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BELARUSIAN ELECTORATE BEFORE THE ELECTION: NAVIGATION FOR A SINGLE CANDIDATE FROM THE WIDE CIVIC COALITION

As follows from the below given data (see Tables 1-6), A. Luakshenko’s rating, as compared to the previous opinion poll in June, has gone up noticeably, though the number of his convinced opponents has not dropped, but steadily levels at one third of electorate. Today A. Lukashenko’s rating – open or closed question about voting (44.4% and 47.4%, respectively), about trust (43.8%), about sympathies (52.2%) – does not drop below 43%.

Table  1. Dynamics of electorate’s attitude towards A. Lukashenko*, %

Indicators of attitude towards A. Lukashenko

Mentioned Lukashenko (Option А)

Did not mention Lukashenko (Option В)

11’97

09’98

11’99

10’00

04’01

08’01

11’97

09’98

11’99

10’00

04’01

08’01

Would have voted for A. Lukashenko at the new election**

44.3

52.2

43.8

33.2

37.2

44.4

55.7

47.8

56.2

66.8

62.8

55.6

Would have voted for A. Lukashenko at the election of Belarus and Russia

35.2

44.7

31.6

25.2

24.4

27.8

64.8

55.3

68.4

74.8

75.6

72.2

Trust the president

45.0

48.0

39.8

33.9

33.8

43.8

22.5*

22.1*

32.5*

35.6*

37.2*

37.1*

Consider Lukashenko an ideal of politics

50.4

51.5

44.9

34.3

34.3

39.4

49.6

48.5

55.1

65.7

65.7

60.6

* Do not trust the president
** Answer to the open question (i.e. respondents entered the name of a politician themselves)

No matter what is the price for the president’s rating growth (a total aggressive and deceitful propaganda, a new wave of promises, receiving Russia’s loan of $300 million, involving prominent Russian politicians in his election campaign, etc.) – it is necessary to consider the reality, rather than one’s desires and ambitions. In our opinion, endless talks by representatives of the opposition about “fear index” (which means every figure must be reduced at least by 10%), simply overshadow the reality (what fear makes a person say “my attitude towards A. Lukashenko is very positive”, when he/she could say “rather negative” or “find it difficult to answer”?).

Table  2. Dynamics of electoral types regarding A. Lukashenko, %

Table  3. Comparative characteristic of electoral groups on the basis of attitude towards candidates*, %(emotional criterion)

Attitude:
positive
negative

Supporters of S. Gaidukevich (17.2)

Supporters of V. Goncharik (29.1)

Supporters of S. Domash (28.9)

Supporters of A. Lukashenko (52.2)

Towards S. Gaidukevich

Х

42.6
25.9

38.7
29.6

11.7
33.3

Towards V. Goncharik

72.0
15.3

Х

69.5
16.6

16.8
36.9

Towards S. Domash

65.1
17.2

69.2
11.1

Х

17.0
30.0

Towards A. Lukashenko

35.6
61.3

30.2
65.3

30.8
64.9

Х

Would have voted for: (closed question)
S. Gaidukevich (4.1)

19.2

5.9

5.5

1.6

V. Goncharik (11.4)

21.8

37.0

22.6

1.8

S. Domash (12.1)

17.6

21.3

38.0

2.3

A. Lukashenko (47.4)

26.1

21.1

22.1

85.9

Think that the president would be elected:
In the first round (47.5)

26.1

27.9

29.2

61.3

In the second round (35.9)

65.5

63.3

59.7

25.7

* Positive attitude – those who answered “very positive attitude” or “rather positive”, negative attitude – those who answered “rather negative” or “very negative”

Moreover, today, when official propaganda (in the person of A. Zimovsky & Co.) misleads the public with exaggerated figures of 70–80% ratings of the president and “insignificant ratings of his rivals”, “inverse propagandists” appear claiming if “the turnout is 80%, A. Lukashenko might receive about 38% of votes, and a single candidate – 57%” (see special issue of Our Freedom newspaper of August 17). If such “inverse propagandists” believe that data of opinion polls could be used freely to form public opinion in a “desired direction” – they run risks of failure, they distract leaders of the opposition, first of all, from a single candidate and his team, from real possibilities to get a chance to win. There are such possibilities. Let’s consider some of them.

