WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A BELARUSIAN?

In the course of the IISEPS December opinion poll, respondents were offered a set of questions concerning national identity. The obtained data to a considerable degree confirm the results of the IISEPS previous researches – about the contradictory, ambivalent character of the identity, about its Soviet background, about the indirect, nonlinear connection between the language and the national feelings.

As it follows from Table 1, such non-articulated matter as the land turns out to be the most important factor which determines for respondents belonging to the Belarusians. Perhaps they simply mean their residence in the Republic of Belarus, but it is also possible that respondents consider the "land" to be a whole set of involvement relations that make the answer a bit tautological: "to be a Belarusian is to be a Belarusian".

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: "What does it mean to you to be a Belarusian? Using a five-point scale (where 1 – "completely disagree", and 5 – "completely agree") estimate to what extent you connect the following concepts with Belarus", %

Variant of answer	1	2	3	4	5	average	DA/NA
Belarusian land	4.2	6.0	11.5	14.7	58.1	4.23	5.5
Belarusian language	12.7	10.9	18.9	16.4	35.9	3.55	5.2
Struggle against Nazism	19.9	12.8	17.4	12.9	26.1	3.14	10.9
Struggle for independence from the USSR	22.3	13.5	19.8	11.3	22.1	2.97	11.0

The second position, which the Belarusian language occupied in the identity hierarchy, draws attention to itself, too. As it will be shown below, not many Belarusians speak Belarusian in everyday communication. However, the language serves as a sign, a symbol of the nation, which is even more important than the great milestones in the national history. By the way, as for the historic milestones we should note a fair degree of the assessments proximity of the struggle against Nazism and the struggle for independence. It is particularly surprising due to the fact that in the state discourse the victory in the World War II is regarded as the peak of the Belarusian national spirit, whereas the struggle for independence almost as a crime. In our opinion, proximity of these assessments is evidence of the mass recognition of the country’s independence value.

It is also confirmed by the high evaluation of independence gained in 1991 in comparison with other periods and events of Belarusian history (Table 2).

If in the question of Table 1 the struggle for independence (taking into account non-indisputability of the question whether it occurred at all) takes an important, but the last position, then in Table 2 independence itself proves to be an event representing the source of the largest pride. At that, some change in the hierarchy of other historic events should be mentioned. In the IISEPS opinion poll of 2004, a relative majority (more than a third) of respondents ascribed the beginning of the Belarusian State system to the GDL and only about 5% – to the BPR. The question from the mentioned opinion poll does not coincide with the question from Table 2, but in any case there is direct evidence that creation of the BPR turns out to be a source of pride approximately to the same degree as the long Soviet history. It might be connected with the BPR "rehabilitation" campaign which was conducted by the official mass media in 2008 on the eve of the first Belarusian republic 90^th anniversary.

Attitude to independence revealed in Tables 1 and 2 is also confirmed by the answers to a direct question: "Is it a blessing for the country, in your opinion, that Belarus became independent in 1991?" Almost two thirds of the polled (65.5%) answered it in the affirmative, in the negative – only every fifth respondent.

At the same time, answers to a series of other questions in the December opinion poll displayed the ambivalent, "fluctuating" character of the national identity. It concerns historic incidents and personages, as well as interrelation of the Belarusian identity with Russian.

According to the data of Table 2, the BPR as a source of pride ranks the same for respondents as the BSSR. Yet there is a considerable gap between the attitudes to the symbols of these two republics (Table 3).

The point here is, perhaps, in the political factor: red-green and white-red-white flags are associated in modern Belarus with various current political forces and attitude to them is extended to the symbols connected with the mentioned forces. However, as it follows from Table 2 they are not quite extended any more to the historical periods which are associated with these symbols.

As for the cult figures of the Belarusians, a surprisingly mixed picture is being observed here (Table 4).

Vicinage of the anti-Russian rebellion leader and secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus with the former Russian president and the Russian empress who once and for all annihilated independence of the GDL creates a strong impression. A quite modest position of J. Stalin and a relatively modest one of the present leader of Belarus should be mentioned among peculiarities of Table 4. Perhaps the recent angry philippics of A. Lukashenko directed against V. Putin can be explained by the deliberate or unconscious feeling of the Belarusian president that the present Russian prime minister is not only an external, but also an intra-Belarusian threat to his power. It also follows from Table 4 that Areopagus of heroes by the Belarusians is a common Russian-Belarusian one (it is undoubtedly completely different by the Russians; any Russian-Belarusian unity is out of question there).

