WIND FROM THE EAST

As Mao Zedong used to say, “The wind from the East weighs upon the wind from the West”. With the help of this phrase it is possible, at least partly, to describe the results of the IISEPS latest opinion poll concerning the geopolitical choice of Belarusians (Table 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of answering the question: “If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?”, %

It is easy to see that in March 2012 the level of sympathy in favor of integration with Russia (in the wording of the question of Table 1) proved to be the highest for the last 5 years, having come close to the 50 percent mark. A growth in the attitude was registered already at the end of the previous year. The obvious reasons which can explain it are as follows: generous Russian economic support, positive information “wrapping” of the steps directed at integration, such as formation of the Common Free Market Zone (CFMZ) of three countries, and certain economic benefits that Belarus got from the CFMZ. Some of these factors could act with a lag – the peak of Russian economic presents’ handout fell upon February of the current year. As, judging by the data of the opinion poll, acuteness of the economic crisis in Belarus has appreciably decreased (at least, the acuteness of its perception has decreased), the relief could have been attributed to the Russian assistance by the public opinion, too.

In addition, the bitter political and diplomatic quarrel between official Minsk and the EU and though restrained and so far rhetorical support of Belarus on the part of Russia in the conflict could also tip the public sympathy scales towards Moscow. As we can see, a growth in the share of “Belo-Russians” was accompanied by a slight decrease in the pro-European attitude.

The poll results show that a relative majority of respondents assess negatively the sanctions which the EU has already imposed on Minsk and which are being planned for the future (Tables 2-3). The mentioned majority is relative, and perhaps due to the fact the conflict did not give rise to a sharp fall in pro-European sympathy.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “The EU and the USA are extending sanctions against the leadership of Belarus – now over 300 of Belarusian officials, judges and others headed by A. Lukashenko, who are held responsible for breaching democracy and human rights will be forbidden these countries. Some people think it is a good idea, others – it is a bad one. And what is your opinion?”

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “Some politicians in Belarus and in the West urge not to hold the world hockey championship in 2014 in Belarus if by that time human rights violations do not cease in the country. What is your attitude to the suggestion?”

At that the essence of the West principle demand which is advanced as the main motive of the sanctions is in fact shared by a significant majority of respondents (Table 4).

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “Western countries are trying to make Belarusian authorities release the people convicted for participation in manifestations after the election of 2010. Various opinions are expressed on this subject. Which of them do you agree with?”

The majority is for the discharge of political prisoners (the majority of this majority is for the discharge of these people as not guilty, and not because the West demands it); the sanctions, however, do not arouse such unanimity.

On the other hand, a growth in pro-Russian sympathy does not mean universal enthusiasm concerning any forms of integration and expansion of Russian influence. During the last months the Russian party, including V. Putin, spoke more than once about the desirability of Belarus switching over to the Russian ruble. However, with all due respect to the eastern neighbor even multiplied by the complicated economic situation in Belarus, the idea found support among very few respondents (Table 5).

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “What is your attitude to the idea of Belarus switching over to the Russian ruble?”

A comparison of the data of Tables 1 and 5 shows that at transferring from an abstract question about integration to a concrete and delicate one the share of supporters of the Russian variant decreases more than by a third.

Still less joy was stirred up by the final selling of “Beltransgaz” to Russia. Even the eloquence of the head of Belarusian state did not help here, although he assured people there had been no other way out and talked exactly in the spirit of some liberal economists about the “rusty pipe”. The population treated the loss of the Belarusian state’s control over one of the country’s main economic assets rather badly (Table 6).

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question: “Last year Belarus completely sold the gas-transport system “Beltransgaz” to Russia. What is your attitude to the transaction?”

There are more than three times fewer supporters of selling the “rusty pipe” to the ally and brother than of those who generally prefer integration with the RF. It testifies to the peculiarity of ideas about the integration form.

It may well be so that a completely new factor became one of the reasons for a pro-Russian shift in Belarusian public consciousness. It is, so to say, the Bolotnaya echo, Russian mass political protests which began after the last year’s December elections for the State Duma. When answering the question about the actions, 28.7% of respondents assessed them positively, 23% – negatively, the rest either did not answer or said it made no difference to them.

