DYNAMICS OF BELARUSIAN ELITE’S POLITICAL VIES

1. Leaders’ confidence in state and public institutes

One can see from Table 1 that public leaders tend to trust independent research centers, non-state mass media and OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group as well as to entrepreneurs’ and trade unions. Leaders have the least of confidence with the militia, courts and Central Election Committee, National Assembly and the President. The positions occupied by the above mentioned institutes have not been changed over studied period and prove steady attitude of the Head of the state to them.

Table 1. Index of leaders’ confidence in state and public institutions*

* Index of confidence may vary from +1 to –1 is calculated as ratio of sum of positive (“trust”) and negative (“distrust”)answers to number of all respondents
** Variant of answer was not suggested

At the same time, the degree of confidence (i.e. the absolute index of confidence) in some institutes have been fluctuating significantly over the time and reflected respective changes in attitude of public figures to them. So, it is possible to say that leaders are likely to trust more to independent think tanks. Yet, the trend remains regardless, a drop of confidence, which occurred in October due to the fact that predictions made by most of independent research centers regarding the parliamentary elections did not come true. It suggests that leaders’ confidence in independent research centers is expected to be high during the forthcoming presidential elections.

One may also state that leaders tend to trust more to top-list institutions. It is useful to pay attention to growing confidence in trade unions especially in members of the Trade Union Federation. The last mentioned fact, in our opinion, is related with trade unions’ distancing from the policy of agreeing with the government, active fight for the rights of employees, and a sudden increase in their political activity mainly due to the developing presidential campaign.

At the bottom of the list, the low degree of confidence leaders link with the militia has dropped even further. This fact can be explained by the militia turning into a mindless and cruel administration protecting force. Central Election Committee has lost even more confidence, especially after results of parliamentary elections were falsified and offered to public. Low confidence rate with other outsiders has remained almost unchanged. Among them are courts, National Assembly, KGB, local administrative bodies, state mass media. Only the government and state research centers have won some degree of confidence thus giving a sign for increasing tension between these bodies and the president and his surrounding.

As for other institutions, one should point at a substantial increase in confidence for the Army (might be related with negative attitude of the president and government) and a less vivid increase in confidence for the church. XIII Supreme Council, which has become almost virtual, has also lost a certain amount of confidence. In general, as one may notice, leaders trust more to non-governmental institutions rather than state institutions, which always have more non-supporters than supporters thus contributing to a negative confidence index.

Taking into account the fact that results of the leaders’ opinion poll conceal views of state representatives, let’s consider the latter separately (see Table 2). One may notice that leaders of state bodies share most of trust with independent research centers, non-state mass media, entrepreneurs’ unions, the Army, OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group and trade unions and the least of trust with Central Election Committee, militia, National Assembly, President and local authority. Thus, the list of leaders and outsiders of confidence for state representatives is almost similar as that described above. At the same time, state leaders’ list of confidence has less contrast: the top is lower and bottom is higher. This peculiarity, in our opinion, is related to state leaders’ adherence to alternatives in relations with the institutions in question while non-state leaders are more unanimous in their evaluations.

Table 2. Index of leaders’ (from public sector) confidence in state and public institutions

* Variant of answer was not suggested

Like all interviewed state leaders take more confidence in non-governmental institutions rather than state ones. Only those trusting to the Army outnumber those who do not. As for the rest points, they are unanimous with their colleagues from non-governmental institutions.

On the whole, one may point at growing discontent of the Belarusian elite with the existing system of state authority and especially in persons, who represent these administrative bodies. In most cases, it is the individuals who influence the degree of confidence with a respective institution. It is peculiar that as soon as any traces of opposition are observed or suspected in a state body, the degree of confidence of the elite in this body increases significantly.

2. Leaders and presidential election

Table 3 shows that the majority of public opinion leaders (over 85%) disapprove the way A. Lukashenko has governed the state for six years. More than that, their share has almost remained unchanged over this period of time. State leaders account for a fewer number of the unsatisfied and their number has also remained almost the same.

Table 3. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Are you satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s six-year rule?”, %

* Variants “Find it difficult to answer”(DA) and “No answer” (NA) are sometimes omitted

Table 4 contains an average estimation of state bodes’ performance, which was suggested by leaders. The leaders are also discontent with A. Lukashenko’s inability to fulfill most of his election promises he had declared in public (see Table 5). It is easy to find out that the absolute majority of leaders including state ones have such an opinion. State leaders have a different view only in respect of promises as to re-maintenance of close relations with members of the former USSR and their views split almost in equal parts.

