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THE CONSOLIDATING POTENTIAL OF UNIQUENESS

In May A. Lukashenko delivered his annual message to Belarusian people and National Assembly. 61% of respondents answered that they know about the head of state’s speech (Table 1). This is a rather high level of awareness.

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The least interest in the message was shown by the age group of 18-29 years old – 51.3%. Political apathy of the generation formed under conditions of the independent Belarusian state doesn’t surprise experts since long ago. Modern authoritarian regimes, unlike their totalitarian predecessors, are based not on the support of citizens, but on their passivity. Thus the main aim of educational system in Belarus (from kindergartens to universities) is mass production of apolitical citizens. It should be recognized that they accomplish their task quite well.
The peak of attention to the message coincides with age groups of 40-49 years old (67.8%) and 50-59 years old (66.7%). In this age ability of people to adapt to external changes decreases notably, and dependency on the support from the paternalistic state on the contrary increases. Thus the high level of interest to the speech of the head of state.
Let us note that, despite the expectations, dependency of answers to the question of Table 1 on education of respondents is not as strong as its dependency on age: 57.9% of respondents with primary education and 65.1% of respondents with higher education showed their interest.
Ratio of agreeing/disagreeing respondents exceeded the value of 1 for 7 of key statements made by A. Lukashenko during his speech (Table 2). In 2013 ratio exceeding one was recorded only for 5 statements of 11.
Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question “What’s your attitude to the following statements made by A. Lukashenko during his speech?”, %
Variant of answer
Agree
Disagree
Agree/Disagree
“We are neither pro-Russians, nor pro-Ukrainians, nor pro-Polish, we are not Russians, we are Belarusians!”
71.3
19.4
3.7
There should be tolerance to various views, discussions and criticism in society
72.1
20.8
3.5
State support should be equal for state and private enterprises
65.7
22.1
3.0
Independence of Belarusian state annoys a lot of people. And if there is a crack in the unity of the Belarusian society, there will be those who will be interested to use it
67.8
23.8
2.9
Sincere, honest public dialog is the best safeguard from disunity and distemper
62.8
25.8
2.0
The BSSR was the most Soviet republic in the Soviet Union
46.1
29.2
1.6
There is no other country in the world (including Russia) that cares as much of the great Russian language and the great Russian culture
49.6
35.0
1.42
Authority in Belarus is attentive to any criticism caused by sincere concerns of the country and not by external orders
41.1
46.2
0.9
Belarusian powers are constantly and severely fighting against corruption
39.1
48.4
0.8
Power in Belarus prevented society from division into poor and rich people, protected and supported people who work hard
36.1
54.7
0.7
* Table is sorted according to the last column
It should be noted that the top position of Table 2 is occupied by a statement directed at the sense of nationality in Belarusians (“We are neither pro-Russians, nor pro-Ukrainians, nor pro-Polish, we are not Russians, we are Belarusians!”). Its factor of support equals to 3.7. The last row is occupied by the most “material” statement of the head of state (support factor 0.7): “Power in Belarus prevented society from division into poor and rich people, protected and supported people who work hard”.
From our point of views this hierarchy of priorities is another evidence of Belarusians’ excitement by Russian propaganda. According to President V. Putin Russians today feel “elation”, and this “elation” was partially transmitted to Belarusians. Mobilization under nationalist slogans turned out to be contagious. Russians are consolidating around the idea of the “Russian World”, Belarusians – around the idea of their uniqueness.
The share of supporters of the statement “Independence of Belarusians state annoys a lot of people. And if there is a crack in the unity of the Belarusian society, there will be those who will be interested to use it” is almost three times as high as the share of opponents of this opinion. Even 45.7% of respondents not trusting A. Lukashenko agree with that (87.4% among the respondents trusting him).
What does that mean? It means that the idea of an external enemy is highly popular in Belarusian society, and in case of need Belarusian power will be able to use it on its own account.
For the first time in presidential message there was a special part dedicated to corruption. Its appearance is a direct result of events in Ukraine, as, according to A. Lukashenko, “there are two reasons for Ukrainian crisis: weakness of economy (it has collapsed, in fact) and total corruption. They are absolutely interconnected”. Luckily, in Belarus “we constantly and severely fight against corruption”.
However, almost a half of Belarusians (48.4%; 29.3% among those who trust A. Lukashenko and 73% among those who don’t trust him) don’t share the optimism of the head of state. The last but one row of Table 2 is a good evidence of it.
In 1994 the image of a corruption fighter contributed to the triumphal victory of A. Lukashenko on the first presidential elections. But you cannot go far in a carriage of past. The image of an implacable corruption fighter is organic for a presidential contender, but when a politician, counting on the fifth consecutive electoral victory, tries to use it, it doesn’t look convincing.
Nevertheless, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict opened for A. Lukashenko a window of new electoral possibilities, but only for a period of time. How long will this period last? Perhaps, there is no well-grounded answer to this question today.