There is approximately the same ratio in comparative assessments of honesty of the Belarusian and Russian elections (Table 7).

Table 7. Distribution of answers to the question: “In what country, in your opinion, are elections more honest – in Belarus or in Russia?”

Attention should be paid to the fact that answers with the same assessments of electoral processes – positive or negative – enjoy the greatest popularity. At that, however, assessments of the authorities’ actions with regard to demonstrators who protested after the voting are characterized by a marked asymmetry.

Table 8. Distribution of answers to the question: “In Belarus after the election of 2010 authorities used force to disperse protest actions, and Russian authorities in 2011 did not use force against participants of such actions. How do you assess the actions of the authorities in the RB and in the RF?”

Here the assessments’ balance is in favor of Russian authorities. It should be noted that the number of those who think that Belarusian authorities acted in the wrong way on December 19, 2010 is quite large and corresponds well with the share of those who believe that participants of the manifestation are in prison sine culpa (see Table 4). It should also be mentioned that adherents of universality of the principle “to drag and not to let out” make up a comparatively small share of respondents. However, those who think that Belarusian authorities acted in the right way in December 2010 total 44.5% – approximately as much as their opponents.

Finally answering the question about projection of Russian protests on Belarus, quite a large number of respondents considered them possible (Table 9).

Table 9. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think the same large-scale protest actions as in Russia after the last year’s elections are possible in Belarus after the current year’s parliamentary elections?”

The data of Tables 10 and 11 let us assess to what extent a growth in the pro-Russian sympathy has happened owing to those who treat Russian protests that occurred after the previous year’s election for the State Duma positively.

Table 10. Attitude protests in Russia and socio-demographic and political characteristics, %

* The table is read across

The attitude is rather anticipated – young people, the educated, frequent users of the Internet are more inclined to assess manifestations in Bolotnaya, Sakharov Ave and Pushkinskaya positively (Table 10). Political preferences prove to be another strong differentiating factor: there are several-fold more supporters of Russian protests among the dissatisfied with Belarusian authorities and their opponents than among adherents of home authorities.

However, if we analyze thanks to what groups the attitude to Belarusian and Russian integration has changed for 9 months, it will become clear that the correlation here is much more complicated (Table 11).

Table 11. Dynamics of the geopolitical choice in terms of socio-demographic groups and political preferences, %

* The table is read across

Although young people and the educated are inclined to integration with Russia to the least extent, a rise in pro-Russian sympathy touched them, too: for 9 months the share of “Belo-Russians” has grown by approximately a third among young people and people with higher education. It is not ruled out that for a part of them it became a consequence of their response to Russian protests. However, it follows from the correlation of a geopolitical choice with political preferences proper that the share is not large. In the groups with the greatest sympathy for demonstrators of Bolotnaya and Sakharov the share of integration with Russia adherents has remained virtually immutable – sympathy for Russian opposition did not give rise to a desire to unite with a country where such nice people lived.

The last lines of Table 11 illustrate it in an integrated form – supporters of Russian protests in general treat integration with Russia much more reservedly than opponents of Bolotnaya. Europe is closer for those for whom Bolotnaya is closer, just as for participants of Russian demonstrations.

In conclusion let us present connection of answers to the question about a possible repetition of Russian protests after the autumn parliamentary elections in Belarus (Table 12). This, however, is by definition already a question of home not foreign policy.

Table 12. Projection of Russian protests on Belarus, socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences, %

* The table is read across

Dependences are quite anticipated: young people, the educated and frequenters of the Internet are more inclined to expect Belarusian Bolotnaya. Also respondents, who state worsening of their financial standing, do not see in prospect improvement of the economic situation, those who do not feel protected from the arbitrary rule of authorities, expect protests more. Attitude to opposition is a strong differentiating factor – over a quarter of respondents among its supporters definitely expect protests. Finally, perhaps the largest share of those who consider protests quite possible is among adherents of boycotting the parliamentary elections. What makes the situation similar to the Russian one in December 2011? There participants of the protest actions actually did not have their representatives at the Duma elections and demanding honest elections was a form of expressing rejection of the whole political system.