Table 4. Leaders’ assessment of state power institutions on five-point scale

Table 5. Leaders’ opinion of A. Lukashenko’s fulfillment of his election promises, %

Thus, it is not surprising that most of non-governmental leaders do not want A. Lukashenko to serve another term in the Office (see Table 6). At the same time, over a short period of time the number of people supporting the absolutely different opinion tends to grow. Besides, the increase occurs not only at the expense of uncertain voters.

Table 6. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Would you like A. Lukashenko to be the president of our country for another term?”, %

More than that, it is clear that the trend is formed mainly by representatives of state bodies and this fact should be taken into account by potential candidates and their teams. The data in Table 7 reads that in January 2001 almost 60% of leaders would like to see an independent candidate as the president of the state. A single candidate of democratic opposition parties is the second taking 27% of supporters. As for A. Lukashenko, his support with the leaders is very insignificant and mainly among state bodies. It should also be mentioned that there are almost none uncertain among the leaders. However, the leaders’ support for a concrete candidate drops when they are asked to specify names. Table 8 shows that at the moment leaders prefer three favorites: V. Goncharik, S. Domash and M. Chigir. The latter was in the head of the list last autumn until S. Domash joined him in November and December. In January 2001, V. Goncharik suddenly took the top of the list. It is peculiar that the decisive support was provided by state leaders, who, on their turn, had withdrew support from M. Chigir.

Table 7. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Whom would you like to see the president of Belarus?”, %

Unfortunately, we have to state that leaders’ back up for each of the above mentioned politicians is far from substantial – less than 20% (Table 8). That means that the elite has not decided on the presidential candidate yet.

Table 8. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “If the presidential election has taken place tomorrow, whom would you vote for?”, % (direct question)

* Names of those who received more than 3% in one of opinion poll, and was mentioned in two previous opinion polls are on the list

As for A. Lukashenko, his candidature has been supported only by 10% of state leaders and he has failed to enter the first five places in the list. It should be noted 1 that A. Lukashenko was mentioned in all opinion polls but his popularity dropped from questionnaire to questionnaire including those filled in by state officials.

The four last positions of an open rating is occupied by outsiders V. Leonov, Z. Poznyak, M. Leonov and S. Shushkevich, who are loosing their support and might not be mentioned soon. At the contrary, A. Yaroshuk and P. Kozlovsky are new figures that have chances to join the team of leaders.

The set-up of Belarusian politicians is a bit different within a closed rating, which implies selection of candidates from a list (see Table 9). Though favorites are the same, the first line is occupied by S. Domash. At the same time, his popularity reached its top last December and plummeted this January. The second place is taken by V. Goncharik, who has won more popularity over the last month. The third place belongs to M. Chigir, who is loosing support. S. Domash is supported mainly by non-governmental leaders as compared with a state support for V. Goncharik. M. Chigir is losing support among state officials.

Table 9. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: ” For whom of prominent social-political figures of Belarus are you ready to vote at the presidential election?”, % (indirect question)

* Names of those who received more than 3% in one of opinion poll, and was mentioned in two previous opinion polls are on the list

As for outsiders of the closed rating, it seems that names of six-seven people will be moved from the list, while perspectives for A. Yaroshuk and P. Kozlovsky will become more obvious.

One can see in Table 10 that leaders of opinions leave few chances for Lukashenko’s reelection. He suffers a defeat in any of the virtual couples of the second round of the elections. The gab is the biggest when the rival is the independent candidate. Yet, one cannot neglect certain trends, which had emerged before the large-scale election campaign was launched. First of all, A. Lukashenko tends to gain support. Though the support is insignificant yet but it is observed with every of his rivals.

Table 10. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “If today you were to chose the president of Belarus only from the below pairs of politicians, whom would you vote for?”, %

A. Lukashenko’s support becomes stronger among state leaders at the background of declining authority of his competitors. It can be noticed that leaders, in general, and those representing state bodies, in particular, seem to believe there is no one able to challenge A. Lukashenko.

The couple of “opposition representative – independent candidate” reveals over a double advantage of the latter. The trend is related with changing attitude of state leaders to rivals: here, the independent candidate outstrips an opposition representative almost seven times.

