BELARUSIAN DEMOCRATS SHOULD MAKE BARGAINS WITH REALITY TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS

In fact, the point is that only 12.6% of respondents personally know a member of an opposition political party and only 4.3% of them have read or heard something about the recent actions of the Belarusian political parties. Meanwhile, 45.6% have at least once discussed activity of the parties in the family or with friends. This means that the opinion of most Belarusians on the activity of democratic parties is built based on the information coming not from the very parties. It is easy to guess now who spreads such information about the parties and which particular information. Hence the result. Among those who have heard about unification of five opposition parties for joint actions (14% of respondents), only 9.5% would vote at the parliamentary election for a candidate for the deputy group Republic, 8.9% – from UCP, 8.6% – BPF, 6,9% – BSDP, 6% – Labor Party, 1.2% – PCB and almost 45% wouldn’t vote for any of them or found it difficult to answer.

Information blockade and constant discrediting of democratic forces enforced by the powerful state’s propaganda machinery are essential yet not the only reasons why they have a low electoral support. Isolation of democrats from the society will continue until their ideological, political and personal interests stand in the reality most Belarusians live in.

A bright example of dominating ideological interests is a peculiar vision of the “Belarusian national idea” under which Russia poses threat to Belarus while no joint movement to Europe, democratization and market economy can be accepted. This domination received new impetus after the recent election to Russia’s Duma (Parliament) (“Perhaps, in the light of new appeals we should re-consider our attitude to A and even look for the means of approaching the current authorities,” a UCP (not BPF) leader has stated recently. In fact, the issue of relations with Russia is very painful for the Belarusians. Although most of them don’t accept the idea of Belarus’ incorporation into Russia “so that the regions of Belarus become Russia’s regions” (72.1% of respondents would vote against and 17.1% – for incorporation at such a referendum), close economic ties with the Eastern neighbor are a foreign policy’s first priority for them. Thus, answering a direct question: “What is more important for you, improvement of Belarus’ economic state or independence of the country?” almost two third of respondents (62.2%) give their preference to the economic situation and only a quarter (25.4%) to independence. If this was possible, half of Belarusians (50.4%) would choose Russia-Belarus economic union and only one third (34.3%) – Belarus’ joining the European Union. Such attitude is accounted for by not only deep cultural and psychological orientation of most Belarusians but also by actual socio-economic orientation. Answering to the question “Where do people live better nowadays?”, 31.4% of respondents said “in Russia” (much better or slightly better), 31.6% – “equally” and 28.2% – “in Belarus”. At first sight, the difference is insignificant. However, comparative analysis of presidential supporters and potential supporters of democrats (i.e. those who are ready to identify themselves with them and vote for them) shows that anti-Russian orientation of the latter is obviously overestimated by the adepts of the “national idea” (See Table 1).

Domination of political interests is illustrated in the split of Belarusian democratic forces into two election blocs – “Popular Coalition 5+” and “European Coalition” (their ideological stands almost coincide) or a very formalistic character of the “plus” in the Popular Coalition (the parties are making constant demands to the deputy group Republic to “demonstrate its political force” and still take it will great suspicion.) The truth is that the potential of consolidated democratic forces increases multifold, especially when their actions appear integrated in the eyes of the electorate. Thus, when respondents learn that “chairmen of the deputy group Republic and the United Civil Party (UCP) have recently proposed an alternative draft of the budget involving reduction of taxes and consequently rise in wages by 10,000 rubles a month, creation of 15,000 additional workplaces and abatement of prices for goods and services” 78.7% of them spoke out in the positive (8.7% – in the negative) to this proposition. Furthermore, 65.8% are ready to support at the parliamentary election the candidate that will promote this alternative project (won’t support – 13.1%). A vast electoral potential of democrats’ consolidated actions is seen in the answers to the question: “If two candidates run in your constituency, who would you vote for if they don’t differ in all other points?” – a candidate supporting A. Lukashenko’s policy (36.3%) and a candidate for the bloc Five Plus (34.5%) would receive approximately equal number of votes (See Table 2).

The situation over Women’s Party Nadzeya and Liberal Democratic Party is a bright example of domination of personal interests. When Nadzeya was headed by V. Polevikova, the party was an active member of the democratic coalition Coordination Council of Democratic Forces. After V. Matusevich headed the party, chairmen of the current Popular Coalition 5+ declined to admit the party into the coalition, even though its program, actions and the new leader (both women represent former trade union board) don’t differ fundamentally from the previous. The basic reason is personal relations between the leaders of the democratic parties. Consequently, such tactics resulted in that the party with the highest rating (6.2%) remained outside the coalition while the Party of Communists Belarusian (PCB) with the rating 1.3% is its active member. Exactly in the same way, the Liberal Democratic Party with the second rating (4.9%) and the electorate close to Five Plus’ electorate stands apart from coalition actions while its Chairman S. Gaidukevich more often criticizes democrats than the authorities.

Clearly, neither ideological nor political nor personal interests can be disregarded as their bearers are living people that have their reasons for this. We are not going to make them change their minds – this is impossible and unnecessary. However, the problem is that all those people are not just willing to express their interests but they make politics, i.e. they wish to come to power and change the current course. There are two variants possible to do this – either elitist (from coup d’etat to election of president in parliament) or popular (from revolution to popular vote). The first variant can be carried based on the interests of elites; the second variant is impossible if the interests of masses are not assigned the primary importance. The Belarusian democrats should finally answer this fundamental question: How are they going to come to power and change the political course? The first variant is quite possible in Belarus, yet the democratic forces won’t play a crucial role in it and won’t possess its results in case of success. If the Belarusian democrats choose the second variant, their ideological, political and personal interests should give way to the interests of the Belarusian electorate and in the form the very electorate and not politicians understands them. Unless the Belarusians striving for changes identify themselves with the interests of the democratic forces and “pass them their powers”, there won’t be chances for victory either today or tomorrow. It was exactly by “popular variant” that A. Lukashenko came to power and received such “popular powers”. But those times have gone. Answers of respondents to the question “In your opinion, does A. Lukashenko see problems and concerns of the people like you?” were equally divided – 44.6% said “yes” and 44.2% said “no”. Belarusian political parties received 24.4% of “yes”-answers while 57.2% still believe that “no” (18.2% found it difficult to answer). As it can be seen, almost half of the Belarusians have given up identifying themselves with A. Lukashenko but haven’t yet identified themselves with the democratic forces. Clearly, such expectations will sooner or later get focused. But on whom?..

To achieve success, the Belarusian democrats should proceed from what they have and not what they would love to have. They should if not accept the reality represented in the interests of the most part of Belarusian electorate then at least learn “to make bargains with it”.