parliament is 5%).

Natalia Korolevska's sociological conveyor. Mustafa Naiem, UE "Vtornik", October 9, 2012:
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2012/10/9/6974286/

To shake the faith in the actual data Korolevska chose a sociological company which came to hand, and went to law with it. That was our company – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and our customer – the Fund of Democratic Initiatives (according to our data, the rating of Natalia Korolevska's party made up 2.1%). The party maintained that the data were unreliable; they put the actual rating too low and injured their business reputation:

The Party of Korolevska to sue KIIS and Democratic Initiative. "Podrobnosti", October 11, 2012:
http://podrobnosti.ua/power/2012/10/11/863353.html

A video on the channel NEWS ONE:
http://newsone.ua/video/ukraine/?media_id=24869

The World Association of Public Opinion Research and the Sociological Association of Ukraine voiced an objection:
The statement of WAPOR:
http://wapor.unl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Ukraine-2012.pdf

The statement of the Sociological Association of Ukraine:
http://www.sau.kiev.ua/docs/20121016.pdf

Some other sociologists who signed the above mentioned statement by SAU (over 60 signatures) or posted articles and comments to the social networking websites also protested: see the article by E. Golovakhi in the newspaper "Den" №188, October 18, 2012:
http://www.day.kiev.ua/237099

The media responded to the event in different ways:
How TV channels shatter confidence in authoritative sociologists ("Telekritika", October 28, 2012)
http://vybory.mediasapiens.ua/2012/10/21/yak-telekanaly-pidryvayut-doviru-do-avtorytetnyh-sotsiolohiv/

In spite of everything the trial took place on October 26:
Korolevska about sociologists: They have screeched so loudly. "Ukrainskaya Pravda", October 19, 2012:
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2012/10/19/6974985/

How the trial was held:
See "Obkom", October 26, 2012, Evgenij Kuzmenko, A scientific-party approach:
http://obkom.net.ua/articles/2012-10/26.1343.shtml

On October 28, 2012 parliamentary elections were held. As the result of the elections Natalia Korolevska's "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party won 1.6%.
(Let me remind the readers that the rating of Korolevska's Party in our pre-election research, the one she sued us for, was 2%; in our exit poll, by the way, she also got 1.6%).

The next session was scheduled for October 8. In the session we asked that the questionnaires of the research conducted by the party and the four centers that had obtained the data that the "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party was overcoming the 5% electoral threshold be required. The court satisfied our request for requiring the questionnaires of the research conducted by the party; however, it refused to require the questionnaires of other centers. The next court session was assigned for November 23.

No one from Korolevska's party was present on November 23. There was, however, a written request to postpone the trial due to the fact that they could not give the questionnaires yet as employees responsible for them were abroad. The trial was postponed to November 29.

After that the party initiated a meeting to negotiate cessation of the trial. Korolevska herself was present at the second meeting; she came to our office together with a member of her party, deputy Logvinenko. What they were saying could be considered apologizing and acknowledging of one's mistakes by a long stretch of the imagination. The entered agreement consisted in the following – the party withdraws the claim, Korolevska gives a briefing and says something vague what we can interpret as our victory and they maintain an appearance ("we do not have claims against sociologists, we have claims against authorities"), and they are ready to indemnify for our expenditures for lawyers, though not in court, but by any other means. We will be discreet in our comments and will not sue Korolevska (as we planned to do it before).

On November 29 at the beginning of the court session the party of Korolevska withdrew the claim and the trial ended:

The "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party withdrew its claim:
http://podrobnosti.ua/power/2012/11/29/873525.html

Below are the comments which we posted to our site:
http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=news&id=123

As the party voluntarily reimbursed us for our expenses (the court refused to satisfy our request for reimbursement of expenses for lawyers to us), and the trials proved to be a rather time-consuming and uninteresting business, we decided not to sue Korolevska and content ourselves with the dismissal of the case.
Author: Andrey Nikolaevich Alekseev – "The Last Change", December 7, 2012
http://www.cogita.ru/kolonki/andrei-alekseev-1/sud-partii-s-sociologami/

