The survey findings show that the autumn crisis of integration moods within Belarusian electorate caused by the tenseness in relations between A. Lukashenko and V. Putin seems has finally wound up this spring. As we see from Table 1, the number of those who support the idea of Russia-Belarus’ unification into a single state has increased 1.2-fold for the past three months (from 21.2% to 25.6%) whereas the number of those who support the integration variants that presuppose maintaining independence of both countries has decreased by 4.1 points. And although at present there are 2.6-fold more supporters of independence than the “unionists”, the tendency is obvious.
Table 1. Dynamics of answer distribution to the question “Which variant of Russia-Belarus integration would you personally prefer?”, %
| Variant of answer |
12’02
|
03’03
|
| Belarus and Russia should form a union of independent states with close political and economic relations |
51.7
|
48.0
|
| Belarus and Russia should become a single state with a common president, army, flag, currency, etc. |
21.2
|
25.6
|
| Relations between Belarus and Russia should be like between other CIS member-states |
19.7
|
19.3
|
Slightly increased (by 3.7 points) a rather high level of hypothetical voting at a hypothetical referendum for unification of two countries while the number of those against have decreased (by 2.5 points) (See Table 2). And a similar tendency, with certain fluctuations, has been observed during the past three years.
Table 2. Voting at a hypothetical referendum on the unification of Belarus and Russia, %
Content contradiction of data in Tables 1 and 2 observed for already a long period time is most likely explained by respondents’ misunderstanding of the term “unification” of two countries: from forming a single state to joint production of energy resources in the Tiumen region or joint maintenance of the pipeline “Druzhba”.
Growth of the Eastern integration moods within the electorate seems has brought up certain decrease in the number of those who supported the idea of Belarus’ joining into the European Union. Thus, Table 3 shows that for the past 6 months supporters of this idea went down from 60.9% to 56.4%, i.e. nearly by 8%. Due to this very reason a possible support of the Russia-Belarus Union State’s constitution increased by 4.2 points (See Table 4). Opponents of the idea have decreased by exactly the same number.
Table 3. Voting at a hypothetical referendum on Belarus’ joining the European Union, %
Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question “If there were a referendum on adopting Russia-Belarus UnionState’s Constitution, how would you vote?”, %
Such fluctuations in the integration moods, as the survey findings show, are hard to explain with certain objective reasons initiating adequate dynamics of the public opinion. In particular, there have been few changes in the comparative evaluation by the respondents of the each country’s “achievements” in the sphere of democratic transformations (See Table 5). General evaluations of the living conditions in both countries haven’t become much closer (See Table 6).
Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question “Do you think Belarus or Russia achieved greater progress in building democratic states and civil societies?”, %
Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question “Do you think people live better in Belarus or in Russia nowadays?”, %
There is certain answer to this question, as we see it, in Table 2. As one can notice, integration moods usually grow stronger in spring and grow weaker in autumn. We assume this dynamics is stipulated by the season character of CIS citizens’ employment, including the Belarusians, in Russia. Of course, such a conclusion needs more thorough analysis but spring aggravation isn’t yet a reason to order a prayer service for Belarus’ peace of soul.