Quite interesting phenomena are being observed when respondents answer direct questions about the unity (Table 5).

At first sight the data of Table 5 look quite disturbing from the point of view of the separate Belarusian nation coming-to-be supporters and rather comforting for the adherents of eastern Slavs’ blending in the united "Russian world". However, what do people mean by a triune nation, what political conclusions do they draw from its three-branch-structure?

In addition to the question whether independence was a blessing for Belarus, two more specifying questions were asked (Tables 6-7).

As it can be seen, no preponderance of the adherents of the triune nation theory is being observed in the answers, especially in the answers to the questions directly connected with the political consequences of this theory. Moreover, a fourth of those who chose the answer "three branches of the same nation" to the question of Table 5, answering the question of Table 6 noted that the Belarusians were not a part of the Russian people.

And in Table 7 the number of supporters of the one nation idea decreased more than 6 (!) times in comparison with Table 5. What does triune mean then? It may simply be ascertaining of close cultural and ethnic nearness, and by no means all supporters of this idea agree with the necessity of a political unity.

As it was shown in Table 1, for many respondents the Belarusian language is a significant element of the national identification. Only 12.7% noted that they did not at all connect the concept of Belarus with the language, and 35.9% claimed an extremely close connection between the country and the language.

How is the language represented practically in the life of the society? Answering the question "Which language do you mostly use at home?" only 3.4% named Belarusian, 36.6% mentioned the mixed one and more than a half (59.5%) – Russian.

A similar situation is also observed in the answers to the question what the official status of the languages should be (Table 8).

It is possible to look at the results of Table 8 from different points of view. On the one hand, the overwhelming majority considers that the Belarusian language should be present in the official discourse to a greater or lesser extent. At that, there are more than four times more of those who support the idea that Belarusian should be the only official language (16%) than of those who speak only Belarusian in private life. It confirms the thesis that the Belarusian language is a value for respondents, even if it is merely symbolic. They do not have to speak it, but it is important for them.

On the other hand, the Russian language also proves to be no less important and significant for the polled. The fact that the shares of supporters of only one language official use virtually coincide pays attention to itself.

Finally, it follows from Table 8 that the present state of affairs when the Belarusian language is practically absent from the official discourse is approved of by only a small number of respondents.

The data of Table 9 show how the language behavior correlates with one’s position with regard to the official use of languages.

Even among the Belarusian native speakers adherents of the official bilingualism and of compulsory use of Belarusian constitute approximately equal shares. Most of bilingualism supporters are among those who speak a mixture of the Belarusian and Russian languages. Among the Russian-speaking respondents supporters of the Russian language official use obligatoriness constitute an impressive number equaling 21.1% which is nevertheless quite far from the majority.

As it was to be expected, the more people use the Belarusian language in their everyday communication, the more they are inclined to regard it as an important nation attribute (Table 10). This dependence is typical to a much greater extent of the supporters of the official languages different variants: for the adherents of only one official language – Belarusian, the status of this language is quite high; those who would like the Russian language alone to be the official one assess the Belarusian language as a nation attribute quite low. However, the gap is not too wide. For all that the Belarusian language as a symbol retains its significance even for the supporters of the official use of Russian – every fifth person among them connects Belarusian with Belarus to a considerable degree. The following paradoxical fact should also be mentioned: a substantial number of the Belarusian-speaking respondents – almost a fourth – are not inclined to regard the language they speak as an important attribute of the nation. The reason for it might be in the following: these people owing to their age, education and social status do not think in national categories at all. Their Belarusian speech is natural, inherited from their parents and they do not attach much importance to this factor.

A different paradox occurs when respondents assess independence of the country. Preponderance of those who consider that independence is a blessing is observed in all the six groups including the group of the official use of the Russian language supporters. However, among the groups with different language practices the largest support of independence is characteristic of the Russian-speaking respondents and not of the Belarusian-speaking ones as it was to be expected.

The headline of the article by Yu. Drakohrust "Belarusian nationalism speaks Russian" published in "BDG" 12 years ago still remains relevant and adequately describes the paradoxical situation.

