It is widely known that efficiently using Russia’s card, in part, A. Lukashenko managed to become the president seven years ago. Later on more than once and rather successfully he has taken use of this card to discredit his political opponents and to solve some other problems. However, at the moment, A. Lukashenko seems to lose the given powerful trump card.
As stated earlier, after V. Putin came to power in Russia, Belarus’ public opinion slightly swayed towards integration. V. Putin’s phenomenon potential, which caused a growth in integration sympathies, most probably, passed its peak, however, pro-Russian moods remain relatively strong. At the same time their character is changing. This is the second survey showing a slump in the number of convinced supporters of integration (see Table 1). This time by 12%. Why and how has that happened? Generally speaking, no extraordinary events, able to cause such an effect, have occurred.
Table 1. Dynamics of the number of convinced proponents and opponents of integration with Russia*, %
* Convinced proponents are those who at a referendum would vote for unification of Belarus and Russia into one state, and consider unification into one state the best variant of bilateral relations. Convinced opponents are those who would vote against unification, and consider neighborly relations of two independent states the best variant of bilateral relations
First of all, let’s pay attention to the fact that the number of voters ready to vote at a referendum in favor of Belarus-Russia unification has almost remained unchanged, on the contrary, the number of those who have the opposite opinion eased down (see Table 2). More than one third of respondents do not confused by the fact that as a result of such referendum the country might lose its independence (see Table 3). At the same time, the number of those who consider unification into one state as the best variant of bilateral relations dropped by 12%. Also the number of those who prefer good neighborly relations of two independent states or a union of sovereign members (see Table 4). That’s why a decrease in number of convinced supporters of integration took place (see Table 1). For the sake of correctness we shall pinpoint that the number of convinced opponents of integration did not go up as well. Thus, those who became disillusioned with extreme forms of integration turned into “undetermined” voters.
Table 2. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “If a referendum on unification of Belarus and Russia had taken place tomorrow, how would you have voted?”*, %
* Here and in most cases below options “Find it difficult to answer” and “No answer” are excluded
Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “Would you vote for unification of Belarus and Russia, if as a result Belarus stops existing as an independent state?”, %
Table 4. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Which variant of relations between Russia and Belarus do you consider the best?”, %
What does this mean and which conclusions could be made? First, it is necessary to emphasize that integration as an abstract idea, as an ideological myth and symbol, still enjoys a strong positive reaction in society. However, as for real forms of its implementation, there is no unity among Belarusians. For A. Lukashenko’s convinced supporters integration is equal to restoration of the USSR, transfer of Belarus’ social-economic model to the Russian territory. Many respondents, mostly “vacillatory”, still consider integration necessary, but they believe such necessity may not exclude retaining sovereignty by Belarus. It seems that statements by V. Putin and A. Lukashenko, who have recently reiterated the idea of integration with both Belarus and Russia remaining sovereign states, are not slipping by unnoticed. Table 5 proves that the majority of respondents, about 40%, consider a union of two independent states as the best future for Belarus and Russia.
Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “Which future for Belarus do you consider the best?”, %
It is noteworthy that during the current presidential campaign the integration issue has not yet become a leading theme for A. Lukashenko and the situation is unlikely to change profoundly. He tries to avoid it or says it must be tackled after the election is over. That means that the populist model of integration, which has been in existence for five years, and within the framework of which the neighbor could have been robbed behind a curtain of unclear agreements, is finally exhausted. What would happen next – is a big question. To be short and clear, A. Lukashenko is unlikely to exchange his status of a dictator of the middle-sized European country for a post of Belarusian governor within Russia. He must have very serious reasons for that.
As for an optimal election slogan on Russia’s issue for the single candidate from the wide democratic coalition, we believe it should be as follows – “Democratic Belarus together with democratic Russia – into Europe”. Provided that union relations are not questioned, but ideological demagogy must be abandoned in favor of real partner relations with unconditional retaining of sovereignty by two countries.