INTEGRATION BREAKTHROUGH

Public opinion is pretty pliant especially when it trusts the information source. As of now, it still does. The rating of trust to A. Lukashenko (country’s chief political informant) has dropped by 4.9 points as compared to November of 2006 but it still remains unattainable (55.4%).

Compliance of public opinion is well known from the Soviet history. It is enough to recall the information turn of Stalin’s propaganda after signing of Molotov-Ribbentrop’s Pact in August of 1939. Conversion of the fascist Germany from a USSR foe into its ally confused only a small group of educated people, yet not for long. Fancy curves outlined by the Soviet propaganda inspired G. Orwell to writing his bright novel “1984”. We could go on with examples.

In his New Year speech President of Belarus A. Lukashenko actually announced about opening of eastern front. It is not fortuitous that in January Belarusian journalists described purely economic issues of prices and rates in terms of oil and gas war. A. Lukashenko’s anti-Russia statements can’t be written off as a slip of the tongue or emotional burst. This January showed that on the New Year night they gave a start for stayer distance and its length is yet indefinite.

Results of the opinion poll conducted in late January quite expectedly showed considerable changes in integration preferences of Belarusians. (See Table 1). Stability in answers (with the tendency of minor growth) registered over the entire 2006 dropped down by 11.3 points which is substantial for such a short time period.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “If a referendum on Russia-Belarus integration is held today, how would you vote?”, %

What happened on the other side of the Union State? The Belarusian president was convinced that his activity was supported there: “I’m very thankful to all Russians for the support they gave to Belarus in this hard moment. They didn’t stand to the side of their government in this conflict and that was a crucial point in settlement of the conflict. If the Russian authorities had support of their people, it would be really hard for us. The government of Russia still reckons with the opinion of Russians. In their turn, Russians clearly said, “Don’t harm the Belarusians. Oligarchs shouldn’t put pressure and torment the Belarusians who must be provided with oil and gas in full amounts.” (an excerpt from the speech at briefing of January 14, 2007).

A. Lukashenko didn’t support this categorical statement with any facts. On the contrary, data of Russian sociologists publicized in late January show the opposite. Thus, according to the Fund of Public Opinion, two thirds of the Russians (67%) said that the decision on twofold increase of gas price for Belarus was right and 12% – wrong.

Informational activity of the Belarusian head of state didn’t bring him any personal benefits either. In January only 26% of Russians noted their positive and 15% – their negative attitude to the Belarusian president (a year before – 35% and 12% respectively), and 49% are indifferent to his personality today.

From the viewpoint of the theory given in the beginning of this article, no other results could be expected. Russia has its own A. Lukashenko. This is V. Putin whose rating didn’t go below 70% in the past year. Monopoly of Russia on its mass media doesn’t yield much to the Belarusian, so Russian TV viewers didn’t watch “Belarusian father’s” expressive statements online but in the interpretation of the TV pyrotechnists like M. Leontiev and V. Zhirinovsky.

Let’s go back to Belarus. In the situation of a strict choice between integration with Russia and accession to the EU (see Table 2) the Belarusians find it difficult to answer (+5.9 points). The information delivered to Belarusians via TV is first of all anti-Russian. Its pro-European character isn’t very expressive either, especially since it appeared in late January when the opinion poll was almost completed (president’s interview to the German newspaper Die Welt, and informational agency Reuters).

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “If you had to choose between integration with Russia and accession to the European Union, what would you choose?”, %

If the above question is re-formatted and more alternatives are given to respondents (see Table 3), it will be obvious that the Belarusians disappointed with integration attempts prefer to choose the variant of answer “Against both.” This points out to the growth of isolationist moods. In other words, residents of the “heart of Europe” (A. Lukashenko) are reluctant to work as the heart of a single European body but prefer to go their own (special) path.

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “If a referendum on the choice of future for Belarus is held today, how would you vote?”, %

Change in integration preferences can always be given a pragmatic excuse. Those who carry such policy against the only ally ready to die from NATO’s tanks for the sake of Holy Russia should have disorder in their own court. The oil spouting right from the ground doesn’t help him either. Although the Belarusians are poor, every year they live better and better than their eastern neighbors. (See Table 4). The life is full of paradoxes and the greatest of them always found place in the minds of citizens (in public opinion).

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “Where do you think people live better today, in Belarus or in Russia?”, %

Data in Table 4 let us see the growth of relative welfare of population over the past four years. The Belarusians managed to take leadership in the beginning of 2004. Things were heading then towards the referendum on amendment of the Constitution that would take off restrictions on consecutive presidential terms. The authorities in Belarus were extremely interested in growth of positive expectations in the society and this is why they re-allocated a great part of export income to raise wages and pensions. In other words, the mentioned trend of 2004-2006 had real grounds. However, recent growth of relative Belarusian welfare was achieved via propaganda solely! In should be noted that asked the question “Where do you think people live better today, in Belarus or in Russia?” the Russians are resolute in their answer “in Russia” (54%). Only 18% of them stick to the opposite viewpoint. (According to the January opinion poll conducted by Levada Center.)

Asked the projective question “Will you support integration of Belarus into Russia, if the consequences of risen prices for Russian gas appear hard for you personally?” 35.1% of respondents answered in the positive (49% in the negative and 15.9% found it difficult to answer). Yet, one shouldn’t hastily blame Belarusians of mass readiness to sell the homeland for the Russian gas and oil cakes. These answers rather show the opposite. Let’s once again look into the data of Table 1. Exactly the same part of respondents stood for integration with Russia without any mentioning about possible hard times. In addition, the wording of this question showed that the number of respondents standing against integration increased by 9.7 points.

In conclusion we should like to analyze public preferences in the situation when more variants of answer are given and the data of the nation opinion poll is divided into two key constituents, the respondents trusting and distrusting to A. Lukashenko. (See Table 5).

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “Different people make different conclusions from Russia-Belarus oil and gas conflict. Which of them do you agree with?”, %

Results of the nation opinion poll appeared very close but supporters of the “special development path” for Belarus, although with minor advantage, took the first place. What is important, this is the only variant when the parts of those who trust A. Lukashenko and who distrust him are very close. All other variants split the society. Those trusting A. Lukashenko still give preference to the Russian direction, yet there’s an opposite trend beginning to show: 10.5% of Lukashenko-supporters are presently ready to reciprocate Europe so as to protect the country from Russia. Their political opponents are ready to negotiate with Russia (12.7%) yet they are categorically against merging into one state.

Summing up all said above, anti-Russian potential isn’t yet drawn out in the Belarusian society. The state-run propaganda will be able to even strengthen it in a short-term perspective. However, not all is as simple in a medium-term or long-term perspective. Much will depend on the dynamics of Belarusian economics and on its derivative, the living standard of population. On the other hand, the backtracking point in the Union State construction hasn’t been passed yet. Change in the official rhetoric can easily turn upside down geopolitical attitudes in the minds of most Belarusians.