PARADOXES OF THE BELARUSIAN-UKRAINIAN BROTHERHOOD

Not so many nations in the world are as close as the Belarusians and the Ukrainians. According to the IISEPS opinion polls, the social distance between them in the perception of the Belarusians is the shortest after the distance between the latter and the Russians. However, the relations with the Russians are complicated by certain ambivalence: Russia is the country closest to the Belarusians, and at the same time during the last years Belarus has had the largest number of conflicts exactly with it. Besides, some part of the Belarusian society – a minority, although a not too small one – perceives Russia as an immanent threat to the Belarusian State system and national identity. There is no such segment of negative attitude to Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the Belarusian society. There is closeness, but as for the southern neighbors, there is no tearing away connected in particular with closeness as it occurs with the Russians and Russia.

It should be noted that in all IISEPS numerous opinion polls beginning with 1994 when comparing the level of life in Belarus and in the neighboring countries Ukraine has always been inferior to Belarus itself in the assessments of the Belarusians. In other words, Ukraine is not perceived as the middle brother, i.e. the elder with respect to the youngest one. And if one talks about mass consciousness, it is perceived neither as an example, nor as an ideal. However, closeness not merely intergovernmental, but rather ethnic and cultural obviously exists.

In our opinion, the data of Table 1 should not be interpreted as support of ideological grounds of Russian expansion or as consequence of underdeterminedness of the Belarusian national self-consciousness. It is simply ascertaining of extreme closeness of the three eastern Slavic peoples, closeness that is not so much state and political, which is not observed by the way, but rather cultural and ethnic. The data of Tables 2 and 3 in which intergovernmental relations and the attitude towards representatives of neighboring nations are being assessed also testify to it.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: "Ho do you evaluate the present relations between Belarus and Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	Belarus	Ukraine*
Good	53.0	41.9
Unstable	34.8	30.2
Bad	5.6	5.7
DA/NA	6.6	22.2

* In Tables 2-4 the data of the opinion poll conducted in November, 2009 by the Center named after A. Razumkova are used

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: "Which attitude to the Ukrainians prevail in Belarus?" and "Which attitude to the Belarusians prevails in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	Belarus	Ukraine
Positive	53.8	70.0
Neutral	38.3	22.5
Negative	3.7	2.4
DA/NA	4.2	5.1

The Belarusians, as well as the Ukrainians, evaluate the relations between the two states less positively, than the relations between the nations. It is not surprising if we take into account quite different almost opposite geopolitical orientations of our states. However, it is possible to assume that assessments of the Belarusians were influenced by the events of the last year in the course of which certain normalization of relations between Belarus and Europe took place, as well as by evolution of the Ukrainian authorities from their intention to export the "orange" revolution in Belarus to a quite pragmatic approach crowned by the visit of president A. Lukashenko to Ukraine. It is interesting to note that the Belarusians assess bilateral relations better than the Ukrainians, perhaps in comparison with other countries. At the same time, however, the Ukrainians demonstrate a better attitude to the Belarusians, than the Belarusians to them. In other words, the attitude of the Belarusians to the Ukrainians is also very good, but nevertheless it is a little bit worse than of the Ukrainians towards the Belarusians. The dimensions of the two nations might explain it: there are almost 5 times more of the Ukrainians than of the Belarusians, and the gigantic neighbor arouses certain fears. It is hardly explained by the Belarusian state propaganda as the Belarusians evaluate the bilateral relations even higher than the Ukrainians.

As for the attitude of the residents of both countries to the leaders of the neighboring states the difference is striking (Table 4).

It seems that as a whole positive attitude of the Ukrainians to A. Lukashenko does not mean that they would like to have a Ukrainian copy of the neighbors’ leader at home. It is exactly the attitude to the neighbors’ leader, whom a quite positive attitude to the northern neighbors is extended to, and also a consequence of desire for some more order in Ukraine. The fact that the Belarusian order is "fatherly" up to soreness does not apparently bother the Ukrainian respondents too much as it is nevertheless the neighbors’ order and not one’s own. Although such assessments characterize in a sense exactly the Ukrainian society – it is unlikely that A. Lukashenko would get the same assessments in Lithuania or in Poland. On the other hand, though the assessments balance of V. Yushchenko by the Belarusians is negative, it is moderate nevertheless. V. Yushchenko is not the incarnation of the world evil for the Belarusians in contrast to the Russians.

The Belarusians’ assessments of the main players of the presidential election campaign, which is being conducted in Ukraine, are extremely interesting, too. They willingly play the game "take part in the Ukrainian elections". At that, their choice differs slightly in a quite unexpected manner from the preferences of the Ukrainians themselves (Table 5).

