While A. Lukashenko continues to believe in the correctness of the policy chosen 18 years ago, the majority of Belarusians continue to consider him the main person responsible for the present crisis in Belarus (Pict. 1). It should be mentioned, however, that in 2011 his fault decreased considerably relative to the government.

It is clear that supporters and opponents of the authorities (and for a typical representative of the Belarusian “majority” authorities is A. Lukashenko) estimate the responsibility of the head of state and government for the crisis to a varying degree. The head of state is an indisputable leader for the opponents of the authorities – 76.5% vs. 57.2%, and the government is “in the lead” by a slender margin for the authorities’ supporters – 31.3% vs. 27.5%.

Approaching of assessments of the responsibility level of the government and head of state relative to the crisis peak (September 2011) occurred due to a decrease in the responsibility of the latter. At that the level of the government’s responsibility has not virtually changed. Responsibility of other policy subjects listed in Pict. 1 did not change considerably either. Using the stock brokers’ terminology one can talk about high volatility of A. Lukashenko’s personal responsibility for the country’s economy condition. It is not surprising: he, who has concentrated full authority in his hands, has to assume the main responsibility, too.

The key person responsible for the crisis simultaneously plays the role of the key subject Belarusians pin their hopes for surmounting the crisis on (Pict. 2). Attention should be paid to the following: the number of those who still believe in A. Lukashenko’s managerial talents finds itself within his ratings (trust and electoral).

The government as a source of hope yields appreciably to businessmen who have gained considerably since March. Directors of enterprises turned out to be almost level with the government. It is not ruled out that businessmen, as well as directors of enterprises, managed to enhance their reputation as anti-crisis managers at the expense of A. Lukashenko’s modernization rhetoric. He considers technical modernization of enterprises the main condition of revival for a reason.

Answers to the question of Pict. 3 divide Belarusians into three approximately equal groups: those who render no success on the part of the Belarusian economic model; those who connect it with the Russian economic aid, and supporters of the official version. Consequently, the “story” the state propaganda had been telling for 18 years did not stand the test of reality. Any propaganda proves to be helpless against a two-digit, and in 2011 tree-digit, inflation. In December even among supporters of the authorities only every fourth person managed to discern progress of Belarusian economy.

Many-valuedness in perception of the Belarusian economic model’s success repeats itself in many-valuedness of assessments of consequences after a possible resignation of its main architect (Pict. 4). The fractions of respondents adhering to the extreme assessments (“life will improve” – “life will become worse”) differ slightly. However, the variant of answer “life will remain the same” turned out to be the most popular one. Thus, the condition of despair that has been manifesting itself for years in the mass sigh “if he does not do it then who will” is gradually beginning to be diluted.

In conclusion let us mention that answers to the question of Pict. 4 almost coincided in March and December 2012, in spite of the fact that the income level of the population had substantially grown for nine months. Therefore, the policy of purchasing the population’s loyalty begins to seriously stall.