THE EUROPEAN BREAKTHROUGH

The data of the opinion poll held in March, 2011 registered a rather noticeable growth of pro-European attitudes and a further cooling down of the Belarusians to the prospects of integration with Russia (Table 1). Although, in comparison with the previous opinion poll held in December, 2010 the number of "Belo-Russians" did not virtually change, the share of those who do not want to integrate with Russia increased considerably – by 7 percentage points. The share turned out to be the largest for the last 10 years, and for the first time it exceeded the symbolic mark of 50%!

Table 1. Dynamics of answering the question "If a referendum on Belarus integration with Russia were held today, how would you vote?", %

Variant of answer	08'01	06'06	12'07	12'08	03'09	03'10	06'10	09'10	12'10	03'11
For integration	57.4	44.9	43.6	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.3	33.1	29.8	29.2
Against integration	20.9	28.9	31.6	38.8	43.2	44.5	48.6	45.4	46.9	53.1

Attitude of the Belarusians to the prospect of Euro-integration has changed still more strikingly during the last quarter: the share of "Euro-Belarusians" has grown by 13 percentage points – by more than a third, and at the same time the share of opponents of Euro-integration decreased by a fourth (Table 2). For the last 5 years the share of Euro-integration supporters turned out to be record high, and the share of its opponents – record low.

The situations of March, 2011 and June, 2006 when also three months passed since the previous presidential elections are mirror opposite – the corresponding shares have switched their places. Answers to the dichotomic question where respondents were offered to make a choice between Russia and Europe also serve as a confirmation of the mentioned tendencies (Table 3).

In the answers to this question, too, the share of Euro-integration supporters is record high, the share of adherents of integration with Russia is record low, and the picture is mirror-like relative to June, 2006.

The causes for this steep geopolitical turn of the public opinion are not quite clear. As for the eastern "front", lately a lull has been reigning there – they do not show "Godfathers" from there anymore, trade wars have remained in the past (or are expected in future); a small bickering in January concerning oil was incomparable in its scale and information resonance either with the last year’s gas war or with the oil battles.

At the same time, it is hot at the western "front" more than ever now. Growth of pro-European attitudes has occurred since 2008 against the background of normalization of relations between official Minsk and Brussels and a decrease in the intensity degree of the anti-Western (at least, anti-EU) campaign of the official Belarusian mass media. Today there is again a "cold" war between Belarus and the EU; visa sanctions have been imposed on many representatives of the Belarusian official establishment… Nevertheless, pro-European attitudes continue to grow at an impressive pace.

An explanation lying on the surface consists in the following: the Belarusians had not supported the incumbent authorities at the elections and that is why the West which had not recognized the elections received in their eyes additional sympathy; and they cooled off Russia because it had recognized the elections, though through clenched teeth.

An answer to the question, whom the Belarusians supported at the elections, you can find in the corresponding analytical materials of the IISEPS. However, there are indicators which directly relate to the problem under consideration (Tables 4-5).

We should not wittingly rule out that questions of Tables 4-5 may have seemed too sharp to some respondents, and although at heart they shared the plans and actions of the West, they preferred to avoid expressing solidarity with those actions.

However, an attempt to explain by fear the poll results which do not correspond to somebody’s ideas about the Belarusian society is underproductive. If we proceed from this explanation, then it follows from the data of Table 4 that in April, 2006 the fear was much stronger, than it is now – at that time more than a half of respondents estimated the sanctions negatively. Now there are only about 38% of such people. Meanwhile the cruelty of persecution of "Square-2010" participants is incommensurately stronger, than the one concerning participants of "Square-2006". Therefore, the role of the respondents’ fear when they answer the questions seems exaggerated.

The fact that the share of those who approve of sanctions has remained virtually the same draws attention to itself.

The data of Tables 4-5 do not at least let us assert that exactly the tough response of the West to the elections results and to the wave of political repressions attracted additional sympathy of the Belarusians to it.

However, accusations of the West of a conspiracy against Belarus which have been heard from the BT screen, as well as from the most important rostrums during the last months are shared not at all by the majority (Table 6).

Here, as we can see, the fear did not prevent more than a half of respondents from rejecting one of the most beloved topics of the official mass media. Thus, the Belarusians are not inclined to ascribe to the West certain ominous intentions (what fully harmonizes with the high level of pro-European aspirations). At the same time we cannot speak about a rather broad support of the West current policy in the Belarusian society. It seems that pro-European attitudes are determined not only by the assessments of this policy.

