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THE CRISIS SPELL

In March of 2009 81.8% of the Belarusians agreed that the economic crisis had begun in the country. Three months earlier in December of 2008 there were considerably fewer of such answers – 64.3%. Owing to such dynamics it became senseless to ask a question concerning the beginning of the economic crisis once again, that is why at the end of the year the question was worded as follows: "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?" It was answered in the affirmative by 81.3%; in the negative – by 10.8% and 7.9% avoided answering the question. Thus, the share of respondents who admit presence of the crisis in Belarus became stabilized and it became stabilized at a quite high level.

The same conclusion can be drawn on the basis of answers to the questions of Tables 1 and 2. The public opinion has defined personal contribution of the country’s leadership and world finances into the development of the Belarusian economic crisis which is confirmed by a slight reduction in the number of those who found it difficult to answer for nine months of the year 2009. Judging by the first variant of answer ("Virtually in full measure") contribution of the world crisis into the Belarusian developments exceeds the authorities’ contribution 1.3 times. Such ratio does not prevent the respondents when answering the question: "Where, in your opinion, the struggle against the economic crisis is conducted more successfully – in Belarus or in other countries touched upon by the crisis?" from giving preference to "other countries" in almost the same ratio 42.1% to 30.4% (1.4).

Table 1. Dynamics of answering the question: "If you believe that Belarusian economy finds itself in crisis, then to what extent can it be considered the consequence of the country’s leadership economic policy of the last years?", %
Variant of answer

12'08

03'09

12'09

Virtually in full measure

14.5

17.5

23.7

To a considerable extent

24.3

34.6

27.9

To a slight extent

17.1

16.5

18.2

It is impossible to say that it is the reason for the crisis

13.1

9.4

10.7

DA/NA

31.0

22.0

19.5



Table 2. Dynamics of answering the question: " If you believe that Belarusian economy finds itself in crisis, then to what extent can it be considered the consequence of the world financial crisis?", %
Variant of answer

12'08

03'09

12'09

Virtually in full measure

27.5

32.5

31.3

To a considerable extent

29.7

37.7

38.7

To a slight extent

10.8

8.2

10.2

It is impossible to say that it is the reason for the crisis

3.6

1.2

2.7

DA/NA

28.4

20.4

17.1

The data concerning delays in wages and pensions payments obtained in the course of the opinion polls are an objective indicator of Belarusian economy condition. At the end of 2002 when it was not customary to use the word "crisis", almost 70% of the Belarusians faced delays in payments. It is not surprising that at the boundary of 2002 and 2003 the electoral rating of the head of state sank to its historic minimum. After 2003 the mentioned problem quickly dispersed and sociologists of the IISEPS stopped including the corresponding question into questionnaires.

Beginning with December, 2008 it was expected that the topicality of delays in wages and pensions payments would increase in light of the beginning of the economic crisis critical stage. However, at it follows from Table 3, those expectations did not prove to be true. A deviation exceeding statistical accuracy was registered only in March at the minimum of social indicators.

The data of Table 3 are also interesting because the answers to the question asked in it register facts rather than opinions. Hence they are free from subjectivism to the maximum which considerably simplifies their interpretation.

Table 3. Dynamics of answering the question: "How many times have you faced delays in wages or pensions payment for the last 12 months?", %
Variant of answer

09'02

09'03

12'08

03'09

06'09

09'09

12'09

None

30.6

53.3

72.5

67.0

70.4

73.1

69.6

One time

12.0

8.7

11.3

11.3

8.3

9.7

9.7

Several times

35.8

26.0

13.9

17.4

15.9

13.6

15.9

Monthly

19.6

11.1

1.9

3.1

3.0

1.9

3.1

However, let us return from the facts to the opinions. The economic crisis did not manage to destroy social stability; moreover it became tedious, fit into the usual image of life and became itself an element of its stability by the end of the year. Well, if there is crisis, so be it. After all, we have outlived famine; we will outlive abundance, too. Thus or approximately thus is the people’s philosophy. It contrives to harmonize with the recognition of the crisis serious influence on the everyday life of respondents’ families (41.8%). Four times fewer respondents (10.8%) adhere to the opposite point of view.

The data of Table 4 let us analyze the socio-demographic characteristics of the winners and the losers of the previous year.

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: "How does the economic crisis in the country tell upon the everyday life of your family?" depending on gender, age, education and trust to the president*, %
Characteristics

Seriously (41.8%)

Slightly (38.2%)

Does not tell on it (10.8%)

Gender:
Male

44.2

36.5

11.6

Female

39.8

39.6

10.2

Age:
18-29

44.7

40.7

7.6

30-39

47.1

37.0

10.8

40-49

51.4

34.5

8.3

50-59

43.9

43.3

4.8

60 +

27.7

37.2

18.0

Education:
>Primary

21.5

34.4

17.8

Incomplete secondary

32.7

38.1

18.8

Secondary

47.6

37.8

8.4

Vocational

44.6

38.4

7.5

Higher

46.1

41.7

10.1

Trust to the president:
Trust

28.1

45.1

14.9

Do not trust

61.2

26.0

5.9

* The Table is read across

As it routinely happens in Belarus those who do not trust the head of state turned out to be the losers. In December they noted that the crisis was seriously telling upon the everyday life of their families 2.2 times more often than their "trusting" fellow countrymen. What is the reason for such crisis political nature? Let us single out two factors. First of all, in compliance with the tradition prevalent in the country, pensioners are the most privileged social group. In contrast to Latvia, for instance, reduction of pensions does not threaten them. The same cannot be said about the employees of state enterprises, many of whom had to switch to a short working week or go on unpaid leaves on a regular basis. Secondly, the economic crisis of 2009 was to a considerable extent virtual. The population perceived it through mass media, however, as it was repeatedly mentioned before the ability of various socio-demographic groups to perceive media information is not equal.

