“Who could oppose A. Lukashenko today? Who needs cosmic rating to be invented?” – Rakhat Lukumov asks sarcastically in the editor’s column of Sovetskaya Belorussia (“respectable newspaper for respectable people”), ardently “denouncing” the results of latest studies by “independent sociologists”. But why should someone oppose the president if “A. Lukashenko remains the acknowledged leader and if there were an election today – the result would have been the same as last year!” Naturally, why? The country prospers, wages and pensions rise, investments come in, birth rate increases, and numerous international organizations repeatedly invite Belarus to join them… There is no need to be a sociologist or psychologist to imagine the expression of anyone who reads these lines – from the president himself and Mr. Lukumov to common citizens. The majority of Belarusians knows (or at least feels) the truth – for that purpose “respectable people” have only to get off their BMW or Mercedes and take a city bus or trolley-bus in any settlement and in any direction. But we shall not turn to the common level of the discussion, let’s better consider the findings of the latest public opinion poll.
How many people in Belarus read independent press, which publishes results of opinion polls conducted by non-state research centers? We will not argue about figures – clearly, much less than state-run press. Undoubtedly, neither the “respectable newspaper” nor the Belarusian television reports the falling president’s rating. This is how Belarusians reacted to a simple question regarding A. Lukashenko’s rating (See Table 1).
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question “Do you think A. Lukashenko’s rating (i.e. people’s readiness to vote for him at the next election) has increased or decreased since the 2001 presidential еlection?”
For each person who is confident that the president’s rating increased, there are four those who believe it fell. And there are twofold more regular readers of Sovetskaya Belorussia than of Narodnaya Volya in the latter group! As the saying goes, murder will out.
But Mr. Lukumov’s question is not an idle one. Until it remains unanswered, Belarus will plunge deeper into the past, and its citizens will more often think about emigration (as of today, about 40% of Belarusians would like to move to another country). Do Belarusians have chances of an alternative? We’ll try to answer this question (See Table 2).
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question “Do you know a candidate who could successfully compete with A. Lukashenko at the next presidential election?”
As we see, the majority of our fellow citizens (five against one) see no alternative to the president, although they begin thinking about it. However, a correlation analysis of the answers to this question revealed a striking fact: 3fold more people among those who believe that A. Lukashenko’s rating dropped after the 2001 presidential election know an alternative candidate than among those who say it went up. That means that the first condition for the appearance of an alternative – awareness of the majority of the population of the president’s real rating – is met.
Let’s see if such an alternative can appear in the circle of political opposition (See Table 3).
Table 3. Comparative analysis of electoral preferences of different groups of voters, %
| If the following politicians were candidates at the next presidential election, could vote for: |
All respondents
|
Convinced A. Lukashenko’s opponents (41.7)
|
Know an alternative to A. Lukashenko (15.8)
|
| А. Lukashenko |
17.8
|
0
|
3.4
|
| Candidate, chosen successor of А. Lukashenko |
7.1
|
0
|
3.4
|
| V. Vecherko (BPF Adradzhenne) |
*
|
3.6
|
5.5
|
| S. Gaidukevich (LDPB) |
7.7
|
13.6
|
25.4
|
| S. Kalyakin (BCP) |
*
|
*
|
3.0
|
| А. Lebedko (UCP) |
*
|
5.1
|
6.4
|
| М. Marinich (Delovaya Initsiativa) |
*
|
4.5
|
5.5
|
| Z. Poznyak (CCP of BPF) |
*
|
4.7
|
8,9
|
| V. Polevikova (Nadzeya)** |
3.5
|
6.8
|
3.4
|
| Another candidate |
5.4
|
7.2
|
10.6
|
| Do not know yet, will judge by circumstances |
40.5
|
44.4
|
16.9
|
* The ratings of these politicians is below the margin of error (3%)
** The questionnaire was worked out before the USDP congress
At first sight, the picture is not very comforting: only two opposition politicians enjoy rating exceeding the margin of error, and more than 40% of the respondents cannot make their choice. We have witnessed a similar picture for many years already. But there are new important circumstances. First, A. Lukashenko’s rating (together with his possible successor) levels at 25% (open rating, as we have recently reported, is 27% today), what is 20% less than during his first term of presidency. Second, if among A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents and the electorate as a whole the number of those who are ready to vote for an alternative candidate is almost equal to the number of those who have not made their choice yet, then among those who know such a candidate there are 4fold more voters who are determined with the alternative candidate than those undecided yet. That means the knowledge of such an alternative is the most important factor for choosing an alternative candidate. In other words, the candidate’s personal features, his political program, team, etc., are secondary factors under such conditions. The main thing is that the candidate appears not only on political arena, but in public consciousness. Another important proof of this statement: 15% of those who know about the alternative candidate are people who a year ago … voted for A. Lukashenko! Having known the alternative, they are ready to reject the former idol. Knowledge is power! That is the second condition of a real alternative, which, unlike the first one, has not been met yet.
