REVOLT OF CONFORMISTS

Consolidation of elite is critical for stability of any authoritarian regime, and it should develop around the personality of the leader. In the modern Belarus this condition is observed which is particularly seen in the well-adjusted mechanism of election. Thus, the staff of the election commissions of all levels comprised over 73,000 people at the past presidential election. Choice of such a number of executives loyal to the regime is quite a difficult task yet it is accomplished. Not a single foul-up has been registered over lately.

Is the loyalty of the elite true? Or perhaps, this is the state of classic mass conformism? There’s no mystery about this. It is not for the first time that opinion polls among elite conducted by independent sociologists reveal disagreement of viewpoints of the elite with the official course of the authorities. First of all, this disagreement shows in geopolitical preferences. The Belarusian elite are pro-European in their majority. (See Table 1). Of course, private sector employees make the greatest contribution, yet supporters of Belarus’ accession into the EU among the public sector are as well many. However, the results appear very different during nation opinion polls. Choosing between integration with Russia and with the EU, the majority of Belarusians give obvious preference to the Eastern direction.

Authoritarian Belarusian regime inherited love to mobilization mechanisms from the Soviet past. It’s quite another matter that the regime is already unable to carry out permanent mobilization of the electorate under the current conditions, yet during election campaigns mobilization mechanisms are used to 100%. Fear of unknown and therefore of extremely dangerous enemy is given much importance there. Just recall 73 terrorist organizations about which President A. Lukashenko spoke from the tribune of the Third All-Belarusian Assembly. Nevertheless, the elite don’t share these fears. If it sees any threat to the development of Belarus, this is on the contrary the Belarusian authorities proper. (See Table 2).

There are of course differences in assessments of public and private sector employees. For instance, the state elite are not that positively affirming about the “Belarusian authorities” as they are the core of the latter. However, they don’t transfer fears on other components. They rather pick up the variant of answer “Nobody threats to Belarus.”

The Belarusian elite identify themselves as the totally national elite. This expounds for its patriotism which shows in particular in unwillingness to integrate with Russia. (See Tables 3-4). Adaptation of both the society and the elite to the new conditions is almost completed for the years of independence. Now, merging with Russia would for many top echelon representatives mean not only loss of the social statuses they achieved but also direct material losses, because power and money are Siamese twins within the Belarusian economic model and the one cannot exist without the other.

Sticking basically to pro-European opinions, the elite nevertheless has a very sober judgment of the Western direction in the Belarusian ‘multidirectional’ politics. In its opinion, no considerable changes are to be expected. This as well expounds for its skepticism about Europe’s proposals. The question in Table 5 is mild in its wording: it speaks about the possibility of a dialogue only, yet the elite say “No.” What’s more, the percentage of negative answers is higher among public sector employees! As they say, they know better. They know what is done and what will be done in the near future.

This same soberness appears in the viewpoints about Russia-Belarus gas conflict. After many years of delay in privatization of Beltransgaz, this issue seems have come to its logic settlement: independent appraiser ABN Amro Bank, Netherlands, have performed its mission. What will be the decision of the Belarusian side? About 75% of the elite believe that it will postpone the sale on any ground. By the way, there isn’t significant difference on this issue between different groups of the elite.

Disagreement in answers to anonymous questionnaires and real actions (this first of all applies to public sector employees) is easy to explain. It is not fortuitous that S. Milgram, developer of the theory of conformism, noted that it is easy to recruit servicing staff for a Nazi concentration camp in any US town. The point is to gradually introduce these people to their new duties.

The Belarusian social model is first of all the instrument of personality suppression. Unlike Stalin’s model, it doesn’t aim at aggressive coverage. It grounds on exterior loyalty which is supported by threats of losing social status (open discontent automatically moves state officials into the group of fringe officials) rather than by brute force. One should be aware that as the Belarusian society learns Western consumer behavior patterns its taste for conformism will grow. A. Lukashenko was absolutely right to state in his time, “We didn’t fire any man with an alternative thinking, who didn’t stick to the conception, from the government apparatus. There were simply no people like that. This is an axiom for us.”

Now, what is primary, conformism of officials under stability or stability in the situation of total conformism? This is a philosophical question. What is much more important, this is absence of personality resources inside this circle able to break it. This doesn’t exclude help from outside, though. As Russia-Belarus talks show, the Belarusian miracle lays on Russia’s subsidies measured in dozens percents of GDP. Representatives of the elite stand in its center and the majority of them bite thumbs for good luck in their pockets. For how long they will keep doing is a rhetorical question.

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