As we could see from Table 1, the overwhelming majority of leaders (86.8%), regardless of structures they represent, do not want to see A. Lukashenko as the country’s president for another term. From the time of the previous survey this opinion has not almost changed.
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “Would you like A. Lukashenko to be the president of our country for another term?”, %
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “Whom would you like to see the president of Belarus?”, %
Table 2 shows that 54.4% of leaders would like to see an independent candidate as new president. A single candidate from democratic opposition parties was placed second. In total they received 92.6%, which is 4 points higher than in November, and 20.4 points higher than in October. If representatives of non-state structures equally support both, an independent candidate receives twice as much support from representatives of state structures, than a single opposition candidate. As compared to the previous month, leaders from non-state structures show much more support to a single candidate, and less support to an independent candidate, and visa versa in state structures.
As for A. Lukashenko, in December only one respondent from state structures spoke in his support. It is worth noting that among leaders there are no those who have not made their choice yet.
The December survey results showed some changes of leaders’ opinion regarding possible candidates for the upcoming presidential election (see Table 3). So, when asked whom would you have chosen the country’s president tomorrow, M. Chigir and S. Domash take top position with leaders, and their support have jumped by 70% within one month.
Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “If the Belarusian presidential election has taken place tomorrow, whom would you vote for?”, % (direct question)
But if M. Chigir has toped popularity ratings since September, S. Domash’s candidacy rocketed only in November, driving A. Lukashenko out from the second place. V. Goncharik ratings’ jump is worth noting as well, in December he took the fourth place.
In an open rating S. Domash takes the lead with non-state structures, M. Chigir – with state structures. As for A. Lukashenko, he enjoys support only in state structures (two respondents). We shall remind that in September he took the lead with representatives of state structures, outstripping M. Chigir, who was placed second, twofold.
Politicians – V. Vecherko, A. Lebedko, M. Grib, M. Krivomaz, V. Yermoshin, I. Korotchenya and M. Myasnikovich – that were mentioned in November, dropped from the December ratings. At the same time new names appeared on the list in December: V. Goncharik, A. Trukhanovich, A. Dobrovolsky, V. Dashuk, D. Bulakhov and M. Pastukhov.
When asked an indirect question (to chose from a list of politicians), distribution of Belarusian politicians in the presidential rating appears different. As Table 4 shows, in December S. Domash topped the list with leaders receiving 22.1% (5.7% in November). M. Chigir took the second place, though his popularity ratings crept up a little (from 17.0% to 20.6%). V. Goncharik was placed third, his ratings jumped 2.3fold.
Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “For whom of prominent social-political figures of Belarus are you ready to vote at the presidential election?”, % (indirect question)
* Entered on empty line
M. Chigir kept his first place in non-state structures, whereas in state structures his ratings slumped (from 22.7% to 14.7%), and S. Domash hit the first line.
Therefore, the results of the December survey among leaders show that so far elite has not defined the most prospective candidate able to struggle for presidency. Appearance of new names on the list and rapid disappearance of others is clear from systematic changes of ratings of concrete politicians. At the same time, there is a group of three leaders who left other politicians behind in terms of popularity ratings. A. Lukashenko is not in this group, since his candidature is considered unacceptable.
How respondents imagine the future president? Table 5 gives an idea about it. As one could see, his “portrait” is in a deep contrast with the first president’s actual features. So, the majority of leaders (regardless of structures they represent) believe that the future president shall be oriented at multivectorial foreign policy, rather than locking oneself on the West, or the East.
Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “What kind of Belarus’s future president should be in you opinion?”, %
| Variant of answer |
All respondents
|
Private sector employees
|
Public sector employees
|
| Supporter of multivectorial foreign policy Supporter of integration with the West or Russia Does not matter |
88.2
5.9 4.4 |
88.2
8.8 2.9 |
88.2
2.9 5.9 |
| Professional in production sphere Professional in the sphere of education, science, culture Does not matter |
25.0
14.7 57.4 |
17.6
11.8 67.6 |
32.4
17.6 47.1 |
| Supporter of the present course continuation Supporter of radical changes to the present course Does not matter |
–
91.2 2.9 |
–
97.1 – |
–
85.3 5.9 |
| Mandatory fluent Belarusian Optional fluent Belarusian Does not matter |
29.4
25.0 42.6 |
38.2
17.6 41.2 |
20.6
32.4 44.1 |
| Connected to Russia’s establishment Not connected to Russia’s establishment Does not matter |
19.1
32.4 45.6 |
26.5
35.3 35.3 |
11.8
29.4 55.9 |
| Civilian Military Does not matter |
69.1
– 30.9 |
67.6
– 32.4 |
70.6
– 29.4 |
| Representative of the opposition Independent candidate Does not matter |
16.2
60.3 23.5 |
20.6
58.8 20.6 |
11.8
61.8 26.5 |
| Experienced politician Respected professional, but not a politician Does not matter |
47.1
19.1 30.9 |
38.2
23.5 35.3 |
55.9
14.7 26.5 |
| Connected to ruling nomenclature Not connected to ruling nomenclature Does not matter |
13.2
44.1 38.2 |
11.8
47.1 35.3 |
14.7
41.2 41.2 |
| Able to work in team, consider opinion of other people Making decisions on his/her own, depending on personal opinion Does not matter |
86.8
2.9 7.4 |
91.2
2.9 2.9 |
82.4
2.9 11.8 |
More than half of leaders (two thirds in non-state structures) think that regardless of his professional sphere, the future president should introduce sweeping changes to the existing course.
As for speaking fluent Belarusian, leaders’ opinions are quite different. About one-fourth in each group spoke in favor of alternative answers, the rest consider this issue insignificant. Mandatory excellent command of Belarusian enjoys more support in non-state structures, in state structures it is optional.
