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TV-PROPAGANDA AND LIFE

In IISEPS publications on the results of June survey the role of propaganda in relation to Belarusians’ attitude to events in Ukraine was already analyzed: “There is a hypothesis about the almighty propaganda. According to it Belarusians’ evaluations of Ukrainian crisis are defined only by this propaganda. This hypothesis is true only partially. Indeed, the level of support of Russian position is significantly higher among those who regularly watch Russian TV. Still, even the majority of those, who don’t watch Russian TV at all, consider Crimea annexation lawful. It is evident that people’s mindsets are as important as informational influence. Among those, who don’t trust Russian TV, who consider it biased (but still watch it sometimes), the share of those who evaluate negatively the Crimea annexation is not lower, but higher, than among those, who don’t watch Russian TV at all. So Russian TV is influential, but not almighty”.
However, many people, especially those who don’t share the point of view of majority of Belarusians on the events in Ukraine, continue to see the main reason in almightiness of Russian (and Belarusian too) TV-propaganda: “Belarusians reproduce only what they see on the zombie-box. They have absolutely no critical approach to the information from Russian TV”.
This question isn’t academic, because there may be various strategies directed at changing the attitude to the events in Ukraine (and to many other things in Belarus): in the case information and propaganda really are main shaping factors and in the case this factor is life “as it is”. In the first case “damned Muscovites” may be blamed for everything (or almost everything) and a “strategy of informational security” may be worked out. In the second case it is necessary to listen to interests of millions of people and constantly work on changing their opinions.
As most adepts of “propaganda theory” often use their own logic, IISEPS decided to present “naked figures” with minimal evaluations, supposing that reality is more convincing than any arguments (Tables 1-4).
Table 1. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, %* (06’14)
Variant of answer
How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?
It’s an imperialistic usurpation and occupation (26.9)
It’s a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice (62.2)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (32.6)
22.4
69.2
Sometimes (53.8)
26.8
60.3
No, I don’t (13.4)
38.7
52.5
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (51.7)
10.6
80.3
Completely/Mostly biased (30.6)
56.4
36.3
* Tables are read horizontally except for specifically stated parts. Respondents which had difficulties to answer or didn’t answer are not shown for an easier understanding. Shares of all respondents are noted in brackets
Belarusians’ evaluation of events in Ukraine depends not so much on the frequency of watching Russian TV as on their attitude to it. Hence, we should talk not so much of Russian propaganda influence, as of formation of Belarusians’ attitude to the events in Ukraine under the influence of other factors (historical, culturally-psychological, socio-political and, above all, own experience of respondents).
Table 2. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09’14)
Variant of answer
How do you evaluate the annexation of Crimea by Russia?
It’s an imperialistic usurpation and occupation (27.2)
It’s a restitution of Russian lands and reestablishment of historical justice (59.9)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
22.2
69.0
Sometimes (48.5)
28.1
57.8
No, I don’t (15.0)
36.0
45.3
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
11.6
78.9
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
48.2
39.8

Table 2a. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09’14)

Variant of answer
If Russia decides to bring their troops into Ukraine, do you think Belarus should permit Russia to do it through Belarusian territory?
Yes (15.2)
No (74.8)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
23.5
68.4
Sometimes (48.5
9.7
80.4
No, I don’t (15.0)
12.8
71.7
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/mostly objective (48.2)
29.9
60.4
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
8.8
85.4

Table 2b. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09’14)

Variant of answer
How do you evaluate President A. Lukashenko’s policy towards the crisis in Ukraine?
Unambiguously/Rather positively (59.5)
Rather/Unambiguously negatively (26.8)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
70.9
18.8
Sometimes (48.5)
54.6
33.3
No, I don’t (15.0)
48.7
25.2
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
77.8
12.3
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
34.4
50.7

Table 2c. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to events in Ukraine, % (09’14)

Variant of answer
Do you trust the President?
Trust (53.5)
Don’t trust (33.3)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
69.8
21.2
Sometimes (48.5)
45.5
40.4
No, I don’t (15.0)
40.5
38.8
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
76.5
13.9
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
32.5
56.3
Analysis of September survey results in general confirms main conclusion made from the results of June survey: Belarusians’ evaluations of events in Ukraine depend not so much on the frequency of watching Russian TV as on attitude to it. Positive connection between the attitude to Russian TV and to President A. Lukashenko is also evident.
Table 3. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to Russia and the EU after events in Ukraine, % (09’14)
Variant of answer
Did your attitude to Russia change after this year’s events in Ukraine?
Yes, it became worse (24.3)
Yes, it became better (21.9)
No, it didn’t change (51.5)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
18.8
36.9
41.5
Sometimes (48.5)
25.1
15.9
57.3
No, I don’t (15.0)
34.5
5.3
57.1
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
9.4
41.5
42.3
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
43.4
9.9
45.3

Table 3a. Connection between informational behavior and attitude to Russia and the EU after events in Ukraine, % (09’14)

Variant of answer
Did your attitude to the EU change after this year’s events in Ukraine?
Yes, it became worse (47.0)
Yes, it became better (5.6)
No, it didn’t change (42.4)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
61.9
4.6
29.6
Sometimes (48.5)
40.0
5.9
49.3
No, I don’t (15.0)
34.5
6.6
50.9
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
61.7
3.6
31.6
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
36.2
8.7
50.6
There is a connection between Belarusians watching Russian TV-news and changing their attitude to Russia and the EU. However, in this question attitude to Russian TV (formed under the influence of factors listed above) is once again more important than frequency of watching it.
Table 4. Connection between attitudes towards Belarusian TV and Russian TV, % (09’14)
Variant of answer
Do you watch Belarusian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (35.3)
Sometimes (50.4)
No, I don’t (14.1)
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
82.1
16.3
1.5
Sometimes (48.5)
7.5
86.4
5.9
No, I don’t (15.0)
12.4
16.4
71.2
Do you watch Russian TV-news? (read vertically)
Yes, regularly (36.3)
84.4
10.3
5.3
Sometimes (48.5)
11.7
83.2
4.9
No, I don’t (15.0)
3.8
20.3
75.9
How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.9)
64.8
33.4
1.9
Completely/Mostly biased (41.0)
19.3
55.4
24.7
How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs? (read vertically)
Completely/Mostly objective (48.9)
74.1
43.1
7.5
Completely/Mostly biased (41.0)
23.2
49.1
55.4
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
56.8
39.3
7.1
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
22.0
55.7
21.9
How objective are the news in Russian news programs? (read vertically)
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
66.9
45.0
12.6
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
24.6
45.4
53.7

Table 4a. Connection between attitudes towards Belarusian TV and Russian TV, % (09’14)

Variant of answer
How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.9)
Completely/Mostly biased (41.0)
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?(read vertically)
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
82.6
15.9
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
10.1
80.5
How objective are the news in Russian news programs?
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
84.1
13.6
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
12.5
83.6

Table 4b. Connection between attitudes towards Belarusian TV and Russian TV, % (09’14)

Variant of answer
Do you watch Russian TV-news?
Yes, regularly (36.3)
Sometimes (48.5)
No, I don’t (15.0)
How objective are the news in Belarusian news programs?(read vertically)
Completely/Mostly objective (48.9)
65.7
49.7
22.1
Completely/Mostly biased (41.0)
31.7
47.9
40.7
How objective are the news in Russian news programs? (read vertically)
Completely/Mostly objective (48.2)
70.2
44.2
8.0
Completely/Mostly biased (39.4)
26.1
46.8
47.1
Majority of Belarusians perceive Belarusian and Russian TV identically, as a single source of information (differences in attitude to them are very small).