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NEGATIVE DYNAMICS OF TRUST TO INSTITUTES

American futurologist F. Fukuyama considers the prevail of social distrust as an additional tax to the national economics. Economic activities are joint activities of people first of all. Low level of trust of economic actors to each other and high level of distrust of economic actors to state and public institutions raise transaction costs (costs incurred by contract awards), and this is equal to the introduction of an additional tax.
Belarusian socio-economic model hampers the development of horizontal relations between people because of its inclination to centralization. That is why 70% of Belarusians are confident that it is necessary to be very careful in contacts with people.
As for the trust to state and public institutions, in December 2013 the confidence index was positive only for the Orthodox Church and for the army, i.e. they were more trusted than distrusted (Table 1). In November 2006 the number of trusted intuitions was 15! Among them were Courts (+0.153), the Central Election Commission (+0.052) and the National Assembly (+0.048). Effective functioning of these institutions directly influences the level of competitiveness of national economies. But today these important institutions not merely don’t contribute to overcoming of the gap inside the Belarusian society, but on the contrary enlarge this gap.
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you trust the following state and public institutions?”, %
Variant of answer
Trust
Don’t trust
DA/NA
Index*
Orthodox Church
63.0
26.2
10.8
+0.371
Army
44.1
39.8
16.1
+0.043
Business associations
39.7
41.4
18.9
–0.017
Bar association
39.4
42.1
18.5
–0.027
Non-state media
41.0
46.1
12.9
–0.052
Catholic Church
36.6
42.2
21.2
–0.056
International organizations (UN, EU, OSCE, European Parliament, Council of Europe and others)
36.9
43.1
20.0
–0.062
Independent research institutes
36.0
44.0
20.0
–0.081
President
37.7
47.5
14.8
–0.097
KGB
33.9
46.4
19.7
–0.127
Free and independent trade-unions
31.9
44.7
23.4
–0.129
Human rights groups (Belarusian Helsinki Committee and others)
28.7
42.5
28.8
–0.140
Courts
34.9
49.1
16.0
–0.143
Public Prosecutor’s Office
34.5
49.4
16.1
–0.150
Militia
34.9
51.6
13.5
–0.167
Trade-unions, members of the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus
30.0
48.4
21.6
–0.185
National Assembly
31.5
50.5
18.0
–0.191
State research institutes
31.5
52.1
16.4
–0.207
Central Election Commission
32.0
53.7
14.3
–0.218
State media
31.6
55.3
13.1
–0.239
Local Executive Committees
28.6
53.8
17.6
–0.254
Government
29.4
54.8
15.8
–0.256
Local Councils of Deputies
28.9
54.8
16.3
–0.260
Political parties supporting the present power
19.9
59.0
21.1
–0.393
Opposition political parties
15.8
63.4
20.8
–0.480
Protestant Church
10.9
62.1
27.0
–0.519
* Confidence index – the ratio of the difference between those who trust and those who don’t trust to the number of respondents who had answered the question
We’ve already mentioned more than once that state institutions in Belarus (excluding the army and the quasi-state-owned Orthodox Church) have no legitimacy. That is why their trust ratings follow the trust rating of the head of state like a thread follows a needle (Table 2). As for public institutions, their trust ratings are more stable due to a weak dependency on the political climate.
Table 2. Dynamics of trust rating of state and public institutions, %
Institutions
12’10
06’11
12’12
12’13
Orthodox Church
68.3
63.3
70.6
63.0
President
55.0
35.7
39.1
37.7
Army
53.6
45.4
52.8
44.1
State media
52.9
39.2
38.1
31.6
Government
51.6
33.6
35.0
29.4
Bar association
49.9
43.2
48.3
39.4
Courts
49.0
43.4
40.8
34.9
Central Election Commission
47.5
34.6
32.9
32.0
Public Prosecutor’s Office
47.3
38.1
37.8
34.5
Non-state media
46.3
46.2
48.1
41.1
International organizations (UN, EU, OSCE, European Parliament, Council of Europe and others)
45.8
43.0
38.7
36.9
Militia
45.6
35.3
37.4
34.9
Independent research institutes
44.0
44.6
45.1
36.0
Local Executive Committees
43.5
36.5
30.5
28.6
KGB
43.2
33.8
37.2
33.9
Local Councils of Deputies
41.2
34.6
31.5
28.9
Human rights groups (Belarusian Helsinki Committee and others)
38.0
32.6
33.5
28.7
Business associations
36.2
33.5
45.1
39.7
National Assembly
35.7
27.2
33.1
31.5
Catholic Church
35.4
38.0
44.1
36.6
Trade-unions, members of the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus
35.4
27.6
34.1
30.0
Political parties supporting the present power
33.8
21.7
23.7
19.9
Free and independent trade-unions
33.3
33.5
38.7
31.9
Protestant Church
18.4
17.4
16.3
10.9
Opposition political parties
16.3
20.1
20.0
15.8
As an example, let’s compare the trust ratings of state and non-state media during the electoral mobilization (December 2010) and at the peak of economic crisis (June 2011). The rating of state media had decreased from 52.9% to 39.2% (–13.7 points). The rating of non-state media practically hadn’t changed. It proved to be resistant to the crisis, because society made responsible the head of state and the government responsible for it.
One of distinctive features of the December survey is the simultaneous decrease of trust ratings of both state and non-state institutions, while the trust rating of A. Lukashenko remained more or less stable (39.1% in December 2012 vs. 37.7% in December 2013). This decrease affected even the Orthodox Church (–7.6 points) and the army (–8.7 points).
It is common practice even among independent experts to explain the low efficiency of Belarusian economy by technical reasons (incompetence of members of the government is probably the most popular one). However technical reasons are just ripples on the socio-cultural basin. Trust should be regarded as an absolute humanitarian value, and trust to the power – as a compulsory part of the general trust. Its’ absence gives warnings of the ill health of society and state.