From the poll to interrogation

A scientific-party approach

Yesterday a trial started in Kyiv. Following its results it will become clear whether Ukrainian sociology is a "pseudo-science" a "prostitute" or "metaphysics" (the favorite swearword of the Marxist-Leninist scholasticism), or whether a new slighting nickname will stick to Natalia Korolevska forever. Not the "prostitute", of course, or "old woman-the-moneylender"… "…a classical example of a scientific party approach to studying various types of research, whose authors were bourgeois and petty bourgeois economists, historians, moneymakers, bourgeois politicians, reformists and revisionists…" (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd edition, 1969-1978).

Ukrainian sociology is on the threshold of new huge shocks and ordeals. As a matter of fact, every election is an event of particular importance for the domestic sociologists. Exactly during the pre-election period the greatest part of society remember sociology trying to guess by means of comparing various counts, if they will be lucky for once, or whether "blockheads will elect blockheads" again.

It is not easy to guess, as even among sociologists not everybody goes in for sociology in the truest sense of the word. At a time of elections commonplace swindlers mobilize, the ones able for appropriate remuneration to turn just anyone into the leaders of public sympathy– an outright moron, a son of an outright moron, a bandit, a high society prostitute or some party of "The Grandchildren of Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and the Home Front". Although at times more scandalous incidents happen (see, e.g. "Daddy of the Party of Regions' court photographer snap-shot a 19% breakaway for Yanukovich").

However, there is no retreat for the people – visits to psychics and fortune-tellers cost money – that is why they have to content themselves with the data received in a scientific way, making allowance for a sociological "error" and for ballot riggers in election committees who are up to their ears in sin.

When in spring all the members of the Academic Board of the Institute of Sociology were called in for questioning to the Security Service of Ukraine it became clear that the new authorities did not waste words and had not forgotten about their pre-election promises (such as "give careful attention to the development of science"). The scientists were let go, though, the passionate scapegoat unmasked, and the whole case was presented as a usual criminal affair specified in Part 5 Article 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

However the idea of correcting sociological data with the help of the Criminal Code got on the fertile ground. The leader of the "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party Natalia Korolevska infuriated by her rating threatened sociologists with criminal responsibility and dragged them to court.

At the beginning yesterday's session disappointed many people. First of all, the claimant Korolevska did not appear before the court – huge hopes had been pinned on her, though. Many were anticipating with pleasure how her severe bass would be heard beneath the dome of the court and blurt out something more staggering than what had been said in a recent interview: "They have screeched so loudly and panicked so much that if somebody had had doubts before that they had been manipulating the results, then now it became clear they did not conduct research"… No one actually believed in the appearance of Andriy Shevchenko, although he had had more reasons to take umbrage at sociologists – he is indeed a nationwide favorite, a possessor of the "Ballon d'Or", no matter how you slice it.

The third of the party leaders – the son of Stupka – did not make his début as a mortally insulted actor, whose feelings could be wounded by anyone.

In general among the persons involved in the scandal only the "screeching panic-mongers" – head of the Fund "Democratic Initiatives" Irina Bekeshkina and director of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology Vladimir Paniotto – were present in the room of the Economic Court of Ukraine. Several huge volumes at least ten kilos in size were lying in front of young judge Oksana Marchenko. Those were the 2043 questionnaires of the ill-fated research requested by Korolevska's side. They say that it took the court employees half an hour just to glance through the collected data. It took the employees of KIIS and "Democratic Initiatives" much more time to get the materials ready.

However, neither the inconvenience caused to the defendant, nor the consolidated position of the Sociological Association of Ukraine bothered the representatives of the claimant. They got their hands full: they had to give the court materials of the Internet periodicals which had spread over the whole world the results of the lousy opinion polls discrediting Natalia Korolevska's party.

