AMBIVALENT GEOPOLITICAL CHOICE

In the recent months, the geopolitical likes of Belarusians have undergone notable changes, though not cardinal (Tables 1-3).

Table 1. Dynamics of answering the question: “If a referendum were held nowadays in Belarus on the issue of Belarus joining the European Union, what would be your choice?”, %

It follows from Table 1 that, at least, the tendency for the decline in pro-European moods has changed: the percent of “Euro-Belarusians” has increased significantly. Meanwhile, the number of opponents of Belarus Euro-integration has also grown, though not so much. There established an approximate balance between the proponents and opponents of Euro-integration.

Table 2. Dynamics of answering the question “If a referendum on Belarus integration with Russia were held today, how would you vote?”, %

However, the percent of the supporters of the integration with Russia has grown simultaneously, there are still less numerous than the opponents of this project, but the gap has reduced considerably (Table 2).

As for the replies to the dichotomous question on the choice between Russia and European Union, after a burst of pro-Russian moods in the previous quarter there was observed a certain decline in such moods (Table 3).

Table 3. Dynamics of answering the question: “If you had to choose between the integration with Russia and membership in the European Union, what would you choose?”, %

Hence, in terms of the above wording of the question we can state an approximate balance between the supporters of the alternatives of the geopolitical choice (the overbalance of Russia is a bit more than a coverage error).

However, other aspects of relationships with Russia and European Union have changed more significantly, though over a longer time period (Table 4-5).

Table 4. Dynamics of answering the question: “In your opinion, where do the people have a better life: in Belarus or in the EU countries?”, %

* This variant of answer was not offered

Table 5. Dynamics of answering the question: “In your opinion, where do the people have a better life: in Belarus or in Russia?”, %

Emphasis should also be put on the fact of almost four-fold growth of the number of those who assesses the Russian life standard higher than the Belarusian one, as well as the fact of the ratio change: whereas in the mid-2000s the percent of those who preferred the Belarusian way of life had been for several years exceeding the percent of those considering that they were better off in Russia, nowadays the ratio is reversed (Table 5).

Probably, such comparisons are one of the reasons explaining the fact that many Belarusians would prefer to go abroad for work or study (Table 6).

Table 6. Distribution of the answers to the question: “Would you like to work/study abroad?”, % (more than one answer is possible)

The above data may be analyzed from the opposite perspective (cf.: a glass may be half full and half empty, which is all the same). Approximately every second of the respondents does not feel like going anywhere from Belarus even for a while. On the other hand, almost the same number of respondents (slightly more than 50%) would prefer to leave the Motherland for a while, moreover, 8% would like to go anywhere, if only from Belarus. Thereat, the preferred destinations of study and work are Europe and the USA.

The wish to see the world is especially popular with the young people. But if they at all times and everywhere have been carried away with ‘the wind of adventure’, the same could not be said about persons with higher education and ‘Euro-Belarusians. Regarding these social groups, it is an obvious case of frustration, a feeling of no opportunity to realize oneself in the contemporary Belarus. However, there is rather a big distance from a wish or even intention to the realization thereof, so the emigration potential is not so much a forecasting parameter as an indicator of the attitude of people to the current situation in their own country.

As was shown above, we can observe an approximate balance between the supporters of the alternatives of the Belarusian geopolitical choice. At the same time, as regards the question on the opportunity to receive economic aid, hopes are mostly pinned with Russia (Table 7).

Table 7. Distribution of the answers to the question: “Which country or union of nations could provide economic aid to Belarus under the conditions you think acceptable?” (more than one answer is possible)

Nonetheless, a sum of hopes for the West (EU+USA) makes up 40.6%. In the context of Russian generous gifts showering upon Belarus in the recent months, and rather adversary relationships of the official Minsk with the West, this level of hopes for the Western aid seems fairly high.

In March 2012, V. Putin became president of Russia again. It would be curious to contrast the attitude to the old new president of Russia against the attitude to his predecessor likewise in three months after the election (Table 8).

Table 8. Attitude to the presidents of Russia, %

The attitude to V. Putin is definitely positive, but it is notably worse than the attitude to D. Medvedev was after the election of the latter. However, D. Medvedev in June 2008 was, in fact, the unknown for Belarusians, “a pig in a poke (or rather a bear! the Russian family name “Medvedev” derives from the word “medved”, which is “bear” in English)“, and a warm attitude to him was a kind of advance pay. V. Putin is a well-known character in Belarus, and not all Belarusians enjoy his policy towards Belarus.

