GREAT THINGS ARE SEEN AT A DISTANCE

“Social facts” (a term by Emile Durkheim) which have been revealed by IISEPS during almost 16 years enable us to come to certain generalizations, a part of which turns out to be quite unexpected.

1. Two alarm signals

May opinion poll has brought a whole series of unexpected results. In particular, the trust index of state institutions has decreased, and the index of their non-governmental “rivals” on the contrary has increased in comparison with November of the previous year. Such dynamics is not accidental. Sooner or later one has to pay back for everything in his life including concealment of information. Oil and gas conflict, the peak of which had fallen on the beginning of the year, revealed the inability of the authorities to carry on a dialogue with their own society under the conditions of a crisis. It is one thing to report triumphantly about success “of the Belarusian economic model”; and it is quite another matter to analyze publicly statements of A. Miller, head of the Russian “Gazprom”, about the forthcoming rise in gas prices and its possible consequences. Let us turn to Tables 1-2.

Trust in literally all state institutions has decreased. The leading group of three includes law-courts, the National Assembly and president. The army has got the minimal changes, which is quite natural. Army is an ancient institution. The level of trust in it in Belarus does not depend on the swings of attitudes generated by the current events. On the other hand, dynamics of public institutions trust indices turned out to be the opposite. Their trust indices have increased, and first of all it concerns the independent mass media. The only exceptions are opposition political parties. Analysis of the given anomaly will be given later, and at the moment let us simply mark it as the first alarm signal.

There is no doubt that the results of polls should be treated cautiously. For instance, what can the majority of the polled know about the work of independent research centers? Regardless of the fact, their trust index has noticeably increased. Most likely, respondents reacted to the word “independent”. However, it is the main result! It is the essence of the tendency revealed during the conducting of May opinion poll. Everything independent, non-governmental went up in price in citizens’ opinion, and everything state devaluated. To confirm the mentioned conclusion, let us refer to Table 3 in which trust indices of the church and of trade unions and political parties controlled by the authorities are brought together.

Trust indices of the church have changed slightly; the same however cannot be said about the indices of political parties, which support the current authorities. In this case the word “authorities” has played the part of a red rag for a bull. When confidence in the authorities increases (in Belarus “authorities” and “president” are synonyms) simultaneously confidence in all authoritative institutions increases as well. The reverse conclusion is correct, too.

In light of the registered tendencies state officials should thoroughly think over their words in order not to find themselves in the shoes of the head of the main ideological office of the presidential Administration, O. Proleskovsky, who in his interview to BELTA not long ago stated literally the following: “What shall they (independent trade unions- the author) occupy themselves with? They shall occupy themselves with protection of working-people. Instead of it they were openly striving for our country to be deprived of the EU trade preferences. That is to say, they were acting exactly against the interests of working-people, against those whom they are supposed to protect. After that they are surprised that the rate of their support in Belarus is swiftly approaching zero.” As it can be seen in Tables 2-3, everything is going on quite the contrary in real life. What can be said here? One should act more often on the basis of everyday traditions. It might be useful.

Let us get back to the matter of alarm signals. The first one has been already mentioned. Let us pass on to the next one. Following the results of January poll analytical material “Knowledge as a Factor of Politics” was published on the IISEPS site (www.iiceps.org). In the material in question all respondents were divided into three groups based on their knowledge of the results of oil and gas agreements between Belarus and Russia. The groups were labeled “The Know-Alls” (those who had marked three correct answers), “The Half-Know-Alls” (those who had marked 1-2 correct answers), and accordingly “The Know-Nothings”. The first group turned out to be rather few in number-1% of the respondents, the second one-53.9% and the third one-45.2%. Data of Table 4 let us to reveal the connection between the extent of cognitive involvement of respondents into political processes and the level of confidence in opposition political parties (the term “cognition” here means the ability to perceive and to process information). This turned out to be an inverse connection. As it is known, leaders of opposition parties are constantly speaking about the need in breach of the information blockade. However, the results of the poll listed in Table 4 are alarming, as breach of the blockade may lead to inverse results.

