BETWEEN CHAOS AND DICTATORSHIP

Modern states “create” rather than “find” their nations. Belarusian state is not an exception in this case. It is working indefatigably on forming a state nation, as reproduction of the authoritarian political regime is possible only under such type of a nation.
The outcome of the almost vicennial effort in the cause of forming a state nation was analyzed in the material “Whose state is it?” It should be admitted that the state has undoubtedly achieved certain success in realizing its project. The question is at what costs. They are considerable. Deepening of the split in society is far from being their only constituent. Let us cite a statement by A. Lukashenko borrowed from his speech at the festive meeting devoted to Independence Day on July 1, 2013: “First of all, we have secured unity of the nation, inner peace and quiet. All outside attempts to kindle the fire of a revolt or a destructive revolution in Belarus break up exactly on our unity. And national unity, in particular, makes up the basis of our economic development”.
Whether national unity or Russian subsidies make up the basis of Belarus economic development is a debating point; that is why let us quote another statement by A. Lukashenko dated July 1: “The crisis of national, human identity which just yesterday was talked about only by scientists-the-futurologists, is becoming a sad reality before our very eyes. Who said that mankind was insured against regress, and would move only up and forward?”
It is true that none of the mortals is empowered to provide such guarantees; however, IISEPS opinion polls held for the third decade already let us assess the movement direction of Belarusians (“forward or backward”) according to the “national and human identity” forming scale.
Within the course of twenty years a new generation has entered active life. It was not virtually touched by the Soviet system, but it experienced the influence of the Belarusian model in which state ideology ranks last by no means to the fullest extent. In Table 1 and in the following tables answers of respondents to the same questions asked with a twenty-year lag are given. In the latest opinion poll answers of the two outermost age groups, as well as of supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko, are emphasized.
Table 1. Dynamics of answering the question: “In your opinion, how well is national identity developed by Belarusians?” depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

So far no consensus has been formed among specialists on the question of what should be considered a nation; everybody agrees, though, that a person’s self-definition is a governing factor. Progress in this issue is evident (Table 1). Let us sum up the answers in the first two lines and compare them: June, 1993 – 5.2%; June, 2013 – 21.2%. There is a fourfold growth! To a greater degree the growth was secured by senior citizens and supporters of A. Lukashenko, which is natural taking into account the effort expended by the state in order to form state identity.
A growth in national identity is also confirmed by the data of Table 2. Attention should be paid, in the first place, to the line “Belarusians do not resemble anybody” with its twofold growth. It became possible owing to a however slight, but statistically important decrease in the feeling of cultural nearness to the Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians. The share of those who found it difficult to answer decreased more than two times, which also testifies to a growth in national identity.

For supporters of the cultural national project a nation is built on the basis of commonness between a culture and a language. Here one cannot help remembering Z. Poznyak: “If we lose the language, we will lose Belarus”. At the beginning of the 90s in Belarus, just as in other former union republics, adherents of cultural and civic national projects came out in a united front (division took place later). That is why fight for a revival of the Belarusian language meant fight for democracy. It is clear that the leading part in connecting the two national projects belonged to intelligentsia.
However, as it follows from Table 3, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the cultural national project did not have any prospects of success in Belarus. Only 14% of respondents completely shared the reservations of the founder of the People’s Front. No principle changes have happened for 20 years. The number of respondents realizing the threat of Russification grew, but only slightly (+5 points). Interestingly, the problem of the Belarusian nation’s disappearance worries pensioners more than the generation that has grown up in an independent Belarusian state. The language issue has also lost its former political nature. Please, pay attention to the fact that there is no fundamental difference in the answers of supporters and opponents of head of state!
Table 3. Dynamics of answering the question: “Do you think the fact that a considerable part of Belarusians speak the Russian language poses a hazard to the existence of the Belarusian nation?” depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

At first sight, answers to the question of Table 4 contradict answers to the question of Table 3: reservations concerning disappearance of the Belarusian nation have grown, however slightly; at the same time the meaning of the language as a mandatory condition of belonging to a nation has decreased, judging by the outermost variants of answer (yes-no). To understand the mentioned paradox it is necessary to remember that interpreting the opinion polls returns one should distinguish between declarative and operational behavior codes of respondents. The problem of “the Belarusian nation disappearance” is a pure abstraction for the majority of respondents. The question of the language knowledge as a factor of belonging to a nation is “nearer to one’s skin”, as the saying goes. For the majority of respondents the problem of their personal national identity does not cause any difficulties. They are Belarusians, who else could they be?! However, they are Russified Belarusians.
Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think knowledge of a language is a mandatory condition of one’s belonging to this or that nation?”, depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

