GEOPOLITICAL COORDINATES OF BELARUS

Results of the December opinion poll testify to the fact that no considerable changes have occurred in the geopolitical preferences of the Belarusians for the last three months. In particular, although the record low index of pro-European attitudes registered in September of the previous year has somewhat increased (however, the change is within the bounds of the sampling error), the number of Euro-integration opponents as before exceeds the number of its supporters (Table 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the question whether Belarus should enter the European Union were being conducted now in Belarus, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'02	03'03	12'05	11'06	12'07	03'08	09'08	12'08
For	60.9	56.4	32.0	36.0	37.1	35.4	26.7	30.1
Against	10.9	11.9	26.8	36.2	35.0	35.4	51.9	40.6
I would not vote	10.0	14.2	20.4	15.5	16.3	15.4	12.2	17.8
DA/NA	18.2	17.5	20.8	12.3	11.6	13.8	9.2	11.5

The data of Table 1 are especially surprising, because for the three months which passed since the previous opinion poll a visible warming of relations has occurred between the official Minsk and the EU. In October visa sanctions of the EU regarding the majority of the Belarusian officials were suspended, contacts of Belarus with Europe recommenced on a rather high official level, Belarusian state mass media stopped criticizing European policy and European observances. However, exactly when the Belarusian authorities decided to establish relations with Europe, the Belarusian society was by no means burning with Euro-enthusiasm. On the other hand, reduction in the number of Euro-integration adversaries (more than by 10 percentage points) became perhaps one of the results of political warming in relations with the EU.

The dynamics of the Belarusians’ attitude to the integration with the East and with the West does not always correspond to standard theoretical schemes: it happened more than once in the past that a decrease or an increase in aspiration for integration with Europe or Russia was not accompanied by the change in the level of integration attitudes concerning the second geopolitical "magnet" of Belarus. Integration attitudes even happened to drop and rise simultaneously. In December of the previous year in comparison with September a certain growth of pro-European attitudes went with reduction in the number of integration with Russia adherents (Table 2).

The September splash of pro-Russian attitudes gave place to the situation when the number of opponents of integration with Russia, as well as the number of supporters of Belarus entering the EU, exceeds the number of the corresponding integration project adversaries.

Dynamics of answering the question in which the geopolitical choice is represented in the form of a strict dichotomy also serve as confirmation of changes, which have happened for three months (Table 3).

It must be noted that in questions of Tables 1-3 the matter did not simply concern collaboration, but some forms of merger. When a question was asked merely about collaboration, preponderance of Russia proved to be more obvious (Table 4).

Change in the attitude to the USA and new friends of Minsk official bodies – Iran, Venezuela and others – draws attention to itself in Table 4. In 2007 the Belarusian authorities tried to compensate for losses connected with changing of the Kremlin energy policy with the help of collaborating with new suppliers of resources, such as Teheran and Caracas. Even at that time, the population had not actually believed that those geopolitical adventures could have solved the problems of the country; however, by December of 2008 (in comparison with May of 2007) the hopes reduced almost twofold. Accordingly, hopes pinned on the United States grew almost two times. It can be assumed that the last change is also an indirect result of Belarus relations improvement with Europe. However, Russia now as before remains the leader of the preferred collaboration.

Answers to the question about concrete ways of integration with the eastern neighbor have not undergone any considerable changes in comparison with the previous opinion polls (Table 5).

As usual, about 10% (only 10% or whole 10%–the assessment depends on political positions) advocate blending of the two countries into a single full-fledged state, the relative (but not absolute) majority declares for a union of sovereign states. These figures have not virtually changed for almost two years.

On the 17^th anniversary of the USSR collapse data of the opinion poll have registered a peculiar record–the minimal share of respondents who would like restoration of the Soviet Union (Table 6).

Taking into account all the development peculiarities of the modern Belarus, it is nevertheless a post-Soviet, not a neo-Soviet, society; and a gap with the past has been increasing more and more after a number of years.

In conclusion let us return to the question touched upon at the beginning – about the reasons owing to which improvement of relations between Brussels and Minsk official bodies did not lead to a considerable growth of pro-European attitudes in the Belarusian society.

One of the possible explanations consists in the following: a part of the Belarusians disposed to Europe was disappointed with it, since they considered (as a substantial part of the opposition) that Brussels "had betrayed Belarusian democracy as well as its own principles" by making steps towards A. Lukashenko. However, data of the opinion poll do not fully confirm this hypothesis (Table 7).

As it can be seen, approval and disapproval of the European Union decision turn out to be weakly connected with the attitude towards integration of Belarus into the EU. Those who are simply indifferent to the cabals of Brussels in particular demonstrate visibly lesser aspiration for Euro-integration.

Another explanation of why the pro-European attitudes did not increase to the extent they theoretically speaking could have, lies in the influence of another factor, which has emerged during the last months – the economic crisis. As it is shown in other analytical materials devoted to the December opinion poll, respondents to a larger extent put the blame for the economic situation worsening on the home authorities – on the government (52%) and on the president (42.5%).

However, not only on them – the third place among the culprits of the crisis was won by the West in the answers of respondents (27.4%). At that, only every tenth respondent put the blame for the Belarusian economic mess on Russia. The attitude to Euro-integration proved to be a characteristic quite closely connected with the opinion concerning culpability or innocence of the West with regard to the home economic problems. Among those who considered the West guilty of them, 17.8% declared for Euro-integration of Belarus (against – 54.1%); among those who did not perceive the guilt of the West in the Belarusian economic crisis, the shares of supporters and opponents of Euro-integration turned out to be approximately equal – 34.8% and 35.6%.

Thus, resentment of the part of respondents against the West, including Europe, laying on it the whole blame for the economic problems, which Belarus had confronted with, apparently became the very counterweight that blockaded any growth of pro-European attitudes after the relations improvement between Brussels and Minsk official bodies.

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