Connection of the respondents’ level of knowledge with the degree of their opposition attitude did not bring anything unexpected (see Table 5). In Belarus the ability to really understand political and economic processes has never gone with love to the authoritarian regime. Why does not this kind of dislike in its turn generate love for opposition parties? Before answering this question let us analyze some essential, in my opinion, trends for the last seven years.

2. “There are many factors in the steppe”

A quotation from Andrey Platonov is used as another subheading. If an attentive observer can discover “many factors” in the bare steppe, what can be said than about the Belarussian society, in which outward factors operate besides internal factors generated by life of its 10 million citizens? Dynamics of trust in four institutions is shown in Tables 6-9. They have been chosen on purpose. Each of them is “independent” to some extent, and besides they possess their antipodes: president-opposition political parties, state mass media-non-governmental mass media.

The tables are made up quite “tightly”. Figures are dancing before our eyes. At first glance this dazzle does not allow us to reveal the inner dynamics of each table, not to mention a possibility of a contrastive analysis. That is why let us begin with the most evident change. Attention should be paid to the line “DA/NA” in each table. One might think what conclusion can be drawn analyzing the number of those who found it difficult to answer, let alone those who refused to answer at all? However, let us not hurry and look closely at the outermost columns.

If we judge by the value of the outermost lines “DA/NA”, an impression is created that in Belarus at the least a cultural revolution has taken place for the last seven years: the number of those who found it difficult to answer has decreased manifold. This is the first and the most important conclusion. It is important not in the view of the attitude to the institutions in questions, but rather in respect to transformation of the Belarusian society. Contrary to the official statements about consolidation of the society (around the president, of course), in reality further deepening of the disunity is taking place. The authorities, undoubtedly, know about it. From this follows the strengthening of propagandistic rhetoric, and beyond the clouds figures of the Central Election Commission. If the overwhelming majority votes for A. Lukashenko, than who is against? According to the official doctrine, there are no such people at all. People are united, hence there is no place for politics, as politics is a process of co-ordination of interests.

Today, literally before our very eyes, an official party of the authorities is being borne (civil society organization (CSO) “Belaya Rus”). Why it has become necessary for A. Lukashenko, is not so easy to comprehend. He exercises his authoritative powers through bureaucracy (presidential “vertical line”), and support of a party might only undermine the existing image of a “nation-widely elected”. It will not be possible to use it as a “personnel farriery” by the example of the C.P.S.U. (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The mechanism of “sorting out people” (the term of Ivan the Terrible) has long been monopolized by the “vertical line” itself. By implication the mentioned suppositions are confirmed by the fact of A. Lukashenko’s avoiding the process of establishing the party. The following fact should also be mentioned- “Belaya Rus” is not being established as a party, but as a civil society organization, and that does not exclude a possibility of its transformation into a party at a certain stage.

It is possible that the reason is in the intensification of disunity. An explanation is required here. Communists at their time were building a conflict-free society. Any roughness was written off to the “remnants of the past”. The soviet system itself was not officially able to create conflicts. Such a view did not exclude a need for internal troops and other structures, but there were no public institutions in the country aimed at settling of conflicts. There was no proper experience in conflict settling either. At the time of “perestrojka” all this became quite apparent.

All the years A. Lukashenko has been building “the Belarusian model” by the Soviet example. That is why he had to simply ignore 25-30% of the economically most active population. It could not last endlessly, and it is not improbable that he decided to use the experience of Russia. There they understood the lack of prospects for the conflict-free model during the fist year of B. Yeltsin’s presidency. Although the latter aspired to full authority, he never positioned himself in the role of a single mouthpiece for people’s expectations, and which is not less important- a mouthpiece for all elite groups. Numerous kinds of pro-governmental parties served the purpose. The first experiments failed, but “Yedinaya Rossia” (“United Russia”) was a success. Putin’s rate drew it out. Perhaps, it was too great a success, and to restrict the ambitions of the members of “Yedinaya Rossia” they had to create its competitor in the person of “Spravedlivaya Rossia” (“Fair Russia”).