But how such knowledge could be achieved? A comparative analysis of these electoral groups on social-demographic profile revealed almost no critical differences between them (which could explain knowledge or absence of knowledge about A. Lukashenko’s possible competitor). Expectedly, among those who know such a candidate, there are more men, people with higher level of education, youth, students, people working in the private sector, residents of the capital having higher incomes. And on the contrary, among those who do not know such a candidate, there are more women, people with lower level of education, aged people, pensioners, residents of towns and villages having lower incomes.
People’s moods, their vision of the most important problems of social-economic and public-political development of the country play a great role in their desire to know more about a possible alternative (See Table 4).
Table 4. Comparative analysis of the electorate knowing the candidate who could successfully compete with A. Lukashenko at the presidential election, and those who do not know such candidate, %
| Social characteristics |
Know
|
Do not know
|
| Estimation of the economic situation in Belarus over the last year: | ||
| Has improved |
4.7
|
6.1
|
| Has remained unchanged |
29.4
|
39.3
|
| Has deteriorated |
60.1
|
48.7
|
| Would wish their children do private business: | ||
| Yes |
70.2
|
48.7
|
| No |
15.3
|
30.7
|
| Satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling: | ||
| Rather/partially satisfied |
15.3
|
43.8
|
| Rather/partially dissatisfied |
82.1
|
52.9
|
| Our country develops: | ||
| In the right direction |
9.7
|
23.5
|
| In a wrong direction |
68.7
|
46.0
|
| Would like emigrate: | ||
| Yes |
51.4
|
35.6
|
| Would not like moving anywhere |
39.8
|
57.9
|
| Estimation of law observance in the country: | ||
| All are equal before the law and a perpetrator shall account for any crime |
7.7
|
16.9
|
| Those who hold high posts could escape punishment |
45.2
|
32.1
|
| Estimation of change of authorities during A. Lukashenko’s rule: | ||
| Power and arbitrariness of authorities have increased |
64.2
|
39.2
|
| Power and arbitrariness of authorities have decreased |
21.0
|
35.8
|
| Believe that after the 2001 presidential election A. Lukashenko’s rating: | ||
| Has increased |
7.2
|
19.1
|
| Has decreased |
80.4
|
56.5
|
| At a possible referendum on changing the Constitution to make A. Lukashenko eligible for the third consecutive term would vote: | ||
| For such changes |
4.2
|
17.9
|
| Against such changes |
77.9
|
46.2
|
| At the election to local Council in spring 2003 would prefer to vote for: | ||
| Candidate-supporters of A. Lukashenko |
6.2
|
32.1
|
| Candidate-opponent of A. Lukashenko |
57.1
|
26.1
|
| Another candidate |
24.1
|
14.7
|
| Support the integration of Belarus and Russia: | ||
| On the principles of the European Union |
65.6
|
45.7
|
| By means of Belarus becoming part of Russia |
17.8
|
22.9
|
| At a possible referendum on the question suggested by V. Putin in August (the unification of Belarus and Russia on three principles): | ||
| Would say they agree |
23.0
|
34.4
|
| Would say they disagree |
41.7
|
23.7
|
| Will judge by circumstances |
26.8
|
32.7
|
| Believe that Belarus shall uphold the same course for rapprochement with the West as Russia does: | ||
| Yes |
70.5
|
56.8
|
| No |
11.7
|
14.4
|
| Confidence in non-state mass media: | ||
| Trust |
50.2
|
29.3
|
| Distrust |
35.9
|
41.6
|
| Confidence in non-state research centers: | ||
| Trust |
52.4
|
35.0
|
| Distrust |
23.0
|
25.8
|
| Attitude towards the recent court trials of non-state newspapers: | ||
| Consider fair |
7.3
|
18.0
|
| Consider unfair |
66.6
|
35.7
|
| Attitude towards introduction of state control over study and formation of public opinion: | ||
| Support |
12.8
|
19.4
|
| Do not support |
74.6
|
54.7
|
The difference between these groups is obvious: those who know the alternative candidate are dominated by supporters of democracy, market economy, law-abiding state and Belarus’ independence. But there are no mirror-like distributions, with minor exceptions, among these electoral groups. That means unlike other “dividing lines” of Belarus’ electorate (on its attitude towards the president and his course, the integration with Russia, etc.), the groups of “knowledge – lack of knowledge of an alternative to A. Lukashenko” are not antagonistic. In turn, that means such division could be overcome: if people know the president’s real rating and an alternative candidate, a considerable part of the second group may join the first group and form the majority of the electorate. The last table reveals the most important mechanisms to meet the second condition – non-state research centers studying public opinion and non-state press publishing findings of this study (we shall also note that in conditions of the Belarusian information space Russia’s research centers and TV channels could play the same and even a bigger role).
As we see today there is no one to “invent a cosmic rating for” – neither the opposition leaders, nor the president. Unlike Rakhat Lukumov and his colleagues stuffing “respectable people” with tales about the “firmness of the acknowledged leader” (probably such “throwing dust in people’s eyes” is their latent Fronde?), on the basis of the received data we state that if the above conditions are met Belarus could have a chance of a real alternative. Who and how will use these chances – the opposition, the president or his entourage (by means of launching true reforms), a “third” or maybe “outside force” – remains as open question. But the one who skillfully takes advantages of them will become the winner.