“ORANGE” PROSPECTS OF BELARUS

The events in the neighboring Ukraine that ended up in the third round of presidential election and election of V. Yuschenko for presidency hardly left anyone indifferent in Belarus. Apart from political reasons, this is as well geographic, cultural and historic proximity that has played its role. On the one hand, during the crisis the Belarusian citizens were powerfully fenced by the state-run Belarusian and Russian mass media that competed in discrediting the Ukrainian opposition and participants of street actions. Those information campaigns had certain differences, yet insignificant in general. The state-run mass media of Russia and Belarus both told that Ukraine fell a victim of a crafty American conspiracy and that American mercenaries acted throughout the country.

On the other hand, due to multiple kinship relations and close contacts between the Ukrainians and the Belarusians (according to the latest IISEPS opinion poll, every third Belarusian citizen has visited Ukraine over the past ten years) the latter judged about the Ukrainian situation based on their personal observations over living in this neighboring country. By the way, Ukraine is the only country neighboring with Belarus talking about which during our opinion polls respondents for many years estimated its general living standard as lower than in Belarus. Our latest opinion poll isn’t an exception. (See Table 1).

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question “Compare the living standards in Belarus and in the neighboring countries. Which is higher?”, %*

* Table is read across

So, on the one hand this is a unilateral informational pressure and on the other – personal experience and estimates. What is the balance? Table 2 gives the grounds to judge about this.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question “How do you estimate recent stormy events (“orange revolution”) in Ukraine?”

In its estimates of the Ukrainian events, the Belarusian society split almost equally into supporters of the conspiracy theory and supporters of popular revolution that is another proof of the common truth that mass media is a powerful instrument yet not almighty. Remarkably, estimates of respondents didn’t bear close relation with their attitude to A. Lukashenko. (See Table 3).

Table 3. Relation between estimates of Ukrainian events and answers to the question on the voting for and against A. Lukashenko, %*

* Table is read as follows: 55.7% of those who would vote for A. Lukashenko believe that the Ukrainian events are a person-controlled process.

The columns in Table 3 are symmetric but don’t show great variance of estimates. Slightly over a half of presidential supporters share the opinion presented by the national TV Channel BT and Russian RTR Channel while over a third of respondents estimate the situation in the opposite. Perhaps, the standpoint of the Belarusian head of state played its role here. A. Lukashenko went to Kiev with V. Putin to congratulate V. Yanukovich with the victory in the second round of election, yet he wasn’t as ardent in his support of V. Yanukovich during the election campaign as the Russian president. It is entirely possible that low estimates of the living standard in Ukraine given by both presidential supporters and opponents urged them to say that the Ukrainian events were caused by the reasons beyond someone’s control. In any case, the relation between the attitude to the Ukrainian events and to the Belarusian authorities appeared composite and indirect.

Naturally, a major question that worried the Belarusians during the Ukrainian crisis and right after it was “Can such a scenario take place in Belarus?” While the opinions split up almost equally in the estimates of the Ukrainian evens, the part of those who think “orange prospects” are entirely possible in Belarus (22.4%) appears threefold less than those who stick to the opposite viewpoint (61.2%).

It is noteworthy that answers to this question bear as well little relation with respondents’ attitude to the main victim of the presumptive conflict. (See Table 4).

Table 4. Relation between estimates of “orange prospects” in Belarus and answers to the question on the voting for and against A. Lukashenko , %

The president himself reiterates impossibility of the “orange” revolution in Belarus as if it were a spell. Clearly, this is not encouraging for his opponents who share this opinion. On the contrary, those few supporters of the president who think the “orange” revolution is entirely possible in Belarus are most likely his ardent followers rather than latent opponents. They are very much afraid of such developments on the grounds that foreign enemies may plot something against the president.

A half of president’s supporters don’t think that Minsk may follow the Kiev scenario. At first sight, this makes such developments hardly possible. However, as the witnesses say, the Ukrainian revolution was totally unexpected both for its leaders and participants. Present Interior Minister of Ukraine A. Lutsenko, an organizer of a crucial mass meeting at the Independence Square, has recently told in his interview to the newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli (Weekly Mirror) that in the night after the second round of election – when the Central Election Commission registered V. Yanukovich’s victory – it was decided in V. Yuschenko’s headquarters to call people into the streets. At the meeting of the opposition, organizational leaders said they could ensure presence of 20 000 people, not more and not less, at the Independence Square the next day. In the morning, 120 000 people came to the Independence Square.