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IT IS STILL UNCLEAR WHO WILL BE THE NEW PRESIDENT OF BELARUS

As we could see from Table 1, even today the majority of adult population (76.1%) are intended of taking an active part in the upcoming presidential election. We shall remind that only 60% of voters intended (and then did vote!) of participating in the past parliamentary election. Such rise in people’s desire to take part in the next election could be explained not only by the fact that in the eyes of electorate presidential election seems more important, but also by dissatisfaction of many citizens with results of A. Lukashenko’s individual rule, and who hope to replace him at the upcoming election.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “Are you going to take part in the upcoming presidential election?”, %

* Items “Find it difficult to answer” and “No answer” are sometimes excluded

That could be said, in particular, from Table 2, which shows that today more than one fourth of adult population (28.8%) are dissatisfied with A. Lukashenko’s six-year rule. At the same time, it is clear that over the last three months the number of those dissatisfied has gone down a little, with the number of satisfied people creeping up. In our opinion, this could be explained by an active presidential election campaign started by A. Lukashenko and his team long before official announcement of the election. We shall remind that since late last year state-run mass media have been actively popularizing their patron’s promise to drive country’s average wage to $100 by the election. In December last year authorities increased salaries of lower-paid budget workers, and in February of 2001 they announced another rise in tariff scales and salaries of all budget workers from March. The same month pension allowances were increased on average by 15%.

Table 2. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Are you satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s six-year rule?”, %

* Survey was conducted jointly with the Center for Social and Environmental Studies

Undoubtedly, it affected momentary moods of respondents. In particular, the number of those who are ready to elect A. Lukashenko for another term eased up (see Table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “Would you like A. Lukashenko to be the president of our country for another term?”, %

Table 4 shows that today more than 40% of the population would have voted for A. Lukashenko. All other politicians could not get a comparable rating even altogether. Their individual popularity ratings, excluding M. Chigir, remain within the margin of error.

Table 4. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “If the Belarusian presidential election has taken place tomorrow, whom would you vote for?”, % (direct question)

Variant of answer*

11’97

09’98

03’99

06’99

11’99

04’00

06’00

07’00

08’00

09’00

10’00

11’00

02’01

A. Lukashenko

44.3

52.2

46.0

45.0

43.8

38.4

33.3

33.6

33.8

36.3

33.2

38.2

41.4

M. Chigir

0.1

2.5

4.9

3.7

3.1

2.7

3.1

4.2

2.4

6.9

4.5

3.3

V. Goncharik

0.3

1.5

Z. Poznyak

2.2

1.3

2.6

4.1

2.6

1.7

1.1

1.0

1.6

1.5

1.9

0.9

1.4

S. Domash

1.2

S. Gaidukevich

0.1

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.6

1.5

0.7

0.6

S. Shushkevich

2.4

1.0

1.5

1.7

2.7

2.4

2.1

2.9

3.6

2.4

3.0

4.5

0.5

V. Yermoshin

0.7

2.0

0.9

0.5

1.8

1.6

0.4

V. Polevikova

0.3

1.9

1.0

0.8

0.3

0.6

0.4

I. Korotchenya

0.4

V. Matskevich

0.3

A. Lebedko

0.4

0.6

1.7

0.7

1.2

0.2

A. Yaroshuk

0.2

N. Masherova

0.2

P. Kozlovsky

0.2

S. Kalyakin

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.5

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.3

0.2

V. Kebich

1.3

0.7

1.9

0.1

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.4

0.1

S. Bogdankevich

0.3

0.5

0.3

0.1

0.3

1.4

1.0

0.6

0.3

0.5

0.1

* Names of those who were mentioned during the previous opinion poll are on this list

It seems that such data show A. Lukashenko’s superiority and other contenders are doomed to failure. However, in our opinion, this conclusion is of a perfunctory nature. Open ratings reveal, first of all, degree of publicity of this or that person. Naturally, A. Lukashenko has no rivals in this respect: monopolization of state-run mass media with the largest audiences – first of all electronic mass media – allows to show merits of their boss and negative features of possible contenders selectively. Notorious administrative resource is working in the same direction.

But even under such circumstances only two fifth of electorate are potentially ready to vote for A. Lukashenko, whereas three fifth are against him, or have not made their choice yet. This is a considerable majority, which cannot give preference to anyone and remains non-consolidated, scattered between several possible contenders. However, in our opinion, these voters know for sure – they are not going to vote for A. Lukashenko!

A closed presidential rating of Belarusian politicians looks different. And though while choosing from the list of names (see Table 5) the favorite remains the same, the next three contenders gained more than the margin of error. Closed rating is usually higher than open, because while choosing respondents have a list of names before their eyes which makes it easier. At the same time, presence or absence of name of this or that politician on the list affects respondents’ choice in favor of one contender and results of closed rating. As we could see from Table 5, omission of name strongly decreased even ratings of A. Lukashenko. For this very reason in the February survey S. Shushkevich’s ratings dropped 10fold.