First of all, attention should be paid to the fact that the share of the Belarusians who would take part in the Ukrainian elections is comparable with the share of the Ukrainians – almost 60% of the Belarusian respondents named their candidate for the elections in the neighboring country. Secondly, their priorities differ considerably: the Belarusians show more "orange" preferences than the Ukrainians themselves. However, causes for this choice can differ form the ones in Ukraine. Quite high sympathy to V. Yushchenko can be explained by his present presidential status – as the head of state he is more well-known in Belarus than other Ukrainian political figures – and by those amicable gestures which he has been directing at the official Minsk for the last year. It is also quite significant that if in Ukraine Y. Timoshenko falls a little behind V. Yanukovich, then in Belarus she ranks approximately the same with the leader of the Party of Regions. It looks even more surprising if we take into consideration the fact that the political line of the Belarusian state is more likely closer to the position of V. Yanukovich, than to the position of Y. Timoshenko. Perhaps, Y. Timoshenko’s charismatic character which slightly resembles the charismatic character of the Belarusian leader turns out to be a more considerable factor than geopolitical priorities. Especially since the process of relations normalization which began between the official Minsk and the European Union and pragmatism of the Ukrainian policy concerning Belarus have made the differences in the geopolitical orientations of Minsk and Kiev less contrasting.

The data of Table 6 show how political and world outlook preferences of the Belarusians are connected with their attitude to the Ukrainians in general and to Ukrainian presidential contenders.

Table 6. Connection of the answers to the questions about the assessment of the attitude towards the Ukrainians in Belarus and to the Ukrainian presidential contenders with political and world outlook preferences, %

Variant of answer	Attitude to the Ukrainians in Belarus*		The preferred candidate at the Ukrainian elections*
	Positive	Neutral	V. Yushchenko	Y. Timoshenko	V. Yanukovich
The Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians are...
Three branches of one nation	62.6	31.8	13.5	19.5	20.5
Different nations	36.0	54.3	17.5	25.6	19.2
The preferred choice for Belarus:
Integration with Russia	64.5	32.2	18.4	20.1	24
Entering the EU	45.9	46.8	13.3	23.4	17.7
Attitude to A. Lukashenko:
Trust	61.9	30.5	18.8	22.7	24.1
Do not trust	45.1	47.5	9.9	20.5	15.1

* Other variants of answer are excluded owing to their small value

In reality while evaluating the attitude of one’s fellow countrymen to the neighboring nation people, as a rule, make public their own assessment. The chosen wording of the answer lets us eliminate certain inconvenience connected with giving publicity to the negative assessments.

In this sense, the data of Table 6 are quite revealing. Respondents adhering to the more progressive views–who consider that the Belarusians, the Russians and the Ukrainians are three different peoples, who support euro-integration, who do not trust A. Lukashenko – also demonstrate a more reserved attitude to the southern neighbors. It might be connected with the fact that people adhering to the opposite opinions share the Soviet paradigm of friendship among nations to a considerable extent. How this principle was made a reality in the USSR is another question, but as a principle exactly it generates benevolent attitude to the neighbors.

At the same time the group of "progressists" is more inclined to thinking in national categories which presuppose a slightly larger distance from the neighbors than the Soviet "brotherhood of nations".

As for the manner in which Belarusian internal political preferences "spread out" on the Ukrainian pre-election palette, some surprises alongside with the expected phenomena are present here. It is not surprising that "progressists" sympathize less with V. Yanukovich. However, at the first sight it looks like a mystery that supporters of A. Lukashenko and even supporters of integration with Russia sympathize with V. Yushchenko largely than opponents of A. Lukashenko and adherents of euro-integration. The last thing is especially surprising: in the interpretation of the Kremlin governing body the present president of Ukraine appears almost as the devil in the flesh. It might seem natural for the supporters of integration with Moscow to pay attention to such assessments of the Russian leaders. In fact, though, striving for integration with Russia long ago became in Belarus not so much a real political aspiration, but rather a part of a certain symbolic pattern that includes conservatism, sympathy to A. Lukashenko and many other things. From this point of view V. Yushchenko is an acting head of the neighboring state, who has made a series of friendly gestures towards A. Lukashenko. Why should not he be rewarded for this with sympathy, too? Moreover, what the Kremlin leaders could not share with him is in essence of little interest for the Belarusian adherents of integration with Russia. Russia for them is a sign of a certain value system and it does not matter to what extent the country lying to the east of Belarus corresponds to these values.

The fact that supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko demonstrate approximately the same readiness to vote for Y. Timoshenko also pays attention to itself. In our opinion it confirms our thesis expressed above: for many Belarusians political distinctions between A. Lukashenko and Y. Timoshenko are less important than resemblance of political stylistics "of the only political figure in Belarus" (according to the self-definition of the Belarusian president) and "the only man in Ukrainian policy".

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