THE ELITE AND THE PAST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

According to the official line, publicized by state-run mass media, the presidential campaign of 2001 ended on September 9 in a full defeat of the opposition and an “elegant victory” by the first president. Perhaps, on the surface it looks like this. However, an analysis of results of the survey among public leaders and experts, conducted right after the election campaign was over, proves it is not that obvious. Let’s consider the most important results of the opinion poll, reflecting attitude of leaders towards the presidential election campaign.

So, the survey results reveal that the overwhelming majority of leaders (97.2%), regardless of structures they represent, took part, as intended, in the presidential election. We asked no open question in this respect, but it appears from answers to other questions (See Tables 1–3, 7).

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “When did you make decision to take part in voting?”*, %

* Here and in most cases below options “Find it difficult to answer” and “No answer” are excluded

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “When did you vote?”, %

Table  3. Distribution of answers to the question: “When did you make your final decision whom to vote for?”, %

Table 1 shows that more than 90% of leaders, regardless of structures they represent, made decision to participate in the election long before. Only a few of them – made their minds a day before or on the day of voting. Almost 86% of respondents cast their votes September 9, and only 11.3% prior to that day. In state structures almost every sixth voted in advance, in state structures – one out of 14 respondents (See Table 2). To some extent it proves the fact of coercion of state sector workers to vote ahead of time.

87.3% of leaders made their final decision long before the election date, that means it was more deliberate (See Table 3). Almost no one in non-state sector made final decision on the day of voting, whereas in state sector – 21.4%.

Table 4 demonstrates that more than 87% of leaders saw observers at polling stations. This is a further proof of the fact that at least in cities there was a wide network of monitoring the election.

Table  4. Distribution of answers to the question: “Were observers present at your polling stations during the voting process on September 9?”, %

As we could see from Table 5, every sixth leader underscored that he/she felt pressure to make him/her vote for a certain candidate. Both representatives of state and non-state sectors felt such pressure. At the same time, the absolute majority of leaders were not afraid of choosing the candidate they really supported (see Table 6). Nevertheless, more than 7% of state structures leaders had certain fears in this respect.

Table  5. Distribution of answers to the question: “Did you feel any pressure make you vote in favor of a certain candidate?”, %

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question: “Were you afraid of selecting the candidate you really supported?”, %

Almost three fourths of leaders (73.2%) stated they voted in favor of V. Goncharik (see Table 7). Among state sector workers he received half of all votes. However, 28.6% of their colleagues refused to answer this question, and we could suppose they also supported him. Therefore, supposedly more than half of leaders from state structures cast their votes in favor of V. Goncharik.

Meanwhile, comparing leaders’ voting results (see Table 7) with ratings of the candidates displayed in the previous opinion poll (see Table 8), we see that Belarus’ elite reacts flexibly to changes of objective conditions and makes its decisions in line with real circumstances.

Table 7. Distribution of answers to the question: “Whom did you vote for September 4-9?”, %

Table  8. Rating of the participants of the presidential campaign*, %

* The survey was conducted in July of 2001
** The names of those mentioned in both ratings are included

In July, as we know, the list of candidates was long enough and the elite had a chance to choose those whom it liked most. As we might note, the majority preferred S. Domash (at the expense of non-state sector representatives), and V. Goncharik was placed second but far behind (the first place with representatives of state structures). But after he became the single candidate from the opposition, the elite had to accept it, regardless of its preferences, supported him at the election (especially active were representatives of non-state sector, the majority of whom in July supported S. Domash).

As for the other candidates, S. Gaidukevich, as expected, received only 4.2% of leaders’ votes (first of all at the expense of non-state sector representatives), and A. Lukashenko – only 1.4%. Only 5.6% voted against all, which means the participants of the presidential election seemed acceptable for the overwhelming majority of leaders.

Such electoral preferences should be applied only while considering answers by respondents to the questions about the presidential election results. So, the overwhelming majority of respondents (85.4%) pinpointed that the candidate for whom they voted did not become the president (see Table 9), what proves they voted in favor of V. Goncharik. Naturally, they are not satisfied with the election results announced by the Central Election Commission (see Table 10).

Table  9. Distribution of answers to the question: “Did the candidate you voted for become the president?”, %

Table  10. Distribution of answers to the question: “Are you satisfied with the election results announced by the Central Election Commission?”, %

It is noteworthy that even before the election leaders sounded rather pessimistic. For example, they did not believe the election could be free and fair, and they became certain of that in practice. As one might see from Table 11, the recent survey results almost coincide with the July poll, just the number of positive answers dropped.

