TRUST TO THE MASS MEDIA

As Table 1 shows, state-run mass media enjoy the trust of over a half of respondents. As regards non-state mass media, the number of distrusting to them is even greater. In both cases, many respondents didn’t give any answer at all.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question on the trust to the mass media*, %

* Table is read across

Leading independent mass media try to be unbiased and comply with high professional standards while state-owned mass media have become a part of the state’s propaganda machine. Yet, these are state-run mass media which are trusted the most.

Some of respondents explain, “This is reasonable from a psychological viewpoint – people trust large-scale, reputed and well-known editions.” It is easy to agree with such an argument. The readership of Sovetskaya Byelorussia’s weekly run makes 2.5 million people, which is manifold higher than a total weekly run of all independent social and political editions in Belarus taken together. What’s more, there’s only one non-state newspaper issued daily in Belarus – Narosnaya Volya (Public Will), yet recently ousted from the state-owned distribution network.

Other people explain high degree of distrust to independent media in the following way, “It is hard to assess one’s trust / distrust to a product if there’s no access to this product.” Perhaps, there’s some truth in this statement.

We may indirectly examine this assumption by comparing the degree of trust to state-run and non-state press in different regions of Belarus. Let us suppose that independent national mass media are equally available (in practice, this is more complicated) in all regions. However, no independent social and political media are issued in Gomel and Mogilev regions. In the regions, local editions are highly competitive with national editions as people are very interested in local news. Because of low incomes, people can’t buy many editions at once. Proceeding from this, let us assume that independent press is less accessible to residents of Gomel and Mogilev regions and more accessible in Minsk. Does this influence the degree of trust to the press?

Table 2 shows that this is true only partially. The highest degree of trust to non-state mass media has been registered in Minsk and Minsk region where these media are better available. In all other regions, except the Mogilev region, trust to independent mass media hesitates at around 30% and slightly higher. In Gomel and Mogilev regions, the degree of trust differs by 8 pct.

Table 2. Trust to non-state mass media depending on the region of settlement, %

As for the distrust, the above assumption does not prove here. The highest degree of distrust – 10 pct above the average level – has been registered in the Brest region where independent media are better accessible than in the other regions. The degree of distrust is equally high in Gomel and Minsk regions, although the first one doesn’t have its own independent regional editions and the other has. Could we possibly overestimate the significance of regional press when making our assumption? Or, do respondents distrust to these editions because they came across them? Residents of Minsk trust as well as distrust to independent mass media less than Minsk region residents.

It should be noted that many respondents found it difficult or refused to answer the question on their trust / distrust to independent mass media. In some regions, this indicator reached a quarter of all respondents. If assuming that they couldn’t define their position towards non-state media because they haven’t ever taken these editions in their hands, perhaps, we can find an indirect proof to our hypothesis. If this is the case, we can state that independent press is poorly accessible in most regions.

According to Table 3, the level of trust to the state-run press is very high in Gomel and Mogilev regions where, as we have mentioned, there are no local non-state political editions. On the contrary, residents of Minsk and the Grodno region trust the least to the official press. This may prove our assumption on accessibility of independent press and the degree of trust to it. However, the Minsk region where non-state press is more accessible stands right next to the Gomel region in the degree of trust to the state-run press. In fact, the number of those who found it difficult to answer on their trust to the state-run press is in all regions much lower than to non-state press.

Table 3. Trust to the state-run mass media depending on the region of settlement, %

Perhaps, the price also plays a great role. It makes the more expensive independent editions less affordable. In addition, depending on incomes people may change their political expectations. As we have found out, the level of incomes scarcely influences the degree of trust to the mass media. We can only note that the number of respondents who found it difficult to define their attitude to mass media decreases with growth of their incomes. Also, distrust to the state-run media goes up with growth of their incomes and becomes equal to their trust to non-state media. It can be assumed that the citizens who receive two sets of information most likely feel distrust to both sources of information.

Furthermore, dependence of trust to non-state press from its accessibility can be proved or disproved by availability or absence of a developed distribution network. There aren’t any retail points of sale for the press in Belarusian villages. The larger the town is, the more retail points of sale it has. In the capital, there even exist rudiments of an alternative distribution system (In 2004, the authorities announced the courier distribution system to be a licensed activity, and then denied the three independent subscription agencies in such licenses and thus deprived many newspapers from their own distribution networks.) This is why we should like to consider how the degree of trust to state-run / non-state press changes depending on the type of settlement. As it has turned out, the highest trust to non-state media is given in the capital, and this indicator is going down as a settlement is going smaller. Thus, 42.6% of Minsk citizens trust to independent press and 49.9% of villagers distrust to independent press. State-run press shows the opposite tendency. It is given the highest trust (70.4%) in the village and the highest distrust (41.8%) – in Minsk. Of course, trust to these or those editions in various settlements depends on many factors (level of incomes, political likings, etc.) but we suggest that the total of all these factors proves the above assumption rather than disproves. If respondents judge about non-state press from the state-run television programs mainly, they will have too little grounds to trust it.

State-owned and state-independent mass media play by different economic rules but, what is more important, they convey fundamentally different content. First of all, this applies to coverage of social and political issues. Independent editions printed in small runs go against the flow and often tell unpleasant things while mass state propaganda claims that living steadily improves. Can it be assumed that political expectations of respondents are revealed in their trust to the kind of mass media? Such an assumption is fairly reasonable. Oppositionists trust more to the independent press and don’t trust to the state-run press (58.4% and 74.9% respectively). As regards their political opponents, the situation is mirror-like: 34.7% of them trust to non-state press, which is close to the general assessment around the country (38.5%), and 69% trust to the state-run press which is much higher than the general level of trust to these media around the country (55.3%) and is close to the trust to the Orthodox Church (68.1%).

To conclude, accessibility of non-state press plays a very important yet not a crucial role in the degree of trust given by respondents to these media. Their political expectations appear much more important in this respect.

On the other hand, distrust to state-run mass media slightly increases with the growth of incomes and becomes close to the trust to non-state media. This implies that the respondents who receive information from both sources, most likely distrust to them both.