REGARDING COLLECTIVE CAPITAL

The year 2006 in Belarus was lived under the guise of stability; at least the authorities took great efforts to make it look alike. The presidential election brought certain dynamism yet it was not for long. Response of the authorities to this dynamism was at all inadequate. The state of Belarusian economics before the election and consequently the social tenseness didn’t give any cause for anxiety. Socio-economic indicators of 2006 were beyond any comparison with the appropriate indicators of 2001. Nevertheless, dismay and bewilderment of authorities were obvious. Desperate decisiveness of citizens (the youth, first of all) to defend their right for a different Belarus that arose from nowhere was as well evident.

Inadequacy of authorities as well as the reasons that took youths to the square should be given thorough political analysis. We will only note that this is isolation of governing vertical from the society that happened due to the very procedure of authoritarian rule development. An efficient dialogue of the first with the second is possible only at the mediation of civil society bodies. The latter are barely presented in Belarus and are openly disregarded by the power. Hence, lack of feedback provokes inadequate response to any non-authorized “move in the bushes”.

Actions of protest at the October Sq that caught both the authorities and opposition leaders unawares demonstrate further growth of disunity in the Belarusian society. Interests of socially active Belarusian citizens are being ignored for several years already. January election in the local councils is yet another stroke into the generally dismal picture. The social elevator in Belarus stopped and student youths were the first who saw this.

Russia-Belarus conflict injected some vivacity into the stability of the past three years. During the latest opinion poll the citizens couldn’t yet feel its economic consequences. All changes in social trends are the result of president’s information activity. Let’s look in Table 1. The needle of social barometer still shows “clear” but every fifth Belarusian already feels coming change in pressure.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “How do you assess the general political situation in Belarus?”, %

It appears from the data above that only the citizens who don’t trust A. Lukashenko have heightened sensibility. Those who build opposition strategy should remember this. Also, every part of the Belarusian society lives in its own reality. There are actually strong social mechanisms that support the disunity once registered. Selective perception of information is one of them. Politicized citizens have heightened sensibility only to the information that the general picture in their minds proves. They ignore all other information, deliberately or, more often, not.

In addition, analyzing answers to the question in Table 1 one should remember that the part of those respondents who trust A. Lukashenko is presently nearly twice as large as the part of those distrusting (55.4% vs. 28.5%). The protest electorate is build from the minority. (See Table 2). However, one should treat this data very carefully. There’s a great gap between intentions registered during opinion polls and particular actions. As of now, 37% of respondents distrusting A. Lukashenko are not doing anything greater than declaring their intentions.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “If there are protest actions held in your city (region) against economic decline, will you take part in them?”, %

Data in Table 3 illustrate all said above. The majority of Belarusian citizens take political activity as purely electoral. Nothing else is required when an election is democratic, but in regards to authoritarian Belarus the issue of power can’t be solved with voting procedure purely. How many citizens nowadays not declare but perform particular actions? As it goes from Table 3, only 3.9% of the polled collected signatures for candidate nomination, or electioneered or were observers. This figure is surely overstated as some of citizens were most likely involved into several activities.

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “How did you participate in the election to Local Councils?” (more than one answer is possible)

The margin of the above value is also proved in answers to the question “Have you ever been introduced to the socio-political campaigns Belarusian Solidarity andFor Freedom! (i.e. read their informational and electioneering materials, talked to their members, discussed with your friends, participated in them, etc.) launched by Belarusian opposition?” The part of those who were not only introduced but also participated in these campaigns appeared pretty low (3.3%). How efficient was their work? It can be seen from the number of those who got introduced to the campaigns organized by the opposition. Thus, 11.2% of respondents noted their awareness about For Freedom! campaign, 5.9% – about Belarusian Solidarity and another 1.3% – about both. These results let us calculate some coefficient of agitators’ informational efficiency. Assuming that all the citizens aware about the campaigns learned about them from electioneers (which is surely not true), we shall divide the percentage of all aware by the percentage of electioneers and receive quite a modest coefficient 5.5. These calculations demonstrate the efficiency of door-to-door campaigns in Belarus. Apart from physical delivery of information, one should also bear in mind perceptibility of this information. This is well seen from the experience of Belarusian Solidarity and For Freedom! campaigns: only 10% of respondents said they support these initiatives, which is twice as little as the number of respondents aware about these campaigns.

In conclusion, we shall turn to ratings. (See Table 4). Trend over the past 18 months lets us make a number of conclusions. First, we can clearly see the role of the Congress of Democratic Forces in legitimizations of a sole candidate. Second, growth of sole candidate’s rating happened due to loss of votes that all other opposition leaders had. This way we could see some re-distribution of popularity among the opposition-minded part of Belarusian society. Third, A. Milinkevich’s highest rating was registered during the election and then it dropped down almost twofold. Such fluctuation is a classic example of the mobilization dynamics. It also took place in regards to A. Lukashenko’s rating at almost the same magnitude. Fourth, A. Milinkevich’s rating has become stable.

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “If a presidential election is held tomorrow in Belarus, for whom would you vote?”, % (open question)

The Belarusian opposition has been discussing the problem of a leader for many years by now. It is especially acute under the regime of A. Lukashenko’s personal power. The attempt of 2001 failed: V. Goncharik left the big politics after the election campaign. Nevertheless, his rating was the highest among opposition politicians even a year later (3.8%). Today the situation is different. January rating of A. Milinkevich is not only the echo of the presidential campaign but, as the leader of communists S. Kalyakin noted in his interview to BelaPAN, “it is the product of our common activity.” The near future will show whether this collective leader capital be demanded by the opposition and the society in general.