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GEOPILITICAL FRONTS OF BELARUS In the course of the opinion poll respondents were asked a question about their attitude to integration with Russia (Table 1). It is symbolic that when the question is asked in such a manner the number of integration opponents exceeds 50%. Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: "Some people advocate integration of Belarus with Russia, and some people are against it. Are you for or against integration of Belarus and Russia?"
The data of the following table give us some idea about the motivation of the population’s attitude towards the Belarusian-Russian rapprochement (Table 2). Table 2. Motivation of the Belarusian-Russian rapprochement, %
The first line of Table 2 shows that although the present ratio of supporters and opponents of integration may change, approximately a half of those who dispute integration now are sure that their position cannot be influenced by anything. At that, about a fourth of the adversaries of integration with Russia admit ponder ability of the argument that Belarus will have a hard time of it without access to the Russian market. It is interesting to note that this purely mercantile motive is important to the same extent for the supporters as well as for the opponents of integration. The feeling of cultural and ethnic unity proves to be the differentiating sign – it is the dominating motive for the supporters of integration with Russia, but at the same time it exerts virtually no influence upon the opponents of integration of the two countries. It proves, on the one hand, that aspiration for integration with Russia possesses a significant spiritual component, and, on the other hand, that motives of material benefit of tight relations with the eastern neighbor are not alien to the opponents of integration either. It is interesting to note that pro-European integration attitude has decreased in the course of the last quarter. The positive balance in favor of Euro-integration remains, however it has become visibly smaller than in September, 2009 (Table 3). Table 3. Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the question whether Belarus should enter the European Union were conducted in Belarus now, what would your choice be?", %
It looks paradoxical at first sight that when respondents are offered a strict choice between the East and the West, the number of Euro-integration supporters increases slightly, and of integration with Russia – quite noticeably (Table 4). Table 4. Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and entering the European Union, what would you choose?", %
In our opinion, the material motives mentioned in the commentary to Table 2 explains it: a part of adversaries of integration with Russia supposes that if Belarus chooses the European direction it might lose even the present opportunities of economic co-operation with Russia. That is why they make their choice in its favor, perhaps with a heavy heart. However, because of it the general ratio of preferences turns out to coincide up to the basis points. As far as the geopolitical choice is concerned, the society proves to be divided in half, as it has been already repeatedly mentioned before. The point is that in the West, in Europe the Belarusians also see many temptations, including material ones (Table 5). Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: "Since autumn of 2008 a certain improvement of relations between the Belarusian authorities and the European Union has been observed: high-level meetings have become more frequent, visa sanctions of the EU against the top officials have been suspended, Belarus has joined the collaboration program with the EU–Eastern partnership. What do you personally expect from it?" (more than one answer is possible)
How does the strict geopolitical choice given by the answers to the question of Table 4 correlates with the attitude to independence of the country? As it follows from the data of Table 6, perhaps the most striking is the almost complete identity of geopolitical opponents’ answers to the question about the choice between improvement of Belarus economic position and independence. At the same time, the impressive preponderance of the mercantile interests in this question causes anxiety by many people as regards firmness of Belarusian independence. However, this anxiety is not quite justified. Table 6. Connection of the choice between integration with Russia and entering the European Union with the attitude to the country’s independence, %
Answers to this question, in our opinion, reflect to a certain extent "bashful nationalism" of the Belarusians, as rhetorically it is not usually customary to place independence above material well-being. This peculiarity becomes especially apparent while comparing the answers to the question about the choice between mercantile interests and independence of the country with the answers to the question about estimating independence itself (Table 7). Table 7. Connection between the answers to the question: "What is more important–improvement of Belarus economic position or independence of the country?" and "Is it a blessing for Belarus, in your opinion, that it became an independent country in 1991?", %
As it can be seen, in reality a considerable majority among the "mercantilists" as well as among those who prefer independence consider it to be a blessing, a value. | ||||||||||
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