OTHER ALEXANDER, OTHER BELARUS

In mid-December, the authorities announced that the forthcoming presidential election in Belarus would be held on March 19, 2006 and not in Jule as planned before. This is four months earlier. Obviously, the authorities try to expedete the process. Why?

Within six months, April through October, almost a thousand delegates were nominated for the National Congress of Democratic Forces at open meetings held in all regions of Belarus. Most of them are representatives of disparate backgrounds and various public associations and not regular members of political paties. They are highly respected and enjoying people’s confidence. Early October, the Congress elected a sole candidate for the presidential election who would lobby the interests and hopes of millions of Belarusians looking for changes in their lives and in the life of the country. This is A. Milinkevich, 58, physicist by education, former Vice Mayer of Grodno and activist of the civic movement.

On the other hand, A. Lukashenko publicly stated in August that he actually began new election campaign right after his re-election for presidency in 2001. It is no wonder that his present rating, i.e. people’s readiness to vote for him again, makes over 50%: let alone the power, he keeps under his thumb all the governmental resources like mass media and schools, courts and banks, prosecutor’s offices and army, parliament and local governmental bodies.

What do the Belarusians know about A. Milinkevich? The majority know nothing as his name, his associates or the program of revival for Belarus have never been mentioned within state-run organizations or in the state-run mass media. The authorities pretend that this person and the millions of people whose interest he upholds do not exist. Yet, opinion polls in Belarus show a fairly different situation. Although the majority of Belarusians do not support the idea of “colored revolutions” and radical changes, many of them look for changes to the better: 43% of respondents nowadays think that “it is more important to change the current situation in the country than to preserve it”, 38% say that “it is time to give presidential powers to some other candidate” and almost 55% are ready to vote “for democracy promoter” rather than “hardliner supporter” at the presidential election. This vast potential for changes accumulated in the society over lately is now been seeking the way to burst out.

Apart from A. Milinkevich, there’s a number of other politicians in Belarus who have declared their presidency ambitions. This is how their ratings are distributed as per December opinion poll. (See Tables 1 and 2).

These two tables take to several important conclusions. First, it is obvious that the current president remains a key player at the electoral field, his rating almost never changing under any conditions. Second, he’s still a key but not the only player at this field. However, supporters of changes should not have illusions. Many of them (people who are far from both sociology and even reality) “sum up” the potential voters and then operate with absolutely wrong figures. In reality, the figure 84.9% (adding of the ratings of eight alternative candidates) simply doesn’t exist. The voters ready to vote for any of these candidates are only 1.6%. However, adding up all people ready to vote for any of candidates (for example, in case their candidate fails to get registered), their number increases to 28.0%! This draws to the third conclusion: maximum consolidation of alternative candidates and their electorates is crucial to ensure feasible competition with the current president. Is this an attainable goal? Data in Table 3 helps to see this.

Also, there are several important conclusions going from Table 3. First, it is obvious that, in average, electorates of alternative candidates are neither totally scattered nor totally merged. They most likely overlap. This means there is a foundation for consolidation of the voters looking for changes. Second, P. Kravchenko’s electorate is the least stable and the least focused on its candidate (60.9% are ready to vote for other candidate as well) while A. Milinkevich’s electorate is the most stable and focused on its candidate (only 35.4% are ready to vote other candidate as well). Third, electorates of other candidates are less of all inclined to vote for S. Gaidukevich (43.0%) and most of all inclined to vote for A. Milinkevich (77.5%). This means that the majority of active supporters of changes (i.e. those ready to vote for an alternative candidate) take A. Milinkevich for the most suitable presidential candidate. At the same time, only a third of voters have heard about the Congress for Democratic Forces and A. Milinkevich’s election into the position of a sole candidate, and 13.9% of respondents did get a piece of information about him or met and talked to him and his representatives. Provided there’s an efficient information campaign (over 30% of respondents would like to get information about A. Milinkevich, meet with him, or his representatives), the sole candidate’s rating might have increased to one third of voters. If other candidates are not registererd (or quit voluntarily), that’s him who already now can count on three thirds of votes of their supporters.

Of course, it is unlikely that the alternative candidates who joined the presidential race – A. Voitovich, V. Frolov, Z. Poznyak and A. Kozulin whose consolidated electorate makes 25.1% – will at the very last moment call their supporters to vote for A. Milinkevich. The academician and the general may possibly do this (if they fail to collect 100,000 signatures necessary for registration) but Z. Poznyak and A. Kozulin will obviously not. Apparently, these are S. Gaidukevich, A. Kozulin and A. Milinkevich who will be able to collect the necessary signatures and get registered. Thus, four candidates will get on one list with A. Lukashenko, which means that the sole candidate won’t become sole for the majority of supporters of changes ready to vote for an alternative presidential candidate. In its turn, this will result in growing number of drop-outs (they were over 16% at the past presidential election) as well as in scattering of votes between alternative rivals.

This is why maximum consolidation of supporters of changes in Belarus around the up-and-coming candidate who will really become a sole candidate for them is the key goal of the current presidential campaign. It is a key goal not because over 18% of respondents are presently ready to vote for him or because his rating is higher that that of other candidates except for the president. Difference between the two Alexanders – this is the point. (See Table 4).

Comparative analysis of socio-demographic portraits of A. Milinkevich and A. Lukashenko shows that supporters of the first are mainly men, youth and middle-aged people who are economically active and well educated, who are residents of big cities, active PC-users, Internet, cell phone and cable TV users. Supporters of the second are mostly women, pensioners, village and small town residents, poorly educated and few of them using modern communication means. In other words, the citizens ensuring country’s socio-economic and cultural development will vote for an alternative candidate. If they meet A. Milinkevich, they will first of all ask him about his election program and peculiarities of his election campaign as well as for his opinion of how Belarus can go out of the deadlock and what should be done for this. Those citizens who depend on the state mainly support the current president. If they happen to meet A. Lukashenko, they will first of all ask him to increase their wages and pensions and ask him the question ‘when will their living standard increase?”

Comparative analysis of socio-political portraits of A. Lukashenko’s supporters and A. Milinkevich’s supporters reveals even greater difference. (See Table 5).

As for the sole candidate’s supporters, their welfare and prospects leave much better to be desired, although these very people take forth the Belarusian economics and culture. Despite their contribution into the country’s development, the current authorities don’t favor them much. Most of them are skeptical about the possibility of colored revolution in Belarus, and therefore they pin their hopes on an alternative candidate, even though they understand that the presidential election will be neither free nor fair. In other words, other Alexander represents different Belarus, the one which is thinking and working actively, which is dissatisfied with the current situation, and which searches for a better future for its children and for its country.

A. Milinkevich’s prospects to win the presidential election or at least to change, if he yields to A. Lukashenko, the current status quo in the Belarusian politics depend, first of all, on whether voters get introduced to his candidature and whether he becomes a really sole candidate for most supporters of changes in this country. As of now, the first scenario looks rather hazy while the second one is absolutely feasible.

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