– Taking into account the fact that notary offices in Ukraine refuse to deal with such data, – monotonously muttered lawyer Alexandra Pavlenko, – we addressed the notary offices of the Russian Federation and received notarized copies of screenshots…

Sociologists exchanged glances in surprise but to no purpose: it is known that the same Russian PR guys who three years ago successfully blew the rating for Sergey Tigipko work for Ms. Korolevska. So it was handy for them to address "their" own office.

–… However, – continued Ms. Pavlenko, – because in the Russian Federation they have their own procedural formalities for Internet sites, they had to print everything which was posted to the site following the link. That is why everything which comes before the bookmarks is of no relevance to the case.

And she offered the judge a volume covered with bookmarks. Ms. Marchenko looked at it with caution, the audience became noisy and a sturdy fellow with a shaven head sitting next to the claimants screwed up his face with displeasure. One could read it in his face that he bore a rather indirect relation to intellectual activity; his knuckles, however, gave away his disposition to active physical exercises of a certain type.

Meanwhile sociologists were already entering their first motion: they suggested considering the information that had aroused the claimant's indignation part of scientific research, and the conflict that had sprung up with regard to the materials – a scientific dispute. Such a dispute should not be decided in the Economic Court of Kyiv in any case, explained lawyer Andriy Guk:

– According to the definition of the Law of Ukraine about the scientific character and scientific-technical activity, – explained the representative of the defendant leisurely, – scientific activity is intellectual and creative activity directed at obtaining new knowledge. A scientific result is new knowledge obtained in the process of fundamental scientific and applied research saved to the scientific data storage items…

The sturdy fellow sitting next to the claimants began to doze, but he was cheered up by the speech of Ms. Pavlenko. The young lady had appreciably changed and was talking with genuine expression in her voice, interspersing her words with active gesticulation. First of all, Ms. Pavlenko expressed her bewilderment with respect to the interpretation of some nuances of the claim by the defendants:

– We wrote in our court claim that in this case the party was not an electoral subject; the case was not "electoral" at all, – she said. – We went to court not as a political party which is a subject of the electoral law, but referring to our status of a business entity possessing a certain business reputation…

Sociologists on the opposite bench clicked their tongues indignantly, although truth came out of the mouth of Ms. Pavlenko. Indeed, "Ukraine – Go Forward!" can't be a party. It is just some economic entity…

Meanwhile Andriy Guk was slowly following his way:

– It is stated clearly in the Decree of the Supreme Court Plenum of Ukraine that requests concerning disproving of scientific information should not be reviewed in court at all. And the claimant's representative confirmed that the issue concerns a sociological survey, i.e. a scientific inquiry of public opinion. That is why we again come to the point that it is a purely scientific dispute.

Having heard it Ms. Pavlenko frowned joyously:

– This is the first time I hear about a "scientific dispute", – she said. – If you allude to the Plenum Decree, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it is not a governing act… A scientific dispute is a non-existent legislative category. And what you are saying about a scientific approach, – these are all methods, and we are talking about the information published, which the party considers to be not true to fact…

– The party considers it to be not true to fact, – echoed Irina Bekeshkina and suddenly trilled with laughter. Alexandra Pavlenko did not like it:

– Excuse me; are we professional representatives ad litem? – asked she dryly. – Do we understand how to behave in court?

– Behave properly – appealed the judge to Bekeshkina.

– Ok, I apologize, – obeyed the latter, but immediately could not help bursting into silent laughter.

It is clear why the young judge and the claimant's lawyer did not understand the reason for the merriment Ms. Bekeshkina got seized with. However, the people who saw the flourishing of Soviet obscurantism did understand the phrase "the party considers something to be not true to fact". All the more so when power in the country had been taken by a party of a much "newer type".

When Ms. Bekeshkina was given the floor, she used it in full. Among many faults of the claimant she singled out its pitiful attempts to conceal its real status:

– It is obvious that in the court claim the claimant acts as a party that does not agree with the trustworthiness of the rating, – explained the sociologist.

