OIL & GAS WAR: “TIE IN THE BATTLE”

Any outsider watching January newsreels on the Belarusian TV would definitely decide that there was unscheduled presidential election or at least another crucial referendum announced in the country. Informational activity of the head of state was a safe indicator of this. It is due to this activity that a row between Belarusian economic entities and their Russian partners turned into gas and oil war between the two states.

Just like a populist politician would have done, A. Lukashenko undertook the job of mobilizing the population. Trusting some work of the mobilization project to his close associates would mean delegating some powers. This is not possible in Belarus as it contradicts to the very nature of the current political regime in this country. Following A. Lukashenko’s notorious statement “There’s only one politician in Belarus”, representatives of power branches don’t even claim to have somehow independent positions.

However, the current mobilization campaign is special. Unlike election and referendum campaigns, it has no fixed completion date. It is unclear when and how it should end up. What’s the most important the action plan of president’s mobilized supporters is totally indiscernible. It seems early to dig tank ditches at the eastern borders while gathering people at squares and slander an impudent ally is quite dangerous: A. Lukashenko, just like Panikovsky, is silly scared of “the crowds of honest men”. He prefers to electioneer among atomized TV viewers.

This non-transparency of goals brought to failure of the mobilization effect the authorities needed so much. Let’s look in Table 1. A. Lukashenko’s electoral rating dropped down considerably after the election. This shouldn’t be a point for disappointment or recasting of political preferences of such a big group of voters. This drop-down of the rating is natural for post-mobilization period. However, a new burst didn’t take place. President’s emotions didn’t hit the electorate.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “If the presidential election is held tomorrow in Belarus, for whom would you vote?”, % (open question)

The rating of trust (see Table 2) which usually doesn’t respond to the mobilization pressure dropped down substantially in January. The respondents who refused their trust to the president partially moved into the camp of those distrusting the president and partially – into the group of vacillating.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you trust the President of Belarus?”, %*

Attitude of Belarusians to the country’s course also changed in the direction unfavorable for A. Lukashenko. (See Table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think the country in general is going in the right or in the wrong direction?”, %

Close attention to growth of oil prices have finally brought to the effect described by A. Chekhov in his short story “Overdoing It”. This is a very important conclusion. From the point of view of those who play the key role in politics-making, politics is to a great extent derivative of economics, but for the society in general the political signs coming from above are the command to taking particular economic decisions. It is not fortuitous that the Belarusians have been actively purchasing foreign currency starting from mid-December.

Nevertheless, attitude of Belarusians to the president after the oil and gas storm remains in general positive. Thus, the part of those whose opinion about A. Lukashenko’s course changed to better (6.2%) is approximately equal to the part of those whose opinion changed to worse (7.8%), yet the number of his supporters is 1.5-fold larger than of opponents (42.4% vs. 28%).

Data in Table 4 show that A. Lukashenko remains a major hope for country’s economic development. Comparing to the polling results of November 1994, i.e. four months after the presidential election, his position didn’t change. The Government making a strong tandem of executive power together with President has moved considerably up. Yet, legislative power has grown thinner which at first sight may seem strange. As regards the Supreme Council, A. Lukashenko struggled against it from the first day of his presidency unlike with the National Assembly. The latter is his child and this eliminates any conflicts. Perhaps, this is why the public opinion doesn’t notice this branch of power. Concentration of power in one hand also affected the mass media and the society still doesn’t pin any special hopes on them. Judicial power closes this list: 2.7% is to a certain extent the result of institutional changes in the country.

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “On what do you lay hopes for country’s economic development?”, % (not more than three answers are possible)

* Questionnaires of 1993-1994 offered “Supreme Soviet” where now goes “National Assembly”

Remarkable is the rating of foreign capital. Unfortunately, there are no intermediate data and this doesn’t let us see the dynamics for 13 years and assess contribution of January events. Yet, presence of a competing source is encouraging.

If the public opinion is offered white-or-black criteria for assessment of president’s activity – only two alternatives to the question “How do assess A. Lukashenko’s activity during Russia-Belarus oil and gas conflict?” – answers will be well predictable.

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “How do assess A. Lukashenko’s activity during Russia-Belarus oil and gas conflict?”, %

They are comparable with the level of trust to the president. Such distribution is not situational. It bears weak dependence on particular on-line events because it is dictated by the very structure of the Belarusian society.

Data in Table 6 take us to another deep historic cutoff. Unlike general opinion, A. Lukashenko was taken in 1994 as a man of reforms and a leader able to perform revolutionary transformation of reality. What has changed in the eyes of public opinion since then?

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question: “How do you see the image of current president?”, % (more than one answer is possible)

* Data of opinion poll conducted by Belarusian service of “Public Opinion”

Revolutionary manner has transformed into attempts to preserve the old government system. Also, the constituent pertaining to strengthening of powers has increased greatly while inclination to reforming has almost fully declined. Yet, one should be very careful with this conclusion. While preparing the variants of answer we deliberately copied the list of 1994. This has some positive sides as well as a negative. The menu of answers was made in the period of socio-economic crisis and this is why it didn’t include the characteristics important for a politician in the period of stability. Today A. Lukashenko’s supporters (i.e. half of respondents) didn’t find a suitable characteristic while choosing from the answers. Their choice in favor of the first variant is to a certain extent explained by feeling of stability going from the words “slowly but steadily” rather than by president’s reforming potential.

This way, if the outcome of gas and oil war is assessed via attitude to the personality of its initiator, we can see “tie in the battle” at the inner front. A. Lukashenko preserved the image of a strong personality in the eyes of supporters while his opponents still keep to their earlier standpoints. The ratio 2 vs. 1 hasn’t changed. In regards to the outcome at the Eastern front, according to the data of opinion poll conducted by the All-Russia Centre for Public Opinion Research, Russian public opinion is betraying the Belarusian father.