The role of national identity in the general set of personal identities increased during the years of independence, but the sphere of the Belarusian language employment narrowed thanks to the purposeful attempts of the state. That is why the changes registered in Table 4 can be estimated as mass actions of surmounting cognitive dissonance. The young generation is most active in taking such actions, as their socialization took place under the conditions of Russification, secured by the Constitutional referendum of 1995.
Answers to the question of Table 5 also confirm success of the Russification policy. However, the degree to which the answers are politically charged in the given case proved to be considerably higher (compare them with the answers to the questions of Tables 3-4). This time respondents could not do without their disposition to declarations, either. For the politically active Belarusians the question about a state language is a question about their attitude to the authorities. In practice, as it was frequently registered in the course of the IISEPS opinion polls, mainly supporters of A. Lukashenko use the Belarusian language in their everyday life. We relegate the doubtful to the article by Y. Drakokhrust “Belarusian nationalism speaks Russian” (“BDG”, 1998).
Table 5. Dynamics of answering the question: “What is your attitude to the fact that the Belarusian language is a state language in our country?”, depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

It should be borne in mind that before the referendum of 1995 there was only one state language in Belarus – Belarusian. The Russian language was considered “the language of international communication” for which reason comparison of the data in the second and the third column is not particularly correct.
The low status of the Belarusian language under the conditions of official bilingualism manifests itself in mass denial of the right of the state for introducing the Belarusian language into the system of education and paperwork management without regard to the opinion of the population (Table 6). Little has changed in this problem during 20 years. The problem is not from the class of abstract ones. If the state exhibits independence here, it will prejudice the interests of an absolute majority; that is why respondents’ answers do not depend on age and political preferences.
Table 6. Dynamics of answering the question: “Do you think it is necessary to take into account the population’s opinion at introducing the Belarusian language into the system of education and paperwork management?”, depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

The share of opponents of the Belarusian language revival at public expense has doubled for two decades, first of all owing to the respondents who found it difficult to answer (Table 7). The difference in answers of the outermost age groups turned out to be considerable in the given case, which once again testifies to the efficiency of the state policy of Russification.
Table 7. Dynamics of answering the question: “Do you think revival of the Belarusian language requires state support?”, depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

There are various reasons why respondents declare against the revival of the Belarusian language at public expense (Table 8). In this case, too, the young generation outstrips the generation of pensioners. Denying the Belarusian language state support, respondents refuse to recognize it as non-existent. The fact returns us to Table 1, in which a growth in Belarusians’ self-consciousness is registered.
Table 8. Dynamics of answering the question: “If not, then why is it so?”, depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Destruction of symbols is a sign of rejecting former hierarchies. For this reason one of the purposes of the Constitutional referendum of 1995 was abolishment of the “nationalistic” symbols, under which the rights of the president were imposed substantial limitations on. The new (old) symbols meant a comeback of the mono-subject power, which “Soviet Belarusians” had yearned for during the years of the post-Perestroika chaos.
Attention should be paid to the last line of Table 9. Is there any other country in Europe whose citizens find it difficult to answer such a question? The official symbols are accepted by the majority, however the acceptance is ensured mainly thanks to the oldest age group. The opinions of the young divided almost equally (this is towards the question of national unity).
Table 9. Dynamics of answering the question: “Which state symbols (the national emblem, the flag), in your opinion, correspond more to the historical and cultural heritage of the Belarusian nation – the ones which existed from 1991 to 1995 (with the national symbol “Pogonya”) or the present ones (resembling the symbols of the BSSR)?”, depending on age and attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

As it was to be expected, the question about attitude to the state symbols turned out to be politically loaded to the fullest extent. Hence follows the twofold difference in answers of A. Lukashenko’s supporters and opponents.
Belarusian society is society of incomplete modernization, but modernization is not a condition, it is a process and Belarusians participate in the process. Modernization, at whatever pace it might be moving, entails social transformations which contribute to weakening of some and strengthening of other identities. Belonging to a nation refers to the latter ones.
In spite of the powerful resource support the state project on forming a Belarusian nation is obviously stalled today. However, it does not follow from here that its civic and cultural rivals have begun to actively replenish their supporters’ camp. That is why the process of constructing in Belarus a modern national state and a civic (political) nation uniting citizens around universally acknowledged values is far from being completed. Society remains largely automized and disjunct. Absence of a civic nation is the main reason for preservation of the personified authoritarian regime. Because if there is no nation, the alternative is simple: either chaos, or a dictator. With all drawbacks, the latter is more preferable.