– Excuse me, are you a lawyer? – asked Ms. Pavlenko smiling gently. How else should the young lady with a Breitling watch showing off on her wrist, and a "Lexus" expecting her at the court's entrance, and a Louis Vuitton bag carried for her by the above mentioned sleepy athlete with horny hands smile looking at the scientist?

– No, I am not a lawyer, – stated Ms. Bekeshkina an obvious fact, although with no apparent regret.

– Ok, then I will simply not respond to it, – uttered Ms. Pavlenko solemnly with an exaggerated humbleness.

– Ok, do not respond, – allowed her Ms Bekeshkina with an oily easiness, and continued:

– Imagine if any person who does not like opinion polls will sue upon their results. According to our sociological studies, the citizens do not trust almost all politicians; do not trust the court, militia, government, and public prosecutor's office… Imagine the banks that are not trusted by the population either, will sue us because we allegedly discredit their business reputation. Imagine if we will be addressed with court claims by fifteen political parties that find themselves beneath the vote threshold. We will not come out of law courts; will multiply ques-

tionnaires for the sake of evidence trying to prove we haven't done anything wrong… This is a dangerous precedent which can completely destroy empirical sociology in Ukraine. And in general it is a very dangerous tendency when sociologists' results are recognized as not true to fact not by sociologists.

The ardent speech did not impress either the claimants or the judge. Without much vacillation Ms. Marchenko ended the issue of motion for recognizing the emerged conflict a "scientific dispute". Then sociologists produced another set piece:

– The claimant calls the opinion poll held by the defendant not true to fact and directed at lowering the claimant's rating on the ground that the claimant and other independent organizations conducted research that revealed over 5% of votes in favor of the claimant… We are asking the court to call up questionnaires and other documents which confirm the fact of conducting such research and reflect the results of questioning each respondent…

A restrained malicious joy could be discerned in Mr. Guk's voice. Somewhat sadistic smiles appeared over the faces of sociologists, too: they were visualizing how in the office of the "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party the clerks deprived of lunch are printing out another hundred of questionnaires being dead on their feet.

However, it was too early to be glad.

– I do have something to say with regard to the matter – said Ms. Pavlenko with a superior air. – First of all, each lawyer knows that this dispute category belongs with a separate dispute category. Presumption in this case creates another order… will you listen – addressed she Irina Bekeshkina who began to ironically mutter something again – you are not a lawyer; it might be interesting for you, too.

Part of the audience did not like it.

– Look who is talking! – resounded a voice from the crowd.

– Behave properly! – gave mouth the fellow with the shaven head unexpectedly.

– In highest terms of a dispute, – continued Ms. Pavlenko – the principle when each party must prove the circumstances it refers to operates. In this category of dispute another presumption operates. This presumption assumes that a claimant does not have to prove unreliability of the negative information. This position is provided for in Article 277 in the Civil Code of Ukraine and is also duplicated in other acts of legislation… It follows from here that the whole burden of proving the trustworthiness of negative information about the defendant falls on the defendant, not on the claimant. The claimant is only entrusted with an obligation to prove the fact of spreading such information by the defendant.

– On what grounds do you consider the opinion poll's results negative? You must put something forth… – said someone from the audience rhetorically. Ms. Pavlenko did not respond to the remark and continued to stick to her guns.

– We have already given the court copies of the newspaper articles and screenshots of the Internet sites were the research according to which our rating exceeds the voting threshold was talked about, – said she. – It is the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine", the site "Podrobnosti" and other resources.

The eyes of the public turned on the judge. Her position was an evasive one: not to satisfy the motion until the court claim is considered on its merits. She immediately met the request of the claimants to give them time to familiarize themselves with 2043 questionnaires of KIIS and "Democratic Initiatives".

– The court orders a recess until November 8, – said Ms. Marchenko and closed the session.

Already in the street Vladimir Skurydin, a representative of the claimant, explained smilingly that it may not even be true that having studied the questionnaires the party would insist on considering the claim.

– I am not saying now that the claim might be abandoned, but who knows, – said he, smiling in a refined manner.