Table  11. Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think the presidential election would be (was) free and fair?”, %

One of the main reasons for such attitude is unequal conditions for candidates during the election, and 95.8% of leaders pinpointed this fact (Table 12). Their opinion does not depend on structures they represent.

Table 12. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think the candidates for presidency enjoyed equal conditions during the election?”, %

Another reason is distrust of the overwhelming majority of leaders to the election results announced by the Central Election Commission (see Table 13). Here, of course, state sector representatives are at variance with their non-state sector colleagues: only 46.4% of state sector representatives expressed distrust, in non-state sector – 90.6%.

Table 13. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think the election results announced by the Central Election Commission could be trusted?”, %

Table 14 demonstrates that almost all leaders, regardless of structures they represent, are confident that people’s trust in the election results would have been stronger if election commissions have included representatives of all political forces. As we know, during the 2001 election campaign Belarus’ authorities did their best to prevent representatives of the opposition from entering such commissions. Meanwhile, none of leaders supported such variant of their formation (see Table 14).

Table  14. Distribution of answers to the question: “Many Belarusians do not trust the election results because local election commissions did not include representatives of the opposition. What do you think in this respect?”, %

Expressing distrust in the official election results, leaders also do not very much trust the figures announced by V. Goncharik. As we see from Table 15, distribution of answers is almost equal. Mostly non-state sector representatives are inclined to believe V. Goncharik’s information, whereas state sector representatives express distrust. About one third of respondents in both sectors declined to answer this question.

Table  15. Distribution of answers to the question: “What is your attitude towards the election results announced by V. Goncharik?”, %

Table 16 proves that in general leaders were not very active during the past election campaign. Especially state sector representatives, who, in particular, admitted they took no part in the process of signature collection or monitoring the election. In this respect leaders from non-state structures proved more active. Over 16% of them stated they took part in monitoring the election.

Table  16. Distribution of answers to the question: “How did you participate in the presidential election?”, % (more than one answer is possible)

Perhaps, this circumstance became for them an argument on the basis of which almost three fourths of non-state structures leaders agree with the opposition saying there were numerous violations during the process of voting (see Table 17). Less than 18% of state sector representatives think this way, and other two thirds noted only minor violations, which did not affect the election results. It is worth mentioning that almost none of leaders believe there were no violations at all.

Table  17. Distribution of answers to the question: “The opposition claims there were numerous violations (voting for other people, issuing a voting bulleting without checking voter’s passport, coercion of voters to vote ahead of time, etc.) during the voting process on September 9. Do you agree with it?”, %

Undoubtedly, criteria of significance of such violations are rather ambiguous. What seems significant for some leaders, others consider insignificant. In particular, many leaders from state sector do not think coercion to vote before time or issuing a bulletin without checking one’s passport is a serious violation of law. It is proved by Table 18, which shows that both in state sector and non-state sector the same number of respondents personally noted similar violations. As for non-state sector representatives, many of them spotted different violations in the process of voting at polling stations. It is worth paying attention to the fact that more than half of leaders (62%) personally witnessed compulsion of voters to vote ahead of time.

Table  18. Distribution of answers to the question: “Did you personally spot any violations during the voting at polling stations?”, % (more than one answer is possible)

Aside from violations of the election law during the voting process, leaders pointed at a greater number of violations during the election campaign as a whole (see Table 19). So, 94.4% of them referred to a monopolization of state-run mass media by one candidate (naturally, not V. Goncharik or S. Gaidukevich!). almost 79% of respondents said the authorities prevented A. Lukashenko’s opponents from campaigning. About 60% believe that visual propaganda was upset and financial resource beyond official limits were used, etc. In fact, state sector representatives point at the same violations, though not so actively. Table 20 proves that according to the overwhelming majority of leaders (almost 79%) all these violations were made in favor of A. Lukashenko. Comments are excessive!

Table  19. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think any violations took place during the election campaign as a whole?”, % (more than one answer is possible)

Table  20. Distribution of answers to the question: “If you spotted such violations, in favor of whom, do you think, they were made?”, %

Table  21. Distribution of answers to the question: “Respected international structures (OSCE, European Parliament, Council of Europe, etc.) claim the presidential election in Belarus did not correspond to the OSCE standards. Some people think it is fair, other – unfair. What do you think?”, %

Not surprisingly, almost three fourths of public opinion leaders and experts agree with respected international structures saying the election in Belarus did not correspond to the existing OSCE standards (see Table 21). Only 5.6% think in the opposite; in state sector – only 10.7%.