To some extent my thought is confirmed by a statement of an activist of the incipient CSO, Senator N. Cherginets: “If we create a movement, in which representatives of all sections of the population, age groups, professions will take part, it means we will unite in order to solve the main tasks- increase of people’s well-being, assertion of the Republic of Belarus sovereignty… As a politician, I noticed long ago that in some countries where such movements are supported by the authorities, there is more order, and people are more willing to work together…”, (quoted from the article “Nostalgia” published in the newspaper “Belorusy i Rynok” N25, 09.07.2007). If we attribute Russia to “some countries”, than it would be appropriate to cite Russian political scientist and historian Y. Pivovarov, who explains the need of authorities for a party of their own by the fact that “a significant part of the Russian people has exceeded the bounds of the social space and has turned into asocial elements. They remain outside justice, public control, officially (not necessarily-actually) existing standards, taboos, etc.” (See Y. Pivovarov “Russian Power and Public Politics”).

Another explanation is possible, too. Nature of the political regime, which was formed in Belarus, does not permit competition, first of all on the part of sub-authoritative groupings that are being formed at the moment. History is able to suggest a universal formula for neutralizing groups which “go too far”. It is creation of outboard structures: oprichniks of Ivan the Terrible, guardsmen of Peter the Great, Stalin’s nomenclature, with the help of which he avenged himself on “Lenin’s Guards”, Mao’s Red Guard, etc.

There exists a more “materially-minded” explanation. Thus, in a private conversation political scientist V. Karbalevich connected the rise of the CSO with the forthcoming parliamentary election. The regime needs benevolence of the West, and in his opinion “Belaya Rus” is a project for an external consumer. The CSO “Belaya Rus” is going to take upon itself a part of administrative functions of the “vertical” members in the course of elections, thereby licking them into westernized shape, if not in content than in form. Chairman of the Central Election Committee L. Ermoshina also confirmed the opinion in question having expressed an assumption (interview to BelaPAN), that the CSO would play an important part during the next parliamentary election.

However, let us return to the analysis of the answer “DA/NA”. It turns out that its share was decreasing unevenly. In the interval between Aprils of 2001 and 2002 a sudden change took place. What is it connected with? In my point of view it is connected with presidential election. Unlike the first one which was democratic enough, the second one had a completely different script. The authoritarian regime which had grown stronger by that time was not ceremonious any longer. The society turned out to be raped in the literal and figurative sense of the word, which was perceived particularly painfully against the background of economic problems (it is enough to remind of regular delays of salary payments). It did not lead to mass protests, though. Yet the fact of losing political “virginity” was engraved in public consciousness, and the share of those who found it difficult to answer the questions did not return to the same level.

As a result, the disunity which had existed before the election deepened drastically. Attention should be paid to the fact that the votes of those who found it difficult to answer (see Tables 6-8) are almost equally distributed between those who trust and those who distrust. That is why the trust rate of opposition parties has doubled, and simultaneously the number of their opponents has grown! A. Lukashenko, on the other hand, evidently turned out to be a pure loser. Symmetrical redistribution of votes did not take place, and although his trust rate did not virtually change, the distrust rate added 12.9 pct.

Tables 6-9 let us demonstrate not only the reaction of public opinion to one-time events (crises in Belarusian-Russian relations, which we are going to discuss later), but medium-term economic tendencies as well. For instance, the upgrowth of take-home pay which had been taking place in the last years significantly raised the trust rate of A. Lukashenko. The upgrowth occurred first of all owing to the reduction of the number of those who found it difficult to answer. Since March, 2003 A. Lukashenko’s trust index has become positive. In November of the previous year its absolute maximum was recorded. Naturally, the same reason brought to the drop of opposition parties trust index.

