UKRAINIAN PUSH FOR GEOPOLITICAL SWING

The survey of March 2014 recorded a significant strengthening of pro-Russian moods and a weakening of pro-European moods in Belarusian society. Least of all it influenced the results of the question about voting on a hypothetical referendum about integration of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation: in fact figures here jumped back to the level of last year’s spring and thus compensated December decrease (Table 1).

Much more apparent is the dynamics of the share of “Euro-Belarusians”. This share dropped down to a record low value over the past 6 years, accordingly high is the share of respondents, that would vote against Euro-integration of Belarus on a hypothetical referendum (Table 2).

The growth of pro-Russian moods in the answers to the question of table 1 is quite insignificant, but is clear in the answers to the dichotomous question on the choice between the RF and the EU: the share of “Belo-Russians” jumped by 15 points over the quarter; it is record high over the last years and close to the values of the beginning of the aughties (Table 3). The level of support of Euro-integration decreased quite significantly, just like in Table 2.

What caused these tectonic changes of geopolitical preferences of Belarusians, which were floating around the same level over the last years? From our point of view, the reason is quite clear – revolutionary events in Ukraine, months-long Maydan, and desertion of president V. Yanukovich. Not only these events in themselves, but also their interpretation and rendering in mass media and Internet, were an important factor for the changes. Here are some results on this account (Tables 4-8).

From our viewpoint, data of Tables 4-8 deny the opinion that state propaganda machinery is omnipotent, that people only retransmit imposed stereotypes. Thus, tables 4 and 5 mean that condemnation of the protests in themselves was not universal: there are even more of supporters of Maydan than of supporters of V. Yanukovich, while the majority of respondents took a neutral stance, and the conspiracy theory about the reasons of the protest attracted the same amount of supporters as the version about objective reasons for the protests.

However, Tables 6-8 show what exactly pushed the balance of evaluations to the disfavor of revolution – blood, violence, overthrow of the President. Relation to the revolution also had its effect on the relation to geopolitical centers behind the rival forces (Table 9).

Variant of answer	“If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?”
	Integration with the RF	Joining the EU	DA/NA
Which side had your sympathies in the Ukrainian conflict?
Power and president Yanukovich	81.0	6.6	12.4
Opposition, Euromaydan	22.9	71.1	6.0
None of the above	54.3	26.7	18.9
How do you assess the turbulent events of last months in Ukraine?
It is a subjective process caused by political technologies from the West and by power’s weakness	69.3	17.5	13.2
It’s an objective process caused by people’s dissatisfaction of power’s policy	35.1	48.9	15.9
President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was overthrown from the power. How do you evaluate this course of events?
It’s an uprising and a power grab	65.2	19.5	15.3
It’s a just retribution for bloodletting	32.8	56.1	11.1
Is a better future worth the people’s blood?
Yes	28.3	62.3	9.4
No	58.4	25.8	15.8
Would you like events, similar to those happening in Ukraine, happen in Belarus?
Yes	11.1	87.0	1.9
Yes, but without violence	31.2	56.1	12.7
No	61.3	21.3	17.3

As you can see, close connection between the relation to different aspects of Ukrainian revolution and its possibility in Belarus and the geopolitical choice is evident. Moreover, even a very close connection between preferences to certain forces in the Ukrainian confrontation and evaluations of driving forces of the revolution and geopolitical preferences couldn’t significantly influence the balance between “Euro-Belarusians” and “Belo-Russians”, because the shares of supporters of V. Yanukovich and of Maydan and of adherents of the objective and the subjective versions of the reasons of Ukrainian events were almost equal.

But the evaluations of V. Yanukovich’s overthrow and possibility of similar events in Belarus influenced the results quite significantly. According to Table 3, the share of “Belo-Russians” among all respondents amounts to 51.5%. A simple calculation shows that the share of those, who think that better a future is not worth the people’s blood and at the same time support integration with Russia, amounts to 45.5%, and the share of respondents, who are simultaneously against of similar events in Belarus and for integration with Russia amounts to 42.9.

In other words, the lion’s share of “Belo-Russians” consists of those, who reject blood and don’t want Maydan to happen in Belarus. As these two latter groups are very big, and corresponding correlation is very tight, this led to the growth of pro-Russian moods.

From the other side, conspicuous is the structure of those who would like Maydan to happen in Belarus, no matter of how it would happen. This group is not big, but it is very revealing that it almost entirely consists of “Euro-Belarusians”. From our point of view, this is an indication of a high level of discontent and frustration, which feel supporters of European choice in modern Belarus. Not so many people in Belarus are ready for decisive actions, but those who are ready support Euro-integration.

Still the odds today are in favor of those who make the other geopolitical choice.