INTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA AS A MEANS OF POWER RETENTION

Two out of three Belarusians presently think that Russia’s policy towards Belarus is positive. Only 14.4% – every seventh – estimate it as negative. The first group incorporates more supporters of Russia-Belarus close integration than the second one. Remarkably, the second group has approximately equal number of A. Lukashenko’s supporters and opponents. Is this possible? Quite possible, as one can see.

We should like to start with the trends on basic indicators of Russia-Belarus integration processes. As the Table 1 shows, there’s certain decline of interest to accession into the EU observed among Belarusians over lately. Although this interest slightly rose from December of 2005, it dropped down by nearly a quarter (by 23.6%) for the past three years.

At the same time, the number of supporters of integration with Russia is obviously going up: their part has increased by almost nine points over the three years and exceeded a half of population (56.5%). Asked an alternative question, two out of three respondents choose integration with Russia and one – accession to the EU. Three years ago this ratio was different – 1.3:1.

We receive fairly different results when respondents don’t need to choose between the direction of the integration (East or West). According to Table 2, there is a considerable decline of interest to integration with Russia (from 53.8% to 44.9%) over the past three years. Also, the number of those who stand against it has increased (from 26.3% to 28.9%).

This difference in data in Tables 1 and 2 can be explained, in particular, by intense brainwashing carried by the Belarusian authorities over lately in what regards the attitude of the united Europe to Belarus. As a result, when asked an alternative question – Europe or Russia – many choose the second. In addition, this is more customary and seems more natural taking into account the ‘Slav fraternity’, Orthodoxy and the events of the latest World War.

However, brainwashing of the population didn’t confine with the problems of integration only. The official propaganda went forth. This is the traditional comprehension about the situation in the Russian society which has been questioned already. As one can see from Table 3, constant promotion of “strong and prosperous” Belarus steadily takes the electorate to the appropriate perception of reality: the number of those who think that people live better in Belarus than in Russia has increased by a quarter over the past three years (from 35.1% to 44.6%). At the same time, the number of those who think in the opposite has decreased almost fourfold (from 44% to 12%). This process went especially fast, as Table 3 shows, starting from Russia-Belarus gas conflict which occurred in spring of 2004 and after which the state-run mass media launched laterally an informational war against Russia.

That war brought up its fruit. On the one hand, the authorities keep saying about necessity of further integration with Russia, its economic efficiency, its benefit for the population, etc. Various integration bodies carry out an active work and some paid adepts of integration like P. Borodin regularly announce new terms of adopting the so-called Union State’s Constitution. On the other hand, state-run mass media and A. Lukashenko personally as well regularly let out rather rude remarks against the Russian authorities. As a result, we observe certain duality in mass thinking in what concerns integration with Russia, and the convinced supporters can’t overcome it even with their reckless faith in A. Lukashenko.

Yet, this duality of mass thinking can take (and it IS already taking!) to quite a different result which the propaganda didn’t plan. With anti-Russia propaganda state-paid ideologists opened a can of worms and didn’t even notice that they took the standpoint of their main political opponents generally presented by the nationalist wing headed by Z. Poznyak. Some time earlier the Belarusian authorities abused him in all possible ways! He was a nationalist, a fascist, a Russophobe, a policeman serving the Germans...

Nowadays, from the ideological viewpoint, they are almost inseparable! The authorities might as well publicly recognize the services of Z. Poznyak in exposure of Russian imperialism and persuade him come back to the homeland into the position of Foreign Minister as a compensation for moral damage.

Now, what about the people? As usual, it keeps silent. However, this silence is very eloquent as data in Tables 4 and 5 show.

Thus, for six months Belarusian society has become 1.5-fold more suspicious about the Russian authorities: two thirds of Belarusians presently hold (the majority perhaps still unaware of this) with Z. Poznyak. This suspicion has increased against the Russian population as well, yet judging by the values most of the Belarusians do understand that little depends on common people.

Furthermore, support of the Union State Constitution has dropped down also. This is a true catastrophe for P. Borodin!

What will happen to integration? Have the Belarusian authorities decided to follow their common sense and close up the project, after all? Will they stop tormenting the Belarusians with possible dissolution of the state?

Hardly this is the case. To tell the truth, the Belarusian Cabinet headed by A. Lukashenko doesn’t need Belarus. They need the power in its original meaning. It doesn’t matter in which country. It happened so that they don’t have any other. In fact, is what they are doing from this country for 12 years already a true Belarus – something eclectic, irrational, Orthodox and atheist at one time but… very well directed. They use everything that can strengthen the power – Soviet flag and the Russian language and “a glass of vodka together with cracklings” and struggle against corruptibility and bureaucrats and espionage in Drozdy and plotters along with dead rats, etc. Integration with Russia takes its appropriate place in this list.

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