FRESH NEWS FROM INFORMATION BATTLEFIELDS

One of the pillars that now support the current power is tight control over the information available to the Belarusian citizens. Therefore, common media space of Russia and Belarus as well as superiority of Russian mass media in quality and quantity, especially electronic ones, remained for a long time an implicit threat for A. Lukashenko. The situation sharply changed 2.5-3 years ago. The president experienced all the power of Russian mass media after the first gas conflict with Russia (autumn of 2002) and immediately started squeezing them out – first of all, news and analytical programs – from the Belarusian media space. The authorities could see the first results of that “cleaning” last winter when they won the information war on gas cut-off undertaken by Gazprom, Russia's natural gas monopoly. Analyzing respondents’ reaction to coverage of the gas row, we have found out the following: most polled blamed Russia of the conflict, agreed with A. Lukashenko that gas cut-off was “act of terrorism at the top level” and said that the Belarusian media were the most unbiased in their coverage of the conflict. Since then, possibility of Russian electronic mass media to influence on the situation in Belarus has been progressively cut. Nowadays, an alternative to the official opinion on crucial social and political issues can be heard only on RTR and NTV channels the audience of which has greatly reduced over lately. (See Table 1).

The Belarusians still have entertainment programs of the First Channel given under ONT brand. As regards political programs, viewers are offered the programs like Our News, Special Opinion, Expert and other species of national propaganda. Taking into account lack of interest to the Belarusian problems from the part of Russian press, it is no wonder that most of the population draw information about events in the country from the Belarusian state-run media that obviously dominate over independent and Russian media. (See Table 2).

Due to a number of reasons (no foreign correspondent offices of Belarusian media, lack of experts and non-covering of any foreign issues), Russian mass media yield insignificantly to the Belarusian state-run media in their supply of information about Western countries. Yet, it will apparently very soon be as well provided by the Belarusian media and in the same clue as the information about Belarus.

Let’s now look how the sources of information influence attitude of the Belarusians to various socio-economic problems. (See Table 3).

They have a very transparent relationship: audience of the state-run mass media supports the current political and socio-economic course in general, expects improvement of the situation in the country and lays its hopes on the current president whom it supported at the presidential election of 2001, referendum of 2004 and in whose victory in 2006 election it believes.

Respondents who prefer other sources of information are much more skeptical about the situation in the country and the current head of state. This skepticism increases from Russian to Belarusian non-state and Western media. If we compare the answers of those who get information from state-run media and from Western media, their estimates are so strikingly different that it seems those people live in different worlds that never overlap. Conspicuous numeral superiority of those who learn about life in the country and abroad from Our News TV program and Sovetskaya Belorussia (newspaper Soviet Byelorussia) rather than from BDG (Belarusian Democratic Newspaper) and BBC is a grave problem that will block up any changes in Belarus if not eliminated.

It is no wonder that, as a rule, the size of audience indicates people’s acknowledgement of the informational product. So far, there are no grounds for optimism in this field: over 60% of respondents trust state-run mass media that also have positive dynamics of the index of trust. (See Tables 4 and 5).

Clearly, we might criticize low professional level of the state-run mass media, their political engagement, narrow ideological focus, etc. This is true but the majority of readers and viewers see this issue differently.

Now, what is the reason of such a negative reaction, especially since in late 80-ies – mid-90-ies we witnessed violent progress of non-state mass media, both in quality and in quantity? First, the conditions under which state-run and non-state media work for ten years already are incredibly far from what is called honest competition. The Belarusian authorities have been taking independent media as their major political opponent and treating them properly. Over the past year, some 30 non-state newspapers have been closed. Second, while with one hand suppressing independent press, with the other hand the authorities have been inducing in the society the idea that there is nothing and no one would need anything but Narodnaya Gazeta (People’s Newspaper), Radiofact, Panorama, etc.

Obviously, independent Belarusian press is able to develop only when citizens feel its necessity and claim their wish to get unfiltered information. Nowadays, people have such a desire and there is public demand: 57.1% of respondents said that they want to receive independent radio and TV programs in the Belarusian and Russian languages from neighboring countries (Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia) and only one third of respondents answered this question in the negative.

Back   Top