Table 4. Comparative characteristic of electoral groups on the basis of attitude towards candidates, % (behavioral criterion)

Electoral characteristics

Would have voted for: (closed question)

S. Gaidukevich (4.1)

V. Goncharik (11.4)

S. Domash (12.1)

A. Lukashenko (47.4)

Intention of taking part in the election:
Would definitely participate (57.2)

47.7

62.1

50.3

70.2

Most probably would participate (31.2)

45.4

33.7

38.5

26.5

Most probably would not participate (5.6)

5.1

3.2

6.3

1.4

Would definitely not participate (4.0)

0

0

1.0

0

DA/NA (2.1)

1.8

1.0

3.9

1.9

Would have voted for (open question):
S. Gaidukevich (3.3)

79.1

Х

Х

Х

V. Goncharik (11.2)

Х

84.6

Х

Х

S. Domash (12.4)

Х

Х

84.4

Х

А. Lukashenko (44.4)

Х

Х

Х

93.6

Why voting for this candidate:
He expresses interests of people such as I am (26.9)

23.1

32.4

29.6

38.5

He has real power and can improve the situation in the country (23.0)

22.2

26.9

20.4

34.6

I’ve liked him for a long time (9.5)

25.4

17.2

16.4

8.8

Most of my acquaintances support him (10.6)

19.1

15.4

21.3

11.2

Would vote for under no circumstances:
S. Gaidukevich (14.2)

Х

9.8

11.5

22.4

V. Goncharik (13.1)

13.3

Х

4.5

22.8

S. Domash (7.4)

8.4

5.7

Х

12.1

А. Lukashenko (27.6)

58.1

74.6

68.9

Х

Believe that the president would be elected:
In the first round (47.5)

27.7

24.3

25.6

64.1

In the second round (35.9)

58.0

71.1

62.0

23.0

Expect the election to be fair:
Confident that the election would be fair (17.8)

5.4

2.0

1.5

34.4

Hope that the election would be fair (40.2)

43.6

22.8

29.5

54.0

Doubt the election would be fair (26.9)

36.1

50.2

49.6

6.5

Confident that the election would not be fair (11.0)

14.9

23.8

18.8

2.0

Think that the majority would vote for:
S. Gaidukevich (1.1)

21.9

0

0.5

0

V. Goncharik (5.4)

2.6

39.3

3.6

0.4

S. Domash (3.8)

3.3

1.2

27.4

0.1

А. Lukashenko (73.6)

47.4

37.8

49.2

95.0

In case the election results are falsified:
Would accept them, because nothing could be changed (42.6)

36.5

30.5

29.0

54.0

Would take part in mass protest actions to try to change the results (11.0)

22.2

30.5

20.8

5.6

Would not believe these results and would be very upset, but would not take part in mass protest actions (27.9)

34.9

33.9

37.2

20.6

There are very important tendencies increasing chances to win. First, ratings of democratic candidates went up considerably. In April V. Goncharik’s open rating leveled at 1.3%, in June – 1.0%, today – 11.2%; S. Domash – 2.7%, 3.1% and 12.4%, respectively! That means “recognition” of these politicians is rocketing. Second, there is a further consolidation of electorates of V. Goncharik and S. Domash (which, unlike A. Lukashenko’s initially consolidated electorate, half a year ago were almost “dispersed”): if two months ago their electorates “overlapped” (i.e. their supporters expressed readiness to vote in favor of both) less than half-way, today – it is three fourths. This is a very important indicator, because there are democrats (politicians, analysts and journalists), who simply sum up ratings of all democratic candidates and on the basis of a mythical “parity” with A. Lukashenko’s rating form their election strategy. 75% of consolidated electorate means that at the moment a single candidate’s rating is about 20%. 100% “overlapping” of electorates of V. Goncharik and S. Domash could hardly be reached, but it might rise to 90%. To this purpose it is necessary to unite their election headquarters, programs, resources, etc. as soon as possible, because unsolved problems prevent some of their supporters from a final unification.

Table 5. Comparative characteristic of electoral groups on the basis of attitude towards candidates, % (behavioral criterion)

Pairs of candidates

Variants of answer

All respondents

A. Lukashenko’s supporters

A. Lukashenko’s opponents

S. Gaidukevich – А. Lukashenko For S. Gaidukevich
For A. Lukashenko
Against both
Would not vote
DA/NA

17.4
49.2

15.1
3.9
14.2

0.3
96.0

0.5
0.5
2.7

42.7
4.7
29.6
6.1
16.9

V. Goncharik – A. Lukashenko For V. Goncharik
For A. Lukashenko
Against both
Would not vote
DA/NA

24.4
50.3

10.3
5.0
9.9

0
98.9

0
0.7
0.4

56.5
4.9
20.9
7.5
10.2

S. Domash – A. Lukashenko For S. Domash
For A. Lukashenko
Against both
Would not vote
DA/NA

25.6
49.9

9.1
4.6
10.8

0
98.6

0
0.5
0.9

61.3
3.3
17.3
7.4
10.8

Table 6. Comparative analysis of electoral groups on the basis of attitude towards candidates,* % (behavioral criterion)

If were to choose from two candidates, would have voted for:

S. Gaidukevich (17.4)

V. Goncharik(24.4)

S. Domash (25.6)

А. Lukashenko (50.0)

