As one could see from Tables 1 and 2, over four years A. Lukashenko’s cumulative rating has plummeted, regardless of some “rises” (for example, after Russia’s default). Over last year ratio of his convinced supporters and opponents has stabilized and is equal to 1:2. This is proved by the analysis and another cumulative rating: ratio of respondents who are satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling, and at the same time would like him to be the president for another term (16.2%), and those who are not satisfied with his ruling and at the same time would not like him to be the president for another term (28.6%) is 1:1.8.
Table 1. Dynamics of attitude towards A. Lukashenko, %
| Indexes of attitude towards the president |
Mentioned Lukashenko (option A) |
Did not mention Lukashenko (option B) |
||||||||||||
|
11’97 |
09’98 |
06’99 |
11’99 |
04’00 |
10’00 |
04’01 |
11’97 |
09’98 |
06’99 |
11’99 |
04’00 |
10’00 |
04’01 |
|
| Would vote for Lukashenko at the new presidential election** |
44.3 |
52.2 |
46.0 |
43.8 |
38.4 |
33.2 |
37.2 |
55.7 |
47.8 |
54.0 |
56.2 |
61.6 |
66.8 |
66.8 |
| Would vote for Lukashenko at Belarus and Russia presidential election |
35.2 |
44.7 |
32.8 |
31.6 |
22.3 |
25.2 |
24.4 |
64.8 |
55.3 |
67.2 |
68.4 |
77.7 |
74.8 |
75.6 |
| Trust the president |
45.0 |
48.0 |
41.0 |
39.8 |
39.2 |
33.9 |
33.8 |
22.5* |
22.1* |
28.8* |
32.5* |
32.9* |
35.6* |
37.2* |
| Consider Lukashenko an ideal politicians |
50.4 |
51.5 |
45.7 |
44.9 |
37.0 |
34.3 |
34.3 |
49.6 |
48.5 |
54.3 |
55.1 |
63.0 |
65.7 |
65.7 |
* Distrust the president
** Answer to open question (i.e. respondents entered name of politician)
Table 2. Dynamics of cumulative rating (convinced supporters and opponents) of A. Lukashenko, %
| Typology of electorate |
11’97 |
09’98 |
06’99 |
11’99 |
04’00 |
10’00> |
04’01 |
| Convinced supporters of Lukashenko (chose option A four times) |
26.0 |
29.3 |
21.8 |
22.3 |
15.5 |
15.4 |
17.1 |
| Vacillatory majority |
53.2 |
53.3 |
52.1 |
49.5 |
54.2 |
53.3 |
49.9 |
| Convinced opponents of Lukashenko (chose option B four times) |
20.8 |
17.4 |
26.1 |
28.2 |
30.3 |
31.3 |
33.0 |
The most noticeable drop of A. Lukashenko’s rating (17-12%) is in his emotional assessment (sympathy, ideal politician) and assessment in Russia’s context.
There is an obvious dependence of emotional (like), rational (trust) and behavioral (would vote) components of the electorate’s attitude towards candidates for presidency: hierarchy of these ratings is the same (See columns 2, 5, 6 of Table 3).
Table 3. Electorate’s attitude towards possible candidates for presidency, % (read horizontally)
A. Lukashenko remains the electoral leader (as well as Z. Poznyak remains an outsider), but gradually his rating is creeping down (in February to such closed question 45.7% of respondents were ready to vote for him).
Ratings of “five” alternative candidates (aside from ratings of political parties), which have recently claimed to create a coalition, jumped (in February to such closed question 6.4% were ready to vote for M. Chigir, for V. Goncharik – 3.0%, for S. Domash – 2.3%, for P. Kozlovsky and S. Kalyakin – 0.3% of respondents for each).
At the moment M. Chigir tops the list in all three ratings. Table 4 prove it.
