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UNOBSERVED JUBILEE

Ten Days That Shook the World by US writer J. Reed was a very popular book under Soviets. The writer presented in it his version of October takeover. Since nothing is eternal, the takeover was soon given the name of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The history did a full turn for 75 years and it has again become fashionable to call the revolution a turnover. Mysterious are the ways of revolution … Non-opportunistic assessment of large-scale events requires time, so the farther of Chinese reforming Den Xiaoping was apparently right when he refused to comment on the Great French Revolution. He believed that it was not much time over to give assessment of that event.

It is even less time over from the date of signing Belovezhskoe Agreement: December 10, 2006 it was only 15 years on. Historic dimensions of this event are unobvious for the majority of Belarusians and not only due to a short period. As Table 1 shows, in the opinion of 38.3% of respondents, Belovezhskoe Agreement is just an episode showing struggle for power in country’s top echelons. Respondents could choose more than one answer to this question, yet only 2.1% used this opportunity (perhaps, given variants of answers were alternative). Every third Belarusian took the Belovezhskoe Agreement as a tragedy. This is twice as many as the number of those who take this end to Communist Party’s absolute power as an important stage on the way to democracy.

The respondents trusting A. Lukashenko twice more often assess this event as a tragedy. This is a typical example of ambivalent public opinion because the part of those who think they won from those changes is high exactly among president’s supporters. They first of all gained power for themselves led by their president.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “December 10, 2006 it was 15 years from the day of signing Belovezhskoe Agreement. Today, what do you think about it?”, % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer

All population

Among them:

Trusting to A. Lukashenko (55.4)

Distrusting to A. Lukashenko (28.5)

It’s just an episode showing struggle for power in country’s top echelons

38.3

31.8

47.8

It’s a tragic event that entailed disastrous repercussions for the country and the people

32.4

41.1

22.7

It’s the victory of democratic revolution that put an end to the power of Soviet Communist Party

15.5

11.3

23.6

DA/NA

15.9

15.8

5.9

What caused collapse of the USSR? Polling results given in Table 2 to a certain extent correlate with assessment of Belovezhskoe Agreement since ambitions of republic leaders in the former USSR and putsch of the State Emergency Committee and the conflict between B. Yeltsin and M. Gorbachev were all components of struggle for power. In fact, the variant of answer “General collapse of the country under M. Gorbachev during Perestroika” was most likely understood by respondents in the light of their personality rather than an objective economic factor. It is easier for the public opinion to look for the guilty rather than make analysis of real social processes cause-and-effect relations of which sometimes appear mutually exclusive.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “In your opinion, what led to collapse of the USSR in December of 1991?” (no more than three answers are possible)

Variant of answer

%

General collapse of the country under M. Gorbachev during Perestroika

44.9

Personal ambitions of republic leaders in the former USSR

26.2

Putsch of the State Emergency Committee in August of 1991

23.7

Conflict between B. Yeltsin and M. Gorbachev

21.9

Plots of the USSR foes from abroad

19.2

Wrong policy of the Soviet Communist Party on the national issue

15.7

USSR wasn’t a true union ever. The Center always restricted the republics in their rights

13.3

National separative movements in some republics of the USSR

6.9

Attempts to suppress national movements in the Baltic States and in Transcaucasia in 1989-1991

4.8

Other

0.9

DA

9.0

Results of these 15 years can be with certain allowances summed up in attitude of respondents to the results of A. Lukashenko’s activity. Under the authoritarian rule, assessment of the country’s first person is a true indicator of situation in the country.

After the “general collapse of the country under M. Gorbachev during Perestroika” the society needed the stability first of all. A. Lukashenko’s long political life exactly shows that in the eyes of the majority of citizens he successfully solved this task. (See Table 3). “Construction of a sovereign Belarusian state” was given the second place in the head of state’s rating of achievements. This is partly the result of well-directed propaganda that is carried in Belarus lately and of the gas and oil war which A. Lukashenko deliberately turned into the war for “defense of national interests.” Of course, this is all not that simple. Collapse of the USSR brought to the collapse of identity of the “single Soviet people” which brought up vacuum. This couldn’t last for long and the vacuum began to get filled at a brisk clip.

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “In what fields A. Lukashenko’s activity was in general successful and in what – unsuccessful?”, %*

Variant of answer

Successful

Unsuccessful

DA/NA

Establishment of order in the country

64.1

25.9

10.0

Construction of a sovereign Belarusian state

61.3

26.6

12.1

Economic development of the country

57.6

30.7

11.7

Struggle against crime

56.7

31.1

12.2

Preclusion against oligarchs

54.7

28.2

17.1

Increase of the living standard of citizens

49.8

40.3

9.9

Struggle against corruptibility

48.7

37.7

13.6

Cooperation with other CIS countries

46.7

36.6

16.7

Development of the Belarusian language and Belarusian culture

43.9

39.4

16.7

Strengthening of morals

43.7

35.8

20.5

Defense of democracy and political freedoms

33.0

47.5

19.5

Creation of a business-friendly situation

30.4

49.8

19.8

Cooperation with the countries of the West

23.5

60.5

16.0

Formation of the Union State with Russia

20.7

66.0

13.3

* Table is read across

The variants of answer in the end of the list are worthy closer attention. They definitely show that unification of the two peoples is coming to its logic end. Judging by the assessments that the public opinion gave to A. Lukashenko, “Akela missed the goal.” Fear attempts to blame Russia of failing Union State construction undertaken by the Belarusian state-run media in January didn’t improve the general situation. They failed with the West either. Nowadays, Belarus is turning into a black hole from which none of foreign policies can find a way out.