But, of course! One may assume in all likelihood (and it must have been intelligibly explained to judge Marchenko) that it has been the first and the last session on the case when representatives of the claimant appeared. Because if Ms. Korolevska is passed over for the Verkhovna Rada, then all her sponsors will forget amid the debacle about some action brought in against sociologists. And if she wins, then the mistake of the "presumptuous sociologists" will cause only a complacent and condescending smile by the party leaders.

Evgenij Kuzmenko,
October 26, 2012
http://obkom.net.ua/articles/2012-10/26.1343.shtml

The Party of Korolevska had second thoughts about going to law with sociologists

The "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party called back the claim to the Economic Court of Kyiv against the Fund "Democratic Initiatives" and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), in which it requested to disprove the information about the party's low rating.

"We decided that today our lawyers will petition the court in order to call back the claim against sociologists", – said the leader of the party Natalia Korolevska to journalists beside the Economic Court of Kyiv on Thursday.

"The elections came to an end, and you don't shake your fist when the fight is over. That is why we decided to turn this page over, as we believe any further consideration of the case completely pointless", – observed she.

Korolevska emphasized that the enemies of her party were not the sociologists but the present Ukrainian authorities. In her opinion, after the elections the parties that were the "projects of Bankovaya" got in the Verkhovna Rada.

In his turn director of KIIS Vladimir Paniotto viewed the fact that the "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party had withdrawn its claim against sociologists favorably. "If this means that we are fully exonerated, we are not going to law any more", – said he.

Paniotto observed that KIIS and "Democratic Initiatives" considered the option of filing a counter-claim for protection of their business reputation, but "it takes a lot of time, and we have no enthusiasm to go to law simply for the sake of receiving apologies". "We said at the very beginning that the claim did not have any prospects as the accusations had the characteristics of a scientific dispute, which was not even reviewed in administrative court. If Korolevska's party has realized it and withdraws the claim, we can only welcome it", – said KIIS director in his interview with Interfax-Ukraine.

As it was reported, on October 11 the "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party filed a suit to the Economic Court of Kyiv against the "Democratic Initiatives" Fund and KIIS with the request to disprove the information about the party's low rating.

According to the data of 99.98% protocols handling, the parliamentary elections which had been held on October 28 resulted in the "Ukraine – Go Forward!" Party's winning 1.58% of the electors' votes in the multimandate constituency, which means the party had not cleared the 5 percent barrier for entry to the Rada.

Interfax-Ukraine November 29, 2012

The text of WAPOR statement

WAPOR
WORLD ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

WORLD ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH (WAPOR)

PRESS RELEASE

Statement Regarding Pre-Election Polls in Ukraine

Lincoln (Nebraska, USA), October 24, 2012. In the run-up to the Ukrainian Parliamentary elections on 28 October 2012, the political party "Ukraine – Forward!" has claimed that the results of a pre-election poll were deliberately distorted to reduce the share of the vote intention for that party. The poll was carried out by two reputable polling organizations, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF). KIIS is a member of ESOMAR. The poll results were in line with the trend in polls over the past couple of months, which have shown a gradual decline in support for "Ukraine – Forward!".

"Ukraine – Forward!" has now initiated a court case against the pollsters, asking the court to demand that the pollsters retract the poll findings, and declare that they were false. The case is to be heard on 25 October, just three days before the elections.

WAPOR is deeply concerned by these developments. Pre-election polls play an important role in democratic societies. The regular publication of reputable polls, and vigorous debate about the findings, are an integral part of a functional democracy. Bona fide pollsters should be free to publish their findings and the media should be free to report and discuss them. For this reason, WAPOR also encourages that the publication of polls meets minimal requirements of disclosure to the public. See the Rules of Practice Regarding Reports and Study Results in WAPOR's Code of Ethics at http://wapor.unl.edu/wapor-code-of-ethics/.