Table 4. If you were to elect Belarus’s president among the following politicians, whom would you vote for? %
| Pair of candidates | Variant of answer |
10’00 |
04’01 |
| A. Lukashenko – M. Chigir | For A. Lukashenko |
35.0 |
38.9 |
| For M. Chigir |
13.5 |
20.3 |
|
| Against both |
16.2 |
14.2 |
|
| Would not participate in the election |
5.7 |
3.8 |
|
| DA |
29.6 |
22.8 |
As one could see, M. Chigir enjoys the most noticeable positive rating dynamics: ratio of competitors M. Chigir and A. Lukashenko has increased over the last six months from 0.38 (13.5% vs 35.0%) to 0.52 (20.3% vs 38.9%), regardless of the fact that M. Chigir went through “crucible” of discrediting official propaganda prior and much more that other candidates.
Table 5 provides data, which characterize possible alliances of electorate and candidates for presidency. Dominants regarding electorate are bold-marked.
Table 5. Possible electoral alliances of estimated candidates for presidency, % (read horizontally)
| Candidate |
A. Lukashenko |
M. Chigir |
V. Goncharik |
S. Domash |
Z. Poznyak |
P. Kozlovsky |
S. Kalyakin |
| A. Lukashenko(39.2) |
X |
6.7 |
5.7 |
3.9 |
2.0 |
3.2 |
2.6 |
| M. Chigir (17.8) |
14.6 |
X |
32.6 |
23.5 |
14.0 |
13.2 |
6.0 |
| V. Goncharik(10.1) |
22.1 |
57.7 |
X |
40.8 |
16.1 |
21.6 |
12.0 |
| S. Domash (8.0) |
19.1 |
52.4 |
51.3 |
X |
22.2 |
28.7 |
16.3 |
| Z. Poznyak (6.2) |
12.8 |
40.2 |
26.1 |
28.6 |
X |
15.1 |
7.4 |
| P. Kozlovsky(4.7) |
26.4 |
49.7 |
46.2 |
48.7 |
19.9 |
X |
27.1 |
| S. Kalyakin (2.8) |
36.9 |
38.0 |
43.3 |
46.5 |
16.5 |
45.8 |
X |
* Numerator of each square – percentage of electorate ready to vote for another candidate; dominator –percentage of electorate going to vote for another candidate under no circumstances
As we could see the most “irreconcilable” electorates (i.e. those who are unwilling to vote for other candidates) – are those of A. Lukashenko (would vote only for A. Lukashenko) and Z. Poznyak (will not vote for A. Lukashenko, S. Kalyakin and P. Kozlovsky). S. Domash has the most “loyal” electorate (i.e. is ready to vote for other candidates): ready to vote in favor of M. Chigir and V. Goncharik. A. Lukashenko and Z. Poznyak seem the most unacceptable candidates – the majority of supporters of all other candidates do not want to vote for them.
On the contrary, M. Chigir turned out to be the most acceptable candidate – dominating groups of electorates of V. Goncharik, S. Domash and P. Kozlovsky are ready to vote for him. That means that at the moment a considerable part of democratic electorate “crosses” on this candidacy.
A. Lukashenko’s stable electorate (i.e. those who are ready to vote for him while choosing from any pair of candidates) amount to 34.2%. Stable electorate of “five” democratic candidates (i.e. those who are ready to vote for any democratic candidate in any pair) is only 4.3%. Ratio of stable electorates of A. Lukashenko and “five” democratic candidates is 8:1. It reveals a serious problem for democratic candidates – their electorates are “scattered”, having almost no correlation and cooperation. That means that in order to win not only candidates shall draw together and cooperate, but also structures that support them and their electorates! In principle there is a basis for consolidation of democratic candidates as well as their electorates. So, the number of respondents ready to vote for a democratic candidate in any pair (no for any candidate!) is 29.2%, for A. Lukashenko – 40.9%. As we could see, here the ratio is 1:1.4.
Table 6 demonstrates that democratic electorate (i.e. those who prefer a candidate from political parties or an independent candidate) is dominating over A. Lukashenko’s electorate (44.3% vs 39.7% in July, 36.6% vs 35.9% in November, 39.7% vs 33.6% in April) in respondents’ own intentions.
