None of serious participants of the ongoing election campaign has recently denied influence of the so-called Russian factor upon results of the presidential election. It should be noted that attitude of the majority of voters towards Russia-Belarus integration has remained steadily positive for a long time. After V. Putin came to power in Russia, Belarus’s public opinion made a significant sway towards support of integration as an idea, because in reality, in real politics everything is not so bright. To all appearance, V. Putin’s phenomenon potential, which caused an increase in integration sympathy, has already passed its peak, however, pro-Russian moods remain rather string (see Tables 1, 2). Integration with Russia, as an abstract idea, sometimes irrespective of its practical realization, finds support with the majority of electorate. Candidates must not doubt this fact, if they do not want to go against the stream.
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you support A. Lukashenko’s actions aimed at integration with Russia?”
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “If there were a referendum on adoption of Constitution of Russia-Belarusian Union State, how would you vote?”
The April survey revealed a certain fall in the number of integration supporters. In June the number of those who consider unification into one state the best variant of bilateral relations, and at a referendum would vote in favor of unification, i.e. convinced supporters of integration, went up again (see Table 3–5). In this respect an open aversion to integration seems inefficient.
Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “Which variant of Belarus-Russia relations do you think the best?”, %
Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “If a referendum on unification of Belarus and Russia were to take place today, how would you vote?” %
Table 5. Dynamics of numbers of convinced supporters and opponents of integration with Russia*, %
* Convinced supporters are those who at a referendum would vote for unification of Belarus and Russia into one state, and consider unification into one state the best variant of bilateral relations. Convinced opponents are those who would vote against unification, and consider neighborly relations of two independent states the best variant of bilateral relations
Table 6. Attitude towards integration depending on respondents’ preferences regarding the future president*, %
| Do you support the president’s actions aimed at integration with Russia? |
Whom would you like to be the president of Belarus? |
||||
|
One of the coalition of democratic candidates (17.6) |
Candidate nominated by CCDF (3.9) |
A. Lukashenko (36.7) |
Other candidate (7.3) |
DA/NA (34.5) |
|
| Yes (68.2) |
40.1 |
58.7 |
89.3 |
49.9 |
65.5 |
| No (21.2) |
46.8 |
33.3 |
6.4 |
36.3 |
19.0 |
| DA/NA (10.3) |
13.1 |
8.0 |
4.3 |
13.8 |
15.5 |
* Read vertically, for example, among those who would like to see the president a members of “five,” 40.1% support the president’s actions aimed at integration
To date pro-Russian moods of a considerable part of voters have remained stable over a year, with some minor fluctuations. A decrease in the number of integration supporters observed in the previous survey did not entail a long-term tendency. Thus, any statements by democratic forces against integration are likely to have negative consequences. Even 40.1% of respondents, who would like to see a democratic coalition candidate the future president, support A. Lukashenko’s moves aimed at integration with Russia (see Table 6). Therefore, it would be more logical not to show aversion to integration as such, but to criticize its present, A. Lukashenko’s variant, which exploits public opinion and brings no result, and, consequently, remains a hollow declaration.