Let us also mention that in comparison with the previous election campaign distribution of answers to the question, whether Belarus is ever going to become a member of the EU, changed only slightly (Table 7).

As for Russia, although many people announce their reluctance to unite with it, i.e. their reluctance to deepen integration, they support maintenance of many currently operating forms of integration (Table 8).

It should be mentioned, however, that in the poll of December, 2010 30.9% of respondents when answering the general question about their attitude to the currently existing forms of integration with Russia declared for making it even closer, and 39.6% – for preservation of the present level of integration ties.

In today’s poll when answering the question about the attitude to concrete, directly named forms of integration, respondents have demonstrated an appreciably lower enthusiasm. The matter may concern a change in the wording of the question, or some cooling off of the attitude to Russia which occurred during the last quarter.

At the same time, assessment of the Russian policy remains rather positive. It has been mentioned above, how fundamentally the attitude of the Belarusians to the prospect of integration with the RF changed in comparison with June, 2006. However, the assessment of the role of Russia in the world did not virtually change (Table 9).

Attitude to the policy of the USA has changed considerably–to the opposite one, and to Russia–has not. However, the share of those who considered the role of the latter in the world more likely negative has grown by 6 points, but the number of positive answers exceeds the number of the negative ones more than four times.

A rather positive attitude to the president of Russia also remains (Table 10).

In comparison with 2006 A. Lukashenko has lost a lot in the eyes of the Belarusians; B. Obama, as opposed to his predecessor, has managed to win their sympathy. On the other hand, attitude to the Russian leader, in spite of the change of individuals and a fundamental change in the attitude to integration with the eastern neighbor, has not altered much. At that, 5 years ago the attitude to the Russian president was better than to the home leader, and it still remains this way.

A decrease in integration aspirations in the eastern direction coupled with the remaining high assessments of Russia as such, looks as a paradox indeed only within the framework of a certain paradigm which has been predominating in the Belarusian policy for a long time. It seems now, however, that it is becoming to a considerable degree a part of history.

Before sympathy for Russia and aspiration for integration with it used to be almost political synonyms. The attitude to the eastern neighbor was measured by the degree of readiness to merge with it in various spheres, including political one. We cannot say that these notions and ideas have become completely "perpendicular", but it is obvious that they have noticeably drifted apart during the last years. It happened mainly owing to a group of respondents which had become rather significant. They preferred Russia – a nice country, much better than Belarus in many respects and a wonderful neighbor – to remain such a wonderful neighbor.

Connection of the geopolitical choice with socio-demographic and political characteristics of respondents is presented in Table 11.

The data of Table 11 let us offer some explanation of the considerable leap in the pro-European attitudes which has been observed for the last quarter. As it can be seen, the vector of the geo-political choice quite strongly depends on the assessments of the financial standing and economic prospects of Belarus: positive assessments of these characteristics tilt the balance in favor of Russia, negative – of Europe. It is peculiar not only to the current opinion poll, but also to the previous ones; it is a structural characteristic of the public conscience which changes more slowly than the assessments of the domestic daily life as such.

And for the last quarter the assessments have quite visibly moved to the negative side. In December when answering the question: "How has your financial standing changed for the last three months?" 24.9% of respondents had given the answer "it has improved", and 16% – "it has become worse"; in March of the current year the ratio of assessments changed to the opposite one – 17.2% vs. 26.9%. Three months ago the ratio of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts concerning the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?" made up 30.6% vs. 17.2%, in March of the current year – 29.2% vs. 23%.

These shifts in the way people feel socially at least partly explain the "European breakthrough" of the last quarter. The matter here concerns not only an increase in negative assessments and expectations, but also the nature of their connection with the geopolitical choice. For instance, two years ago in March, 2009 at the height of the crisis negative assessments of the financial standing, as well as of prospects, simply went beyond the limit which did not lead, however, to any visible change in the ratio of the shares of "Belo-Russians" and "Euro-Belarusians". Today a considerably smaller worsening of assessments ensured, at least in part, such a change.

Another peculiarity of the data of Table 11 – a rather close connection between the geopolitical choice and assessment of the ability of Belarus to withstand the "steel shower" of European prices for the Russian gas – can serve as an additional explanation. In comparison with the post-election situation of five years ago anxiety in this connection has appreciably grown (Table 12).

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