Table 6. Dynamics of “silence spiral” – attitude of electorate towards different types of candidates for presidency, % (answers to the questions: “Whom would you like to see the president of Belarus?” and “For whom, do you think, the majority would vote?”)
| Variant of answer |
07’00 |
11’00 |
04’01 |
|||
|
Themselves |
Majority |
Themselves |
Majority |
Themselves |
Majority |
|
| Single candidate from opposition parties |
10.2 |
5.5 |
9.8 |
5.4 |
3.0 |
1.9 |
| Candidate from other political parties |
5.0 |
3.2 |
2.2 |
2.4 |
10.2** |
6.0 |
| Independent candidate |
29.1 |
15.1 |
24.6 |
13.7 |
26.5 |
14.5 |
| A. Lukashenko |
39.7 |
60.6 |
35.9 |
44.5 |
33.6 |
49.3 |
| Other candidate |
9.1 |
7.6 |
1.7 |
0.9 |
4.6 |
1.2 |
| DA/NA |
6.8* |
8.0 |
25.8 |
33.1 |
22.1 |
27.1 |
* In the July survey option “Find it difficult to answer” was omitted (it coincided with those who gave no answer)
**In the April survey wording “candidate from wide democratic coalition” replaced “candidate from other political parties”
At the same time A. Lukashenko’s electorate is steadily dominating over democratic electorate (60.6% vs 23.8% in July, 44.5% vs 21.5% in November, 49.3% vs 22.4% in April) in respondents expectations pinned to the majority. That means that “silence spiral” of democratic electorate remains the major obstacle for its candidate to win.
Fortunately, this “spiral” is not being “intertwined” further, but also not being “untwisted” as visibly as expected (60.6% expected votes for A. Lukashenko in July is more than 49.3% in April, but its ratio to real intentions is the same – 3:2). That means that democratic forces shall first of all focus on a joint “break-through” to electorate, rather than coordinating their programs, actions etc.
To sum it up – two more important issues, which are of great concern for all candidates and are being discussed by politicians, analysts and journalists: “Would chances of a candidate from democratic forces increase if he/she is nominated by a wide coalition, which will unite all supporters of sweeping changes to the present course?”, “To win the presidential election it would be better to register one or several candidates, and the election campaign will show who has more chances?” Threefold more respondents answered the first question in the affirmative than in the negative (27.5% vs 8.5%), however, the overwhelming majority (64%) found it difficult to answer. It means that the idea of a “large coalition”, uniting absolutely different supporters of changes shall be considered with caution. As for the second question, there are no doubts: the overwhelming majority of respondents (41.5%) would like the most “worthy candidate formed during the election campaign”, rather than before the registration procedure (10.9%), i.e. here ratio is 4:1 (only 24% found it difficult to answer, the same number of respondents consider A. Lukashenko the best candidate for presidency).
In general, there is a dynamics towards democratic forces in Belarus’s electorate, but to win the presidential election it is necessary, first of all, to consolidate efforts of “five” candidates in forms, which would vividly demonstrate such consolidation for democratic electorate as a whole. To this purpose it is necessary to urgently adopt and publish not a “Declaration of intentions”, but a “Statement” explaining mechanisms of candidates’ interaction during the election campaign, nominating single candidate before mid-August, joint actions after victory, etc., as well as a common “Platform” or “Program”.
Second, it is necessary to consolidate not only efforts of democratic candidates, but also of forces that support them – political, economic, civic and electoral groups. A rise in democratic candidates’ ratings, rather than parties, shall not demobilize parties. On the contrary: today parties and other structures can contribute to common victory by means of supporting these candidates!
Third, it is necessary to speed up a joint “break-through” of democratic candidates to electorate.
And finally, fourth, it is important to avoid the mistake of the parliamentary election boycott, be ready to tough struggle in deliberately unequal conditions: from the one hand, today three fourths of electorate are willing to take part in the presidential election, on the other hand – only 30.3% consider the Central Election Commission an unbiased body guided only by law (two thirds believe that it takes decisions favorable for concrete candidates, first of all those, who enjoys support of authorities), and only 28.3% think that the upcoming election would be free and fair.