THE ECHO OF THE CAUCASIAN WAR OR THE EUROPEAN MINIMUM-2

As the data of Table 1 reveal, a tendency of systematic decrease in pro-European aspirations of the Belarusians has been observed since December, 2002. The September opinion poll of 2008 has registered, however, a new minimum: the results of the opinion poll show a quite considerable decrease of the pro-European attitudes in comparison with the last opinion polls as well as with the average level for several years.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “If a referendum on Belarus entering the European Union took place tomorrow, how would you vote?”, %

On the other hand, a still more considerable growth of anti-European sentiments draws attention to itself. It is symbolic that the number of opponents of Belarus joining the European Union has exceeded 50% for the first time since such a question was asked during the opinion polls conducting.

Answers to the question in which respondents were offered a choice between the eastern and western “directions” of integration also testify to the fact that in September, 2008 the Belarusians treated the European prospect of their country as coldly as never before (Table 2).

Table 2. Dynamics of answering the question: “If you had to choose between integration with Russia and entering the European Union, what would your choice be?”, %

The fact that the drop in the pro-European sentiments is accompanied by approximately the same increase in the pro-Russian ones pays attention to itself: the level of the latter almost reaches the record of June, 2006, which we have registered as the first “European minimum”.

In its turn the growth of pro-Russian sentiments is also confirmed by the answers to a direct question about the attitude towards Belarusian-Russian integration (Table 3).

Table 3. Dynamics of answering the question “If a referendum on Belarus joining up Russia were conducted today, how would you vote?”, %

Changes in answers to the question of Table 3 are less considerable than in the answers to the questions of the previous tables, although they are also quite evident.

What could have possibly influenced the attitudes of the Belarusians in such a strong way? No fundamental changes in the economic status of the country have occurred recently; the international situation of the country has undergone no considerable changes either (at least for the time being). We cannot say that the authorities have launched an aggressive anti-West propaganda campaign; energy wars are in the past (or in the future?).

The impression is that perhaps the only factor which could have influenced the pro-European sentiments of the Belarusians is the war in Caucasia. For the Belarusians, with their “if-only-there-were-no-war” attitude, a war is a rather serious matter; it is a reason which exerts powerful influence upon their sentiments.

Wars of the 90s of the twentieth century and of the present one had various influence upon the Belarusian public opinion. The beginning of the first Chechen campaign caused a considerable decrease in the pro-Russian sentiments – the Belarusians “tried on” the prospect of perishing in the “hot spots” – the places where battles were being fought – in case of political integration with the eastern neighbor. The second Chechen campaign, on the contrary, entailed strengthening of integration attitudes. The Yugoslavian campaign of the NATO provoked a decrease in pro-Western and, in particular, in pro-European aspirations.

How did the Belarusians take in different aspects of the present war in Caucasia?

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “Who, in your opinion, is to blame for the armed conflict between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia?”(more than one answer is possible)

As it follows from Table 4, it is quite evident whom the Belarusian public opinion has put the blame for the war on. At that it should be added that no particular anti-Georgian sentiments have been and are being observed in the Belarusian society, especially as it was registered already in June, 2008 the Belarusians unlike the Russians treated the prospect of Georgia entering the NATO much more calmly (see: http://www.iiseps.org/press9.html).

However, the Belarusians unambiguously lay the blame for the war in particular on Tbilisi and partly – on Washington. At that the EU turns out to be guilty to the least extent, but here the perception effect similar to the one which existed during the Yugoslavian campaign of the NATO in 1999 is possible – at that time also respondents laid the blame primarily on the USA; and worsening of the attitude towards the EU was the consequence of the worsening of the attitude to the West in general, a part of which constitute the USA as well.

The data of Table 5 show in what way perception of the Caucasian war has directly influenced the attitude of the Belarusians towards the prospect of their country entering the NATO.

Table 5. Distribution of answers to the question: “Has your attitude to the possibility of Belarus entering the NATO changed after the Georgian-South Ossetian-Russian conflict?”

In general, only a small part of the polled has changed their attitude to the North Atlantic alliance under the influence of the war. However, the balance of these changes is intriguing. Only a smaller part has changed its attitude from the anti-NATO to the pro-NATO, perhaps reasoning from the motivation similar to the one which is expressed by the leaders of Georgia itself and the Georgian society – one needs reliable international protection from such Russia. The majority of those, who have changed their opinion, have done the reverse evolution. In this case two opposite motivations with the same result are very likely possible: “Such Russia is more serious than the NATO, and it would be better to stay with it” and “it would be better not to provoke such Russia; it is not clear if the NATO is going to be in time in case something happens if Russia gets very angry with Belarus”.

Data of Table 6 also marginally testify to the fact that the attitude to the conflict in Caucasia influenced other aspects of Euro-integration.

Table 6. Connection of answers to the questions “Who, in your opinion is to blame for the armed conflict among Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia?” and “If you had to choose between joining up Russia and entering the European Union, what would your choice be?”*, %

* The table is read across

The dominating attitude towards the Russian-Georgian war worked as a pressure factor squeezing the pro-European Belarus till the “kernel” of firm “Euro-Belarusians”.

The fact, that a considerable part of the polled contrary to the traditional Belarusian caution demonstrated in their answers a certain resoluteness declaring for the idea of Belarus supporting Russia and South Ossetia, testifies to the intensity of this attitude. At the same time, many of the polled supported the idea of Belarus not expressing its attitude to the conflict in any way. And the idea that Belarus should support Georgia in the conflict gathered an entirely insignificant number of supporters (Table 7).

Table 7. Distribution of answers to the question: “In your opinion, should Belarus openly support any of the parts in the conflict?”

Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of the Belarusians regarding the further lot of the separative Georgian autonomies supported the idea of their separation from Georgia, and an impressive majority–almost two thirds – approved of the decision made by Russia (Table 8).

Table 8. Distribution of answers to the question: “Which solution of Abkhazia and South Ossetia problem would you consider the best?”

In view of it one should mention that president A. Lukashenko, not consenting to following the Kremlin in this question, obviously went against the dominating tendency of the public opinion. This, however, does not happen for the first time: the previous opinion polls showed it more than once that his confrontational actions with respect to the West quite often did not find support by the majority. His turning from the integration with Russia rhetoric towards praising of independence and sovereignty of the country did not get general support either. Finally, his initiative concerning construction of an atomic power-plant still has no support of the majority. In the given case, however, although the problem is quite far from the daily life of the Belarusians, the majority is too distinct. In addition Moscow calls upon Minsk to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia quite insistently, perhaps accompanying its calls with weighty arguments of financial character. And, as it follows from Table 8, the Belarusian public opinion influences it in the same direction. It is a big question whether A. Lukashenko is going to be able to resist this double pressure.

In this sense the situation is rather paradoxical. As anti-Georgian aims were a priori peculiar to the Belarusians to a considerably lesser extent than to the Russians, and besides the Georgian war did not concern their immediate experience in any way, than mass media – Belarusian as well as the Russian ones – are most likely the main source of interpretation. This factor is very important, although it is not the only one. And in this sense in full compliance with Marx’ formula: “ideas, overcoming masses, become a material force” the echo of the informational impact of the Belarusian authorities might create certain problems for the authorities themselves.