Some 20% of leaders believe that the future president shall have ties with Russia’s ruling elite. And this opinion finds more support in non-state structures.
About two thirds of leaders think that the future president shall be a civilian (not a military man!) and from independent background. About half of them would like him to be an experienced politician, rather than an experienced professional. There is no big difference in opinions among representatives of state and non-state structures.
It is quite interesting that the majority of leaders do not want to have a president connected with ruling nomenclature. This idea is shared even by representatives of state structures.
Finally, the overwhelming majority of leaders do not want to see an autocrat as the future president. Perhaps here a sad experience of life under the present leadership is felt.
Table 6 could be viewed as a general assessment of leaders’ attitude towards the first president. It shows that regardless of structures they represent the majority of respondents are not satisfied with how A. Lukashenko ruled the country. As compared to October, support to this opinion went up (by 5 points).
Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question: “Are you satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s six-year rule?”, %
The above statement and Table 7 allows to draw an unambiguous conclusion: leaders of opinion (regardless of structures they represent) are strongly against electing A. Lukashenko for the second term of presidency. In December (as well as in November) leaders were asked to answer: whom would they vote for in a hypothetical second round, if A. Lukashenko have faced a united representative of this or that public group. Their answers showed that leaders are apparently ready to support any politician who would challenge the first president.
Table 7. Distribution of answers to the question: “If you were to elect Belarus’s president from the following pairs of politicians, whom would you vote for?” %
| Variant of answer |
Leaders survey
|
National survey (11’00)
|
||
|
total
|
from private sector
|
from public sector
|
||
| A. Lukashenko – representative of opposition | ||||
| For A. Lukasehnko |
8.8
|
2.9
|
14.7
|
39.1
|
| For representative of opposition |
64.7
|
79.5
|
50.0
|
16.2
|
| Against both |
16.2
|
14.7
|
17.7
|
15.7
|
| Would not vote |
2.9
|
2.9
|
2.9
|
6.6
|
| DA/NA |
7.4
|
–
|
14.7
|
22.4
|
| A. Lukashenko – independent candidate | ||||
| For A. Lukashenko |
2.9
|
–
|
5.9
|
34.8
|
| For independent candidate |
89.8
|
100.0
|
79.4
|
33.8
|
| Against both |
2.9
|
–
|
5.9
|
5.5
|
| Would not vote |
1.5
|
–
|
2.9
|
4.8
|
| DA/NA |
2.9
|
–
|
5.9
|
21.1
|
| Representative of opposition – independent candidate | ||||
| For representative of opposition |
29.4
|
44.1
|
14.7
|
9.9
|
| For independent candidate |
52.9
|
41.2
|
64.7
|
35.7
|
| Against both |
4.4
|
2.9
|
5.9
|
12.9
|
| Would not vote |
1.5
|
–
|
2.9
|
6.9
|
| DA/NA |
11.8
|
11.8
|
11.8
|
34.6
|
| A. Lukashenko – another candidate from “power party” | ||||
| For A. Lukashenko |
4.4
|
2.9
|
5.9
|
34.8
|
| For another candidate from “power party” |
33.8
|
35.3
|
32.4
|
5.8
|
| Against both |
42.6
|
50.0
|
35.3
|
22.8
|
| Would not vote |
7.4
|
5.9
|
8.8
|
6.5
|
| DA/NA |
11.8
|
5.9
|
17.6
|
30.1
|
However, an independent candidate would have received the majority of leaders’ votes – 89.9% – (regardless of structures they represent). Only a few of them would have voted against both candidates, or did not give a definite answer.
An opposition representative enjoys less support among leaders – some 64.7%. At the same time, if an independent candidate gained a little as compared to November, an opposition candidate lost some points. In this variant the number of those who would have voted for A. Lukashenko went up (in state structures), as well as the number of those who are against both candidates.
In the pair “opposition representative – independent candidate” the latter is in the forefront with 1.8fold advantage. In state structures this advantage is greater – 4.4fold.
As for another candidate from “power party”, he/her outstripped A. Lukashenko with leaders (regardless of structures they represent). However, in this case more than 40% would have voted against both candidates (especially representatives of non-state structures).
Therefore, leaders’ answers to this question clearly prove that Belarus’s elite would have opted for an independent candidate. Unfortunately, so far leaders of public opinion see no independent politician who is able to challenge A. Lukashenko.
Table 8 shows that the majority of leaders doubt the upcoming election would be free and fair. Judging by the previous election campaign leaders of non-state structures doubt this possibility more than others. It should be noted that if compared to November the number of those who doubt it crept down, because more respondents declined to give a definite answer (among leaders of state structures the ratio went up by 20 points).
Table 8. Distribution of answers to the question: “Will, do you think, the 2001 presidential election in Belarus be free and fair?”, %
Table 9 provides leaders’ prognosis how the majority of the population would vote at the upcoming presidential election. As we could see, half of respondents believe that the population would vote for an independent candidate. This confidence is characteristic of leaders of non-state structures. Less than one fourth (23.5%) say A. Lukashenko is likely to win. Some 17.6% say the same about an opposition candidate. As compared to previous opinion polls, leaders’ confidence in success of an independent candidate is gradually increasing (from 35.5% in September to 38.9% in October), whereas A. Lukashenko’s chances are diminishing (from 33.8% in September to 35.2% in October). As for a single opposition candidate, his success prognosis remained almost unchanged (17.7% in September, and 18.5% in October). The above tendencies practically do not depend on structures that leaders represent.
Table 9. Distribution of answers to the question: “For whom, in you opinion, would the majority of voters cast their votes at the presidential election?”, %
Therefore, leaders’ prognoses for the upcoming presidential election look more and more optimistic.