The desire of the first Belarusian president to extend his term of office yet again lets us put a question about the personality cult of the “only Belarusian political figure” formed in the country. Within the bounds of the political system which has appeared out of the debris of its Soviet predecessor such statement of the question should not surprise. The principal of separation of powers was declared in the USSR, but was never observed in practice. In the name of Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regardless of the person, the state of workers and peasants always had an authoritative mono-subject who used to declare a return to “Lenin standards of joint leadership” only during a short period of time after his assignment. Later he would begin forming his own personal cult. And it was not his private whim. Consolidation of power in the same hands answered the historical nature of the centralized state.
Here is a fresh example. Notwithstanding article 61 of the Electoral Code, A. Lukashenko passed the documents for registration of the initiative group to the Central Election Committee not personally, but through an authorized representative. It is not difficult to understand the mentioned violation within the model of an authoritative mono-subject. A personal visit of the head of state to the CEC would mean that he is equalized in rights with other presidential contenders, i.e. he has to act “just as everybody else”. He could not have performed such a thoughtless action, of course; that is why he deliberately violated the law, having emphasized thereby the distance between himself and other candidates. By the same reason A. Lukashenko will never consent to pre-election debates. And the point is not in his fear to lose the debates, although it is also the case. Public debates presuppose equality of participants and therefore officially confirm presence of different opinions. How can one aspire to the title of the “only politician” after that?!
In September over a third of respondents (35.4%) answered the question “Does the personality cult of president A. Lukashenko exist in Belarus, in your opinion?” in the affirmative. Additional 28% consider that there is no personality cult so far; however, there are more and more prerequisites for it. 24.7% did not notice any signs of the personality cult, and 11.9% found it difficult to answer. If we compare the cited results with the Russian ones (the Levada-center), then the personality cult of the Belarusian “father” will prove to be mightier than the one of Putin (yes – 27%, not yet – 28%, no – 33%, DA – 12%). Unfortunately, the question about A. Lukashenko’s personality cult was not asked before, that is why we cannot retrace dynamics of its forming. As for the personality cult of V. Putin, the share of affirmative answers grew from 10% in March, 2006 to 27% in July, 2010.
The data of Table 1 let us analyze the public opinion according to the socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences of respondents. The main conclusion is as follows: those who trust A. Lukashenko (in the first place, these are women, the elderly and people with a low level of education) do not notice the personality cult of their political idol. A personality cult is a negative notion. N. Khrushchev’s efforts in this respect were not in vain, that is why Belarusians creating an idol out of A. Lukashenko do not notice the result of their own work.
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “Does the personality cult of president A. Lukashenko exist in Belarus, in your opinion?” depending on gender, age, education and trust in the president*, %
| Characteristic |
Yes |
Not yet |
No |
DA |
| Gender: | ||||
| Male |
41.0 |
30.6 |
19.2 |
8.6 |
| Female |
30.5 |
25.8 |
29.4 |
12.6 |
| Age: | ||||
| 18-29 |
38.3 |
27.1 |
20.2 |
13.0 |
| 30-39 |
40.4 |
32.9 |
14.0 |
11.7 |
| 40-49 |
40.7 |
33.3 |
18.0 |
7.7 |
| 50-59 |
31.3 |
25.8 |
25.8 |
15.7 |
| 60 and older |
26.3 |
42.8 |
42.8 |
7.7 |
| Education: | ||||
| Primary |
34.4 |
10.9 |
43.8 |
9.4 |
| Incomplete secondary |
20.5 |
18.4 |
48.4 |
11.1 |
| Secondary |
35.6 |
29.9 |
22.2 |
11.0 |
| Vocational |
39.7 |
30.8 |
16.9 |
11.6 |
| Higher |
38.8 |
30.8 |
21.6 |
8.6 |
| Do you trust the president? | ||||
| Yes |
19.8 |
27.8 |
40.2 |
11.1 |
| No |
55.9 |
26.7 |
7.5 |
8.5 |
* The table is read across
Denying the personality cult of the “only politician”, those who trust A. Lukashenko simultaneously approve of consolidation of virtually all power in the country in his hands (Table 2). It once again confirms the fact that the authoritarian power in Belarus personified by “the father” possesses a social base. A. Lukashenko’s victory at the first and so far the only democratic presidential election in 1994 was not accidental. A demand for “a strong personality” at the beginning of the 90s should not be regarded solely as a response to the post-perestroika chaos. It was engendered by the very nature of the Belarusian society. Today under the conditions of stability a need for a strong personality remains by a half of the Belarusian society as well.
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think the fact that virtually all power in the country is concentrated now in the hands of A. Lukashenko does Belarus good or gives the country nothing positive?”, %
| Variant of answer |
09’09 |
09’10 |
||
|
All respondents |
Trust A. Lukashenko |
Do not trust A. Lukashenko |
||
| It does Belarus good |
44.4 |
44.1 |
72.9 |
11.0 |
| It gives the country nothing positive |
36.0 |
38.5 |
12.5 |
72.6 |
| DA/NA |
19.6 |
17.4 |
10.3 |
9.6 |
The data of Table 3 confirm that, in the opinion of the majority of Belarusians, the situation in the country is stable today. Assessments of political life development in Belarus have not changed for the last year and a half in spite of the world financial and economic crisis. Only 7.3% of respondents agree that chaos and anarchy are increasing in the country. Those who do not trust A. Lukashenko have made the main contribution into such an assessment (15.1%).
Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “What direction is political life of Belarus developing now?”, %
| Variant of answer |
03’09 |
09’10 |
||
|
All respondents |
Trust A. Lukashenko |
Do not trust A. Lukashenko |
||
| Establishment of authoritarianism, dictatorship |
29.4 |
33.4 |
16.7 |
53.3 |
| Development of democracy |
24.7 |
23.5 |
40.6 |
4.7 |
| Restoration of the former Soviet order |
19.9 |
19.9 |
22.5 |
16.4 |
| Chaos, anarchy and the threat of coup d’etat increase |
7.3 |
7.3 |
1.3 |
15.1 |
| DA/NA |
18.7 |
15.9 |
17.9 |
10.1 |
Attention should be paid to the following: in the opinion of 40.6% of those who trust A. Lukashenko, developing of democracy is taking place in Belarus. Such a paradox is connected with the fact that the given group of respondents “is looking for democracy in the wrong place” (K. Rogov). We are facing another recurrence of the Soviet past when democracy was interpreted as “representation of the majority” and not as the principle of free competition of public ideas and interests. In view of the above mentioned the authoritarian policy of A. Lukashenko is not regarded by the considerable part of the Belarusian society as contradictory to democratic values.
How is the loss of stability going to tell on political preferences of Belarusians? Let us once again refer to the research of the Levada-center for a hint. In December, 2009 the growth of chaos and anarchy was felt by 19% of Russians (in Belarus – 7.3%). Accordingly, the share of those who noted that consolidation of all power in the hands of V. Putin was for the benefit of Russia made up 63% (in Belarus – 44.4%).