We wish to express our solidarity with KIIS and DIF. We hope the Court recognizes the value of conducting and publishing poll results and takes no action to suppress polling in Ukraine. It is important that the Ukrainian public should continue to trust the results of genuine polls, and surveys more generally. Well-conducted surveys hold a mirror to society. Survey findings can provide information that permits debate to be informed, rather than uninformed. We would uphold the right of all Ukrainians to freely express their views and we believe that the discussion of those views is more fruitful in the context of objective information about the state of society, including poll results.

Media Contact:
Jennifer Agiesta, jagiesta@ap.org
Media Relations Chair

WAPOR Secretariat ♦ UNL Gallup Research Center ♦ University of Nebraska-Lincoln
201 N. 13th Street ♦ Lincoln, NE 68588-0242 ♦ USA
Phone: 1 402-472-7720 ♦ *Fax*: 1 402-472-7727

BOOKSHELF

"The Future of Belarus. Sight independent experts". Edited by Professor Oleg Manaev. – *St. Petersburg, "Nevsky Prostor", 2012, 534 pp..*

A serious contribution to the future modernization of Belarus

Devastation in society is the consequence of devastation in heads. Having received national independence as a present, having a high level of the public's readiness for transformation and a relatively good initial position in economy when state sovereignty was being proclaimed the country did not use the opening up opportunities. The ruling elite proved to be unready to formulate a national idea, did not offer a realistic conception of Belarus future to society, did not make any in the least bit viable political idea clear for public consciousness.

At the point of independence acquisition an elite unable to lead society to the future held power in Belarus. The West seemed suspicious. Because of the post-Soviet understanding of the world the future was seen in the past, in restoration of the totalitarian system.

Today it has become obvious that at the close of the previous century our elite did not have any sound project of Belarusian state's development on the way of democracy and market reforms. Mainly state and executive high-ranking functionaries acted as political elite. Post-Soviet society's adherence to the social justice values as they were interpreted by the Bolshevik ideology was its main trait. For the majority of Belarusians the values ranked higher than political and economic freedoms and civil rights, which led populist neo-Soviet political forces to governing the country, and to actual public support of an authoritarian regime.

Sources of many present problems of ours should be looked for in the fact. Belarusian reality testifies to the effect that the path from totalitarianism to democracy and liberalism is difficult and thorny. Belarusian public consciousness frees itself from the past painfully and rather slowly. Today an outright authoritarian, closed political and socio-economic system has been formed by A. Lukashenko's effort. A total domination of the presidential power over other power-holding structures, legislative and judicial in the first place, as well as total monopolization of mass media, including with the help of "legal regulation", is the prevailing sign of the system.

In the new book "Belarus Future" a team of authors under the general editorship of Professor Oleg Manaev made an attempt to research the basic sources of Belarus development, the reasons for the established socio-political and economic condition, the past, the present and possibly the future of the country. The historical misfortune of Belarusians consists in the following: having gained independence the country did not manage to build a *democratic* Belarus. Democracy presupposes mandatory observance of certain procedural norms, ensuring in practice respect of civil rights and freedoms. Democracy presupposes that citizens must have at their disposal a possibility to influence the state policy by means of various civil institutions. The parliament's control over the government, protection of alternative information sources, the right of citizens to establish independent associations and organizations are obligatory conditions for carrying out political democracy.

There is no democracy in today's Belarus. Article 4 of the Constitution about free competition of various political ideologies and inadmissibility of imposition of any particular ideology, Article 5 about the right of political parties to use state mass media, Article 33 about inadmissibility of mass media monopolization and inadmissibility of censorship, as well as some others, are invalid.

Refusing to implement reforms authorities deliberately preserve an old social model of society. The majority of the population is still united in former entities which in a slightly modified form continue to play the role of the totalitarian framework. Work collectives, as before, continue to fulfill political functions. Deliberate politicization of former semi-totalitarian entities occurs parallel to restricting and neutralizing political and public functions. The existing political parties find themselves beyond the power system, in the background of politics. Any claims of civil society entities to an independent role, autonomous existence are regarded as hostile and destabilizing actions. That is why an all-out attack of the state on the nascent beginnings of non-governmental structures, their exclusion from public life is an obligatory condition of the regime's existence. At that a considerable part of them is not formally destroyed but integrated in the state infrastructure, and turned into puppet entities. Activity of those organizations that do not agree to such a role is forcibly restricted. It is obvious that Belarus future is inseparable from democracy, formation of market economy and world integration tendencies.

