According to June survey, in general Belarusians evaluate positively the actions of Russia in Ukraine over the last months, in particular, the annexation of Crimea. This approval is not as unanimous as in Russia, but the share of approval if notably higher than 50%.
How probable do respondents consider the repetition of the Crimean script in Belarus?
It is revealing that the share of those who don’t expect that Crimea’s lot will be repeated in Belarus is almost equal to the share of those who approve this lot of Crimea (Table 1).
It seems that one of reasons for this is the fact that a lot of respondents think that spring situation in Crimea was fundamentally different from the current situation in Belarus (Tables 2 and 3).
One of main reasons that Russia used to justify the annexation of Crimea was infringement of the rights of Russian-speaking people. A very insignificant part of respondents agreed that similar infringement may be observed in Belarus. Almost four times as much of respondents mentioned that in fact there is a certain infringement of Belarusian-speaking people. However, an overwhelming majority of respondents replied that there are no infringements of rights of Belarusian-speaking people as well.
If nevertheless Russia tries to annex Belarus wholly or partially, what will be the answer of Belarusians? President A. Lukashenko told that he will personally struggle for every inch of native land. Oppositional politicians declare their readiness to resist as well. But moods of the masses are different (Table 4).
Answers to the question of Table 4 don’t testify great readiness of Belarusians to follow either the official leader or his opponents in case of a threat to territorial integrity of the country. Besides, President’s supporters are much less inclined to resist this threat than his opponents (Table 5).
Table 5. Connection between political preferences and attitude to the possible annexation of Belarus*, %
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Variant of answer
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“If Russia annexed Belarus or its part, what would you do?”
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I’d resist up in arms
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I’d try to adapt to a new situation
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I’d greet these changes
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Do you trust the President?
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Yes
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8.9
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49.1
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21.8
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No
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23.1
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43.1
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12.5
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Do you trust opposition?
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Yes
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29.5
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39.2
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12.2
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No
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10.4
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48.9
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19.6
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If presidential elections were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote for?
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A. Lukashenko
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9.1
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49.2
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24.0
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* Table is read across
So A. Lukashenko shouldn’t better preach to Ukrainians how they had to protect Crimea using as an example his own fearlessness and determination. It seems that this is precisely the case when it’s better not to trouble.
Two-faced politics of A. Lukashenko in relation to the Ukrainian crisis was vividly criticized over the last months. Belarus voted against the resolution on territorial integrity of Ukraine in the UN. Minsk consented to accommodate Russian combat aircraft on the territory of our country. At the same time Belarusian leader spoke against the federalization of Ukraine, met the stand-in President of Ukraine A. Turchinov, assisted at the inauguration of President P. Poroshenko. Belarus refused to join restrictive measures towards Ukraine, which were proposed by Russia as a response to the signing of agreement on association with the EU in Kiev.
Table 6 partially explains this two-faced politics.
Table 6. Connection between level of trust to different state and public institutions and attitude to the policy of Russia in Ukraine*, %
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“Do you trust the following state and public institutions?”
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“How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?”
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“How do you evaluate the events that happened in the East of Ukraine, in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in the first place?”
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It’s an imperialistic usurpation and occupation
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It’s a people’s protest against the non-legitimate power
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It’s a people’s protest against the non-legitimate power
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It’s a rebellion, organized by Russia
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President:
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Yes
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17.1
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73.4
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77.0
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14.8
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No
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42.2
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50.5
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52.2
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35.6
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Opposition:
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Yes
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41.6
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52.0
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51.8
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39.2
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No
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21.6
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67.1
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72.0
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17.7
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State mass media:
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Yes
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18.3
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70.6
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78.5
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15.5
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No
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36.2
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55.8
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54.8
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31.1
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Non-state mass media:
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Yes
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38.6
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52.5
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56.5
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32.1
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No
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20.6
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70.7
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71.5
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17.9
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* Table is read across
As you can see, these are mostly President’s supporters who support the actions of Russia in Ukraine. So when he makes a step towards Kiev, in a sense he acts in defiance of the opinion of his supporters. However, it should be noted that Moscow’s position on Crimea and Donbass is also shared by the respondents who trust opposition and non-state mass media, though the level of support in these groups is not as impressive as among those who trust president and sate mass media.
Since Belarusians are not really inclined to fight against a hypothetical Russian aggression, as table 4 shows it, they don’t approve special measures of preventing such threat (Table 7).
It is notable that the share of those who support the restoration of nuclear power status for Belarus is twice as big as the share of those who are ready to protect their country up in arms in the case of annexation. However, the majority is against.
The idea of obtaining guarantees by joining NATO doesn’t enjoy great support as well (Table 8).
It should be noted that the idea of Belarus joining NATO enjoyed its biggest level of support in September 2002, shortly after V. Putin proposed that Belarus should be integrated in Russia as 6 provinces. At the time the threat of independence loss might seem real. A threat to other countries doesn’t provoke a similar wish to hide under NATO’s “security umbrella”. Neither the Russian-Georgian war, nor the present actions of Russia in Ukraine didn’t cause an upsurge of pro-NATO moods. Today their level is higher than 6 years ago, after the Russian-Georgian war, but is still insignificant.
Belarusians don’t expect that Crimean script will be repeated in Belarus. However, in case it happens, the readiness to resist it is quite low. The idea of Belarus joining NATO enjoys almost the same level of popularity. The number of supporters of the idea of nuclear power status restoration is slightly higher.