S. Gaidukevich

Х

58.1

55.6

2.0

V. Goncharik

81.6

Х

71.8

3.2

S. Domash

81.7

75.2

Х

4.1

A. Lukashenko

5.6

4.9

8.0

Х

One sociological fact should be mentioned separately, because so far (at least publicly) no one has spoken about it, raising a similar problem in the opposition camp has always been completely rejected. Here S. Gaidukevich is meant, to be more correct, his electorate. Many representatives of the opposition are inclined to believe that his nomination and registration as a candidate for presidency is a perfidious project by authorities. S. Gaidukevich is rumored to bargain certain political and economic dividends from A. Lukashenko, and that he is going to quit at the decisive moment “leaving” his electorate to A. Lukashenko. Last winter he was basically ignored by “troika”, “five”, as well as the Coordination Council of Democratic Forces and other structures. In turn he did the same. Is S. Gaidukevich an initial “project” by authorities, has A. Lukashenko made a deal with him already – we do not know and have no intention of guessing. The facts show that his supporters do not like A. Lukashenko (more than 60% express negative attitude towards him, and almost 60% would vote for him under no circumstances), as well as V. Goncharik and S. Domash, but – what really matters – are willing to vote in favor of V. Goncharik or S. Domash in case S. Gaidukevich is out of the game (almost 82% – see Table 6)! Since S. Gaidukevich’s real rating varies from 3.3% (open question) to 17.4% (closed question in the pair S. Gaidukevich – A. Lukashenko), his electorate shall not be reduced to members of the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus and “shady” elements or simply ignored. This is a real resource, which might drive the rating of a single candidate up to 25%. Therefore we believe negotiations with him must be started immediately. (Anticipating inevitablesuspicions of some engagement, we shall state that the IISEPS basically has no interest or contacts with S. Gaidukevich, moreover, more than once he has spoken negatively of our activities. This is not private interests or sympathies, but objective facts what matter). A brief look at the above mentioned data is enough to see that A. Lukashenko’s electorate differs from electorates of all the other candidates with its confidence in itself and the favorite. So, 85.9% of those who sympathize with him are ready to vote for him (among S. Gaidukevich’s supporters there are only 19.2% of them, among V. Goncharikov’s supporters – 37%), 61.3% believe he would be elected in the first round (among S. Domash’s supporters there are less than 30% of them), 95% of those ready to vote for A. Lukashenko think the majority of other people would do the same (most proponents of S. Domash and S. Gaidukevich think the majority is likely to support A. Lukashenko, the number of V. Goncharik’s adherers who also think this way is almost equal to the number of those confident in the victory of their candidate).

The well-known “spiral of silence” is still “strangling” democratic electorate even several weeks before the election. One should not exclude that “promoting” the idea of a total falsification of results (which is very important in terms of a preventive non-recognition of A. Lukashenko’s victory) has a reverse effect, demoralizing supporters of democratic candidates and strengthening the same “spiral of silence”: almost 90% of A. Lukashenko’s adherers are confident or hope that the election would be fair, among S. Gaidukevich’s supporters there are 49% of them, S. Domash – 31%, V. Goncharik – 24.8%. In our opinion, it is necessary to “promote” the idea that independent monitoring, organized by democratic forces and international structures, guarantees registering any falsification and becoming a legal basis for further non-recognition of A. Lukashenko’s legitimacy would allow to count all votes in favor of democrats without any “loss”.

The protest potential of Belarus’ electorate should not be overestimated. Only 11% (10.2% two months ago) expressed readiness to take part in mass actions in case the election results are falsified. The figure is threefold less than figures published by Nasha Svoboda. Naturally, it is necessary to prepare to such turn of events, but we shall not expect it to play a role similar to that in Yugoslavia. But there is no evil without good: protest potential of A. Lukashenko’s electorate is scanty (5.6%), therefore authorities could hardly organize “a mass indignation at falsification of results by democrats”. In this respect they would face more difficulties than democrats.

To sum it up we shall note that it is risky to forecast accurate results of the presidential election on the basis of this data. First, because different factors are going to influence the situation and public opinion in the three week left before the election – both in favor of a single candidate and the functioning president (so far the single candidate’s election campaign has been losing to the president’s campaign, who, probably, is paying more attention to our analyses than the opposition).

Second, public opinion in itself – is a very “unstableformation”: decision made by voters at polling stations could be motivated by anything. In our opinion, sweeping changes of public opinion in favor of A. Lukashenko or the single candida6te – just because new factors are going to have influence in both directions thereby partially neutralizing each other – are unlikely. That’s why considering the existing situation, working on directions indicated might raise chances that A. Lukashenko would not win in the first round. Announcing the second round, undoubtedly, would have a demoralizing effect on his supporters, and on the contrary, would stimulate all factors contributing to the single candidate’s victory: positions of vacillatory electorate, nomenclatures, the Kremlin, etc. But in case A. Lukashenko wins, no matter whether international community recognizes the election results, elaboration of an efficient strategy for democratic forces is impossible without considering the circumstances described.