Table 5. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “For whom of prominent social-political figures of Belarus are you ready to vote at the presidential election?”, % (indirect question)

Variant of answer**

06’00

08’00

09’00

10’00

11’00

02’01

A. Lukashenko

5.9*

15.8*

14.8*

16.7*

41.1

45.7

M. Chigir

7.1

9.5

5.7

8.9

7.9

6.4

V. Goncharik

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.8

3.0

Z. Poznyak

2.6

2.1

2.7

2.0

1.5

3.0

S. Domash

0.5

–*

0.4

–*

0.2

2.3

S. Gaidukevich

1.9

1.1

1.3

2.4

0.9

1.3

I. Korotchenya

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.9

S. Shushkevich

7.0

6.7

6.4

7.2

6.0

0.6*

V. Matskevich

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.4

V. Polevikova

5.4

5.5

3.1

1.0

1.7

0.4*

V. Yermoshin

–*

8.1

0.1

6.2

4.7

0.3*

P. Kozlovsky

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.3

S. Kalyakin

2.2

0.8

0.9

1.2

0.5

0.3

A. Lebedko

2.1

3.9

1.5

3.8

1.9

0.2*

A. Yaroshuk

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.2

S. Bogdankevich

1.8

1.3

1.5

1.2

0.9

0.2*

V. Kebich

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.1*

N. Masherova

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

0.1*

* This name was not included in the list
** Names of those who were mentioned during the previous opinion poll are on this list

From Table 5 we could also see that over the last three months some opposition politicians have seen a small rise in their ratings, and first of all those whose participation in the presidential campaign has been foreseen by independent mass media (V. Gonhcarik, Z. Poznyak, S. Domash, etc.). From the close rating we could also see that more than half of respondents are not going to vote for A. Lukashenko at the upcoming presidential election.

As Table 6 shows, more than 60% of the country’s population have no doubts that if A. Lukashenko is elected the president again, his policy is unlikely to change, but it would become even more reactionary.

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think that if Lukashenko is elected the president for another term, his policy will change?”, %

Table 7 gives an idea of what the future president should be. In particular, it proves the above conclusion that more than half of voters do not want A. Lukashenko being elected the president for another term. So, almost 55% would support a candidate, whose program envisions sweeping changes to present authorities’ policy, 77.4% – a candidate, who could put power structures and law enforcement structures under control, almost 60% – a candidate, who promises to carry out market economy reforms instead of the present social-economic course, and the same number – a candidate, who could promote a rise in citizens’ role in politics and economy.

Table 7. Distribution of answers to the question: “Which clauses of programs of candidates for presidency in Belarus will be the most important for you while voting?”, %

Variant of answer

02’01

Sweeping change of A. Lukashenko’s present policy
Continuation of A. Lukashenko’s present policy

54.6
38.9

Further integration of Belarus and Russia
Strengthening of Belarus’s independence

57.0
38.1

Carrying out market economy reforms
Continuation of present social-economic course

59.6
30.2

Strengthening of law and order by means of legislation perfection, public control of power structures and law enforcement bodies
Strengthening of law and order by means of expansion of power structures and law enforcement bodies and their functions

77.4
17.2

Rise in people’s role in politics and economy
Rise in state’s role in politics and economy

59.3
32.4

As for integration with Russia, we could say that the majority agrees with A. Lukashenko, who is still considered as integrator of post-Soviet area.

By the way, the ratio of those who share principles and objectives of A. Lukashenko is lower than his personal popularity ratings. That means that supporters of A. Lukashenko are attracted no only by his program or practical activity directions, but by other factors, including personal ones. It is possible that many of A. Lukashenko’s supporters know and support not so much himself as a mythic image of “fighter against corruption”, which led him to power back in 1994 and is constantly galvanized by officials.

As Table 8 shows, only 40% of respondents believe that the upcoming election will be free and fair. However, if compared to the previous opinion poll, the ratio of those who have no doubts about it eased up. At the same time, the number of those who doubt it remains the same – about one third of respondents.

Table 8. Distribution of answers to the question: “Will the 2001 presidential election in Belarus be free and fair?”, %

Although there are big doubts about fairness of the upcoming presidential election, the overwhelming majority of electorate will participate in it any way (see Table 1). That’s why any effort to organize a boycott of the presidential election would be a strategic mistake. On the contrary, the idea to “persuade” electorate to come to polls and cast their votes seems more promising. It is highly desired that youth take part in the election. Second, it is necessary to organize an active monitoring of voting procedure to document all possible violations. This is what political opposition shall direct its efforts at, rather than hopeless attempts to find a single candidate, suited to every one, but voters.