In the book "Belarus Future" in its fundamental chapter "Formation of national identity" a broad outline and peculiarities of Belarusian national identity are revealed

on the basis of numerous public opinion polls' materials. At that the national identity of Belarusians is not considered as purely academic, but rather as political and geopolitical. It began to be used as an ideological platform of nationalistic, as well as of pro-Russian political forces. Belarus future is examined by the authors mainly in the light of its identity, formation of the nation on the basis of the past, which includes images of the heroes of the late war, the impasse of ethnic nationalism, problems of the language and self-consciousness.

Much attention is paid to analyzing the problem of political and socio-economic development of the country, to the economy of social stability, to the technology of the ruling regime's self reproduction, to the peculiarities of socio-historical context for the formation of Belarus public organizations, to the influence of the Internet on political views and democracy development.

Research of Belarusians' economic mentality, of degradation of the "Belarusian model of economic development", as well as of the economic mentality as the basis for a socio-political split of Belarusian society and its transformation in the near term are seen as interesting and rather important for a forecast of the future.

The prospects of the country in the European context, in the formation of the Eurasian future are being examined in the third part of the book devoted to the problem of the geopolitical self-determination of Belarusians and Belarus, to the trends and paradoxes of a geopolitical choice, to "lukascism" as a phenomenon and authoritarianism. At that an assumption is expressed that the main task of an enlightened civil society is changing people's mentality.

I would like to emphasize that the book under consideration will certainly become a serious contribution to future modernization of Belarus on a democratic platform and will give rise to prosperity of the Belarusian people.

Prof. Stanislav Bogdankevich, Ph. D.,
Chairman of Board of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (1991-1995)

Important lessons and challenges of twenty years to Belarus independence

Editor of the book professor Oleg Manaev is a founder of IISEPS – the most famous non-state research institute in the Republic of Belarus (registered in Vilnius since 2005). One of the most important achievements of the institute is its public opinion polls held quarterly over the period of twenty years of Belarus independence. Without the IISEPS objective data Belarus would be indeed a black box hard to deal with. It is paradoxical, but objective data of social research prove to be most important in the country where authorities do not respect public opinion, and official returns differ from public opinion polls!

Of course, the book contains numerous references to opinion polls held by IISEPS. Reading the texts by Professor Manaev and other famous authors of the book it is possible to understand what allowed the Institute within two decades to play the central role in Belarus' research and in its destiny inside the country and abroad – it is an aspiration for impartiality.

I remember the day very well – already at the end of 1990s – when I was shocked reading for the first time an article by Professor Manaev which revealed that Belarusian-speaking Belarusians supported integration with Russia to a greater extent than Russian-speaking ones. This and other results of IISEPS research may be unpleasant for advocates of ethnic nationalism, but with all due respect to Belarusian history and culture, one should begin with the reality as it is.

Twenty years of Belarus independence present a lot of important lessons and challenges, minutely described in the book. I recommend it to all the readers interested in the problems of the post-Soviet states' national development.

Michitaka Hattori,
Deputy Director of the Institute for Studying the Economy of Russia and CIS (Tokyo, Japan), author of the book "Belarus – A Mysterious Country"

Analytic Bulletin of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies

IISEPS Executive Director:

Dr. **Algirdas Degutis**

IISEPS News
Jogailos g. 4, LT-01116 Vilnius
Editor Algirdas Degutis (+370-6) 887-50-00
E-mail: ***iiseps@iiseps.org; iiseps.iiseps@gmail.com***
www.iiseps.org
ISSN 1822-5535
ISSN 1822-5543 (on line)
250 copies

© IISEPS 2012

Analytic materials in this Bulletin represent views of the authors and do not necessary represent position of the IISEPS