ASTRANGED PEOPLE

A trinomial classification of the Belarusian society, dividing it into supporters and opponents of the present authorities and also into the vacillating ones, "the swamp", is wandering from one political science article into another. This classification cannot be called incorrect, however it requires serious more precise definitions. In particular, it is not quite suitable for explaining a well-known phenomenon that decrease of the head’s of state popularity does not always (to be more precise-very seldom) lead to increase of the opposition popularity.

A certain step to introduce clarity into the classification was made in 2004 in the article by Yu. Drakokhrust "Paradoxes of trust" published in "Belorusskiye novosty" ("Belarusian news"). On the basis of the results of the IISEPS opinion polls a paradoxical dependence was registered in the article: respondents, who do not trust the president, on average trust the opposition and many other institutions of the civil society to a lesser extent than those who trust the head of state. From this a conclusion was drawn that there was a rather considerable group of people in the Belarusian society who were estranged from the socio-political system of the country: they did not trust A. Lukashenko, because they did not trust anyone at all. These people, in essence, reject the society as a whole.

Resting on the data of the national opinion poll of December, 2007 we are going to try to single this group out more patently and study its characteristics and distinctions from other groups. In the opinion poll respondents were offered questions about their trust and distrust to 26 different institutions and organizations of the Belarusian society. To divide the whole sampling into groups, which substantially differ from each other in trust indices, the cluster analysis was used.

The essence of this mathematical procedure is in the following: for every pair of respondents "a distance" between them, which is defined by their answers to the questions about trust, is calculated. This "distance" equals zero if both of them trust or distrust the same institutions. This "distance" is maximal if one of them trusts the institution the other one distrusts, and vice versa. Then the whole sampling is divided into groups in such a way, that "distances" among the objects inside a group are shorter than among the objects from different groups. In other words, respondents who get into one and the same group differ less in their attitude to 26 public institutions than the polled from different groups.

Indices of trust to 26 public institutions are given in Table 1 according to the sampling as a whole as well as inside of each out of four constituted groups (clusters). An index is calculated as difference of answers "trust" and "distrust" divided by the volume of the group. An index may have a value from +1, when all the members of the group trust a certain institution, up to –1, when all of them do not trust it.

Pithy interpretation of the data of Table 1 shows that respondents who form the first cluster are classical opposition electorate. Members of this group out of all official institutions trust on average only the Orthodox Church. Balance of all state institutions assessments is negative with a strong shift into distrust. Especially strong distrust these people feel towards the Central Election Committee, local government bodies, the government and the president. Conversely, all civil society organizations have a positive index of trust by the respondents of this group. Independent research centers and independent mass media arouse the greatest trust by these people, the opposition-considerably less; however, members of this cluster rather trust than distrust all public institutions (except the Protestant Church). Let us call this smallest in number group "oppositionists".

The second cluster unites staunch defenders of the present authorities. Trust to state institutions in this group is almost universal. Trust index towards many of them exceeds 80%. This group could be called antipodes of "oppositionists" although with one more precise definition-these antipodes are with a strong shift towards trust. The point is members of this group on average rather trust than distrust the majority of civil society institutions, too. Balance of trust and distrust is negative in this group only with respect to the Protestant Church and the political opposition. Alternatives in the form of independent mass media, independent trade unions, and associations of businessmen have positive trust indices in this group. These people on the whole accept the society they live in almost in all its manifestations. Nevertheless, for the reason of absolutely fantastic state institutions trust indices let us call this group "supporters of the authorities".

The fourth cluster is almost equal in size (about a third of all the polled). It resembles "supporters of the authorities" in the structure of assessments. In this group, too, trust to state institutions is noticeably stronger than to civil society organizations, but absolute values of assessments are much more modest. In this group trust indices of civil society organizations are negative or close to zero; trust indices of state institutions are mostly positive, except of the local authorities and the Trade Union Federation. Let us call this group "moderate supporters of the authorities", as in comparison with the average values according to the whole sampling (see the first column of Table 1) they treat the authorities with more trust, and the alternative-with less, than the polled as a whole.

Finally comes the third cluster – the most mysterious and unexpected one. Its presence confirms the hypothesis set up in the mentioned work by Yu. Drakokhrust. There is virtually no state or public institution which trust index could be positive in this group. Even towards the Orthodox Church the balance of assessments equals zero with a slight inclination to distrust. Members of this group distrust independent mass media a little bit less than others. However, in essence there are no great distinctions in distrust to state and non-state institutions in this group. At bottom they trust no one. Let us call this group "the estranged".

Presence of this group serves as a certain explanation of the political opposition failures, an explanation of why pretty widespread distrust to the authorities does not become transformed into trust to the alternative. Universality of distrust of "the estranged" lets us suppose that the point here is not in the lack of these or those institutions. The point is in the life attitude, in the way this group of people treats the society. They reject the authorities not for the reason that they in particular are especially bad in the opinion of "the estranged", they reject them because they reject everything.

Data of Table 2 give us an idea of comparative socio-political aims of the four groups under consideration.

Data of Table 2 show that positions of "the estranged" are situated between the positions of "oppositionists" and "moderate supporters of the authorities" on the majority of political questions. That is "the estranged" are oppositionists (although quite moderate) in some more comprehensive sense – they do not cherish any kindly feelings for the authorities and adhere to the opinions different from the official ones. However, they differ from the "oppositionists" not only in the extent to which they reject the official positions. When answering a direct question about their attitude to the authorities "the estranged" in particular are inclined to give any definite answer at all to the least extent. Although pro-European attitudes are not alien to them, they demonstrate if not the strongest aversion of Europe than indifference towards it as far as practical questions of Belarus cooperation with Europe are concerned. "The estranged" demonstrate less interest in Europe than even "supporters of the authorities" and "moderate supporters of the authorities" concerning the question about their attitude towards opening in Minsk of an official representative office of the European committee, as well as the question about frequency of discussing in a family circle of the way the Europeans live.

Attitude of "the estranged" to representatives of different ethnic minorities is quite revealing, too. As far as all these nationalities are concerned – from the Russians who are close to the Belarusians up to very distant natives of South-East Asia – "the estranged" in particular demonstrate the largest social distance, the largest estrangement. That is why this group does not have any excess of tolerance, at least towards ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note that "supporters of the authorities" demonstrate the greatest tolerance.

As for the age characteristics, the share of the young people is larger among "the estranged" than on average in the sampling. The largest share among them is among the youngest people 18-19 years of age. That is why pinning hopes on the young people as on "the revolution barometer", as on those who dream about changing the society is perhaps not quite well-grounded. A considerable share of the young people is among those who do not care about this society at all.

The trinomial model of the society mentioned at the beginning of the article still presupposes a certain positioning of all the members of the society with regard to the political "axis": they are either for the authorities, or for those who are against the authorities, or take an intermediate position between these two "poles". However, the place of "the estranged" is in general beyond "the axis".

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