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UNFORGOTTEN WAR

The 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism intensified arguments about the sense and the meaning of that war for Belarus. Tragic events in Ukraine, when Russia uses the paradigm of the Great Patriotic War as an ideological basis for their actions and for the actions of separatists, give a new dimension to these arguments. Admittedly, these arguments in Belarus can mostly be found in social networks only. To what extent do these internet-passions reflect real changes in the notion of that war in general?

7 years ago IISEPS asked respondents about their attitude to some of sharp plots of Nazi occupation in Belarus in 1941-1944. In June 2015 we asked these questions once again.
As you can see (Graph 1), over 7 years these evaluations remained almost unchanged: majority take a moderate stand and prefer to evaluate acts of specific people rather than blame everyone for the very fact of collaboration (question did not include all types of collaboration including paramilitary forces, we asked only about civil collaboration).
As in 2008, the share of those who blame all people who collaborated with Nazis is bigger than the share of those who see people, who collaborated in non-military organizations, created by Nazis, as heroes.
However, it is easy to see that the first group increased significantly, while the second one decreased. One may suppose that these shifts in public opinion are caused by public and mass media atmosphere of celebrating the anniversary of the Victory and by a strong influence of Russian and Belarusian state propaganda. Graph 1 results demonstrate the extent of influence of these factors: indeed, they do shift public notions in a certain direction, but only by several percentage points. Hierarchy and order remain unchanged.
If we’re talking about rethinking war in the aspect of collaboration, we can say that in a sense it had already happened: there was no universal condemnation either now or 7 years ago. However, there is no possibility that those who were considered as villains and traitors would once be considered as heroes.
Despite the numerous publications stating that partisans were far from being angels, the share of those who answered that they have heard about partisans’ cruelties has not increased. On the opposite, there was even a slight decrease (Graph 2).
By the look of things, it is not a phenomenon of insufficient awareness, but of a certain social “deafness”: I haven’t’ heard anything about it because I don’t want to hear anything about it. And the share of people, who chose this answer, only increased over 7 years.
This interpretation is confirmed by the answers on a question on the attitude to those cruelties (Graph 3).
The theory of social “deafness” explains the seeming paradox: over 7 years the share of those, who said that they hadn’t heard about such information, increased, and the share of those who don’t believe in it decreased. In other words, in reality this information gets into society, but significant part of people reject it: I don’t know because I don’t want to know, this information contradicts my values and ideas.
As you can see, the total of first two answers remained almost unchanged: 60% vs. 58.2%. But there was a certain redistribution of votes: part of those who rejected the fact started to justify it.
The next question was about the interpretation of the war in general (Table 1). What did this war mean for Belarus?
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “Which statement on the Second World War in Belarus do you agree with?”, % (more than one answer is possible)
Variant of answer
Agree
Partially agree
Disagree
For Belarusians it was a patriotic war over their Fatherland, the Soviet Union
85.8
12.1
1.8
For Belarusians the war against Nazis was the war over physical survival of the nation
53.8
29.7
15.9
That was a war between two dictators – Hitler and Stalin – over the rule in Europe
22.0
40.8
36.7
In Belarus it was a civil war between the supporters of the USSR, Germany and independent Belarus
7.3
31.3
60.8
For Belarusians it was other’s war and they were drawn into it
10.9
28.2
60.3
Belarusians, who were on the side of Germans then, were struggling for the independence of Belarus
5.0
23.4
71.0
As you can see radical revisionist interpretations of war (the last three answers) don’t enjoy popularity in Belarusian society: each one of them is rejected by an impressive majority. At the same time, the same majority identifies themselves with the first two traditional evaluations. Table 2 results demonstrate the correlation between the interpretations of war and political setups of respondents.
Table 2. Correlation between evaluation of the Second World War in Belarus, attitude towards the President and geopolitical choice*, %
“Completely agree”
“Do you trust the President?”
“If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?”
Trust
Don’t trust
Integration with the RF
Joining the EU
For Belarusians it was a patriotic war over their Fatherland, the Soviet Union
90.2
79.0
90.6
77.5
For Belarusians the war against Nazis was the war over physical survival of the nation
52.6
53.0
55.9
55.6
That was a war between two dictators – Hitler and Stalin – over the rule in Europe
17.7
30.1
18.7
32.0
In Belarus it was a civil war between the supporters of the USSR, Germany and independent Belarus
8.4
6.9
7.1
8.6
For Belarusians it was other’s war and they were drawn into it
11.7
11.3
8.5
16.0
Belarusians, who were on the side of Germans then, were struggling for the independence of Belarus
5.1
5.2
4.1
6.1
* Table is read horizontally. It includes shares of those who completely agree with the according evaluation of the war among supporters of certain political orientations
Supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko, as well as supporters of integration with Russia or Eurointegration, have very different, sometimes opposite, views on many things. But the Second World War is not one of those things. Here you can see a consensus. This was already mentioned in IISEPS analytical materials dedicated to evaluation of importance of certain historical events (e.g., see http://www.iiseps.org/analitica/546). This is observed in war interpretations as well: those who don’t trust the President, as well as supporters of Eurointegration, are not inclined to share radical revisionist interpretations more than their political opponents. Those who don’t trust A. Lukashenko and “Euro-Belarusians” are slightly more inclined to regard that war as an opposition of two dictatorships. However, the hierarchy and the order of evaluations is still the same.
In countries, where the Second World War is regarded differently, these differences are expressed in the bans on usage of both Nazi and Soviet symbols. Belarusians’ attitude to this is the same as their attitude to war in general (Graph 4).
Only 20% of respondents support a ban on Soviet symbols; majority support a ban only on Nazi symbols. In this case opinions of political opponents differ more, than in the question of evaluations of the war, but the difference is not so big (Table 3).
Table 3. Correlation between evaluations of ban of Soviet and Nazi symbols, attitude to the President and geopolitical choice, %
“According to you, should Belarus (like Ukraine and Lithuania) ban the usage of Soviet and Nazi symbols?”
“Do you trust the President?”
“If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?”
Trust
Don’t trust
Integration with the RF
Joining the EU
Usage of both these types of symbols should be prohibited
15.7
22.3
10.6
30.0
Only usage of Nazi symbols should be prohibited
64.7
47.9
72.3
38.6
Only usage of Soviet symbols should be prohibited
1.6
2.5
1.2
3.6
Usage of these symbols should not be prohibited
17.4
26.9
15.7
27.2
For the neighbors of Belarus (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) one of the main symbols of the Second World is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Attitude to this pact is unambiguously negative in these countries. Belarusians in their turn are not very well aware of this pact (although it is probable that this is another example of social “deafness”), and their attitude to it is more ambiguous (Graph 5 and 6).
In conclusion, it should be said that Belarusians’ attitude to the Second World War significantly differs from the attitude of most nations of the Central Europe. Belarusians in their majority share the traditional viewpoint on this war, and political differences doesn’t influence this attitude.