A reserved attitude to the incumbent president of Russia is also confirmed by the dynamics of his “ideal rating”, i.e. the percent of respondents who have chosen V. Putin, while answering the question “Who of the politicians listed below do you sympathize with most of all, who matches your political ideal?”: June 2004, 39.3%; 4 years ago, 31.2%; today, 19.2%.

It is notable that the attitude to the favorite foreign-policy child of V. Putin, i.e. the Eurasian Union, near exactly matches the attitude to his persona (Table 9).

Table 9. Distribution of the answers to the question: “President of Russia V. Putin has declared creation of a close Eurasian union with participation of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and, possibly, other countries one of his political priorities. What is your attitude to this idea?”

To all appearances, the mass consciousness tends to identify not the leader with the country, but rather the politician and the policy, so the attitude to V. Putin and to Putin’s policy is closely related. Besides, as regards the long-term plans of the Kremlin Master, nearly every tenth is against these plans, while the assessment of effectiveness of the Eurasian Union approach invokes a wider disillusionment (Table 10).

Table 10. Distribution of the answers to the question: “From January 1, 2012 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are in the Common Economic Space. In your opinion, what are the consequences of Belarus joining this interstate structure?”

Nevertheless, in this case again the percent of supporters is approximately the same as the percent of the supporters of V. Putin, and the same as the number of the supporters of his plan of a Eurasian union, that is almost a half of the respondents.

In general, there are very few people who expect big changes in the Belarus-Russia relationships from V. Putin’s come-back to the Kremlin (Table 11).

Table 11. Distribution of the answers to the question: “In your opinion, how will the relationships between Belarus and Russia change under the new president of Russia?”

What intrigues in the replies to the questions about the Eurasian Union and the Common Economic Space is quite a small percent of stern opponents of these projects; they make up 10.7% and 18% correspondingly. Well, where are the rest “Euro-Belarusians”, who, according to the questions of Tables 1 and 3, make up about 40%? Are they afraid? But why aren’t they afraid to say that they prefer integration with EU and not with Russia? Don’t they understand that CES and the Eurasian Union do not very much agree with the slogan “Belarus goes to Europe” even in the context of the rhetoric “integration of integrations”?

Apparently, they don’t understand in a sense, to be more exact, they don’t want to accept the rigid disjunction of the geopolitical choice. And the reasons for this are cultural and mental by nature according to the data of Tables 12 and 13.

Table 12. Dynamics of answering the question: “Do you rather consider yourself a modern European person or a Soviet person?”, %

Table 13. Dynamics of answering the question: “Who do you feel closer to: Russians or Europeans?”, %

Over the six years, “the Soviet club” has lost some members and they do not make up a majority any more, but they are still in the majority (Table 12). Moreover, cultural self-identity is even more exhibitory. Whereas in the political context there is an approximate balance between the geopolitical alternatives, in the cultural and mental sense, one alternative overbalances the other more than twice (Table 13).

The data of Table 14 reveal the structure of the above identification variants.

Table 14. Correlation of the answers to the questions: “Do you rather consider yourself a modern European person or a Soviet person?” and “Who do you feel closer to: Russians or Europeans?”*,%

* The table should be read horizontally

“Soviet people” demonstrate their close relationship to Russians in a vast majority. However, almost a half of “Europeans” also feel closer to Russians and not to Europeans. This internal ambivalence (even not of the society as a whole, but of individual mentalities) explains well many contradictions in the Belarusian geopolitical choice.

Table 15 illustrates relations of this choice with the most of the indicator described above.

Table 15. Correlation of the geopolitical choice and socio-demographic and political characteristics *, %

* The table should be read horizontally

The correlation of the geopolitical choice and socio-demographic characteristics has been described in IISEPS materials many times and this correlation remains unchanged: young people, educated people, men, frequent users of the Internet are more attracted by Europe, and the elderly, undereducated people, women, and people rarely using the Internet, by Russia.

The assessments of the life standards in Belarus and abroad are associated with the geopolitical choice which is a bit paradoxical: those who think the life is better in Belarus than in Russia choose Russia; those who assess higher the Russian life standard choose EU.

The cultural identity has a great effect on the choice, but it doesn’t fully determines it: a quarter of not only the respondents who feel closer to Russians but also of those considering themselves Soviet people prefer Europe and not Russia.

The attitude to V. Putin and his policy towards Belarus are related with the geopolitical choice, but this correlation is mostly one-way: those having a negative attitude to the president of Russia and his geopolitical project almost all choose EU; those demonstrating an indifferent attitude are also for EU but not all of them; those supporting V. Putin and his policy are for Russia in the majority, but nearly a quarter of the latter are for Euro-integration.

And finally, internal political preferences are related to the choice between Russia and EU in a well expectable manner: those who are for A. Lukashenko are for Russia; those who are against are for EU.