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AUTUMN CRISIS OF INTEGRATION MOODS

Polling results reveal that, as usual, traditional strengthening of integration moods within the Belarusian electorate observed in spring has given place to a regular autumn crisis. As it can be seen from Table 1, the number of those standing for Russia-Belarus unification into a single state has dropped down by almost 28% (from 25.6% to 18.5%) for the past six months while the number of those supporting all integration variants that ensure independence of both countries has increased by nine points (from 67.3% to 76.3%).
Table 1. Dynamics of answer distribution to the question “Which variant of Russia-Belarus integration do you personally prefer?”, %

 

Variant of answer
12’02
03’03
09’03
Belarus and Russia should form a union of independent states with close political and economic relations
51.7
48.0
55.7
Relations between Russia and Belarus should remain as between the other CIS member-states
19.7
19.3
20.6
Belarus and Russia should become a single state with a single president, government, army, flag, currency, etc.
21.2
25.6
18.5
These changes of integration moods in the social opinion can hardly be accounted for by objective reasons only. Thus, comparative assessment on the part of respondents of each country’s achievements in the sphere of democratic transformations hasn’t changed much (Table 2) and dynamics of general assessment as concerns living conditions in both countries isn’t essential (Table 3).

Table 2. Dynamics of answer distribution to the question “in your opinion, does Belarus or Russia has achieved greater progress in building a democratic state and a civil society?”

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* This variant wasn’t offered

Table 3. Dynamics of answer distribution to the question “Do you think people live better in Belarus or Russia today?”

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* This variant wasn’t offered

In our opinion, nowadays Belarusian social awareness undergoes the process of radical transformation as for its conception of further integration with Russia is concerned. This is first and foremost concerned with the stand of the Belarusian head of state. Under B. Yeltsin, A. Lukashenko in every way tried to accelerate the processes of ‘unification of Slav people up to their full mergence’ expecting to grab the helm of state from the hands of an aged Russia’s leader. But with coming of a young, dynamic and none the less pragmatic V. Putin he switched to intensive verbal balancing that resembles political tug-of-war for the title of ‘chief integrator’.
All those reasons predetermining behavior of the Belarusian leader are not at once and not always adequately taken by the presidential electorate. In particular, regular assurances in our ‘fraternal love’ to the Russian people supported by controversial attacks against the Russian government only mislead it. This is why, previously, tough presidential supporters stood firm for integration with Russia and even incorporation into it following president’s rhetoric but today they take this idea much colder. Data in Table 4 demonstrate that the number of those standing for Russia-Belarus unification among Lukashenko’s convinced supporters has dropped down 1.6-fold (from 38.3% to 23.3%) for the past year while the number of those supporting all integration variants that guarantee independence of Belarus has increased by 27% (from 57.8% to 73.5%). Decline of integration moods among Lukashenko’s supporters is also proved by Table 5.

Table 4. Dynamics of preferences between A. Lukashenko’s supporters and opponents as regards Russia-Belarus integration patterns, %

Variant of answer
A. Lukashenko’s supporters
A. Lukashenko’s opponents
12’02
09’03
12’02
09’03
Belarus and Russia should form a union of independent states with close political and economic relations
44.5
55.9
52.1
51.7
Relations between Russia and Belarus should remain as between the other CIS member-states
13.3
17.6
25.9
26.9
Belarus and Russia should become a single state with a single president, government, army, flag, currency, etc.
38.3
23.3
15.3
16.4

Table  5. Dynamics of answer distribution between A. Lukashenko’s supporters and opponents to the question “If there is a referendum on adopting Union State’s Constitution, how will you vote?”, %

Variant of answer
A. Lukashenko’s supporters
A. Lukashenko’s opponents
12’02
09’03
12’02
09’03
I will vote for
66.4
57.3
40.6
41.8
I will vote against
9.0
24.2
29.4
28.4
I won’t take part in the voting
8.0
4.4
13.0
13.4
This is concerned with not only natural decrease in the number of presidential electorate that supported its political leader because of its nostalgic hope for USSR restoration. A heavy loss for the business of integration is those convinced supporters of A. Lukashenko who always follow him despite political extremes of their leader. In fact, political somersaults of electorate need little time. Thus, after Lukashenko just a few times criticized the project of converting to the Russian ruble his convinced supporters turned into ardent supporters of this political step despite the long-term official propaganda of its positive consequences (See Table 6). Unlike president’s opponents they cannot so far clearly argue their position (See Table 7 and 8). Evidently, purely negative statements of the leader are not enough – people need certain comments and explanations. By the way, isn’t the ‘ideological vertical’ being built for this very purpose?

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question “Do you think the Russian ruble should be introduced in Belarus?”, %

Variant of answer
All population
Among them:
A. Lukashenko’s supporters
A. Lukashenko’s opponents
Yes
44.2
41.3
42.8
No
34.4
35.4
41.9

Table 7. Distribution of answers to the question “If you stand for introduction of the Russian ruble, then why do you?”, % (open question)

Variant of answer
All population
Among them:
A. Lukashenko’s supporters
A. Lukashenko’s opponents
This means closer integration with Russia
13.4
15.3
8.9
Economic state of Belarus will improve
12.9
7.1
15.3
Russian ruble is a firm and stable currency
8.8
4.2
12.0
Rise in prices will be halted
6.2
1.5
4.3
Financial state of population will improve
5.3
9.4
4.3
Going to Russia will be easier
1.9
1.8
1.2
Other
3.0
3.7
2.1

Table 8. Distribution of answers to the question “If you stand against the introduction of the Russian ruble, then why do you?”, %(open question)

Variant of answer
All population
Among them:
A. Lukashenko’s supporters
A. Lukashenko’s opponents
This means loss of independence for the country
10.8
7.5
15.5
A country should have its own currency
9.4
7.6
11.2
Our economics is not ready to this
3.6
3.0
5.4
Financial state of population will deteriorate
3.4
5.3
2.9
Russia doesn’t give guarantees, it will cheat us
1.4
2.1
1.1
Prices will grow up
1.0
0.6
1.5
Russian ruble is a soft and non-stable currency
0.5
0.8
0.5
Other
3.4
1.5
4.0
Several years have passed and A. Lukashenko again cherishes his resurgent hopes to ‘play the integration stick’ at the Russia’s political field. In the opinion of a famous Russia’s oligarch, the reason is that ‘V. Putin follows in the footsteps of A.  Lukashenko.’ In other words, Russia’s president, as many analysts agree, in many respects copies the governing methods that are far from being democratic and are in particular applied by A. Lukashenko in Belarus. This means that Putin’s perspectives for presidency turn less transparent than it was considered earlier. His opposition both on the left and on the right gains obvious strength. That same oligarch who did much for V. Putin to come to power has publicly stated that the latter won’t receive a new term and a new candidature will be presented to the society in the near future. Thus, the desired dream of A. Lukashenko on governing one sixth part of the earth has again come into his view, even though it is so far very hazy. This fact well accounts for unduly familiar criticism of Russia’s government in the Belarusian mass media, regular disconnection of Russian TV channels if there’s a mere hint to negative attitude to the Belarusian leader, the projects of complete ousting as regards some Russian channels, public maintenance of ‘friendly relations’ with the Russian like-minded persons, etc.
This all implies that a new burst of integration stir is to be expected in the near future and A. Lukashenko’s electorate will have to once again re-consider its standpoints on the relations with Russia.