Time interval used while making up Tables 6-9 enables us to compare the reaction of the public opinion to the second and the third presidential election, and also to compare two crises in Belarusian-Russian relations. In order to examine the details more elaborately, let us increase the “scale” of A. Lukashenko’s trust rate and add extra columns for the purpose (see Table 10).

In the second column the data received in a month after the election are mentioned. The trust index turned out to be lower in April than in February and in June. Logic of mobilization required the opposite, but the rape effect became apparent again. Its amplitude cannot be compared with the one observed after the election of 2001. Firstly, adaptation took place, and there were already no illusions in the society concerning fairness of election. Secondly, steady economic growth made its presence felt. November peak of the trust index has an additional reason: pensions were raised for the second time during the year (the first time was in May).

Reaction of the society to energy crises, on the other hand, differs not only in its amplitude, but in the sign as well. February gas tripping in 2004 was obviously perceived by the majority of Belarusians as an act of aggression on the part of Russia. That is why trust in opposition parties and non-governmental mass media caught in non-patriotism noticeably declined. The crisis at the beginning of the current year was perceived by the citizens first of all as a threat to their personal well-being. It turned out that many Belarusians had something to lose after the stage of economic growth. Hence follows December panic of depositors. Concern over one’s welfare standards for its turn provoked increased interest in information. State mass media were not able to satisfy that interest; as a result citizens turned to non-governmental ones. The short-term character of the effect of February, 2004 crisis should be underscored, too. Thanks to it, opposition parties as well as non-governmental mass media quickly returned their pre-crisis level of trust. On the other hand, January conflicts did not become just an episode in Belarusian-Russian relations. They have launched a process which is going to determine the “lot” of the four institutions singled out by us in the coming years.

3. The art of “creating struggle in Curia”

Low trust rates of political parties are not a national peculiarity of Belarus. That’s worldwide practice. For instance, in Western Germany only 13.5% of citizens trusted in political parties in 1999; and in Eastern Germany still fewer-9.8%. The trust rate of parties rarely exceeds 20% in European countries. Russia presents an interesting example in this respect: in 1990 42.2% of Russians trusted in parties, ten years later there were only 16.8%. This trend visually illustrates transition from revolutionary chaos to post-revolutionary stability (see World Values surveys).

However, let us get down to business. Let us transfer from party problems of Germany and Russia to the alarm signals which have sounded for Belarusian opposition parties in May. Why has it become possible? The answer is lying on the surface. A fleeting glance from the outside will suffice to discover obsession of opposition parties with predominantly organizational problems of their own.

For example, here is the latest information published on the site “A Belarusian Partisan” on July, 16 with a quite typical heading “Opposition signs a new agreement”. Let us choose any paragraph: “Until September, 15 2007 the committee of headquarters chiefs shall make up a combined list of candidates. Until January, 1 2008 the political council of the United Democratic Forces (the UDF) shall confirm the list of common candidates under the agreement with regional coalitions. The UDF shall determine priority districts taking into account the following criteria: results of the previous elections; positive publicity of a candidate; sociological surveys, not later than January, 15 2008”.

I suppose, it is not easy for a person alarmed by what is going on in Belarus to read this till the end. The parties spent almost the whole first half of the year on preparation for the congress. At that problems of the society were left aside. As a proof let me quote an article by political scientist V. Rovdo “In search of the lost sense” (“Nashe mneniye” (“Our opinion”) 20.06.2007): “The common candidate lost at the regional meetings in respect of the main question: in defining the nature of governing bodies of the democratic coalition.” If such a question under the conditions of an oncoming system crisis in the country turned out to be the main one, than the art “to act on the basis of everyday traditions” which A. Lukashenko can manage so masterly, remained unclaimed by his opponents. It is not necessary to possess Nostradamus’ talent to predict the kind of information which is to be generated in the heart of the UDF next year. Elections are ahead, i.e. a virtually endless possibility for agreements of every sort and kind.

