"ORANGE PROSPECTS" IN BELARUS
The analysis given (See Table 1) is based on numerous researches and contacts undertaken by the IISEPS. Its goal is rendering assistance to all concerned agents of influence in Belarus in determining and promoting a feasible scenario of political changes in Belarus.
Table 1. "Matrix of readiness"*
|
Political agents of influence |
Readiness to this kind of developments (as compared to Ukraine before the "orange revolution") |
Rank of readiness |
Rank of possible change in readiness |
|
A. Lukashenko and his immediate circle |
Higher |
I |
VI |
|
Russia |
Higher |
II |
V |
|
West |
Lower |
III |
I |
|
Opposition |
Lower |
IV |
II |
|
Electorate |
Lower |
V |
III |
|
Nomenclature |
Lower |
VI |
IV |
|
In general |
Lower |
|
|
* The influence can be both positive (i.e. promotion of the events similar to Ukrainian ones) and negative (i.e. aversion of similar events)
- Readiness of A. Lukashenko and his immediate circle is higher in the sense that he will go farther than L. Kuchma and his immediate circle in retaining the power (by force included). As regards probable change of this readiness (i.e. liberalization of the regime), on the contrary, the chances are the least.
- Readiness of Russia is higher in the sense that, taking into account its experience in Ukraine, it is obviously ready to take more efficient measures to avert similar developments in Belarus. As regards probable change of this readiness (i.e. supporting an alternative candidate to A. Lukashenko), there are some chances, although little.
- Readiness of the West is lower in the sense that its influence on the Belarusian politics is by far less than in Ukraine (in Moldova, it is even greater) both in the procedures and the resources involved. As regards probable change of this readiness (i.e. giving support to the democratic forces), its position seems the most dynamic (this is proved by the “Belarus Democracy Act” as well as EU most recent decisions).
- Readiness of the opposition is lower in the sense that it lags far behind Ukraine in the level of consolidation, presence of a single leader, capacities, part within the bodies of the legislative power, determination, etc. As regards probable change of this readiness (i.e. readiness to further consolidation and more direct actions), the opposition seems has every prospect to succeed.
- Readiness of the electorate is lower in the sense that the Belarusians still yield considerably to the Ukrainians in the degree of discontent with the current regime, level of consolidation, determination, etc. As regards probable change of this readiness (i.e. readiness to mass protests), the electorate has fair chances.
- Readiness of the nomenclature is lower in the sense that it is greatly backward Ukraine in the degree of solidarity, resources, diversity of political and economic interests, independence and determination. As regards probable change of this readiness (i.e. readiness to give up support of the current regime and turn to the alternative), the nomenclature stands some chances.
- In general, ‘orange prospects’ are presently much less in Belarus than they were in Ukraine but are absolutely possible under certain conditions.
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