Survey findings reveal that nine of the ten adult Belarusians (89.1%) have already come to some conclusions on what they will have in case of our country’s incorporation into Russia (See Table 1). As one can see, 45.5% of the respondents expect to see positive results and 1.5-fold less people (30.1%) expect negative results. Another 13.5% of the respondents don’t expect any outcomes.
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question “Will, in your opinion, Belarus’ incorporation into Russia have positive or negative impact on the lives of the Belarusians?”
Among hypothetically positive results of Belarus’ incorporation top the improvement of the economic state (34.8% of answers) and improvement in the people’s standard of living (20.7%). Only 8.8% expect improvement of state of democracy. No other positive outcomes will happen, according to the respondents (See Table 2).
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question “If you believe Belarus’ incorporation into Russia will have a positive impact on the lives of people, then how positive?” (more than one answer is possible)
The list of hypothetically negative outcomes of this event is essentially more various. It is led by the perspectives for the Belarusians to fight in the “hot spots” of the old new “Homeland” (24.3%), growth of criminal activity and corruption (16.1%), loss of national morale and national culture (12.8%) and decline in the standard of living (11.9%). Yet, other negatives outcomes also have many votes (See Table 3). If judging by the number of answers to the questions from Tables 2 and 3, the citizens are above all concerned about negative outcomes of the integration.
Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question “If you believe Belarus’ incorporation into Russia will have a negative impact on the lives of people, then how negative?” (more than one answer is possible)
Such negative expectations and absence of clear conception of which type of integration the citizens need, seems, have resulted in voter’s obvious confusion on the perspectives of Russia-Belarus relations. Nearly third (28.8%) of the respondents does not share the views of our countries’ leaders on the integration perspectives; the views of the latter, as it is known, essentially diverge (See Table 4). The support of A. Lukashenko’s and V. Putin’s standpoints is rather low (slightly over a quarter of respondents) and isn’t at much variance (less than a margin of error).
Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question “There are different opinions on the future of Russia-Belarus relations. Do you support the opinion of Russia’s President V. Putin or Belarus’ President A. Lukashenko?”
Such uncertainty of integration perspectives and fear of its negative outcomes have, in our opinion, strengthened self-identification of an average Belarusian citizen and have led to a deeper comprehension of their clear social and ethnic distinctions from the Eastern neighbors (See Table 5). In particular, the number of those who cannot see such distinctions has decreased by 6.5 points for six months (from 44% to 37.5%), the number of those who believe the Belarusians differ from the Russians with their culture and traditions increased by 6.2 points (from 27.3% to 33.6%) and with their history – by 4 points (from 22.3% to 26.3%).
Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question “In which manner do the Belarusians differ from the Russians?”, % (more than one answer is possible)
Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question “In the ten years to come Belarus will, in your opinion:”
| Variant of answer |
%
|
| Remain a sovereign state but its dependence from Russia will grow stronger |
34.9
|
| Incorporate into Russia |
33.4
|
| Remain a sovereign state but its independence from Russia will grow stronger |
9.6
|
This tendency indicates that the Belarusians are not willing to lose their identity and “dissolve” in the vast expanses of the “great” country among hundreds other national minorities. Especially since the respondents are rather pessimistic about the perspectives of the Belarusian independence – 68.3% are convinced that within next ten years Belarus will either incorporate into Russia or its dependence from Russia will grow stronger (See Table 6).