At the same time "political Belarusian speaking", i.e. adherence to the official status of the Belarusian language only (regardless of the language practices of those who advocate this position), gives the highest support to independence.

Attitude to the state symbols – white-red-white and red-green flags – proves to be connected with the language practices not very strongly. The ratio of different symbols supporters inside each language group is approximately the same, although among the Belarusian-speaking respondents there are slightly more than on average of supporters of the symbols which used to be the state ones in 1991-1995.

If one talks about the interrelation between the state and the society, than paternalism is peculiar to those who speak the mixed language at home to the greatest extent. Most of the "minimal state" supporters find themselves among the Russian-speaking respondents. Supporters of the Russian language as the only official one adhere to the formula of state non-interference most of all.

A similar situation is observed as far as the attitude to the head of state is concerned – Russian-speaking respondents and supporters of only the Russian language official status would like the change of power to the utmost. Belarusian-speaking respondents (50%) and supporters of only the Belarusian language official status (over 50%) to the greatest extent prefer the acting head of state to an alternative.

It is another paradox, though a socio-political one already. In spite of the fact that the Belarusian language and its state usage are ideological symbols of the opposition in its confrontation with the authorities, as regards the whole society and mass consciousness the Belarusian-speaking respondents in particular and even the “political Belarusian-speaking” ones adhere to A. Lukashenko to the greatest degree. And those citizens of Belarus who live in the Russian language context are most of all disposed to an alternative.

The voice of the opposition sounds as a voice in the wilderness in most authoritarian regimes. However, the mentioned circumstance makes the wilderness listening to the voice of the Belarusian opposition still wilder. And the voice loudness hardly compensates for the void.

Connection of the variables under consideration with the socio-demographic characteristics is extremely revealing (Table 11).

Respondents with the lowest, primary education prevail among the supporters of the official use of the Belarusian language – up to a fourth, and also among the Belarusian-speaking ones – up to a fifth. At the same time, the largest share of respondents with higher education is also among the Belarusian-speaking, and the smallest share of such people is among the supporters of the official use of the Russian language.

Connection with age is more distinct: the largest share of young people is among the Russian-speaking, the smallest – among the Belarusian-speaking. As for the share of people in their declining years, the correlation is invert here: the share is the largest among those who mostly speak Belarusian at home, and the smallest among those who speak Russian. A similar correlation is also observed between the "political Belarusian-speaking" and the "political Russian-speaking".

Finally, connection between the place of residence and the language of home communication is rather significant, too. The Russian-speaking have the obvious preponderance in the capital and in cities, among the Belarusian-speaking more than a half of respondents lives in villages.

It stands to reason, that it is an accident there were no Belarusian-speaking among the respondents residing in Minsk. However, it should be reminded that the marginal error of the research in question is 3%. In other words, zero of the Belarusian-speaking respondents in Minsk from the statistical point of view (at that with a large assumption towards the Belarusian-speaking) means that in reality there up to 3% of them, i.e. about 60 thousand. There are no researches known to us which would prove that there are much more of the Belarusian-speaking in Minsk.

Summing up we should say that although the Belarusian national identity finds itself in the making, it is not yet completed, nevertheless it is already quite stable. The importance of state independence is recognized by the impressive majority and preponderance of independence supporters remains in groups with any language practices. Attainment of independence occupies a rather significant place in the hierarchy of important events in history of the Belarusians.

At the same time, national identity is being built to a considerable extent on the basis of the Soviet experience and the Soviet past. It is not so much nostalgia for the USSR, but rather recognition of succession with the Soviet and imperial past of the Belarusian nation. These periods are considered by mass consciousness not as the time of occupation, but as the time of the Belarusian State system ripening, and the USSR and Russia are not only the stages of the Belarusians’ existence preceding the current one, these are also elements of their present-day identity, which is not reduced to these elements, though.

As for the Belarusian language significance, its symbolic role is quite high – it is an important national identifier. The majority of respondents consider the official use of both languages – Belarusian and Russian to be the best alternative.

As regards its practical usage, connection with the identity is more complicated here. Belarusian native speakers constitute a minority. Use of the Belarusian language is more characteristic of the "weak" social groups – of people in their declining years and village residents. Usage of the Belarusian language on a mass scale proves to be connected with the lesser adherence to Belarusian independence and with greater sympathy for the present head of state A. Lukashenko.

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