EUROPEAN PROSPECTS FOR BELARUS

Despite high popularity in Belarus of the politician who promised nine years ago not to lead its people after the civilized world, the Belarusians have fairly kind feelings to this very civilized world. (See Table 1).

One of the reasons is that, despite horrifying stories of the state-run mass media about living in Western countries, most Belarusians are convinced in the opposite. (See Tables 2 and 3).

It is noteworthy that slightly more respondents would like to live like the EU as compared to those who said that the united Europe lives better than Belarus, and by far more as compared to those who take the EU in the positive. Giving assessment of the EU involves a political issue. Thus, some cannot give preference to the EU as compared to Belarus because of their patriotic feelings. When the question seems to have no political pretext and doesn’t mean comparison with the homeland, the preference given to the EU appears dominating.

At the same time, respondents feel lack of information about living in EU countries but still demonstrate love to the knowledge and knowledge advancement. (See Table 4).

As for the attitude to fellow citizens who managed to enter educational institutions or find a job in the EU countries, the Belarusians are in general positive about them and don’t think they are traitors or turncoats. (See Tables 5 and 6).

Yet a more thorough research shows that attitude of the Belarusians to the European Union is unsteady and contradictory. (See Table 7).

There have been a considerable reduction of European path followers within the past year, and it is especially significant as compared with the highest indicator of 2002 when the number of those who stood up for accession of Belarus into Europe exceeded 60%.

What’s the reason? It might seem that accession of neighboring countries – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – into the EU should have strengthened pro-European moods in the Belarusian society as more Belarusians now can see this united Europe with their own eyes and, as the polling data shows, these very EU countries aren’t a picture on TV any more. (See Table 8).

However, accession of new members into the EU, or to be more exact, assessment of consequences of accession for these countries has turned away a part of Belarusians from the European future. (See Table 9).

Hardly the assessments given in Table 9 should be assigned to the Belarusian state-run mass media which in all details describe ‘horrors’ of living of EU member-states neighboring with Belarus. As we can see from Tables 2 and 3, these state-run mass media are very influential yet not all-mighty and they failed to persuade the Belarusians that their living is a pure paradise if comparing with living in the EU in general. Perhaps, this is the influence of assessments by the Poles and Lithuanians with whom the Belarusians communicate. The situation in the new EU member-states hasn’t yet become clear-cut while uncertainty is often taken by people rather in the negative. At the background of great expectations the reality is often estimated as worse than it is: positive changes are taken as self-evident but negative changes are taken especially painfully.

Probably, this is the conflict around the Union of Poles in Belarus (It developed into a big international conflict between Belarus and the most influential as well as the nearest new EU member state) which played its role in reserved assessment of the European Union and reserved pro-European moods. In December, when the conflict already went down, mass moods of the Belarusians (also due to the efforts of the state-run mass media) turned even more distant from the Polish stance than in the peak of the conflict. (See Table 10).

Nevertheless, this is not only the conflict with the neighboring Poland and adaptation problems of the new EU member-states to EU regulations and conditions which explain attitude of the Belarusians to accession into the EU. (See Tables 11 and 12).

Every positive or negative reason gains comparatively little votes. As it has turned out, supporters and opponents of accession to the EU have very different motivation. There is no a single and recognized conception in the country why Belarus should or should not enter the EU. This means that the issue of accession into the EU isn’t a national topic for discussion. When such a discussion takes place, respondents usually retranslate in their opinion one of explanations given in such a discussion.

On the other hand, when respondents are offered a closed question with already given reasons of possible consequences of accession to the EU, answers appear more definite. (See Table 13).

Despite all concerns and the fact that respondents divided in two halves as regards accession into the EU, only less than one third of them are firmly convinced that Belarus will never be a part of the united Europe. (See Table 14).

The number of those who think that Belarus should become an EU member is 38.3% (see Table 7) and it is approximately equal to the number of those who think that this possibility is very real for Belarus – 24.0+16.1=40.1%. The reasons given by opponents of integration into the EU are less coordinated which indicates that anti-European moods are not very strong in Belarus.