However, a certain distance lies between fixation of the fact and understanding of its nature. Let us try to pass over it with the help of Pierre Bourdieu (see P. Bourdieu. Sociology of politics. – Socie-Logos, M, 1993). According to the classic of sociology, there is nothing unusual in obsession of parties (party staff) with their internal problems. A political field, by P. Bourdieu, is a place where only professional politicians meet: “The most obvious consequence of this peculiarity of the political field is in a sense esoteric culture (assigned exclusively for the consecrated – the author), which consists of problems completely alien to or beyond comprehension of the majority; of concepts and statements that bare no relation to the experience of ordinary citizens”. The inaccessibility of the political field for the majority “is determined by the complexity of relations which constitute the political field rather than by the complexity of a language: this artificial creation of the struggle in Curia seems not so much incomprehensible as devoid of vital sense for those who not being included into the game do not see any interest in it”.

Thus, politics is a struggle inside a political field in which professionals take part. This is what we are observing. All the others (a society) are inside a social field, but there is (there must be) a connection between these fields, as success of the struggle in a political field is determined by “political capital” of a politician, that is directly connected with his ability to mobilize “the aboriginals” of a social field.

Sad as it might be to admit, political struggle is a struggle for personal interests of politicians. Our only chance lies in the following: this struggle is carried out (must be carried out) “by means of competition for the uninitiated, better to say for the exclusive domain of the right to speak and to act on behalf of a part of the uninitiated or on behalf of their aggregate”.

Now is just the time to transfer from the French (or any other western) political field to the native one. To do it is not so easy because of absence of such a field in Belarus. Authoritarian regime has no need in a political field. It is authoritarian because it replaces political methods of government by administrative ones. There is a well-known statement by A. Lukashenko regarding the above mentioned: “There is only one politician in Belarus! It’s me!” (Selector conference 27.07.2000). However A.G. obviously passed his desire off as reality. An only politician is something akin to an only footballer.

Having “trampled down” the political field, A. Lukashenko turned out to be powerless to repeat his feat on the social field. The latter, as it has been already mentioned at the beginning of the article, is divided and, thanks to the efforts of head of state, the disunity is constantly increasing which is especially visible in the course of election mobilization campaigns.

Polarization of a society is an indispensable result of any mobilization actions. Thus, beginning a regularly scheduled election campaign, A. Lukashenko not only mobilizes his potential supporters, but in spite of himself, his opponents. Hence it is not accidental that elections are a serious test for modern authoritarian regimes.

Polarization which might seem extremely favorable for opposition parties has a negative side effect for them. It gives rise to an illusion that opposition actually influences electorate. In reality under the conditions of disunity people vote not so much for opposition candidate (candidates), as against the current authorities.

Let us recall that political capital of a politician is determined by his mobilization potential. That is why there is no politics in pure form in the West. P. Bourdieu constantly underscores: “Outcome of the internal struggle depends on the forces which agents and institutions involved can mobilize outside the field”. In Belarus, however, this kind of politics is quite possible. If there is no full value political field, that does not prevent creating a subfield. Competitive struggle for electorate does not appear because of the fact. Creation of a coalition came in rather handy. Instead of the principle “I am the only politician!” emerged its complete analogue “We are the only politicians!” Nothing can hinder now from utter withdrawing into internal (organizational) problems.

The State machinery has won. The State machinery dos not need ideas. Knowledge of society and its laws is not required for a successful struggle in Curia. In this case everything is determined by an ability to mobilize a small group of party activists on the threshold of a portfolio distribution at hand, rather than an ability to mobilize the society. The best redistribution is a complete absence of any redistribution; in short, it is stability, only its side view.

They do not read P. Bourdieu in the social field. They do not read him in the subfield of the Belarusian politics either, though. However, that does not prevent public opinion from reacting to the current events and from estimating state and public institutions. Judging by dynamics of trust indices professional politicians have once again moved away from the struggle for “the exclusive domain of legitimate expression of the truth about the social world”. They did not use the chance which oil and gas conflict had given them. After all, Belarusians needed the truth as never before during the last years, and they found it at professional journalists and non-governmental mass media.

Back   Top