So, the dynamics of leaders’ answers to this question once again reveals advantages of an independent candidate as compared with anyone else. Unfortunately the general figure of the independent candidate hides a real person, who is able to consolidate voters and take the lead in the fight against A. Lukashenko. Absence of such a leader might result in apathy and disillusions and allow A. Lukashenko to reinforce his position in the combat for the presidency.

Table 11 gives us a portrait of the future president drawn by leaders. Three fourth feel confident that the future president must be a male Minsker. Almost 50% think he must be over 45 years old. The leaders have no discrepancies about the demographic “portrait” of the president. However, values of the future Head of the state arouse disagreement. Though the majority of leaders are certain that the president must be a supporter of market economy, separation of powers, independence of Belarus, integration with Europe, and radical changes in the course of national development, state leaders are less likely to adopt these views as compared with their non-governmental colleagues.

Table 11. Distribution of answers to the question about necessary features of the future president, %

* This group was not offered answers
** Answers “Does not matter “and “No answer” are excluded

The bulk of leaders believe the president must be able to work in a team, listen to opinion of others. Some 50% think he must be an experienced politician rather than a narrow expert. One may notice that the “portrait” of the future president differs from real features of A. Lukashenko. Comparison of features of the latter and preferences in Table 11 reveal that his supporters are familiar with a myth image of A. Lukashenko created by the Belarusian television but not the real person.

Table 12 suggests that over 50% of leaders believe people will vote for an independent candidate at the elections and this confidence is growing with every opinion poll. At the same time, the number of those, who think that either A. Lukashenko or an opposition candidate, will win the presidential race is also declining with every interview.

Table 12. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Whom, in your opinion, the majority would vote for at the presidential election?”, %

Table 13 emphasizes that most leaders still hardly believe the forthcoming elections will be free and just. Naturally, non-governmental leaders, who make their judgment by using experience of the previous elections, have more doubts about this. Yet, it is important to admit that the number of non-believers has dropped significantly especially among state leaders.

Table 13. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Will the 2001 presidential election in Belarus be free and fair?”, %

The majority of leaders are going to take part in the forthcoming presidential elections (see Table 14) regardless big doubts about honesty of the presidential elections. Of course, most of voters also share the same opinion. Therefore, it would a strategic mistake to attempt to boycott the presidential elections. At the contrary, it would be more effective to persuade voters to show up at polling stations on the day of the elections. This is the direction, the political opposition should strive to and stop seeking unpromising single candidate.

Table 14. Distribution of answers to the question: “Are you going to take part in the upcoming presidential election?”, %

Summing up the mentioned above, the following conclusion may be drawn. First, the researches reveal growing leaders’ confidence with all non-governmental institutions. The increase is especially obvious with independent research centers and Trade Union Federation, which has taken a tougher position in respect to the government. Leaders trust less to state bodies, mainly to those responsible for cruel treatment of opponents of the regime and for falsification of parliamentary election results. Leaders are getting discontent with the system of state authority and individuals, who represent this system. As soon as any traces of opposition are observed or suspected in a state body, the degree of confidence of the elite with this body increases significantly.

Second, majority of leaders are unsatisfied with the way A. Luakshenko govern the country. They believe he has not fulfilled his election promises and does not deserve being elected for the second term. Yet, there is a trend for growing popularity of A. Lukashenko among state leaders.

Third, most of the leaders wants to see an independent candidate as the president. By the moment, there are three favorites: V. Goncharik, S. Domash, and M. Chigir. Yet, the degree of leaders’ support is not extensive, as the elite has not delivered final decision yet. A. Lukashenko’s support among leaders is plummeting. New figures appear on the list – A. Yaroshuk and P. Kozlovsky – whose perspectives will show up shortly.

Fourth, leaders imagine the future president as a 45-year-old male citizen of Minsk. He must stand for market economy, separation of powers, independence of Belarus, integration with Europe and radical changes in the political course. Besides, he must be an experienced politician, be able to work in a team and listen to others’ opinions.

And, finally, fifth, most leaders feel confident (and this confidence is increasing) that an independent candidate will win at the presidential elections. The majority of leaders will take part in the forthcoming presidential elections regardless they do not believe the elections will be free and fair. In this respect, the idea of boycotting the presidential elections seems to be a mistaken one. Attraction of voters and youth to polling stations is more effective and reasonable strategy. These are the points the opposition is recommended to focus on instead of vain attempts to find a single candidate, who would be popular among everyone except for voters.