As it goes from Table 15, there are few optimists believing that this country will join the EU in the near future. However, respondents are ready to join a kind of a game when they are asked questions about the politics they think the EU and Belarus should carry within such a union. Despite conditional mood of these questions, answers of respondents provide intensional information about how the Belarusians see themselves, Europe and their country’s future.

They think Russia is the most desirable candidate into the EU, even though it doesn’t makes any claims in this direction itself and Western politicians think such a scenario is the least possible of all. However, for the Belarusians, its Eastern neighbor is the best company to go with to the West. Furthermore, quite illustrative is the low degree of religious distance in the answers to the question on accession of Muslim Turkey into the EU. Such prospects provoke wide protests in many European countries. This is exactly cultural or religious distance which is usually the main reason. Of course, the conditions are not comparable: the Poles and the French assess prospects of Turkey’s accession into the Union as members of the EU while for the Belarusians this is still a game to a greater extent. On the other hand, strong phobias would get uncovered in the game as well, but the Table 15 shows that the Belarusians don’t have either strong phobias towards the Turks or a feeling of their insurmountable cultural distance from Europe. The Belarusians show even greater readiness (if this would depend on them) to admit Turkey rather than fraternal Slavic Ukraine into the EU.

It has become customary to use the notions “new Europe” and “old Europe” which were borrowed from US Defense Minister D. Rumsfeld yet at the time of hot debates around Iraq in 2003. The political configuration of the continent has changed since then, but this division still takes place in the minds of Belarusians and their choice is fairly unambiguous. (See Table 16). Answer to this hypothetical question opens by far not hypothetical preferences. After integration of new members into the EU, many politicians from both Western and Eastern Europe assumed that these new member states bordering with Belarus might have become an example for it and a kind of guides into Europe. However, data in Table 16 makes us doubt if the Belarusians are ready to accept such a role of its neighbors.

Assessment of the political courses of various countries given by Belarusians also proves their choice in favor of the “old Europe.” (See Table 17).

What looks especially impressive in Table 17 is the assessment of Berlin’s politics. Attitude to the politics of Western European member-states of the EU varies greatly: assessment of the Czech politics is close to the French while Warsaw politics is assessed as rather positive, but in general there is a clear distinction in assessments of the political courses carried in the countries of old and new Europe which is proved in Table 16.

As Table 18 shows, these assessments also have a moral aspect.

This data partially explains why an overwhelming majority of Belarusians want to live like the EU (see Table 3) and at the same time by far less of them want accession of Belarus into the united Europe. The barrier is created with not only fear but with the system of values. Now, the EU values are taken as alien and dissimilar.

The preference given to the old Europe as well as a fairly negative assessment of US politics quite naturally produce a desire that the united Europe become a geo-political opponent of the United States. (See Table 19).

It can be assumed that willingness to see the united Europe counterbalanced with America is very typical of those who don’t like the USA and don’t have any pro-European feeling but take Europe as a possible rival to America: Europe, Russia, China – the more, the better. Yet, a more thorough research doesn’t prove this supposition. On the contrary, a large number of those who think that the EU should balance up the USA (48.2%) are placed exactly among those who think that Belarus should join the united Europe. About 40% of those who think that Belarus shouldn’t enter the EU also share the opinion on counterbalance. This idea is the least popular among those who didn’t give any answer on membership of Belarus in the EU.

Thus, standing a distance from the USA on the one hand and having pro-European aspirations on the other hand go pretty well together in the Belarusian society.

In fact, willingness to see Brussels opposed to Washington doesn’t generate among Belarusians any sympathies with a political scheme which could make this possible. In this regards, the Belarusians appear closer to the old Europe but not Germans – rather the French or the Dutch. (See Table 20).

According to the polling, only 12% of respondents want Russia-Belarus integration into a single state with one president, army and currency. The project of the European Union State attracts even less Belarusians. Although some may claim that identity of Belarusians is not transparent and not firm, they don’t want that their, or whoever, identity dissolve in some Russian or European super-ethnicity.

Thus, the above research has revealed, despite all concerns, that although respondents split almost equally in what regards the necessity of Belarus to join the European Union, only less than 30% of them think that Belarus will never enter the EU and over 40% say that it will sooner or later integrate into the United Europe. Hence, the European prospects aren’t as vague for Belarus as the current authorities try to persuade the citizens.

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