Also, they failed with business. There is no good place for it in the Belarusian economic model. Officials were given the task to ensure economic growth in the republic and this is the cause of corruptibility growth. In 2006 Belarus set up a sad record among 163 countries of the world annually assessed for corruptibility by a respected international organization Transparency International. In the index of corruptibility, this country fell from 107th to 151st place. This is what Transparency International registered. As regards the public opinion about A. Lukashenko’s struggle against corruptibility, the balance is still positive, even though over a third of respondents (37.7%) called it inefficient.

Formation of national identity is impossible without support of State symbols and ceremonies. A. Lukashenko well understand this and works in this direction. This is why they changed the State symbols and moved Independence Day in referenda. The results of well-directed propaganda carried for years are registered today in opinion polls. Thus, two thirds of Belarusians (65.5%) know that Independence Day is the day when Belarus was delivered from fascist invaders and only 13.4% think that the Supreme Court adopted Declaration of independence for Belarus on that day.

Gradually the Belarusians got accustomed to their new (old!) State Symbols introduction of which was so painfully taken by the nationalist citizens. At present 59.2% of the polled approve Lukashenko’s symbols, 26.3% – are indifferent and only 12.1% – disapprove it. (See Table 4).

Table 4. Attitude to the State Symbols of Belarus (State Emblem, flag and hymn) depending on trust to the president, age and education, %*

Variant of answer

Approve (59.2)

Disapprove (12.1)

Indifferent (26.3)

Trust to the president:
Yes

84.9

1.3

13.0

No

20.3

33.8

44.1

Age:
18-19

60.7

13.6

25.7

20-24

47.0

24.2

25.8

25-29

39.6

19.9

39.8

30-39

51.3

14.3

32.3

40-49

58.9

8.3

29.5

50-59

56.7

14.0

26.1

60 and over

77.7

5.0

14.8

Education:
Elementary

79.9

3.3

13.9

Secondary incomplete

68.2

4.2

24.9

Secondary complete

57.3

10.8

29.1

Secondary vocational

53.6

16.2

27.8

Higher

47.7

23.3

27.9

* Table is read across

Today the issue of State Symbols is totally solved for the Belarusians trusting A. Lukashenko. This decision is not surprising. However, this is only one third that disapproves the State Symbols among those who distrust the president. One fifth of them approves the symbols and those who dominate in this group are the indifferent (44.1%). Dependence of attitude to State Symbols from age will let us analyze the time dynamics. The part of those youngest respondents who approve the Symbols is higher than average (60.7%). It goes down considerably as we pass to the next two age groups and then again grows. The youth starts from a blank sheet but the state has the monopoly of writing on this sheet today. It is easy to predict the tendency. It will be determined by political situation in the country.

Obvious dependence of approval/disapproval of State Symbols on education should give hope to adherents of historic Belarusian symbols. If there opens an opportunity, there is intellectual potential in Belarus that will transmit its values.

According to the official version, construction of independent Belarusian state has moved onto a new stage – construction of state for the people. Yet the history shows that the state for the people and the state of the people are two different things, as they say in Odessa. We should like to recall the first line of the current Constitution in this regards: “We, the people of Belarus …” The Preamble defines the people as the only agent enjoying full rights. Now, who are then those secret constructors of the “state for the people”?

Data in Table 5 will let us see the result of construction for the people. The majority to which the official propaganda loves to refer doesn’t take any influence on country’s political and economic life, by its own estimates. Only 6.8% of respondents take significant influence. In addition, figures in the groups of those who trust and who distrust to A. Lukashenko differ significantly. The result is obvious: people feel not implicated in all that is happening in the country.

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do the people like you take any influence on country’s political and economic life?”, %

Variant of answer

All population

Among them:

Trusting to A. Lukashenko (55.4)

Distrusting to A. Lukashenko (28.5)

Don’t take any influence

57.6

52.1

68.3

Take minor influence

29.1

31.5

24.2

Take significant influence

6.8

10.0

1.7

DA/NA

6.5

6.4

5.8

Interests of the Belarusian society certainly weren’t confined to political issues only over the past 15 years. People live in their everyday cares. They may take interest in political information as TV viewers mostly. Table 6 shows the changes that happened in the society over the years of independence from the viewpoint of values of everyday life. Comparing the results, one should remember that the end of 1993 was the peak of socio-economic crisis when following hyperinflation millions of common citizens lost their saving and only a handful became dollar millionaires (this expounds a high rating of dishonesty).

Table 6. Distribution of answers to the question: “In your opinion, what leads to wealth more often?”, %(no more than three answers)

Variant of answer

12’93

01’07

Labor

36.6

68.2

Profitable connections

72.4

42.9

Good luck

29.6

39.1

Education

22.2

37.6

Talent

32.2

34.9

Dishonesty

56.3

15.5

Nowadays Belarus faces relative stability and the time of profitable connections as the main survival strategy seems to be over. Under the market, although with Belarusian peculiarities, they first of all have to work hard. The role of education has also increased significantly. Openness of the Belarusian economics contributes to this. However, stability has a reverse side: it is hard to break loose from its grip and make an independent step forward. Stability generates demand for miracle which accounts for high figures for good luck. In opinion of Belarusians, good luck is a more important factor of welfare than talent.

The Belarusians surely fulfilled the major task of the first 15 years. They have built a nation state. Criteria of successful construction should be found not in GDP rate or in growth of consumption but in the heads of citizens because strength of a nation state is determined in the level of national identity. The state is built and it is time now to settle it properly.