In view of the above enumerated reasons the economic crisis touched men to a greater extent than women (among women the share of pensioners is larger, and they traditionally are less interested in "politics"). The young people found themselves among the losers due to the same reasons, however not everything is so unambiguous here. The share of losers is the highest possible in the age group of people between 40 and 49 years old. It is difficult for the citizens of the fore-pension age to compete with the younger and owing to the fact often better prepared employees at the labor-market. Due to the fact they are more sensitive to the negative information. Many of them constantly experience stress. Everything aforesaid can be also extended to the citizens with primary and incomplete secondary education. The majority of them are pensioners living in the rural area. A considerable part of their personal incomings is formed by their vegetable gardens, and the total yield of produce from them is not subject to the world crisis.

Another list of losers is presented in Table 5. The last line is the most interesting one. The public opinion has assigned it to the employees of the government institutions and officials. We suppose that the majority of experts will agree with the public opinion in the given case. As a whole the data of Table 5 contradict Table 4 in many respects. It happened in view of the fact that self-appraisals of the respondents (Table 4) turned out to be closer to the Belarusian reality than the appraisals of "others" that in many respects coincided with the traditional stock phrases. Thus the list of those who suffered from the economic crisis was headed quite naturally by the poor and the low-income population whose basis, by the way, is constituted by the people of little education, elderly residents of the countryside, i.e. those who suffered the least from the crisis according to Table 4. Highly qualified employees and businessmen found themselves in the similar dual condition.

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: "Who, in your opinion, suffered most from the economic crisis in Belarus?" (more than one answer is possible)
Variant of answer

%

The poor and the low income population

39.7

The middle class

28.6

Young people

28.3

Businessmen, entrepreneurs in small and medium business

21.3

Elderly people

20.2

Pensioners

19.4

People with money savings, bank deposits

18.3

Middle age people

18.1

Low-skill employees

17.9

Employees of state-financed organizations

16.6

Employees of private organizations (enterprises)

14.1

Businessmen, entrepreneurs in large-scale business

12.8

Highly qualified employees

3.9

Employees of the government institutions and officials

3.3

The Belarusians demonstrate quite moderate optimism concerning the terms of the crisis termination. In the opinion of 22.8% of respondents the crisis in the country will come to the end after 2011, 15.3% suppose that it will happen in 2011, 28.4% believe in the crisis completion in 2010. Let us remind you that the government has made up plans for the final year of another Belarusian five-year plan reasoning from an over-optimistic scenario. Who will turn out to be closer to the truth – the government which consists of professionals or ordinary citizens – will become clear after the completion of the first quarter of 2010.

Whatever the terms of the crisis completion are, the Belarusians have to save now. It is clear that people, first of all, give up civilizational luxuries. According to the importance decrease their list looks as follows: 61.1% of respondents were saving on holiday trips in 2009, 54.5% – on purchasing a TV-set or a computer, 53.5% – on clothes, 48.8% – on mobile phones, 44.6% – on car repairs. The list is crowned with foodstuff – 41.4% and medicines – 36.2%. Saving on medicines (on one’s health) is the last thing people resort to adapting to the crisis. And we must admit that there are a lot of such people in Belarus today!

If transfer to the saving routine had an effect on the population’s survival strategies, then towards the increase in demands (Table 6)! This perhaps is one of the main paradoxes of the last year. It is one thing to save on one’s health, and quite another – to agree to live worse than the majority of neighbors!

Table 6. Dynamics of answering the question: "If one speaks about your family, then what do you and members of your family have for an object?", %
Variant of answer

12'07

12'08

12'09

To survive even if at the most primitive level of existence

13.2

12.1

7.0

To live not worse than the majority of families in your city, district

48.8

45.3

39.5

To live better than the majority of families in your city, district

18.5

20.2

26.5

To live the way an average family lives in Western Europe, the USA

11.9

15.0

17.3

To live better than an average family in Western Europe, the USA

5.7

5.2

7.5

"The rich" years which had continued in Belarus from the end of 2003 till the end of 2008 undid the public flywheel of steep expectations. It possesses considerable iterance additionally supported by the state propaganda. In the pre-election year the level of populism traditionally intensifies. Concrete steps are being undertaken in this direction already. As an example let us quote pensions and the first-class rate increase from January, 1.

However, not only the society lives by steep expectations. They are peculiar to the authorities to the same extent. The authorities pin their main hope on the "pre-term" completion of the world crisis. It is difficult to say how all this will come to the end; however history teaches us that steep expectations are a sure sign of socio-political changes.


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